COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 1

CITY COUNCIL

CITY OF NEW YORK

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TRANSCRIPT OF THE MINUTES

Of the

COMMITTEE ON CONTRACTS JOINTLY WITH COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

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HELD AT: COUNCIL CHAMBERS - CITY HALL

B E F O R E: Gale Brewer, Chairperson

COUNCIL MEMBERS:

Julie Won, Chair
Joann Ariola
James F. Gennaro
Linda Lee
Sandy Nurse
Diana Ayala
Rita C. Joseph
Shekar Krishnan
Marjorie Velazquez

## COMMITTEE ON CONTRACTS JOINTLY WITH

## COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 2

## A P P E A R A N C E S

Lisa Flores, Director of Mayor's Office of Contract Services and City Chief Procurement Officer

Annie Meredith, General Counsel at Mayor's Office of Contract Services

Jocelyn Strauber, Commissioner at Department of Investigations

Towaki Komatsu

Contracts. Thank you for joining us for this joint

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3 Investigations Chaired by Council Member Gale Brewer.

We're here today to talk about the massive contracting needs incurred by the City after the COVID-19 pandemic struck two years ago. Almost overnight, New York City had to stand up entire public health systems for testing, tracing, vaccinations, and PPE procurement among other public health needs. By necessity, we had to rely on outside contractors to secure the tools to keep ourselves healthy and contain the virus' spread while adapting our city as a new normal. More than two years and many billion dollars later, it is imperative to account for how our money was spent. The purpose of this hearing is to ask how do we keep track of all these contracts, did the City get what it paid for, and did we make the best use of the system we already had in place for ensuring our contracts are fulfilled with the highest standards for integrity.

New York City pioneered vendor integrity
best practices in 1996 following a decade of
investigations into the penetration of our
construction industry by organized crime. The
Department of Investigation launched its Vendor

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Integrity Monitor Program. Under this initiative, firms paid for outside monitors to come in and impose codes of ethics and ensure contracts are fulfilled in good faith. The Vendor Integrity Monitor Program allowed the City to award contracts to vendors with an additional layer of outside oversight without incurring more cost for taxpayers. It's been expanded after September 11th, the City Times scandal, and Hurricane Sandy. Congress cited DOI's efforts as a national model, but in the last decade its use has atrophied with the number of active agreements falling to a decade low in Fiscal Year 2021. We hope the Department of Investigations can explain why the Integrity Monitoring Program has declined even as the COVID response forced the City to pay billions to contractors under emergency procurement rules.

Thank you to my central staff team of

Lead Counsel Alex Paulenoff and Policy Analyst Alex

Yablon as well as my Chief-of-Staff Carolina Gil,

Legislative Director Isaac Blasenstein, and for all
helping prepare for this hearing. With that, let's
begin.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: I'm Gale Brewer. I'm Chair of the Committee on Oversight and

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Investigations, and I really love working with the Committee on Contracts Chair Julie Won.

Today, we're going to focus on the steps the administration is taking to ensure that companies that do business with the City are not engaged in fraud, corruption, abuse, and any other conduct, and I think we all agree with that. Mayor Adams has emphasized his commitment to reducing government waste and inefficiency, but when we talk about good government we can't just focus on the activities of city agencies, we also need to look at the hundreds of firms of and non-profits that the City pays to deliver essentials goods and services and, unfortunately, the papers are full of what happened today at Rikers Island with a non-profit that was working there, lots of problems. Procurement is a fundamental part of the city government. Last year, the City spent nearly 40 billion dollars on over 100,000 procurement transactions. These contracts helped the City fulfill a variety of government functions, all important, from direct services to New Yorkers to maintaining our infrastructure. To ensure that taxpayer money is spent responsibly, the procurement process in our city is subject to a

COMMITTEE ON CONTRACTS JOINTLY WITH COMMITTEE ON 1 OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS number of exacting regulations. Yet, in recent years, 2 3 the City has relied on a fast-track process known as 4 Emergency Procurement to get around these regulations in certain contexts, and I know what that was like because I was here during the pandemic and we did 6 7 need PPE and other things quickly so I remember during that pandemic then-Mayor DeBlasio issued an 8 executive order authorizing the use of Emergency Procurement to acquire the goods and services like 10 11 the PPE to respond to COVID and more recently Mayor 12 Adams authorized Emergency Procurement for responding 13 to the migrant crisis, the asylum crisis, the seekers. While the City must be able to respond to 14 15 these emergencies quickly, we cannot let the 16 Emergency Procurement process open the door to fraud, 17 waste, abuse, and other misconduct because it is 18 public money. In the past, the City has been proactive about ensuring vendor integrity when 19 emergencies arise. After September 11th, when we had 20 21 immense need for demolition and hauling and 2.2 reconstruction contracts, the Department of 2.3 Investigations ramped up its use of outside "integrity monitors" to ensure that public money was 24

being spent responsibly. Has the City taken similar

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steps in response to COVID-19 and the migrant crisis?

As we heard earlier from Chair Won, why is there

number of integrity monitors going down given the

fact that we have many emergency contracts and other

kinds of contracts? We are here to get an answer to

that question today. Whether it's through the use of integrity monitors or other measures, we have to make sure that the taxpayer money goes to non-profits and

10 profits that are good actors.

I'd like to thank certainly Senior

Counsel Staff C.J. Murray, Policy Analyst Alex

Yablon, and Legislative Director of my office Leo

Bullaro for preparing this hearing.

Now, we'll turn it over to C.J. Murray.

COMMITTEE COUNSEL MURRAY: Thank you,

Chairs. We'll now turn to testimony from representatives of the administration.

Before we begin, I will administer the affirmation to all members of the administration who will be offering testimony or available for questions. Please raise your right hand.

Do you affirm to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before this

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2 Committee and to respond honestly to Council Member 3 questions?

## ADMINISTRATION: (INAUDIBLE)

COMMITTEE COUNSEL MURRAY: Thank you. You may begin your testimony.

Chair Won and Members of the Contracts Committee and Committee on Oversight and Investigations. Thank you for taking the time to hold this important hearing today on the topic of maintaining vendor integrity through the pandemic. My name is Lisa Flores, and I serve as the Director of the Mayor's Office of Contract Services and the City Chief Procurement Office. I'm joined by MOCS General Counsel Annie Meredith as well as our colleagues, Commissioner from the Department of Investigations.

As many of you know, MOCS is an oversight agency responsible for ensuring compliance with the City's procurement rules and leading reform initiatives to improve the procurement process. MOCS has a wide purview over procurement. We implement technology solutions to bring the process into the digital era, lead legislative advocacy efforts to make sure the procurement rules match our modern

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reality, provide hands-on support for agencies and vendors to speed up procurement, and provide strategic consultation to help agencies improve their procurement outcomes.

Part of this last activity involves reviewing contracts and contractors for risk, supporting agencies with any remedial action needed to mitigate risks, and implementing safeguards to protect against waste, fraud, and abuse. MOCS' efforts here fit within a broad framework of risk prevention, assessment, and remediation carried out across multiple oversight agencies and based on practices and protocols that have been put in place over decades. With nearly 38 billion dollars in procurement value in Fiscal Year 2022, this administration is keenly aware that the City's contracting portfolio poses a target for abuse, and we are continuing to find ways to safeguard responsible use of taxpayer dollars through collaborative work across oversight and risk management agencies. The Adams' administration has doubled down on managing risk as a core tenet of both being responsible with taxpayer dollars and ensuring agencies are operating as efficiently as possible.

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The newly created Mayor's Office of Risk
Management and Compliance is responsible for
reviewing and enhancing risk protocols to find the
most effective safeguards we can implement without
overburdening the City's notoriously cumbersome
procurement process. Within this general framework,
it is a requirement in city contracting that agencies
determine a vendor responsible before awarding them a
contract. This is a holistic assessment, which must
be completed on a contract-by-contract basis as set
forth in the Procurement Policy Board Rules which
only allows the reward of a contract to a vendor who
has the capability in all respects to perform fully
the contract requirements and the business integrity
to justify the award of public tax dollars.

Factors affecting a vendor's responsibility can include financial resources, technical qualifications, experience, capacity to carry out the work, historical performance records, business integrity, and others. If adverse information later emerges on a contractor after the contract has been registered, agencies have a range of options to utilize when assessing the best path forward, which can include entering into a corrective

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complete VNCs as needed.

action plan or even terminating a contract in severe cases. Broadly speaking, this framework offers a comprehensive means by which to assess, prevent, and mitigate risk at each stage of the contracting process. The crisis set off by the first wave of COVID-19 in the spring of 2020 forced the City to operate under a set of emergency rules, which fast tracked the procurement process due to the dire need to get personal protective equipment in the hands of medical personnel treating the novel virus. Executive Order 101 temporarily suspended some procurement laws and rules to allow agencies to enter into contracts more quickly at a time of massive supply chain disruption. As part of this process, MOCS in coordination with other agencies established a process to intake and expeditiously review the multiple of PPE offers we were receiving, many from unknown sources. Each offer was evaluated against the same set of key criteria, including available supply, delivery timelines, vendor integrity, pricing, current burn rates, and projected inventory for key goods. MOCS maintained a risk review process for potential suppliers and was supported by DOI to

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While the City identified and referred fraudulent activity for investigation in a few cases, this EEO overwhelmingly saw the successful completion of contracts for needed goods and services. EEO 101 expired 101 July 16, 2021, but this same set of emergency rules was reinstated under Executive Order 322 on December 20th, 2021, to combat a resurgence in COVID-19 cases and acquire the needed test kits. In total, MOCS registered nearly 1,600 contracts for COVID-related needs under these emergency executive orders valued at around 8.5 billion dollars in total. Only a small percentage of these contracts still remain active based on ongoing needs to mitigate the spread of the virus and any current emergency contracts are submitted to the Comptroller's Office now for registration.

Turning to the bills in front of us today, Intro 300, 301, and 452, MOCS shares the Council's goal of strengthening the City's oversight of waste, fraud, and abuse of City contract dollars and further supports the goal to use contract language to address conflicts of interest and potential wasteful spending. However, at a time where these is consensus on streamlining the process to

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ensure that it doesn't pose an obstacle to getting providers paid on time, we want to thoroughly consider the impact from these bills, and we're happy to continue this conversation with the Council.

Thank you for calling this hearing to bring attention to this important topic. While the height of COVID emergency era is over, it is important that we analyze this period to inform our ongoing reform work and ensure that the City's risk mitigation framework is truly maximizing our resources to target the riskiest areas with the strongest safeguards and we're better able to respond to continuing impacts of COVID-19 and other emergency situations facing the City. I'm happy to keep the Council informed on these continued efforts and will make ourselves available for questions now and after the hearing if necessary. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: We'll go ahead with the Department of Investigations. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: Good morning and thank you, Chair Won and Chair Brewer, for the opportunity to address the Committee on Contracts and the Committee on Oversight and Investigations on three bills involving vendor integrity oversight and

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the impact of these bills on the work of the City's

Department of Investigations. I should say I'm

Jocelyn Strauber, the Commissioner of the Department

of Investigations.

Vendor integrity is and has long been a critical part of DOI's mission to root out corruption, protect public funds, and ensure the existence of strong internal controls and best practices with respect to City operations. DOI's investigations relating to city vendors have led to public reports and recommendations proposing stronger agency oversight of vendor contracts as well as criminal referrals and convictions. DOI also manages an Integrity Monitorship Program to ensure that vendors with an ongoing contractual relationship with the City who have had integrity problems in the past are acting appropriately.

Within the last year, DOI released a report on corruption vulnerabilities in the City's oversight and administration of not-for-profit human services contracts, that is contracts with third part non-profit entities that provide services to New Yorkers in areas like housing, education, and health. The DOI report based on dozens of corruption and

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fraud investigations involving non-profit entities included recommendations for reform with respect to the City's budgeting, invoicing, and auditing of these contracts. The Mayor's Office of Contract Services has not yet responded to those recommendations, but we understand that they will be considered as part of a taskforce addressing city contracts with non-profit entities and that we will have an opportunity to weigh in on the policies and

procedures proposed by the taskforce.

In addition, since February 2021, DOI has been working on a comprehensive examination of Department of Homeless Services' non-profit human services vendors to identify for DHS potential compliance risks including conflicts of interest and financial issues so that DHS can address these risks and, if necessary, end the relationship with that vendor. DOI is making significant progress on this examination and expects to issue a public report summarizing its findings early next year.

Vendor misconduct also can involve criminal offences. For example, a joint investigation DOI conducted with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York led to the guilty plea

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of the former CEO of the city-funded Bronx Parent
Housing Network, an entity that provided services to
DHS. The CEO conspired to enrich himself through
bribes and kickbacks in connection with the services
that he provided and was sentenced to a 27-month
prison term in May as a result. These are just some
of the examples of DOI's investigative work to
identify and prevent corruption, fraud, and waste in
relation to city contractors.

Before I address the three bills, I want to explain DOI's role in the City's procurement process, our longstanding initiatives to oversee contracts and vendors that pose a particular risk of fraud and abuse as well as the steps that DOI took during the pandemic and in the wake of other crises to provide enhanced oversight of emergency-related contracts. The Director of the Mayor's Office of Contract Services has already explained the City's standard procurement process. DOI has a discreet role in that process. We provide specific information relating to the vendor and its principals for a prospective contract or contracts valued at 250,000 dollars or more within a 12-month period. DOI obtains that information by conducting what we refer to as

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vendor namechecks. This is not a full background check of a vendor nor is it a responsibility determination. DOI checks its internal databases and informs the contracting agency of any substantiated findings. We play a small role in the vetting process. City agencies conduct additional checks and ultimately make an independent determination whether to award a contract.

DOI also oversees an Integrity Monitor Program. That program is used for vendors with integrity issues, sometimes uncovered through DOI investigations, that the city agencies wish to continue doing business with. While these issues might ordinarily preclude a vendor from obtaining city business, this program allows the company to continue to perform under existing city contracts or be awarded new contracts under certain conditions. These include the condition that the company pays for an integrity monitor and makes other arrangements such as separating principals who engaged in misconduct from the business and the implementation of polices and procedures and training of employees to ensure the entity's integrity. The monitor reports directly to DOI so that we can maintain close

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oversight and work in real time with both the vendor and contracting agency to address any issues. DOI can also join the monitor on site visits, audits, and investigations. For example, a critical Parks Department contractor pleaded quilty to a 1-milliondollar insurance fraud earlier this month. So that the agency could continue doing business with that contractor after it was initially charged, the contractor was required to retain a monitor that reports to DOI. The terms of the monitorship include remedial measures such as barring the now-former principals of the company and any entities those individuals own from working on any city contracts and construction projects and requiring the company to establish a code of conduct and train employees on it. The City has taken a similar approach with the Bronx Parent Housing Network. Because that network provides critical services for the Department of Social Services, DOI worked with that agency to strengthen oversight of BPHN requiring it to retain a monitor that reports directly to DOI so that it can complete its existing city contract.

Vendor integrity and identifying and stopping vendor fraud are high-priority areas for DOI

and will continue to be. That is important context for our position on the following three bills.

We do not support Intro Bill 300 which would establish a special inspector within DOI to review contracts that were entered into in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. DOI opposed a similar bill, Intro Bill 1980, that was introduced two years ago. My predecessor's core concerns about that bill as expressed in her testimony apply to the current bill as well. While there have been some minor changes made to the legislation, the current bill contemplates a role for DOI that is not consistent with nor the best use of our expertise. Furthermore, to be frank, it is a role that we cannot fulfill given our current resource limitations.

First, the bill has an unfunded mandate to appoint a special inspector to collect and review COVID-19-related contracts in order to identify deficiencies. This broad contractual review would require significant resources that we do not have. To attempt this work with our current staffing would significantly damage our ability to pursue our current docket of active investigations.

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Second, the bill asks that DOI report the results of the review and other specific vendor information in a public database. DOI does not maintain this information as a general matter. We are an investigative agency, and, while we, of course, can obtain such information for our investigations, our role is not to parse city contracts or manage city contract data as a general matter. Putting aside our limited resources, the tasks contemplated by this bill are not the best use of our expertise.

Third, many COVID-19-related contracts have already been awarded during the height of the pandemic, and our understanding is that most of them have concluded or are winding down. Thus, there is the question whether this is an appropriate use of resources at this time.

DOI's appropriate role in the wake of a disaster or crisis has always been to use our integrity monitoring expertise to assist. We did so in the wake of Hurricane Sandy with the Rapid Repairs Program, an emergency initiative to fulfill New Yorkers' basic needs including heat, hot water, and electricity. DOI implemented a monitoring program for RRP to oversee repairs by contractors at over 13,000

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residential units. That monitoring led to a number of recommendations for improvement of the Build It Back Better program, criminal convictions of those who sought to defraud the City of disaster relief funds, and a significant cost savings to the City.

Similarly, during the pandemic, when the

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regular procurement rules were suspended so the City could obtain essential items such as PPE, DOI proactively offered to conduct and performed vendor namechecks for agency contracting officers, even though in that period such namechecks were not required. We also asked the Mayor's Office of Contract Services to provide us with the contracts related to COVID-19 on a rolling basis and gave that list to our Inspectors General. They took a number of steps to ensure the integrity of the vendors. Among other things, they discussed the emergency contracts with the agencies they oversee, checked certain vendors through a matrix of databases, and investigated whether certain purchases were made and if they comported with the intended purpose. DOI also conducted criminal investigations of COVID-19-related fraud and misconduct. One case resulted in a federal conviction of a New Jersey man for a 45-million-

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dollar scheme to defraud the City during the height of the pandemic by trying to supply PPE that he did not possess. In another matter that is pending in federal court, four defendants were charged with abusing the City's COVID-19 Hotel Room Isolation program by falsely claiming to be healthcare workers and by selling hotel rooms to ineligible individuals, defrauding the government of 400,000 dollars. In our experience, the most effective way to address integrity concerns related to emergency contracting is by engaging an outside integrity monitor that reports to DOI. Our proposed approach has been used numerous times during prior crises in the city that have called for large-scale contracting endeavors, including, for example, in the wake of Hurricane Sandy and in the cleanup of Ground Zero. While my predecessor reasonably suggested the appointment of an integrity monitor for emergency COVID-19 contracting as an oversight option in her 2020 testimony, that appointment likely is no longer timely given the limited number of remaining COVID-19 contracts.

With respect to Bill 301, DOI has previously recommended that city contractors be

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required to make disclosures to aid the City in identifying potential corruption and conflict of interest risks. While this bill may seek to accomplish the same result, DOI disagrees with the Bill's approach and, in particular, the requirement that standards and procedures be imposed on contractors so that the contractors can determine whether corruption or conflicts exist and make a certification with respect to those issues. The determination and certification that the Bill asks vendors to make is usually made by law enforcement or other authorities such as the Conflict of Interest Board based on laws that are complex and that may differ across state and federal jurisdictions. Such a certification could not be made without a full internal investigation, even if a vendor was wellpositioned to evaluate whether any identified conduct constituted corruption or a conflict of interest. To extent, this requirement prompts a vendor to conduct its own investigation. That could have a negative impact on current or future DOI investigations, and, furthermore, the requirement that certifications be made public also could interfere with ongoing investigations. We share the Council's commitment to

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eradicating corruption and conflicts of interest in city contracting but note that our proposed approach to this issue was quite different. We recommended in our 2021 report on corruption vulnerabilities in connection with non-profit contracts that the City require disclosures of information from vendors so that the City could exercise its oversight responsibility with more complete information among other measures.

Intro Bill 453, turning now to that Bill, the last one, would require that employees of city vendors report corruption, fraud, waste, abuse, and conflicts to DOI and to cooperate with any investigation. Putting aside any implementation issues, DOI supports the imposition of a reporting requirement on city vendors. As the Council is well aware, reporting of suspected or potential corruption, fraud, or misconduct is critical for DOI to accomplish its mission. The affirmative reporting obligation of New York City employees is a cornerstone of the City's anti-corruption efforts. The City's Whistleblower Law's prohibition on retaliation against city employees and employees of city contractors further demonstrates the City's

2 intent to root out corruption and protect those who

3 come forward to report it. Imposing a reporting

4 requirement on city contractors certainly will aid in

5 DOI's and the City's critical anti-corruption

6 mission.

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Thank you very much and I am happy to answer any questions that Council Members may have.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: We have Council
Member Velazquez, I believe Council Member Gennaro
was here earlier, he stepped out for a minute,
Council Member Ariola is on Zoom, Council Members
Nurse, Joseph, and Lee.

CHAIRPERSON WON: Thank you so much everyone for joining us and thank you so much to MOCS and DOI Commissioners for testifying.

To start, is there a process by which

MOCS considers debarment information from city

agencies such as debarment lists of the Business

Integrity Commission when reviewing potential

contract awards? If yes, please explain the process

by which MOCS considers and reviews such information

to ensure that principals of companies looking to do

business with the City have not formerly been

debarred by other city agencies. If no, why does MOCS

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not review that information, particularly when the information speaks directly to potential integrity issues?

DIRECTOR FLORES: Thank you for your question, Chair. At Mayor's Office of Contract Services, we take in a number of lists and a number of different sources of information which is in PASSPort including debarment lists from entities that have the authority to debar vendors such as United States Department of Labor and others, and that is in addition to information that's updated by vendors who are doing business with the City regarding the entity, regarding principals, and, in addition to a multitude of data that we make available in PASSPort, we actively also seek out information that may not be provided to us on the lists but is timely that may result in a caution or is populated in PASSPort. We have the ability now with having an online system through PASSPort to have that information be much more timely than it was in the past when we only had a paper system and everything was through data entry and so we take it very seriously, the Mayor's Office of Contract Services, to ensure that we have robust information in our PASSPort system so that agencies

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have everything at their fingertips in addition to their own research and their own information when determining whether or not a vendor is responsible, whether or not they can be awarded a contract.

CHAIRPERSON WON: Yesterday, I found out that there is currently a vendor that is debarred from the federal government and there's ongoing investigations, but, because it has not been finalized, the City continues to do business with them. Can you help me understand why that is?

with the particular circumstance of the vendor, but there, obviously, is due process in terms of what information we put in and the details regarding particular investigation. I will say that there are questions within PASSPort filings that require both the entity and principal to affirm whether or not there is an investigation, there are certain standards about what types of investigations, and also an obligation, in addition, if an agency comes aware of information that they should be contacting our office so that we can determine in consultation either internally with our counterparts and other stakeholders and other oversight agencies whether or

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not the information rises to the level of including a caution, but that depends on each particular circumstance with the investigation and the status of what would be entered in and when but happy to work with you offline about that specific vendor and I mentioned our Counsel, Annie Meredith, is here and we can dig into that with you.

CHAIRPERSON WON: Yeah, we'll definitely be following up on that contract. Would an individual that has been previously prohibited from doing business with one city agency or from receiving a permit to operate in a specific sector be allowed to receive a contract by another agency?

DIRECTOR FLORES: First, I would start off with terminology in prohibition. As the Commissioner mentioned in her testimony and briefly in my testimony, the determination of responsibility is made on a contract-by-contract basis, which is why it's so important for us to have updated and accurate information in our PASSPort so that the agency can make that determination. It is each agency's process and supported by the Charter and the PPB rules to make the determination based on all of the information available, whether it's a contract with

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that vendor for their particular contract needs,

goods and services, so it is possible for one agency 3

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the information not to move forward, but the scope of 5

work for another agency, they may make a 6

7 determination that they can move forward.

contract performance?

CHAIRPERSON WON: Other than PASSPort, what other processes are in place to share information between agencies regarding potential integrity issues that have been flagged during

DIRECTOR FLORES: PASSPort, obviously, is the source of information. However, we have ongoing conversations and very strong relationships, again, with our other oversights including Department of Investigations. This administration, I think as was mentioned in opening testimony, takes this very seriously and has created the Mayor's Office of Risk Management and Compliance, and that Office, we work very closely, as the Commissioner also mentioned, on known issues to sort of determine what best practices can be put into place, not only citywide but in relation to a particular portfolio, but we work very closely with all of our oversight agencies and also

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other investigatory entities. It may not necessarily, depending on if the information at that particular time cannot be shared for legal reasons, we do communicate closely with our agencies and, in some cases, also with the Council related to pending contract awards.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: This may not be directly related, but at a recent meeting on NYCHA and our Committee, as you probably heard, we were having some problems at Jacob Riis, and the prime contractor hired contractors to do testing that were not licensed to do so in New York and you know the end of the story, problems. How would that have been stopped by any of the work that you've been doing or it is not relevant because those contractors, then it turned out they'd done it before, and we didn't know it until recently. That's another whole story, so how would this have been caught by some of your processes or how it should've been caught?

DIRECTOR FLORES: Thank you for that question, Chair. First, I'll start with speaking broadly around subcontractors. As the Commissioner mentioned, there's a dollar threshold for filing for contractors. That also applies to subcontractors with

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particular dollar amount, 250, aggregate in the 12month preceding period, and so we do enter information as well into PASSPort regarding subcontractors and doing business with the City, there's an obligation to file. When agencies, and I'll speak regarding Mayoral agencies, when Mayoral agencies are moving forward with a subcontractor, their prime is moving forward with a subcontractor, there's a process in the Procurement Policy Board rules that requires the agency to approve of the use of a subcontractor and there's certain information and a baseline standard that's required to be reviewed, approved, and documented in the agency's contract files. We work really closely with our non-Mayoral agencies, NYCHA included, does work with us and their vendors do file in PASSPort and they have access to the same information that Mayoral agencies have.

Having said that, I think obviously there's room for improvement overall, and it's part of our reform sort of analysis of how we can further leverage the tools that we have including PASSPort for information regarding subcontractors. I think

they'll be opportunity in the future to really 25

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improve the type of information and how timely we have it available in PASSPort, but there is a process in place and there is a requirement to review that information before making a determination to move forward with a subcontractor.

CHAIRPERSON WON: If a vendor has previously had integrity issues regarding past contract performance, what criteria lead them to be banned from receiving future contracts versus being able to receive a contract but with a DOI-appointed monitor? I'm trying to understand the benchmarks.

DIRECTOR FLORES: Thank you for that question. There is a sort of holistic review of each contractor in determining whether or not to either award a contract and, as I mentioned in my testimony, throughout the life of the contract what actions, if any, should be taken regarding integrity information which includes performance and so it's a determination based on the needs of the City and the ability for other transactions to meet those needs of the City for goods and services, and it's important for us to have the flexibility as is allowed within the Charter and the PPB to ensure that we're protecting the City from waste and fraud and also

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make sure that we're getting those goods and services so there's not a sort of one-size-fits-all approach to how to deal with a performance issue. In some cases, it may be that the city agency no longer will contract with that particular vendor. In other cases, I think as was also mentioned in the Commissioner's testimony, there may be sort of a higher level of engagement, either with a corrective action plan or monitoring agreement reporting directly to the Department of Investigations.

CHAIRPERSON WON: Is there a written set of criteria or quality control for these vendors or is it case-by-case basis is what I'm hearing?

performance evaluations, performance evaluations do have sort of a standard set of questions and categories and criteria by which agencies review performance on an annual basis, and, obviously, that's sort of a summary of the contractual obligations regarding performance that is specific to each contract in that scope of work.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Just regarding
M/WBEs, I don't know if it's you or SBS, but what are
the steps for bidders and contractors to be properly

vetted to verify that they M/WBEs, and does MOCS review and audit agency specific goals for awarding contracts to these bidders? I must admit I thought it was SBS but please answer.

DIRECTOR FLORES: Thank you, Chair, for that question. You're right. The Department of Small Business Services is responsible for the certification process and so reviewing a vendor's information to determine whether or not they meet the standards for being certified as an M/WBE is a purview of the Department of Small Business Services so that is at the vendor level for certification. At the contract level, our office does review contracts from city agencies, and, in terms of whether or not there are goals and the level of goals in a particular contract, that is something that is within the purview of our office and reviewing either prior to the solicitation going out and throughout the process. We work very closely obviously with the Department of Small Business Services to ensure that our system has accurate information regarding certification and any changes to that certification is accessible to agencies.

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CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Just to go back to the non-Mayoral, the H and H, the NYCHA, I don't even know if DOE, ADC, how do you do the same for them as you do with the Mayoral or you don't? This NYCHA debacle was pretty extreme so how do you deal with those agencies just on an overall basis? Is it the same as the Mayoral?

DIRECTOR FLORES: It's not the same.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: I knew the answer already.

DIRECTOR FLORES: As I mentioned, I want to make it clear that PASSPort in terms of filings and vendor's obligation to file and subcontractors and that information both being entered into and accessible within the PASSPort is the same across all agencies so NYCHA, H and H and all of the Mayoral and non-Mayoral agencies can access and interact with our office as it relates to the vendor filings. We do not have oversight of the non-Mayoral agencies in terms of their procurement processes.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Okay. Something to talk about. In August, Mayor Adams announced an Emergency Procurement declaration as we know for the shelter and services for people seeking asylum. What

goods and services has the City procured pursuant to

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3 | this declaration. Of course, we want to know about

4 the money and, of course, are there more goods and

5 services to be purchased? Some of us have been quite

6 familiar with this issue.

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DIRECTOR FLORES: Thank you for that question, Chair. Obviously, the crisis and the emergency that the administration and the city is dealing with now is a new crisis in terms of comparison to previous emergencies that the city has encountered. The Adams' administration acted swiftly with compassion in order to ensure that we are meeting the needs at this time of asylum seekers. Obviously, that impacts a number of different goods and services to be provided and is ongoing. There's a collaboration centralized with City Hall among multiple agencies that are ensuring that we're being actively participating and making sure that we have all of the services and goods available. I did not come today, I apologize, Chair, with that summary information but happy to follow up afterward with what we have at hand at this time, which obviously is an ongoing, changing situation but happy to follow up after this hearing.

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CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON WON: Did MOCS perform the standard integrity checks for contracts relating to the migrant crisis?

DIRECTOR FLORES: The integrity check, Chair, in the case of Emergency Procurement just to make a distinction, the process for procurement contracting and therefore integrity reviews follow just a little bit of a different path than a nonemergency contract, and so we're working really closely obviously with our partners. The agencies, as always, in particular in this emergency are looking all available contracting in terms of selecting vendors at the time of an emergency. This particular process is following the standard Emergency Procurement process which means that both under the Charter and the Procurement Policy Board rules agencies receive authority, approval from the Comptroller's Office and the Law Department to use this method and ultimately, when contract actions or amendments to existing contract to address the emergency are ready for registration, those will be sent to the Comptroller so we're actively working in partnership with all of our agencies but the process

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for integrity review is slightly different than a competitive contract.

CHAIRPERSON WON: Can you help us understand what the difference is?

DIRECTOR FLORES: Starting with sort of a baseline for a competitive contract using a competitive sealed bid or an RFP for example, an agency is putting out a solicitation, vendors are responding to that solicitation, they're doing an evaluation of the vendor's ability to perform those services. When there's a potential award to be made to the contract or contractor, then the agency follows the appropriate path for oversight, whether it's public hearing, the Law Department, Office of Management and Budget, and also the review of the vendor's integrity which may include as the Commissioner mentioned earlier a piece of the process, vendor namecheck, reviewing all of the pertinent information in PASSPort and other resources and making a determination that the vendor is responsible and then moving on to registration.

In the case of an emergency, again, it's important that this particular method allows the City to quickly respond to potential danger to property or

to life and so that preapproval as I mentioned

VERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 40

3 earlier by the Comptroller Office and the Law

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4 Department gives the agency the authority to use that

5 method. They are required to use the most competition

6 as practicable, again, with the first and foremost

7 being able to respond to the emergency. When

8 selecting a vendor or vendors that may be able to

9 perform the work, agencies do review some integrity

10 | information obviously, but there is another step

11 | later on in the process when they're ready to compile

12 | the contract for registration. There's a major

13 distinction that in the Emergency Procurement method,

14 | unlike a non-emergency situation, the contract in

15 non-emergency situations is only implemented when

16 registration happens. Here, again, the Emergency

17 | Procurement method allows agencies to make decisions

19 | that the vendor has the business integrity to do

20 business with the City but there's an additional step

21 later on in the process.

22 CHAIRPERSON WON: For the public, to make

23 | sure that I'm hearing correctly, for emergency

24 | contracting or emergency procurement, the standard

25 | integrity check is not performed?

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DIRECTOR FLORES: Thank you, Chair, for the opportunity for that clarification. There are responsibility determinations that are done for all contracts. The engagement with the contractor in the emergency situation happens earlier, obviously, in the need to respond to the emergency, and there are reviews that are done by the agency on a case-by-case for each contract need, and the responsibility determination that is standard happens at a later time so there are multiple times within the Emergency Procurement process that an agency is reviewing the contractor's information to determine to move forward.

CHAIRPERSON WON: Is there a standardized later time for these contracts or it's a case-by-case basis when we talk about the timeframe of a later time?

DIRECTOR FLORES: There is not a timeframe set in the rules. Again, I would say that the immediate issue is responding to the emergency, getting that preapproval from the Comptroller and Law Department for the use of that method, reviewing information regarding vendor or vendors that the City intends to enter into that Emergency Procurement and

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varies.

then the contract documents and other steps in the process would happen, as in any procurement, happen depending on a number of factors. I think overall we hope to get to a place even with competitive procurement that there's more of a reliability especially from a vendor's perspective of how long the process would take. At this time, it really

CHAIRPERSON WON: Within my District, I have more than 20 shelters, and half of them were emergency shelters due to COVID and the migrant crisis. The contracts were awarded to vendors who did not show up even though they were paid for that contract or they were awarded that contract for more than two weeks so they were just empty hotels. I'm trying to understand what review process there is to ensure that they are carrying out the work that they have been awarded for even in the case of an emergency, especially in what timeframe. Sometimes it's two weeks, sometimes it's six weeks where the hotel remains empty because a vendor is not around.

DIRECTOR FLORES: Thank you, Chair. I can't speak to the specifics of those particular locations or contracts. There may be not only in the

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circumstances that you're describing but in other circumstances an intent obviously, an approval to use the Emergency Procurement method, but there's a negotiation with each contractor in terms of when those services are to begin so I definitely need to follow up with you afterwards to provide more information, but obviously the administration takes very seriously holding our vendors responsible to the expectations of the contracts so happy to work with you after this with more specifics.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: What, if any,
exceptions were made during the review process for
facility construction, I think you know what we're
talking about, or service contracts related to the
asylum seekers and the crisis that they're facing?
Obviously, maybe it's back to the questions I asked
earlier, but were there exceptions made?

DIRECTOR FLORES: Thank you, Chair. If I may ask, is the question whether or not the process was similar to what I described earlier in terms of terms of the emergency process?

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Yes, exactly. In other words, were there exceptions to the review process for things like the purchase of the tent or

COMMITTEE ON CONTRACTS JOINTLY WITH COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

other kinds of facility construction? In other words,
what kind of process did it go through, the review

4 process, if any?

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the clarification. The processes that are being used for Emergency Procurements follow what I described earlier, and, as I said, the agencies in any situation, whether it's this situation or another emergency situation do make every effort to leverage existing contracts, for example, in that case obviously if they're leveraging existing contracts for a particular emergency then those particular contractors had been previously vetted through a competitive process but also locating vendors to meet needs that may not have been leveraging an existing contract so the processes are similar to the ones I described earlier for all emergencies.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Okay. I believe we're going to have another hearing in the future on the issue of the cost and benefits you could say of some of these emergency contracts so maybe we could discuss it then.

Also, were the M/WBE contracts for emergency contracts for this particular crisis? Do

you know if some were (INAUDIBLE) on that topic,

M/WBEs for emergencies that we're facing today?

DIRECTOR FLORES: M/WBEs are always a high consideration for the administration in all cases including emergency situations, and that would include both as prime contractors and potentially subcontractors which I'm sure, you know, Chair, may be part of the process anytime during a contract depending on the needs. I don't have in front of me today, Chair, specifics on those contracts regarding M/WBEs as it's an everchanging, ongoing situation, but definitely look forward to circling back with you when we have more information to provide to you regarding M/WBEs.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Thank you very much.

We're going to switch to the Department of

Investigations. I know that you talked about the

integrity monitor process. I know Chair Won and I

were just wondering why the numbers have gone down so

we'd like to understand it. Are the agreements

typically the result of deferred prosecution

agreements, proactive work by DOI, complaints, and

just in terms of the numbers and why?

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COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: Sure. Thank you, Chair Brewer. First of all, just give you the background. There are really two types of integrity monitorships that DOI does. One I would call proactive monitors and two would be rehabilitative monitors. A proactive monitorship is a situation where the City is undertaking a large capital project, and a decision is made that given the scope of the project and the expense engaging an integrity monitor at the outset before there are any potential concerns about fraud or corruption is a cost-saving measure because having someone on board to oversee whatever that work is is going to have a deterrent effect so that's a proactive monitorship. In that situation, we would work with the contracting agency to develop a scope of work for the monitorship, we would issue an RFP for the monitor, and we would then select a monitor that would be paid for by the City and usually out of the budget for the project, and there is such a monitor, for example, for the Borough-Based Jails project. That's just one example of a proactive monitorship.

A rehabilitative monitorship, as the Director just mentioned, is really for companies that

have had some sort of problem, they've been the 2 3 subject of an investigation, they're indicted or 4 convicted, either the company or the principals, but for whatever reason there is a need for the City to 5 continue working with that company and that could be 6 7 because they provide a service that is not really readily available from any other entity. It might be 8 because they're in the midst of a significant contract and changing vendors at that stage in the 10 11 game could cause delay and significant expense to the 12 City so there are a number of reasons why the City 13 might choose to continue working with an entity that has integrity issues. When that happens, the general 14 15 process would be that DOI would work with the agency 16 to address the need for a monitor and then again 17 negotiate the terms with the vendor and with their 18 legal representative, what the terms of the 19 monitorship would be, and I think it's important to 20 note here that this is not just a question of having an outside entity supervised by DOI to sort of watch 21 2.2 the progress of the project. The other thing that is 2.3 typically part of these monitoring agreements, we might, for example, require the company, let's say 24 there are indicted or convicted principals of the 25

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company, we would often require that they be removed from the company so that they are no longer benefiting from the contract although the entity can continue to perform the work. We might also require that the company put in place policies and procedures designed to address corruption issues, waste issues, whatever the issues that specific entity had might be, and also that they would provide training to their employees. The goal, yes, it is to oversee the project and the entity. It is also, if possible, to try to rehabilitate the entity. It may be that at the end of this process this entity transforms into one that the City will want to have a continuing contracting relationship with. That's an overview of the process and, whichever monitorship we're talking about, DOI plays an oversight role so we obviously involved in the terms of the monitorship, and then we are receiving sort of real-time reports from the monitor of what they're seeing. That way, if there are issues that arise during the monitorship, we can address them with the vendor, their counsel, and the contracting agency.

To your question about numbers, at least the numbers from recent years if we go back to Fiscal

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Year '18, we had 15 integrity monitorships that year and going forward in '19 we had 13, in '20 we had 12, in 2021 we had 10, and '22 we were back up to 12 so to some extent there's a downward trend, but I just want to flag that in '18 the 15 monitors include 4 that were part of the Build Back Better, the post-Hurricane Sandy rebuilding and so to some extent, that number you could argue is...

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Those are the ones that the houses never ended up what they were supposed to be?

issues that came out of that rebuilding, yes, there were some criminal cases that came out of that, but that number 15 really incorporates four monitorships from that time so you could argue that that's because the project was so big we had four separate ones but it's really one event so I think that if you look at it that way the trend is a little sharply downward. You know, the need for these monitors, it comes out of the City needing to continue to use an entity that has had issues and so the more of those there are, the more of these monitorships we would do so I really can't give a more precise explanation for why

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the number went down. We certainly haven't changed our practice or approach to these monitorships. That is not the reason.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Who are these monitors? Are they law firms? Are they former city employees? Do they have issues or has it been pretty clean?

themselves, I'm now aware of the monitors ever having issues. We have a long list of firms that we have worked with in the past who sort of operate in this space. There are law firms, but there are also firms that are really more exclusively monitoring firms.

They have a range of different types of expertise for certain projects you might need. Engineering expertise, for others it might be more standard auditing expertise so it really depends on the project. I'm not aware of us ever having an issue with the monitors themselves.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Do you have enough staff? Obviously, this is an issue. I think I was helpful in getting you a little bit more money in the last budget because I believe that you should have enough staff, but do you have enough staff to oversee

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2 the monitoring situation? I know you have to say yes,
3 but can you be more honest?

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: I can say yes and be honest in this way which is that we certainly do have enough folks to oversee the monitorships that we're doing. We have not cut back on monitorships because of a lack of staff. However, it takes time to work through these contracts and to get them up and running, and what I will say is that the decrease in staff, which has affected our agency as a whole including our Vendor Integrity Unit, it takes a little bit longer to get these monitorships up and running, and that I think is the primary way where we see the impact of our reduced staffing on this part of our program.

CHAIRPERSON WON: DOI has proactively launched vendor integrity monitor campaigns ahead of large-scale contracting initiatives such as the 9/11 response. Why did it not do so for the COVID response or the emergency asylum seekers refugees?

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: With respect to the COVID response, my understanding, and obviously I wasn't at the agency at that time, was that as I explained the funding for the monitor comes out of

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the funding for the project, and at least at the time that this issue was raised as a possibility, the possibility of a monitor, there was not at that point funding available as I understand it. In addition to all of the funds that were already being expended on the COVID response, there was not funding available to hire an independent monitor. That's the reason with respect to COVID.

I think with respect to the current asylum crisis, as I understand it contracting on that is very much ongoing, whether that is an appropriate setup for an integrity monitor, I think is yet to be seen. It's certainly something that we could discuss and consider, but I think it may be somewhat premature at this stage before we have a sense of the full scope of expenditures to know whether it would be appropriate or not, but it certainly could be and we would certainly be happy to have that discussion.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Can DOI update us on your efforts with Health and Hospitals following the Eugene Roberson bribery case?

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: Sure. Just one clarification is that that was an embezzlement case so not strictly speaking a bribery case. There was a

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high level Bellevue Hospital employee who embezzled over 50,000 dollars in rent checks from a hospital concessions vendor. In terms of the work that arose from that case, our Inspector General for Health and Hospitals is currently conducting a review of the processes and procedures with respect to concessions licensing contracts and leasing so that's an ongoing matter that also involves the Health and Hospitals Corporate Comptroller and various CFOs of the Health and Hospitals facilities, and the goal sort of in light of the criminal case is to identify whether there's any other potentially misappropriated funds relating to concessions or licensing and to assess the current state of internal controls around rental revenues to ensure that they are sufficient to monitor and minimize any ongoing risk of misappropriation, and this is still an ongoing review.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Before we go to the next question, I want to thank Council Member Ayala and Council Member Krishnan for being here today.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Thank you so much.

One of the bills we are hearing today, Intro 301,

would require the City's Chief Procurement Officers

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to develop procedures for city contractors to use in order to identify conflicts of interest between their employees and employees of the city. Currently, are city contractors required to take any affirmative steps to identify such conflicts of interest, and, if so, I know that Lisa Flores has said that there are questions within the PASSPort system, can you provide more details on that if that's the only affirmative

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: I'm not sure who that question is directed to. I can speak to some of the recommendations we made for enhanced disclosures. You may have more current information about the current disclosures.

step that they're currently taking?

DIRECTOR FLORES: I think definitely you should start.

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: Okay. I actually cannot speak in detail to exactly what is currently in PASSPort. I know there is some information in there from which conflict of interest issues can be identified.

The recommendations that we made in our 2021 report on non-profit human services contracts, and remember this was specifically directed to non-

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profits, called for disclosure of executive compensation and also called for information about relationships between the contractor and the subcontractor, the contractor and any other sources of city income, and these were not disclosures or certifications about whether or not there was a conflict of interest. These are questions that would just give the City more information to bolster, improve, support the information it already has in making conflicts of interest determinations and in evaluating expenses.

GENERAL COUNSEL MEREDITH: Sure. I will continue the response. Thank you, Commissioner. We are actively reviewing DOI's recommendations as it relates to conflicts of interest and really appreciate their thoughtful recommendations and are working with all of the stakeholders to figure out the best way to incorporate and respond to those recommendations.

In terms of current information, there is language in our standard contracts that vendors must disclose information as it relates to conflicts of interest, and in the standard vendor disclosures that are made in PASSPort as the Commissioner pointed out,

2 there is information that agencies can use and

3 leverage to look further into conflicts of interest.

4 However, as Director Flores mentioned, we are always

5 looking for ways to improve the process and welcome

6 any input or thoughts from the Council on

7 strengthening that, and we will continue to look at

8 | the recommendations. We agree with the spirit of the

9 recommendations in the Bill as it relates to

10 considering conflicts of interest.

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CHAIRPERSON WON: For Intro 301, it also requires the Chief Procurement Officer to develop procedures for contractors to use in order to identify whether their employees have engaged in corruption, criminal activity, or other misconduct related to the contract. Currently, what affirmative steps are city contracts required to take to prevent this kind of misconduct?

DIRECTOR FLORES: Chair, as Annie

Meredith, my General Counsel, mentioned there, there
is language both in city contracts and information
relating to disclosures that both either provide
information that can be used for reviewing potential
conflicts of interest and/or require vendors to
report conflicts of interest. As mentioned earlier, I

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2 think there are really robust recommendations as well

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3 that were in the DOI report from I think December

4 2021, and this administration takes very seriously

5 and is really committed to figuring out with our

6 stakeholders how do we implement the appropriate

7 procedures, have the appropriate tools to do that in

8 | a way that does not burden the procurement process

9 because we do not want the unintended consequence to

10 add layers which has happened over many decades of

11 | adding additional layers to processes without

12 | necessarily reviewing if those layers are pertinent

13 | now in the procurement system that we have now, which

14 | is obviously not paper and obviously really needs us

15 to be nimble, flexible, and ensure that we both

16 | balance contracting with vendors who have the

17 | business integrity, vendor integrity, prevents waste

18  $\parallel$  and fraud, and also get contractors paid on time.

20 question because the PPB rules are supposed to enable

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: I just have a quick

21 the agency to do some of this oversight. It's my

22 | experience that sometimes it's done well, sometimes

23 | it's not. I read the PPB rules because Marla Simpson

24 sent them to me. You know how Marla is, right? She

25 sent me tons of them last night. I got through as

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many as I could. If you don't know Marla, then you don't know, well you do know Marla so you know why she sent them to me so my question is how are they implemented? That is the goal by which you are trying to achieve this kind of integrity. Is it followed? How are we dealing with the PPB rules? That's what I'm trying to say.

DIRECTOR FLORES: Thank you, Chair. Yes, I do have the pleasure of knowing Marla Simpson when she was the (INAUDIBLE) at my first gig at the Mayor's Office of Contract Services.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: That's what she told me.

DIRECTOR FLORES: I am very familiar with the PPB rules thanks to her leadership and obviously her brilliance in this space and commitment to the City over many years of service.

I think I would start off by saying we are in a time when it's unprecedented that we have partnerships with many stakeholders including the Comptroller's Office to not only look at how do we improve the processes within the existing paradigm and framework but really look at what's not working, what do we need to leverage, what do we need to

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2 review of the PPB rules and other regulations for reform.

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CHAIRPERSON WON: For the PASSPort system, internally as an agency who is looking to contract, is there a very clear flag for those who have conflicts of interest or any sort of misconduct in the past?

DIRECTOR FLORES: Thank you, Chair. I can answer that question and pass it off to my General Counsel for more details, but, as mentioned earlier, there are certain sort of steps or standards if you will related to putting information into the system as a caution, and that cautionary information then is available to every agency that's doing a procurement, a contract action, and alerts them to review that information and take it into consideration in making their award determination. Again, I can't overstate again as a person who was doing procurement at the time and Marla Simpson was the (INAUDIBLE) and we still had (INAUDIBLE) forms which were delivered in paper and data entry by individuals on a blue screen with Alt-5, Alt-4, and in some cases took months to put into the system. That was not a way to provide the most accurate and timely information for agencies

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to make the determinations. There's room for improvement as there always is, but we are able now, unlike before, to really respond quickly in putting information into the system and making it available to agencies.

CHAIRPERSON WON: Thank you. My last question is about the report from DOI with all their recommendations to reform the City's budgeting, invoicing, and auditing of the contracts. Can you help me understand why the recommendations haven't been put into place from MOCS?

DIRECTOR FLORES: Thank you for that question. We have reviewed early on in this administration those recommendations and have had both preliminary conversations with our counterparts including Department of Investigations and are using that as a framework for ongoing reform work. As I mentioned earlier, this administration is putting front and center procurement and understanding that everything that the City needs and buys is reflected in our procurement policies, rules, and procedures, both what impacts at the selection process but also on the contract management process, and many of the recommendations also have to do with post-contract

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registration and contract management and so there are very robust conversations happening with our counterparts around how do we implement and envision implementing some of those recommendations at a future state, again that are sustainable, scalable, and that do not slow down the process so we will continue to be working on that. It's hard, long work, and we are 100 percent committed to having many of those recommendations with our counterparts be implemented in the future.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Two last questions for DOI. One is, as you see all in the papers today, a non-profit was in deep trouble for hiring people who went to Rikers and produced drugs for those who are detained. I know that program very well. They do have other contracts with the City so how will that be handled? They house people, etc., etc. How will that be handled in the future? Why don't we start with that? Would that be an opportunity for a monitor or is nothing done?

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: I think it could be. I think the questions that go into consideration of whether there's a monitorship imposed or requested, when there's not a criminal charge, and

2 obviously there is no criminal charge in this case,

3 is whether there are substantiated findings of

4 misconduct. I've seen the article that you're

5 referring to as well, and so I think it's certainly

6 something that could be considered as I know the

7 Council is aware there are other aspects of Exodus'

8 work including their work with a security company

9 | that the Mayor's Office referred to us for

10 | investigation. That investigation is ongoing. I

11 | obviously can't speak to other ongoing

12 | investigations, but it's obviously well-known that

13 DOI works with the Department of Corrections to

14 | investigate contraband cases so there are a number of

15 | things that I think flow from the allegations in that

16 article.

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CHAIRPERSON BREWER: I will just give an example because I'm sure as the public when you read that then you wonder if my son is now housed at one of their facilities, will something similar happen, and who's paying attention. That would be a question I would ask so it's just an example.

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: Yes. I can certainly say that we are paying attention. I know

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CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Okay. Also for the future, what do you need to know to determine if a monitor would be appropriate for those that are dealing with the migrant crisis because there are many, many contracts that are involved? How would you even begin to think about it in this very fast-moving situation?

Situation like that we would want to have an understanding of the current and anticipated scale of the contracting, how many vendors are involved, how long we expect the contracts to last, exactly what they're for, what kind of contracts they are, really sort of all the considerations that would go into weighing what is the cost and expense of imposing a monitor versus the amount of potential savings in light of the risk of fraud and abuse that any particular contracting situation poses, and that's how we would go about that analysis.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Okay. Thank you very much. I think we're going to go to the public testimony now, but I want to thank my co-Chair and

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also to state that this is a conversation that is nuanced but it's not nuanced if the public money is not spent correctly so I appreciate your oversight. A lot more needs to be done. Thank you very much.

Now, we'll go to the public.

COMMITTEE COUNSEL MURRAY: Thank you,
Chairs. We'll now turn to public testimony. Our first
panelist will be Towaki Komatsu.

TOWAKI KOMATSU: Hi. I'm Towaki Komatsu. I have testified to most of you previously, mostly to no avail. I guess the people that just testified was the Commissioner of DOI, someone from MOCS. I came here late so I'm not sure if they testified under oath subject to the penalties of perjury, but the point is that they lied to your face.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: They testified under oath.

TOWAKI KOMATSU: Okay. The point is that they lied to your face. Miss Brewer, you and I have had conversations repeatedly about contract matters, and the fact of the matter is on Saturday I filed a new federal lawsuit against Urban Pathways. The point is when the City issues contracts to various vendors that they have public hearings, and with regards to

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HRA, people have their 1st and 14th Amendment right to go to HRA's headquarters to examine those contracts prior to those public hearings. The problem HRA still won't let me walk through the doors to do that. There's a public hearing about a vendor named IOS Acquisitions in two days. I contacted HRA to get that authorization to go to its offices to see that contract prior to that public hearing. Guess what? They still won't play ball so the point is today's hearing is about oversight, to give your team I guess further responsibility to provide open spaces of the City's contracting processes and procedures. Problem is, you and I have had these conversations previously. Not just you, but even people on your Committee. I'm sure there's more people than are currently here in the room today. Guess what? They're not here. The point is when people take time out of their day to come here to talk about fraud, waste, abuse, all that stuff, they go to DOI's offices to actually report that, DOI doesn't do anything. They just refer the matter back to HRA so the point is when you and I have these conversations, whether it's about not being able to walk through the doors to go to a town hall meeting to talk about waste, fraud,

COMMITTEE ON CONTRACTS JOINTLY WITH COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

and abuse about contracts, then why exactly should

people give your team authorization to provide proper

4 oversight of contracts when for the longest time it

5 hasn't been doing that.

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CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Thank you very much for your testimony. Thank you.

Council Member Yeger has joined us. Thank you.

I also want to state that Williamsburg

Prep High School is up in the balcony. Thank you very

much for joining us. Thank you.

anyone from the public who is on the Zoom currently, and there's no one else here in person who has signed up to testify so I'll turn it back to Chair Brewer to close us out.

CHAIRPERSON BREWER: Thank you very much.

This is an important hearing. We are going to

continue to follow up. I think particularly because

we have so many emergency contracts, they need

particular scrutiny. Thank you all for joining us

today. This hearing is concluded. [GAVEL]

World Wide Dictation certifies that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. We further certify that there is no relation to any of the parties to this action by blood or marriage, and that there is interest in the outcome of this matter.



Date October 31, 2022