

Jobs-Plus Program Review and Recommendations

On December 6, 2016, Mayor de Blasio enacted Local Law 164, “Requiring the center for economic opportunity to review the jobs-plus program,” mandating that the then-Center for Economic Opportunity, subsequently expanded and re-constituted as the new Mayor’s Office for Economic Opportunity, prepare a report on the strengths, limitations, and effectiveness of the Jobs-Plus program, and present what would be required to make the program available to all residents of public housing operated by the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA). The Mayor’s Office for Economic Opportunity (“NYC Opportunity”) has prepared the following document to address these topics, as required by the Law.

Jobs-Plus primarily serves residents of public housing and has three main components: 1) employment services located in the community; 2) rent-based and other financial incentives that help “make work pay,” including financial counseling; and 3) community support for work that organizes neighbors to promote the benefits of working and serve as a helpful network for overcoming barriers.

This report first describes the strengths of Jobs-Plus. Second, it details the program’s limitations. Third, it summarizes four independent studies of the program that have assessed elements of its effectiveness. Fourth, it recommends that any expansion be phased while facilitating experimentation to improve the program. The report concludes with a description of the budget needs for such an expansion.

Note that a core component of this review is the qualitative and quantitative evaluation conducted by Urban Institute (Urban) under the direction of NYC Opportunity. Urban submitted

JOBS-PLUS BY THE NUMBERS
Total Jobs-Plus sites in NYC: 10
Number of City-funded sites: 9
Annual budget per City-funded site: \$1.05 million
Number of HUD-funded sites: 1 (FY18 launch)
Annual budget per HUD-funded site: \$500,000
Total Number of NYCHA developments served: 27
Number of people served in FY17 (9 sites): 4,395

preliminary findings to NYC Opportunity in August 2017 and these data have informed the analysis in this report. NYC Opportunity and other partner agencies submitted a number of follow-up questions to Urban which they are currently investigating. When the evaluation is complete in early 2018, the full study will be provided to the City Council and NYC Opportunity will advise if any new information affects the recommendations made herein.

I. Strengths of the Jobs-Plus program

A. Jobs-Plus is designed to meet the specific needs of NYC’s public housing residents for high-quality workforce development programming

Across NYCHA’s 326 public housing developments, the median household income is \$17,076 (~\$1,425 per month); 92 percent of households earn below New York City’s 2015 median household income of \$55,270, or ~\$4,600 per month; and 47 percent of the 173,842 working-age residents without disabilities do not report income from employment.¹ In 2015, 30 percent of residents lived below the NYC Government Poverty Measure (“NYCgov poverty measure”).² (For comparison, the citywide NYCgov poverty rate in 2015 was 20 percent and 21 percent of City households reported zero income from

¹ NYCHA data on median income and working-age residents as of January 1, 2017.

² The NYCgov poverty measure captures how people living in New York City are doing after taxes and transfers as opposed to the pre-tax and transfer Federal Poverty Level. More information at <http://www1.nyc.gov/site/opportunity/poverty-in-nyc/poverty-measure.page>.

employment.³) Young adults in particular need more employment support: 72 percent of NYCHA residents ages 18-24 do not report income from employment, compared with 45 percent of those ages 25-39 and 41 percent of those ages 40-61.⁴

The City is determined to increase earnings and employment levels for low-income New Yorkers, including those who live in public housing. In 2014 the administration released *Career Pathways*, a framework for better connecting NYC workforce development programs and promoting best practices, such as specialization in high-growth industries, hard skills training, and Bridge programs.⁵ Increasing resident earnings and employment rates is also a goal of the NextGeneration NYCHA Ten Year Plan, which aims to create safe, clean, and connected communities, and which was informed by input from key stakeholders such as resident groups. NYCHA seeks to double the number of residents connected to jobs each year from 2,000 to 4,000 by 2025, closing the gap between NYCHA and City unemployment rates (10 percent and 6 percent in 2015, respectively⁶).

NYCHA residents have access to citywide workforce development programs such as Workforce1 Career Centers, operated by the NYC Department of Small Business Services (SBS). Residents receiving the NYC Human Resources Administration's (HRA) Cash Assistance benefits, including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), have access to Career Services through HRA. In addition, NYCHA maintains the Office of Resident Economic Empowerment and Sustainability (REES) to support residents

in increasing their income and assets through programs, policies, and partnerships in the areas of employment and advancement, financial literacy and asset building, adult education and training, and resident business development.

The Jobs-Plus model is designed specifically to benefit public housing residents. It takes advantage of the density of public housing developments by locating employment services on-site or close to where residents live. The model also promotes neighbor-to-neighbor support networks and uses a rent-based financial incentive to mitigate the disincentive to work created by tying rent levels to income. The incentive currently offered in NYC is the Earned Income Disallowance (EID), which allows eligible residents to delay a rent increase after increasing earnings. (The EID is described in more detail in Section IV.B below.)

The model requires that program

offices be physically located inside of or in close proximity to the development or cluster of

JOBS-PLUS PROGRAM HISTORY IN NYC

1. Jefferson Houses (2009-2013):

NYC Opportunity supports the first City-funded Jobs-Plus site in NYC.

2. South Bronx/Social Innovation Fund (2011-present):

NYC Opportunity and the Mayor's Fund replicate Jobs-Plus in the South Bronx through a federal Social Innovation Fund grant. The site now operates using City funding.

3. Young Men's Initiative expansion (2013-present):

The City expands Jobs-Plus through the Young Men's Initiative to seven new sites, with HRA support to continue the Jefferson Houses program (eight sites total – Jefferson Houses plus six newly-launched sites in 2013 and one in 2014).

4. HUD expansion (2016-present): Through a competitive RFP, NYCHA was awarded funding from HUD to expand Jobs-Plus to a new site in East New York, with HRA support to expand and continue the Jefferson Houses and SIF South Bronx programs.

³ American Community Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

⁴ NYCHA data as of January 1, 2017.

⁵ Bridge programs prepare individuals with low educational attainment and limited skills for entry into a higher education level, occupational skills training, or career-track jobs, building the competencies necessary for work and education alongside career and supportive services.

⁶ American Community Survey.

developments targeted for services.⁷

The City currently has 10 Jobs-Plus sites which serve 27 developments (out of 326 total). Nine of these sites receive City funds and one, Pennsylvania-Wortman, receives federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) funds.⁸ All sites are managed through contracts held by HRA and are overseen by the “Jobs-Plus Collaborative” of NYCHA, HRA, NYC Opportunity, and the Department of Consumer Affairs’ (DCA) Office of Financial Empowerment (OFE).

Jobs-Plus targets all working-age residents⁹ who reside in the NYCHA developments it serves. This includes a wide age range of individuals who may be unemployed, underemployed, or seeking career advancement. Jobs-Plus contractors are also allowed to have up to 10 percent of their enrollees be individuals who do not reside in targeted developments, but who seek out and would benefit from Jobs-Plus services. These individuals are often connected to eligible NYCHA residents through family or social networks.

Launched in 2009, NYCHA’s outcome-driven economic opportunity platform for residents – the Zone Model – focuses on service coordination, strategic partnerships, and leveraging community and NYCHA resources to increase residents’ incomes and assets. To implement the Zone Model, REES divided New York City into 15 geographic zones that each include an average of 11,000 NYCHA households. Each Zone has an assigned REES Zone Coordinator who works with resident leaders, local service providers, NYCHA front-line staff, and other stakeholders to connect residents to high-quality economic opportunity services. Zone Coordinators support Jobs-Plus sites, including by facilitating referrals from NYCHA frontline staff and providing EID-related technical assistance to Jobs-Plus and NYCHA staff.

⁷ “Close proximity” is defined as less than 0.5 miles, with no intervening highways or other significant barriers. A “development cluster” is defined as more than one development whereby the closest buildings between developments are within 0.5 miles and not separated by a highway or major barrier. Staten Island’s developments are considered a cluster despite exceeding the 0.5 miles rule because of the borough’s low density compared to other boroughs and the greater distances between proximate NYCHA developments.

⁸ In 2015 HUD launched a national Jobs-Plus initiative. It has provided Jobs-Plus grants to 24 public housing authorities to date, of which NYCHA is one.

⁹ While Jobs-Plus targets those who are working-age (18-59), individuals who are younger or older than working-age can be served as well.

10 Current Jobs-Plus Sites					
Developments Served	Provider	Housing Units Served as of Jan. 1, 2017	Borough	Current Funding Source	Program Start Dates
Jefferson, Clinton, and Johnson Houses	Urban Upbound	3,501	Manhattan	HRA	09-Oct (NYC Opportunity), 13-Apr (YMI), 17-Jan (HRA)
Betances, Moore, and East 152 nd Street/Courtlandt Ave. Houses, Melrose	BronxWorks	2,765	Bronx	HRA	11-Sep (SIF), 17-Apr (HRA)
Astoria Houses	Urban Upbound	1,092	Queens	YMI	13-Mar
Mill Brook Houses	Eastside Houses	1,367	Bronx	YMI	13-Apr
Wald & Riis II Houses	Henry Street Settlement	2,425	Manhattan	YMI	13-Mar
Mariners Harbor, Richmond Terrace, Stapleton, South Beach & West Brighton I, Todt Hill Houses	Arbor/ResCare Workforce Services	3,144	Staten Island	YMI	13-Apr
Sack Wern, Clason Point & Monroe Houses	Goodwill Industries of Greater NY	1,892	Bronx	YMI	13-Apr
Marcy, Lafayette & Armstrong I, Armstrong II Houses	Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration	3,194	Brooklyn	YMI	13-Apr
Brownsville & Van Dyke I Houses	DB Grant Associates, Inc.	2,906	Brooklyn	YMI	14-Nov
Pennsylvania Ave.-Wortman Ave. Houses	Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration	335	Brooklyn	HUD	17-Mar

The eight community-based, Jobs-Plus providers have a strong focus on job placement and retention. Jobs-Plus members complete a Job Readiness Evaluation during enrollment so staff members can tailor assistance by placing members into one of three groups: fast-track, needs minor assistance, or needs extensive assistance. Fast-tracked members receive immediate job opportunity referrals, while others receive employment services such as cover letter writing, motivational interviewing, or referrals to adult education or training programs. Jobs-Plus providers receive incentive payments for job placements and for members that retain employment after three, six, and 12 months. Providers also may receive a bonus payment for high-wage retentions.¹⁰

All contracts have performance targets and HRA has a performance management system called “Jobs-Plus Stat” through which it monitors progress toward contract goals. HRA meets with providers regularly to discuss performance, successes, and challenges, and to identify technical assistance needs. To meet these needs, HRA also works with separate technical assistance organizations that train providers. Performance has met most contractual targets.

While the Jobs-Plus contract structure incentivizes job placement paired with financial coaching, staff members expend substantial resources on promoting longer-term career readiness, help members meet their basic needs, and confront all sorts of barriers to employment. Jobs-Plus sites have assisted with applications for educational financial aid, driver’s licenses, Supplementary Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), and other public benefits, and offered services ranging from haircuts to immigration assistance.

The forthcoming Urban evaluation reports that members appreciate their Jobs-Plus sites. Members describe the value of Jobs-Plus as a unique resource and one-stop center to address a variety of needs. In comparing experiences in Jobs-Plus to other available workforce development services

¹⁰ 12-month retention and high-wage retention bonus payments were created in spring 2016.

across the city (including Workforce1 Career Centers), many members saw the program as uniquely providing a robust set of services through caring onsite staff who are invested in the success of residents and the community. Key distinguishing characteristics of the program for residents included open access to services, opportunities for more informal engagement, personalized care for members' needs, and the motivation and support staff provide.

B. Performance data and multiple rigorous evaluations show that Jobs-Plus helps members get jobs and increase earnings

The first Jobs-Plus evaluation was conducted by MDRC, a nationally recognized social research firm, when it first developed and tested the Jobs-Plus model between 1998 and 2008. MDRC found that when all elements of the program model were implemented, residents of the targeted developments increased their earnings by 16 percent. Moreover, these gains in earnings persisted over seven years, including three years post-demonstration, and were observed across diverse sub-groups, including people receiving TANF. New York City started its first City-funded Jobs-Plus program in 2009 at Jefferson Houses on the basis of these strong findings.¹¹

Since March 2013, Jobs-Plus sites have enrolled nearly 16,000 members, placed over 6,000 members into jobs, and helped over 7,000 members achieve an outcome related to training, education, or financial counseling. This represents strong performance: providers exceeded their enrollment targets, reached 94 percent of job placement targets, and had 94 percent of the targeted number of members achieve an outcome related to training, education, or financial counseling. Providers have faced challenges meeting job retention targets, which is not unusual for NYC service providers working with vulnerable populations. In response to these challenges, the City and providers began to emphasize a *Career Pathways* model, and have since noted improvements in retention. This includes prioritizing skill-building and education over short-term job placement when appropriate, and developing stronger expertise in high-growth employment sectors.

Jobs-Plus is one of the most rigorously evaluated of the City's workforce models. In addition to the original MDRC evaluation that precipitated the City's initial investment, the New York City implementation has been the subject of three independent evaluations, including the forthcoming, qualitative and quantitative study of eight NYC Jobs-Plus sites by the Urban Institute. The quantitative portion of the study used a methodology that compared Jobs-Plus members who had enrolled in the program for one year to members who had just enrolled, while controlling for demographics, prior work history, and job readiness. The analysis found statistically significant results showing that members who had been involved with Jobs-Plus for one year were 72 percent more likely to be employed and earned an additional \$838 in quarterly earnings more than their peers who had not.¹²

This research and two other studies are described in more detail below in Section III, "Effectiveness of the Jobs-Plus program."

C. NYC's interagency Jobs-Plus Collaborative can facilitate continuous program improvement

A 2015 MDRC study of the South Bronx and San Antonio sites found that NYC's Jobs-Plus Collaborative, which includes NYCHA, HRA, NYC Opportunity, and OFE, was essential in promoting successful implementation in the Bronx. Under this Collaborative, each agency brings its own expertise and has the following roles:

¹¹ East River Development Alliance, now Urban Upbound, based its program model on Jobs-Plus principles when it was founded in 2005 in Queens.

¹² Urban Institute. Study of New York City's Jobs-Plus Expansion: Implementation and Outcomes. (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, forthcoming).

WHAT PARTICIPANTS SAY ABOUT JOBS-PLUS

“[The Jobs-Plus staff] make you understand that you are a person and that no matter where you come from no matter your story you are a person you should have the same opportunities as everyone else. The same guy that is a janitor, and the same guy that is the CEO of his own business. No favoritism here... They never shut the door on you. You may not always come out with a job, but you do come out with something. Something you may not have known about before.”

— Young male Jobs-Plus member

“What makes Jobs-Plus work is the community. We listen. We attend. They help us to get what we need. Instead of being on the street you can be here to help you get what you need. They won’t give up on you unless you give up on yourself.”

—Young male Jobs-Plus member

“Even if you don’t leave with a job, at least they give you an opportunity... they give you something to look forward to. They keep tabs on you. They don’t leave you in the dark. They keep you updated on everything. They work with you. It’s not like you need to have expectations like when you go to other places and when you work with other people. They make you comfortable. It makes it suitable and more open for people to come back.”

—Jobs-Plus Member

Source: Urban Institute (forthcoming)

- **HRA:** Serving as the primary program administrator, awarding and overseeing financial administration of performance-based contracts and responsible for: accountability management; data and information sharing; reporting and administration of Jobs-Plus data system; strategy advisement and technical assistance; and connection to medical insurance through Medicaid (or the NYS Health Exchange), nutrition assistance through SNAP, work supports, housing assistance, child support order establishment, enforcement, modification and debt reduction through HRA’s Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE), among other HRA-administered benefits and services.
- **NYCHA:** Provides affordable housing and responsible for: administration of rent and other NYCHA-related incentives and resources; program guidance; connection to NYCHA’s Office of Resident Economic Empowerment & Sustainability (REES) referral and recruitment partners; outreach support through referrals from NYCHA front line staff and access to NYCHA Communication Channels, where appropriate (e.g. REES e-newsletter and website, NYCHA’s Journal and social media); research and data sharing to inform quality service provision and evaluation; convening of Jobs-Plus sites; connection to NYCHA-focused employer-linked training and job opportunities (e.g. NYCHA Resident Training Academy); provision of space to host events (as available); connection to NYCHA stakeholders (e.g. Resident Associations)

and community initiatives to heighten partner visibility and a REES Zone Coordinator who serves as the Jobs-Plus site’s singular point of contact to NYCHA.

- **NYC Opportunity:** Provides program guidance, and responsible for: accountability management, reporting requirements, evaluation, Young Men’s Initiative (YMI) oversight and reporting,¹³ and technical assistance.
- **OFE:** Provides oversight and expertise with regards to financial counseling, evaluation, and technical assistance.

This collaboration has also benefited agencies’ other programs. For example, NYCHA leveraged its experience implementing the EID (described in more detail in Section IV.B below) as part of Jobs-Plus to revise all of its EID enrollment procedures, automate the benefit calculation, and retrain nearly 1,000

¹³ NYC Opportunity has worked closely with YMI since its launch in 2012. It oversees program implementation, budget, and evaluation of all YMI programs.

frontline staff.¹⁴ This dramatically increased EID take-up such that, as of November 1, 2017, 10,048 of NYCHA's 11,223 reported EID cases since 1982 – 90 percent – occurred after the 2012 policy revisions.¹⁵

II. Limitations of the Jobs-Plus program

A. Successfully implementing the full Jobs-Plus model can be challenging

While evaluations have demonstrated the impacts of Jobs-Plus (see Section III below), research has also documented how 1) successfully implementing all three components of the model can be challenging, and 2) when the model is only partially implemented, impact declines. In MDRC's 2005 initial evaluation of Jobs-Plus, researchers found that the two sites that did not fully implement all three components of the program – employment services, financial incentives for work, and community supports – did not demonstrate significant, positive impacts.¹⁶ MDRC later conducted an implementation and cost study of NYCHA's South Bronx site, as well as one in San Antonio, Texas, and again found that Jobs-Plus site management can be difficult. Providers were sometimes unable to coordinate service delivery of the three main components of Jobs-Plus to development residents, often placed people in low-wage work, and did not adequately serve people who were already employed. EID (described in more detail in Section IV.B below) receipt was low, too.¹⁷

Urban's forthcoming report confirms that providers have been challenged by member recruitment and retention in the restricted catchment areas they serve. Through interviews, staff members identified a number of common barriers for residents, including limited access to childcare for those seeking services, the lack of open positions at desirable employers, concerns over a lack of safety in communities due to gang violence, a loss of disability benefits stemming from new employment, or, among already employed residents, beliefs that Jobs-Plus would not benefit them.¹⁸

The Urban evaluation also explores development-level impacts of Jobs-Plus in NYC. The 1998-2003 original MDRC national Jobs-Plus demonstration and 2005 evaluation showed significant development-level impacts that reached beyond program members to affect their neighbors in sites that successfully implemented the model. Researchers hypothesized that these community-wide changes occurred because the suite of Jobs-Plus offerings reached a sufficient proportion of residents to "saturate" the developments. However, preliminary analysis from Urban using NYCHA administrative data comparing similar developments with and without Jobs-Plus shows significant development-level impacts on wages and employment for Jefferson Houses, but not for other developments, at least to date. The lack of observed impact may derive from not having sufficiently saturated developments that are newer than Jefferson Houses with all three components of Jobs-Plus for an adequate length of time. That is, as the first Jobs-Plus program introduced in NYC, Jefferson Houses' analysis captures a longer implementation period of six years. The data from other City-funded sites included in the study was assessed at about three years after their launch in 2013. This is roughly comparable to the period needed for sites in MDRC's original demonstration to begin showing impact.¹⁹

¹⁴ Kate Dempsey et al, "The Jobs-Plus Model: Interagency Collaboration in New York City" in *Models for Labor Market Intermediaries*, ed. Stewart Andreason (Atlanta: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2016), 12-15.

¹⁵ Internal NYCHA analysis.

¹⁶ MDRC. Sustained Earnings Gains for Residents in a Public Housing Jobs Program: Seven-Year Findings from the Jobs-Plus Demonstration. (New York, NY: MDRC, 2010).

MDRC. Promoting Work in Public Housing: The Effectiveness of Jobs-Plus. (New York, NY: MDRC, 2005).

¹⁷ MDRC. The Second Generation of Jobs-Plus Programs: Implementation Lessons from San Antonio and the Bronx. (New York, NY: MDRC, 2015).

¹⁸ Urban Institute (forthcoming).

¹⁹ While employment-related services were offered at the launch of all of the MDRC demonstration's Jobs-Plus sites, implementation of financial rent incentives and community support rolled out at different paces starting one and a half years later. All three sets of services were offered at all sites by three and a half years into the demonstration, although the quality of implementation varied.

Another potential reason for the lack of observed development-level impacts at most NYC Jobs-Plus sites is that NYC's implementation targets much larger developments than the MDRC demonstration sites. Because Jobs-Plus is presumed to work at least in part by saturating a public housing development with people attached to the program, this difference in development size matters. The number of public housing units in the NYC Jobs-Plus sites varies from 1,082 to 3,501.²⁰ In contrast, only Los Angeles operated more than one site during MDRC's original demonstration. Each of the two LA sites only targeted a single development, and neither development had more than 1,000 units. Moreover, while between 62 and 76 percent of people across all MDRC demonstration developments lived in units that received a rent incentive or enrolled in Jobs-Plus, the saturation rate of NYC's seven Jobs-Plus developments studied by Urban ranges from 25 to 60 percent. Five of the seven examined developments have a saturation rate under 40 percent.²¹

Urban has proposed conducting further analysis to explore the limitations of the available data and other key implementation challenges noted above, which may have influenced the development-level findings.

B. Place-based programming like Jobs-Plus is operationally intensive and expensive

Were it to serve residents of NYCHA across NYC, Jobs-Plus would need to expand existing sites and create new sites. Jobs-Plus services would ideally be accessed by residents in a space located within half of a mile from the targeted developments. This requirement could be relaxed to up to a mile to promote feasibility, but preserving the core component of community access would be important. For neighborhoods with a concentration of development clusters, it would be beneficial to identify program space on NYCHA grounds.²² Nevertheless, the cost for space for each new site would need to be budgeted at market rate.

Provider capacity may not exist to rapidly scale Jobs-Plus. The number of local, high-quality employment services providers is not limitless, and having the best ones serve significantly more people may create growing pains that reduce fidelity to the model and cause performance to suffer.

At an estimated annual cost of \$1 million per 530 people served, scaling Jobs-Plus from approximately 10 percent of NYCHA developments to nearly all of them would be expensive, and securing adequate funding will likely be the largest obstacle to undergoing a significant program expansion. The City would probably need federal funds to pay the tens of millions necessary to serve all or most of NYCHA's residents. These costs do not account for the potentially large expense of the rent-based financial incentive that is a core component of the Jobs-Plus model. The federally-funded EID is set to be discontinued in about a year, and there are no identical options for a replacement (discussed in more detail in Section IV.B below).

²⁰ This range includes City-funded sites. It does not include the new, HUD-funded Pennsylvania-Wortman site, which includes 335 households and has a significantly smaller budget than other NYC Jobs-Plus sites.

²¹ Urban's method of calculating saturation differs from MDRC's. Urban's analysis did not allow matching Jobs-Plus members to public housing units to measure saturation as MDRC's did. Instead, NYCHA and HRA matched members to public housing developments based on their reported addresses in the database used to track Jobs-Plus outcomes, and then calculated the percentage of all targeted public housing units that had at least one match for each service provider. The Urban numbers thus show the percent of units that ever had an occupant join Jobs-Plus, not the percent of units with a Jobs-Plus member at a specific point in time. While these are distinct methodologies, the large disparities in measures of saturation are still indicative of a real difference in saturation levels between NYC sites and the MDRC demonstration sites.

²² Many of these spaces may require rehabilitation, which are not accounted for in the budget included in this document.

III. Effectiveness of the Jobs-Plus program

The following table summarizes findings from four evaluations of Jobs-Plus.

<i>Promoting Work in Public Housing: The Effectiveness of Jobs-Plus</i>	
Evaluator	MDRC
Publication Date	2005
Study Period	1998-2003
Type	Impact study; Random Assignment of program to developments
Findings	<p>Four of the six study sites implemented full Jobs-Plus programs, but this took over two years to accomplish.</p> <p>Once Jobs-Plus was in place at the four sites, it markedly increased the <i>earnings</i> of residents relative to the comparison group. There was no program effect on earnings at the two sites that did not fully implement Jobs-Plus.</p> <p>The effects of Jobs-Plus on <i>employment</i> were positive at the sites that substantially implemented the program but were smaller and less consistent than the effects on earnings.</p> <p>The large positive earnings effect of Jobs-Plus in the stronger implementation sites held for a wide range of residents. However, there were especially large impacts for immigrant men.</p>
<i>Seven Year Findings from the Jobs-Plus Demonstration</i>	
Evaluator	MDRC
Publication Date	2010
Study Period	1998-2006
Type	Impact study; Random Assignment of program to developments
Findings	<p>Jobs-Plus increased average earnings for residents of the target developments by 16 percent over a comparison group in developments in which Jobs-Plus was fully implemented.</p> <p>Interestingly, the effects of Jobs-Plus on earnings were sustained 3 years after the program ended and even grew somewhat.</p>
<i>The Second Generation of Jobs-Plus Programs (SIF)</i>	
Evaluator	MDRC
Publication Date	2015
Study Period	2011-15
Type	Implementation and Cost Study
Findings	<p>Providers found it difficult to coordinate service delivery of the three main components of Jobs-Plus to development residents.</p> <p>Providers often placed people in low-wage work and found it difficult to serve people who were already employed.</p> <p>Earned Income Disallowance receipt was low.</p> <p>NYC's Jobs-Plus Collaborative, which includes NYCHA, HRA, NYC Opportunity, and OFE, was important to advancing successful implementation in the Bronx.</p>

Forthcoming Urban Institute Evaluation Report

Evaluator	Urban Institute
Publication Date	2018
Study Period	2011-15
Type	Implementation and Impact Study; Quasi-experimental methodology
Findings	Members were typically satisfied with the services they received. Using a methodology that compared people in the same development across time, there were large, significant impacts on employment and wages. Using a methodology that compared all on-lease residents of developments that had Jobs-Plus to all on-lease residents at developments that did not have Jobs-Plus, no significant impacts on employment or wages were found except at Jefferson Houses.

IV. Jobs-Plus expansion analysis

The legislation mandating this report specifies that NYC Opportunity “present what would be required to make the program available to all residents of public housing operated by the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA),” and we therefore outline below what an expansion of Jobs-Plus would entail. In addition, we recommend that any expansion of Jobs-Plus follow a gradual approach.

NYC Opportunity does not endorse an immediate citywide expansion of this program for two reasons. First, the evaluations described above only demonstrate a partial success of the program model to date. That is, Jobs-Plus is achieving significant results for individual New Yorkers that we are generally not yet seeing for entire NYCHA developments. In a phased expansion, the City would have enough time to assess the potential for development-wide impacts at more established sites. Second, a citywide expansion would be expensive and difficult to implement rapidly.

A. Expansion timeline

As discussed above, any expansion of Jobs-Plus would need to be gradual. A gradual expansion would allow the City to a) ensure that any new sites maintain fidelity to the Jobs-Plus model, b) continue evaluating existing components of the program, c) strategically adopt new interventions before scaling those that work best, and d) decide whether to expand the program citywide at all.

Several phased-in expansions would be required to achieve a full expansion. Any expansion should begin with areas with the greatest needs, such as those that have the highest concentrations of youth ages 18-24 who are not reporting work and are located in NYCHA communities that are geographically isolated and have few partnered local nonprofit organizations. Moreover, any large scale expansion of Jobs Plus would require a shift to a “hub” model, where each hub would be managed by a centralized provider delivering services to several sites. A transition to hubs would be necessary to scale Jobs-Plus as the number of local, high-quality providers is limited, but it would also bring multiple benefits. First, providers would at this point better understand how to implement all three program components to more effectively serve clients. Second, providers could establish employment services and community supports for work that meet the specific needs of developments and their surrounding neighborhoods, emphasizing the place-based focus of the Jobs-Plus model.

We estimate that the timeline for any full scale expansion would be approximately 15 years.

V. Budget need

In FY18, funding for Jobs-Plus totals \$11 million, which includes \$10 million in City funds and \$1M in HUD funding (which will end in 2021). The annual cost for serving 530 people is approximately \$1 million.

Reaching all working-age residents citywide would require serving 247 NYCHA developments (this excludes developments that do not have working-age residents ages 18-59). We estimate an expansion to these developments would cost between \$120 million and \$150 million, depending on the implementation strategy, the community needs identified, and the ability to share services across sites. Any cost estimates and budget proposals would need to be reviewed through and subject to approval by the City's financial plan process.