



June 22, 2026

Hon. Julie Menin
Speaker, New York City Council
City Hall
New York, NY, 10007

Dear Speaker Menin:

We write to express our concerns regarding Intro 501, which, as currently drafted, would undermine the institutional effectiveness of New York City's community boards.

Intro 501 would impose term limits on community board District Managers. District Managers are professional public servants whose institutional knowledge and long-standing relationships with residents, agencies, and stakeholders are indispensable to the effective operation of community boards. These positions are not political appointments, nor should they be treated as such.

At a time when land use and service delivery issues are becoming increasingly complex, community boards benefit from experienced administrative leadership. Mandatory turnover would unnecessarily weaken continuity, diminish expertise, and impair the ability for boards to effectively serve their communities. Community board members have universally told us that District Managers are the glue that hold community boards together. We have heard no concerns among our constituents on the performance and dedication of District Managers, so why would we disrupt something that is working?

As a former community board chair, you understand firsthand the important role that community boards and District Managers play in New York City civic life. We therefore respectfully urge the Council to reconsider this bill in its current form.

Sincerely yours,

Brad Hoylman-Sigal
Manhattan Borough President

Vanessa Gibson
Bronx Borough President

Donovan Richards
Queens Borough President



BRONX BOROUGH PRESIDENT VANESSA L. GIBSON

**New York City on Governmental Operations, State & Federal Legislation
Oversight: Community Board Resources and Structure
June 22, 2026**

Good morning Chair Brewer and the members of the Committee on Governmental Operations, State & Federal Legislation for convening this important hearing today to discuss how we can improve the functioning of community boards across the city.

Community boards are the most local units of New York City's government and provide a vital link between community members and elected officials and city agencies. These boards are made up of volunteers who are devoted to making their local neighborhoods a better place, and they deserve our full support to ensure they receive the appropriate support and resources so they can do their jobs effectively. Community boards have important roles when it comes to land use, oversight of agency delivery, alcohol and marijuana licensing, and more. They also serve as a forum for residents to make their voices heard in their own communities.

The proposed legislation, Introduction 322, which aims to alter the way community board members are appointed would not serve the interests of either the boards or the community as a whole. The proposed legislation would allow council members to appoint half of the boards instead of the current method of nominating members for the borough president to approve. While this may seem like a minor change, it has potentially far-reaching consequences.

The current process involves collaboration between the borough presidents and the local council members, but decision-making remains firmly within the borough presidents' offices. This is important for several reasons, not least because the borough presidents retain significant oversight authority over the members of the community boards, regardless of how the members came to be on the board.

The legislation does not contemplate several factors that would be affected by this change:

1. How would recruitment occur? The legislation would require the borough presidents to post, as part of the annual demographic report, "a description of any coordination with relevant council members as part of the recruitment plan." However, this does not require council members to take any action to recruit their share of the members, nor does it require the borough presidents and council members to work together in any way. Currently, all applicants must go through the borough presidents' applications, but we would no longer be able to take applications for prospective members we are not able to appoint.
2. How will trainings be handled? Currently, borough presidents have requirements to conduct certain trainings for community board members, and each borough president goes above and beyond to provide more training and orientation than is legally required. If the borough presidents are no longer appointing all the members, what duties would the

borough presidents have towards the members who are appointed by the city council members? These trainings and orientations consume resources in both funding and staff time from the borough presidents' offices, and this would result in borough presidents training members of different city agencies who are no longer appointed by our own offices, hampering our own offices' work.

3. How would Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) claims be handled? Currently, EEO complaints implicating the community boards are handled through the borough presidents' offices. Would this continue to be the case for members who are not appointed by the borough presidents? How would the appointing city council member for a board member involved in an EEO complaint be involved in the process?
4. How would codes of conduct be enforced? The Bronx Borough President's Office requires community board members to adhere to a code of conduct to ensure that each member comports themselves in a way that makes the operation of the boards successful and limits potential disruption of the boards' work. Would the borough presidents' offices be able to enforce a code of conduct against members who are not appointed by the borough presidents? What will be the city council members' responsibilities in ensuring that the board members that they appoint are behaving in a respectful and non-disruptive manner?
5. How would removal of community board members work? Under §2800(b) of the City Charter, borough presidents may remove members of the community board for cause, including for substantial non-attendance at meetings. The proposed legislation amends this provision by adding that the appointing council member may remove, but it does not take away the borough presidents' power to remove members. This section of the legislation must be clarified as to whether the borough presidents retain the ability to remove members appointed by council members. If such power no longer exists, how does this affect the borough presidents' authority to enforce the City's EEO laws or our own codes of conduct to ensure that the boards run smoothly and within the bounds of the law.
6. How is borough president communication with the boards affected? Currently the borough presidents' offices communicate with the boards, often through the district managers or the chairs, but also to all members directly. If half the boards are not appointed by the borough presidents, do the borough presidents have the responsibility to continue to communicate with those members? Will the council members take on responsibility for communicating with the members that they appoint?

While I welcome increased council member engagement in the community board process, and I will continue the strong collaboration with the Bronx members, I do not believe that this legislation would serve the best interests of the community boards in The Bronx. I urge the Council not to pass this legislation at this time and to engage in a more robust and collaborative process with the borough presidents and community board members throughout the city to determine the best way to move forward to ensure that the boards are operating to the best of their abilities.



OFFICE OF THE BROOKLYN BOROUGH PRESIDENT

ANTONIO REYNOSO

Brooklyn Borough President

City Council Committee on Governmental Operations, State & Federal Legislation

Oversight: Community Board Resources and Structure

June 22, 2026

Good morning, Chair Brewer and thank you for holding this hearing today. I am glad to see the Council giving its attention to community boards' dire need for resources.

First, I want to explain my opposition to the two bills related to community boards that are being heard today:

Intro 322 would give Councilmembers the power to appoint members to the community boards directly, rather than submitting their recommendations to Borough Presidents' offices. This bill raises major concerns about both logistics and equity.

Complying with the City Charter's mandates regarding board member appointments is a huge undertaking. My office has two full-time and one part-time staff who manage this process. It involves creating and disseminating the application, conducting outreach to potential applicants and recruiting them from all parts of the borough, appointing members subject to the mandates laid out in the Charter, tracking and reporting on membership data, and alerting existing members when their terms are expiring and they need to reapply.

In 2018, voters added new language to the City Charter that requires Borough Presidents to seek out applicants of diverse backgrounds, including with regard to race, ethnicity, gender, age, disability status, sexual orientation, and language, as well as other factors which the Borough President may consider important in promoting diversity and inclusion of underrepresented groups and communities. This language also dictates what information the Borough Presidents' application must collect, and required the BP's offices to submit a report every year detailing this demographic information and documenting both objectivity and efforts to promote diversity and inclusion in the appointment process.

Last year, my office received almost 1,200 applications for membership on the borough's 18 boards, and my team personally interviewed every applicant who responded to our interview request. My staff made recommendations based on these interviews, and we shared this information with the appointing Councilmembers. I ultimately appointed members based on staff recommendations, Councilmember recommendations, and ensuring that board membership reflects the demographics of the district and the diversity of our borough as described in the

Charter. I appointed almost all the applicants that Councilmembers recommended. The only exception was if the applicant did not qualify based on extra standards I have imposed to promote diversity and objectivity; for example, I will not appoint two members of the same household or staff of elected officials whose district overlaps with the community district.

Given that Intro 322 does not also update language from the 2018 Charter changes, should this bill pass, the application processes that Councilmembers develop could look very different from what my office does and is required to do. There would be no oversight to ensure consistency, so with up to five Councilmembers appointing to a single community board (due to overlapping district lines), one board could have up to six different member applications, which would create confusion and make data tracking nearly impossible. More concerningly, Councilmembers would not be required to consider diversity in their appointments, counter to the mandate that voters gave to ensure diverse representation.

In short, the process is working as-is. Councilmember offices simply do not have the resources to manage this process efficiently. My team and I take our responsibilities seriously, and our demographic report reflects this. With term limits coming into effect starting next year, there will be a significant increase in the number of open seats, requiring a well-coordinated recruitment and appointment process. Now is not the time to shift responsibility to under-resourced staff or to throw out the diversity mandate, especially considering that we already appoint based on Councilmember recommendations the vast majority of the time.

However, one action the Council can take to help this process run more smoothly is to pass Intro 625, which would change the appointment deadline from June to August. This would give Councilmembers more time after the budget passes to focus on candidate recruitment and appointment recommendations.

Intro 501 would create terms of employment for community board district managers. This bill is simply unnecessary. District managers are City employees, hired and managed by the board leadership. They are not elected and therefore should not be subject to terms. All community boards should already have an evaluation and removal process for staff included in their bylaws. If the existing process is an issue, board leadership can consult with the Civic Engagement Commission, which is Charter mandated to provide technical assistance to the boards.

Additionally, the Borough President should not be involved in removing a district manager. I cannot think of another job where someone is involved in firing staff who is not involved in the hiring or supervision of that staff. Once again, this would open the door for duplicative and potentially conflicting regulations, creating confusion and taking away autonomy from the boards.

These two proposals are distracting from what community boards really need to be successful – funding and support. The Charter mandates them with 22 responsibilities, including holding public hearings on issues facing their districts, creating annual Statements of District Needs and Budget Priorities, weighing in on local land use proposals, working with City agencies to

communicate information to residents and evaluate service delivery, and much more. Yet due to chronic underfunding, community boards struggle to carry out these mandates, let alone day-to-day work. Most have very small staffs, with little money left over to hire other assistance, such as professional planners or tech support.

As term limits approach, the community boards' staff need more resources than ever to support succession planning, in addition to all the previously identified work. Yet every year, the Council lets community board budgets go untouched during budget negotiations. They are often not even discussed during budget hearings. I urge the Council to give this more attention.

Finally, I urge the Council to support my proposal to the Charter Revision Commission on Government Efficiency to create a Community Board Central Office. Loosely based on the model of City Council's central staff, This Office would support existing board staff in numerous areas, including land use and planning, communications and technology, real estate matters, human resources, procurement, legal support, and training. This Office would consolidate community board support, and because it would be an independent agency, its services would be consistent across both geography and time, and it would not be subject to political whims, directives, or budget cuts.

Thank you again for holding this hearing today. I urge the Council not to move either of these bills, and to instead focus on real supports to help our city's 59 community boards succeed.

Testimony of Paul Seamus Ryan, Executive Director of the New York City Campaign Finance Board to the New York City Council Committee on Governmental Operations Committee on Proposed Int. No. 12-A: Requiring Disclosure of Digitally Manipulated Content in Local Elections

June 22, 2026

Good morning, Chair Brewer and members of the Committee on Governmental Operations, State & Federal Legislation. My name is Paul Seamus Ryan, and I am the Executive Director of the New York City Campaign Finance Board (CFB). Joining me today is First Deputy Executive Director Amanda Melillo. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding Int. 12-A of 2026.

The CFB is an independent, nonpartisan City agency dedicated to strengthening local democracy. The CFB combats the influence of big money in politics by amplifying the power of small-dollar contributions from everyday New Yorkers through our matching funds program. We work to eliminate barriers to participation by equipping New Yorkers with the information and resources they need to vote and run for office. Through our NYC Votes initiative, the CFB engages directly with voters and provides resources to make voting more accessible.

Int. 12-A, sponsored by Speaker Julie Menin, would require disclosure to the Campaign Finance Board when candidates for local elected office, or entities making local-election-related independent expenditures, create political materials or advertisements using artificial intelligence software capable of generating synthetic content. The CFB previously provided testimony on an earlier version of this bill, Int. 293-2024, on December 4, 2024.

The CFB acknowledges the Council's efforts to protect the integrity of our local democratic process as artificial intelligence technologies advance. The CFB has a unique perspective on this topic rooted in our dual mandate to serve candidates and voters. We sympathize with the perspectives of both. We wholeheartedly share your concerns about the ways that AI technology could be used to spread false information to intentionally mislead or deceive voters about Council members and other City candidates and officeholders.

At the Campaign Finance Board, we have placed a priority on learning about artificial intelligence. Ms. Melillo and I recently completed the Harvard Kennedy School *AI in Action* certificate course, we have formed an agencywide AI working group, and we are learning more every day. Nevertheless, AI technology is evolving at such a rapid pace that we cannot say with certainty how best to regulate its use in elections.

To that end, we appreciate that the amended version of this legislation meaningfully addresses our most significant legal and implementation concerns shared at the hearing in December 2024. By shifting from a prohibition to a disclosure model and naming the CFB as the agency in receipt of these disclosures, as well as naming the CFB as the agency responsible for implementing the new disclosure regime, the Council eliminated the greatest vulnerabilities to First Amendment legal challenge and clarified administrative and enforcement responsibilities.

The CFB is well qualified to administer and enforce the requirements of Int. 12-A. We receive disclosure reports from all campaigns running for city office and all independent spenders active in city elections, and we impose fines and penalties for violations of our campaign finance rules and laws. Importantly, this bill casts the CFB in a role we already play as a disclosure administrator—receiving, processing, and making public the information reported to us—not as a content regulator. For that reason, we are relatively confident in our ability to implement this new mandate, though significant resources and time will be required.

Shifting the strategy to a disclosure model means the Council would be placing an entirely new administrative and enforcement mandate onto the CFB. We want to be realistic about the timeline and resources that would be required to implement this legislation. We are still researching the exact technology and staffing costs associated with implementing the bill, but we anticipate that the cost would be steep and that it would take at minimum a year to implement after bill passage. This estimate includes both updating our existing candidate and independent spender reporting systems and building an entirely new internal system to receive and make public the provenance data and other similar ad information we would be receiving from candidates and independent spenders.

As noted moments ago, the legislation's shift from prohibition to disclosure largely mitigates the First Amendment risks present in the original draft. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld disclosure requirements against constitutional challenges over the past half-century, including in *Citizens United*, *McConnell v. FEC*, and in the Court's seminal 1976 campaign finance decision in *Buckley v. Valeo*. Over and over, the Supreme Court has recognized the governmental interest in providing the electorate with information necessary to make informed choices in the political marketplace. Int. 12-A serves this interest. To even further strengthen Int. 12-A, the Council should consider narrowing the law's application in several ways.

Int. 12-A incorporates by reference a definition of "synthetic content creations system" in the state Stop Deepfakes Act. The most recent version "E" of that legislation, which was

passed by the Assembly on June 4th, defines the term to mean “a class of generative artificial intelligence system capable of generating wholly synthetic content.” This is a very broad standard, encompassing not only ads that contain synthetic content, but also ads generated or modified using a system capable of generating synthetic content even if such synthetic content was not incorporated into the ad.

The earlier version of the Stop Deepfakes Act that was passed by the State Senate on June 3rd exempted from this definition “technologies such as red-eye filters or other technologies that are only capable of making changes to existing audio or visual content.” I will return to the significance of this legislative language in a moment.

Another aspect of Int. 12-A’s broad coverage is its application to “any literature, advertisement, or other communication.” Combined with the Stop Deepfakes Act’s definition of “synthetic content creations system,” Int. 12-A would seemingly require a campaign that uses generative text software like ChatGPT or Claude to draft or edit a fundraising email, for example, to report this communication to the CFB.

A third element of Int. 12-A’s breadth is that its candidate disclosure requirements are triggered when a candidate “makes, publishes, or publicly distributes” a covered communication. This language would seemingly encompass instances where a candidate or campaign staff member reposts someone else’s content on a social media platform like X, Instagram or TikTok—without spending any money and perhaps with no knowledge of whether the content was created or modified with a synthetic content creations system.

The Council should look to the federal AI Transparency in Elections Act (S. 3875), principally sponsored by Senator Amy Klobuchar, for an example of a narrower scope of regulatory coverage.

First, rather than covering all forms of communication, such as fundraising email created or edited with ChatGPT or Claude, the federal AI Transparency in Elections Act applies only to “an image, audio, or video that was substantially generated by artificial intelligence.”

Second, the federal bill’s coverage is narrowed further by exempting images, audio, and video that have only minor AI alterations, “including cosmetic adjustments, color editing, cropping, resizing, and other immaterial uses” that do “not create a fundamentally different understanding than a reasonable person would have from an unaltered version of the media.” This approach is similar to the version of the state Stop Deepfakes Act passed by the State Senate on June 3—an exemption that was removed from the version passed by the Assembly on June 4.

Finally, the Klobuchar bill applies only when a person makes a “disbursement for the purpose of financing a covered communication”—effectively exempting from the law candidate reposts of social media content. As an alternative or complement, the Council could apply the disclosure requirements of Int. 12-A only in instances where candidates know or should reasonably know that the media they are distributing contains AI-generated content.

Narrowing Int. 12-A in these ways might better serve the public interest. As currently written, Int. 12-A requires disclosure not only of malicious synthetic content but of *all* political communications that were, in whole or in part, created or modified using software that is simply capable of generating synthetic content. Given the ubiquitous incorporation of generative AI capabilities into design and other software, and the widespread use of ChatGPT, Claude and other text generation software, Int. 12-A could require disclosure of nearly all political communication.

The CFB may end up with a database filled with information about innocuous, immaterial uses of AI, muddying the water for journalists, law enforcement, and members of the public seeking information about malicious use of artificial intelligence for deepfake images, audio and video. We may inadvertently bury the needle of information the public wants and needs in a haystack of information that serves little or no public interest. Limiting the disclosure law’s coverage in the ways I suggested moments ago would help reduce the volume of extraneous information.

Even with the refinements we suggest, we want to be clear-eyed about the practical limitations of this regulatory approach, so as not to create unrealistic expectations. The combination of low cost, high quality deepfake technology and social media platforms enables bad actors to spread disinformation in elections with speed and effectiveness unfathomable just a year or two ago. Earlier this month, *The New York Times* ran a disheartening profile of the world’s leading deepfake expert, Professor Hany Farid, who has given up on his own ability to distinguish deepfakes from reality and moved from the Bay Area to a cabin in the Green Mountains of Vermont.

Unstated in the *Times* profile is that Professor Farid is an advocate for digital provenance systems of the sort reflected in Int. 12-A. However, the real utility of digital provenance systems is enabling people to trust verified images and video as true and to dismiss unverified images as untrustworthy. Digital provenance systems serve as a sort of digital media nutrition label. Candidates would likely comply with the disclosure requirements of Int. 12-A, and that’s a good thing.

Unfortunately, even with the enactment of Int. 12-A, the public will still have access to the equivalent of digital junk food created by bad actors who may be unlikely to comply with the nutrition label-like disclosure requirements of Int. 12-A. The increasing difficulty of distinguishing deepfakes from truthful media, combined with the anonymity offered by social media platforms and other Internet-based communication streams, may present enormous enforcement challenges for the CFB.

Nonetheless, we remain deeply committed to working collaboratively with the Council to ensure this becomes an effective piece of legislation. While we have outlined specific concerns today, our ultimate goal is to partner with you to provide realistic guidance on resources and funding needed, refine and improve the legislation, and deliver a bill that truly serves New Yorkers.

The CFB is committed to ensuring our City's elections are transparent and secure. Thank you for your time and your leadership on this issue. Amanda and I are available to answer any questions you may have.

TESTIMONY
presented by
Dr. Sarah Sayeed, Chair & Executive Director
New York City Civic Engagement Commission
before the
New York City Council
Committee on Governmental Operations
on the subject of
Community Board Resources - Civic Engagement Commission
on
Monday June 22, 2026 at 10:00 AM

Thank you, Chair Brewer and members of the Committee on Governmental Operations, for holding this hearing and for the opportunity to submit testimony about the work of the Civic Engagement Commission (CEC) in regard to Community Boards. My name is Dr Sarah Sayeed, and I am the Chair and Executive Director of the Civic Engagement Commission. I am joined by Benjamin Solotaire, Senior Advisor.

To begin, I'd like to give you an overview of the CEC's current structure, staff, budget, and programs. CEC consists of 15 Commissioners, eight of whom are appointed by the Mayor, two by City Council, and five by the borough presidents.

The Charter grants CEC broad authorization to increase civic participation, enhance civic trust and strengthen democracy. Our mandates include citywide participatory budgeting, language assistance at poll sites complementary to the Board of Elections, and assistance to community boards. We also manage the Taskforce for Racial Inclusion & Equity (TRIE) Neighborhood Initiative (TNI), a coalition building program that began during the COVID-19 pandemic and continues to strengthen community engagement. Our vision is to create dynamic civic engagement processes where communities who have been excluded from government are heard and affirmed in their civic power.

Today we are here specifically to discuss our work with Community Boards. Some of our accomplishments include:

- Since September 2025, the CEC has held 29 workshops in 11 topics for which we had 703 people register and 298 attend, and we have four more workshops coming up this week. Topics included Parliamentary Procedures (Motions & Amendments, Nominations & Elections, Committees, Efficient Meetings,); De-escalation Training; Affordable Housing; How to Use Artificial Intelligence, Social Media, How to use the Open Data Portal, and Disability Voters Rights. After hosting sessions, we post many of them to our CEC You Tube channel where we currently have 22 videos posted that have a combined 12,894 views.
- To remain responsive to the evolving needs of New York City's diverse population, and to support community boards in language access, we provide a yearly training on best practices for implementing language services as well as how to request language services from agencies. We do receive requests from boards from time to time for translation services, which we accommodate as budget allows. For interpretation service, we refer requests to MOIA or one of our trusted vendors. Finally, the CEC continued to make over-the-phone interpretation available to all community boards through a paid contract with Language Line.
- We work to make training more accessible and responsive to board members' needs and interests. We offer workshops at different times and days to meet members' busy schedules. We also provide

more personalized service for individual boards, including parliamentary procedure topics of their choosing and exclusively for their members. We are in regular communication with the Future of Community Boards Working Group discussing ways to improve services to the boards, including exploring approaches to the upcoming member term limits. At the request of Brooklyn CB 4 and Council Member Gutierrez's office, we are in the process of organizing a workshop on how boards deal with liquor licenses that will consist of a panel of board members who have expertise in that area. We expect that to occur in the fall of 2026.

- Lastly, in February we began a partnership with the National Civic League and Perfect City called Better Public Meetings NYC. This has included conducting surveys and interviews at 6 community boards, Brooklyn 4, Queens 6, Manhattan 3 and 11, and Bronx 7 and 9. Working with the Borough Presidents' offices, we are conducting a survey of all boards asking for their best practices and policies on public meetings. This coming July we will be hosting a public forum to discuss what we have learned so far and how we can implement the learnings. We will also work to form peer learning groups with Community Board members and staff. We look forward to reporting back on that work in the future.

Thank you for your attention and we are happy to answer any questions.



**THE CITY OF NEW YORK
BRONX COMMUNITY BOARD 6**

1932 Arthur Avenue, Room 403-A, Bronx, NY 10457

Honorable Vanessa L. Gibson, Bronx Borough President

Honorable Oswald Feliz, New York City Council Member, 15th District

Telephone: (718) 579-6990 – Email: BX06@cb.nyc.gov – Website: nyc.gov/bxcb6

MS. EVONNE CAPERS
Board Chairperson

MR. RAFAEL MOURE-PUNETT
District Manager

June 22, 2026

The Honorable Oswald Feliz
New York City Council Member
15th District, Bronx

The Honorable Julie Menin
Speaker
New York City Council

The Honorable Zohran K. Mamdani
Mayor
City of New York

The Honorable Gale Brewer
Chair, Committee on Government
Operations, State & Federal Legislation
New York City Council

Bronx Community Board 6 would like to join with our colleagues across the city in calling for a baseline budget increase for New York City Community Boards. We are heartened to see a renewed focus on service delivery in New York City's leadership and want to highlight the role Community Boards play in that process. Every week, residents call our Board offices seeking assistance with quality-of-life concerns with agencies like DOT, DOB, DSNY, and NYPD. Our Board's committees serve as the interface between these agencies and the public to learn about new initiatives and address community concerns.


For the past two decades, Community Board budgets have increased by about 1.5% per year, while inflation averaged 2.5%. This has effectively cut Community Board budgets in a time where Community Boards have taken on more responsibilities that continue to grow. Recently, Community Boards have reviewed and opined on six comprehensive zoning text amendments, the new Universal Affordability Program developments, Open Dining permits, retail cannabis licenses, Open Street applications, city charter amendments, as well as their ongoing review of ULURP actions, liquor licenses, and traffic redesign projects. The voters of New York City have chosen to amend the ULURP process to allow development to bypass the City Council (under certain circumstances), but not the Community Boards. If the city's assumptions with this proposal prove true, we will see an increase in the number of buildings that move through ELURP or UAP and will continue to be reviewed by their local Community Board.

What do Community Boards use their budget for? Most of our funding is used for staff salaries, with Boards typically employing 2-4 city employees, many of whom are represented by SSEU Local 371. Our Board, like many others, uses our remaining funds for our office operations and to support community programming. Bronx Community Board 6 has supported vocational training, educational workshops, National Night Out, health fairs, holiday toy giveaways, know your rights trainings, and more to address needs in our community. These events are often with groups too small to access

discretionary funds through the City Council or city agencies. Nearly all those events and programs are made possible by staff and Board Members using unpaid time outside of work hours.

Fortunately, we know that the City Council and Mayor value community service and local community input. The functions of Community Boards must be supported with an adequate budget to facilitate that input. With only approximately 175 community board staff citywide, we serve 8.5 million residents, as well as local businesses and community organizations. Please support an agency-wide adjustment of \$50K per community board to redress a 20-year funding gap. It is a small request in the budget sense but meaningful to the staff and members of Community Boards and the people of the districts they serve.

Regards,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Evonne Capers".

Evonne Capers
Chair
Bronx Community Board 6

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Rafael Moure-Punnett".

Rafael Moure-Punnett
District Manager
Bronx Community Board 6



Antonio Reynoso
Borough President

COMMUNITY BOARD NO. 8

1291 ST. MARKS AVENUE • BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 11213
(718) 467-5574 • BROOKLYNCB8.ORG • BROOKLYNCB8@GMAIL.COM

Irsa Weatherspoon
Chairperson

Michelle T. George
District Manager

June 22, 2026

Testimony Before the Committee on Governmental Operations, State & Federal Legislation

Good morning Chairwoman Brewer and members of the Committee,

On June 11, 2026, the members of Brooklyn Community Board 8 voted unanimously to oppose Intro 501, the proposed local law that would amend the New York City Charter by imposing four-year term limits on Community Board District Managers, subject to reappointment, and by granting Borough Presidents the authority to remove District Managers at will.

Brooklyn Community Board 8 believes that both provisions undermine the authority, independence, and effectiveness of Community Boards.

Under the New York City Charter, District Managers are city employees who are hired by and serve at the pleasure of their respective Community Boards. They are accountable to the boards that recruit, evaluate, and supervise them—not to the City Council or Borough Presidents. By imposing arbitrary term limits on District Managers, Intro 501 diminishes the discretion of Community Board members and interferes with their ability to retain experienced and effective administrative leadership.

Moreover, Community Board 8's By-Laws already establish clear procedures for evaluating performance, addressing concerns, and, when necessary, removing a District Manager for cause. These safeguards provide accountability while preserving the Board's authority to manage its own personnel decisions.

The proposal to grant Borough Presidents unilateral authority to remove District Managers is particularly concerning. Allowing an elected official to dismiss an employee whom they neither hired nor directly supervise is inconsistent with the structure, purpose, and independence of Community Boards. Such authority would disregard the extensive time, effort, and deliberation that boards invest in recruiting, selecting, and overseeing qualified District Managers.

At a time when Community Board members themselves are subject to term limits, the importance of experienced District Managers cannot be overstated. Long-serving District Managers provide critical institutional knowledge, continuity, and stability. They cultivate longstanding relationships with city agencies, elected officials, community-based organizations, houses of worship, local businesses, and residents. These relationships strengthen the Board's ability to advocate effectively for the communities it serves and ensure that important initiatives and concerns are addressed without interruption.

District Managers are professional administrators whose performance should be evaluated by the Community Boards that employ them. Intro 501 appears to treat these positions more like elected offices subject to periodic political review rather than professional management roles grounded in experience, expertise, and accountability to the Board.

For these reasons, Brooklyn Community Board 8 respectfully urges the Committee on Governmental Operations, State & Federal Legislation to oppose Intro 501 and preserve the authority of Community Boards to select, supervise, and, when necessary, remove their own District Managers.

Thank you for your consideration.

In solidarity,

Irsa Weatherspoon,
Chairperson



BROOKLYN COMMUNITY BOARD 13

1201 Surf Avenue – 3rd Fl., Brooklyn, NY 11224

(718) 266-3001

FAX (718) 266-3920

<http://www.nyc.gov/html/bkncb13>

ANTONIO REYNOSO
Borough President

JEFF SANOFF
Chairperson

EDDIE MARK
District Manager

June 12, 2026

To: Members of the committee and New York City council members at large

Thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony in reference to Intro 501, a Local Law to amend the New York City Charter, in relation to the terms of employment for District Managers. This bill would limit the term of community board District Managers to four years with the possibility of re-appointment, and provide borough presidents with the power to remove the District Managers at will.

With the multitude of projects and situations that take place within a community board, it stands to reason that a four year term isn't sufficient time for a District Manager to grasp the needs and issues of a diverse community.

Community Boards are now and have always been independent, non-Mayoral city agencies. They are advisory bodies on proposals, permits, events, and applications, and the overriding responsibility of a community is to be the mediator between the community and the city agencies. The community board's independence must be preserved, and the board's functions must be supported with a budget that works with inflation and with all city agencies and elected officials.

The idea that an elected official, the Mayor or Borough President, can fire the staff of another independent city agency for no reason is without precedent and against all regulations of the City Charter.

This proposal must be withdrawn entirely.

Jeff Sanoff
Chairperson, C.B. 13

Eddie Mark
District Manager



**BROOKLYN COMMUNITY
BOARD 14**
FLATBUSH–MIDWOOD COMMUNITY DISTRICT
810 East 16th Street
Brooklyn, New York 11230

June 22

Testimony to the Committee on Government Operations – ~~March 13, 2026~~

Good afternoon, Chair Brewer, Committee Members, Members of Council and those assembled today. My name is Shawn Campbell. I am the District Manager at Brooklyn Community Board 14. I am here to offer testimony on the need for a baseline budget increase for Community Boards. This is a request in CB14's District Needs Statement and Budget Priorities for FY 2027.

While this is the need I wish to amplify today, it is also important to note that it was submitted by CB14 along with an additional 20 capital and 27 expense budget requests. Not one of those requests received a meaningful response from a city agency. The responses are generally absurd. Community Boards engage in a long process and devote many hours to the CDNS to play our charter mandated part in bringing local community needs to the New York City budget conversation. That reflection of community needs deserves to be respected. It has been anything but by DCP, OMB and those at the agency level who select nonsense answers from a meaningless drop-down menu developed by DCP.

Community Boards are independent non-mayoral city agencies which have not had a significant budget increase in over 20 years. The average is a 1.5% annual increase over the last two decades during which inflation averages 2.5%. CBs are not keeping up.

Inarguably, we have far more responsibilities, more community demands, and greater technical needs than CBs did in 2002. Yet, we have fewer staff and relatively less funding with which to get it all done. Nearly all other city agencies have had significant staff and budget increases.

Brooklyn CB14 is struggling to continue events such as our annual youth conference which just took place this week. There were nearly 70 agencies, organizations and job providers who met with nearly 400 youth. Somehow, we will host our 14th annual nonprofit roundtable in May. I say somehow because we don't have the funds that we've drawn from in the past.

CB14 has one District Manager and two Community Coordinators. My last merit increase was in 2020. The last time staff received a merit increase was in 2023 and 2024 respectively. And believe me, they merit more! However, none of us will be able to ever get another merit increase again without a baseline increase (or the departure of a staff member to take advantage of a position with salary growth possibilities).

A baseline budget increase of \$50,000 or .02% of the city budget would be a worthy investment in local community service.

In addition to a baseline adjustment in keeping with our growing populations, growing responsibilities and the economy itself; CB budgets should be stabilized by tying them to a funding formula that considers full staffing minimums, or creating parity with another service agency, or a set percentage of a percentage of the citywide budget.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

NYC COUNCIL GOVERNMENT OPS HEARING MONDAY JUNE 22, 2026
10:00am

Good Morning, My name is Laura Singer and I am District Manager for Brooklyn Community Board 15, Sheepshead Bay, Gerritsen Beach, Manhattan Beach, Homecrest and Madison.

In regard to Intro: 501 (Williams)

Limiting District Manager's terms of employment. What City Agency Manager has a term limit? What Agency Manager would take a job outside of perhaps an Elected Official if they could potentially lose it in 4 years' time? Not all of us have that calling to be an Elected Official, but we still want to serve our Community's so this is the path we chose.

By placing term limits on District Managers, we wind up in actuality denying ourselves of some truly talented people who would never consider a position with a potential term limit.

Currently resourcing and attracting staff with our very small budgets has been challenging, now with the caveat of not being extended past a 4 year term would only further turn potential hires off. Board Members with historic knowledge are now being termed out so you want to take a potential long standing staff member with institutional knowledge and place them on the chopping block as well? To what end?

With a potential for a constant turnover of District Managers, you run the risk of having a new hire using

crucial time, learning the job, and focusing on procedures, giving them less time to devote to actually serving their community.

There is a natural progression and turnover that occurs. Limiting a person's capacity to serve will prove more of a deterrent to those who truly care and want to make a positive impact.

Boards have By-Laws that determine how employees are hired and terminated. Giving an outside agency, such as the Borough President's Office, who does not do the resourcing or hiring the ability to fire a District Manager seems quite frankly illogical.

Unfortunately, as of late, it has been open season on Community Boards, with legislation being created each and every day to silence their voice. This Bill, is no different, is just targeting another component of the Community Board, a key staff member that oversees its management which is just looking to further rip Community Boards asunder.

As Elected Officials you are entrusted to serve your communities to the best of your abilities, you should be visionaries to bring about positive change and amplify your Community's voice, not silence it.

This legislation just serves to incapacitate Community Boards further and I urge you as champions for your

communities to let Bill Intro 501 go no further than this hearing.

COMMUNITY BOARD 7/ MANHATTAN
– **JUNE 18, 2026 RESOLUTION** –

Date: June 18, 2026

Committee of Origin: Steering

Re: Opposition to Intro. No. 501

Full Board vote: 30 In favor 0 Opposed 0 Abstentions 0 Present

Committee: 11-0-0-0.

WHEREAS, [Intro. No. 501](#) would limit district managers to a four-year term and grant borough presidents the power to remove them at will, raising serious concerns about how community boards will retain experienced district managers and attract qualified candidates to the position;

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that Community Board 7/Manhattan **opposes** Intro. No. 501 as currently formulated and **urges** the Council to revise it in consultation with the community.

TESTIMONY IN OPPOSITION TO INTRO. 501-2026

Good afternoon, Chair Brewer and Members of the Committee.

My name is James McClelland, and I am the District Manager of Community Board 9 in Queens. I respectfully submit this testimony in opposition to Intro. 501, which would amend the New York City Charter to impose four-year terms on Community Board District Managers and grant Borough Presidents the authority to remove District Managers prior to the expiration of those terms.

I have dedicated more than 25 years to public service in New York City government and have worked closely with Community Board members, Borough Presidents' offices, city agencies, elected officials, and residents. Based upon that experience, I believe this proposal would weaken, not strengthen the effectiveness of Community Boards.

The Council is proposing a significant change to the governance of Community Boards without demonstrating that the current system is broken.

District Managers are not elected officials, policymakers, or political appointees. They are professional administrators responsible for the day-to-day operation of Community Boards and serve as the institutional backbone of neighborhood governance throughout New York City. District Managers oversee staff, manage budgets, coordinate municipal services, facilitate land use review, assist constituents, respond to emergencies, and maintain working relationships with dozens of city agencies, elected officials, civic organizations, and community stakeholders.

The effectiveness of a District Manager is measured not by political ideology or election cycles, but by experience, professionalism, responsiveness, and the trust they build within the communities they serve.

For decades, the New York City Charter has appropriately recognized that District Managers serve at the pleasure of their respective Community Boards. Those Boards, composed of local residents appointed by Borough Presidents, are in the best position to evaluate the performance of the District Manager and determine whether that individual is effectively serving the district. Intro. 501 would fundamentally alter this longstanding structure by shifting authority away from Community Boards and placing it in the hands of Borough Presidents.

This change would undermine the independence of Community Boards and weaken local control. If enacted, Community Boards could find themselves working under the leadership of a District Manager whose continued employment is determined by an external authority rather than by the Board itself. Such an arrangement is inconsistent with the Charter's intent that Community Boards serve as independent representatives of neighborhood interests.

The proposal would also create instability in positions that depend heavily upon institutional knowledge and long-term relationships. Effective District Managers often spend years developing expertise regarding local infrastructure projects, land use applications, budget

priorities, agency procedures, emergency preparedness plans, and neighborhood concerns. They become repositories of information and experience that cannot be easily replaced or transferred.

Community Boards already face significant challenges, including increasing workloads, complex land use matters, emergency response coordination, and limited staffing resources. The last thing these Boards need is a system that encourages turnover and uncertainty among their professional leadership.

Perhaps most importantly, Intro. 501 singles out District Managers for a form of employment restriction that does not exist for similarly situated professional management positions throughout New York City government.

Department commissioners, deputy commissioners, agency counsels, budget directors, operations managers, and countless other senior administrators are not subject to fixed term limits. Their continued employment is determined by performance, qualifications, and the needs of the agencies they serve. There has been no showing that District Managers present a unique concern requiring a special system of term limits and removal authority.

If term limits are not considered necessary for those positions, there is no rational basis for imposing them upon District Managers.

Moreover, existing accountability mechanisms already exist and function effectively. Community Boards have the authority to evaluate the performance of their District Managers and, when warranted, remove them. Borough Presidents already exercise substantial oversight through appointments, budget review, training requirements, and ongoing engagement with Community Boards. No evidence has been presented demonstrating a widespread problem that would justify restructuring the employment relationship between Community Boards and District Managers.

Good government requires accountability, but it also requires stability, experience, institutional knowledge, and continuity of leadership. Intro. 501 would diminish all four.

At a time when New Yorkers expect responsive government and effective local representation, the City should be strengthening Community Boards and supporting the professionals who help them function and not creating unnecessary uncertainty, discouraging qualified candidates from pursuing District Manager positions, and weakening local oversight.

For these reasons, I respectfully urge the Committee to reject Intro. 501.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

Valerie De La Rosa, *Chair*
Eugene Yoo, *First Vice Chair*
Donna Raftery, *Second Vice Chair*



Antony Wong, *Treasurer*
Emma Smith, *Secretary*
Brian Pape, *Assistant Secretary*
Mark Diller, *District Manager*

COMMUNITY BOARD NO. 2, MANHATTAN

3 WASHINGTON SQUARE VILLAGE

NEW YORK, NY 10012-1899

www.manhattancb2.org

P: 212-979-2272 F: 212-254-5102 E: info@manhattancb2.org

Greenwich Village ♦ Little Italy ♦ SoHo ♦ NoHo ♦ Hudson Square ♦ Chinatown ♦ Gansevoort Market

Hon. Adrienne Adams
Speaker
NYC Council
City Hall
New York, NY 10007

Hon. Lincoln Restler
Chair, Government Operations Committee
NYC Council
250 Broadway, Suite 1883
New York, NY 10007

Hon. Christopher Marte
NYC Council, 1st District
250 Broadway, Suite 1815
New York, NY 10007

Hon. Carlina Rivera
NYC Council, 2nd District
250 Broadway, Suite 1820
New York, NY 10007

Hon. Erik Bottcher
NYC Council, 3rd District
250 Broadway, Suite 1785
New York, NY 10007

Hon. Mark Levine
Manhattan Borough President
1 Centre Street, 19th Floor
New York, NY 10007

Hon. Speaker Adams, Chair Restler, Council Members Marte, Rivera and Bottcher, and Borough President Levine:

At our May 22, 2025 Full Board meeting, Community Board 2/Manhattan adopted the following resolution:

Manhattan Community Board 2 Resolution Opposing Intro 1065 Regarding Terms of Employment for District Managers

WHEREAS, Int. No. 1065, introduced by Council Member Williams, seeks to amend the New York City Charter to establish fixed four-year terms for district managers of community boards, with provisions for reappointment and removal by the community board or borough president; and

WHEREAS, under current law, district managers serve at the pleasure of the community board, providing boards with essential flexibility and autonomy to respond to the needs of their districts without the limitations of term appointments; and

WHEREAS, the proposed legislation introduces ambiguity and potential conflict by giving borough presidents the power to remove district managers mid-term, which could undermine

the independence of community boards and politicize the role of district manager; and

WHEREAS, district managers play a vital administrative and leadership role that requires continuity, trust, and close alignment with the board they serve; and

WHEREAS, fixed terms could disrupt the effective functioning of community boards by introducing unnecessary instability, discouraging long-term planning, and undermining board-district manager relationships; and

WHEREAS, Manhattan Community Board 2 (CB2M) was not consulted in the development of this legislation and strongly believes that any proposed changes to the structure and governance of community boards should include meaningful input from boards themselves; and

WHEREAS, the legislation proposes a significant structural change without demonstrating a compelling need or offering sufficient justification based on performance, transparency, or community engagement concerns; and

WHEREAS, CB2M values the ability to recruit and retain highly capable district managers based on performance and board needs, rather than rigid timelines or politically influenced decision-making;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that Manhattan Community Board 2 strongly opposes Int. No. 1065 as currently written; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that CB2M calls upon the New York City Council to reject this legislation and to instead engage in a thorough and collaborative process with community boards to address any concerns related to district manager oversight, accountability, and performance.

Passed, with 36 in favor, none opposed, 6 abstentions (J. Herrera, R. Kessler, P. McDaid, M. Perreira, B. Roessler, E. Siegel), and no recusals.

We respectfully request that the Council take action consistent with the position expressed above.

Respectfully submitted –



Valerie De La Rosa
Chair, Community Board 2/Manhattan

Copies: Hon. Dr. Nantasha Williams, NYC Council, 27th District
 Hon. Brian Kavanagh, NYS Senate, 27th District
 Hon. Brad Hoylman-Sigal, NYS Senate, 47th District
 Hon. Grace Lee, NYS Assembly, 65th District
 Hon. Deborah Glick, NYS Assembly, 66th District



THE CITY OF NEW YORK
MANHATTAN COMMUNITY BOARD 3
59 East 4th Street - New York, NY 10003
Phone (212) 533-5300
www.cb3manhattan.org - mn03@cb.nyc.gov

Andrea Gordillo, Board Chair

Susan Stetzer, District Manager

: Opposition to No. 322-2026, a Proposed Local Law Giving Council Members the Power to Make Appointments to Community Boards

WHEREAS, Int. No. 322-2026 would amend the New York City Charter to split community board appointment authority between Borough Presidents and Council Members, with Borough Presidents appointing one-half of a board's membership and Council Members share one-half of the member appointments; and

WHEREAS, the bill would alter the existing structure, under which Borough Presidents are solely responsible for all community board appointments, by giving Council Members direct appointing power over a portion of each board; and

WHEREAS, CB3 is concerned that dividing appointment authority across multiple offices would introduce administrative complexity into what is currently a streamlined and centralized process; and

WHEREAS, CB3 is concerned that without a single coordinating authority, the application, interview, and review process could vary significantly across Council districts represented on the same board; and

WHEREAS, because CB3's district spans more than one Council district, the board would be subject to multiple appointing authorities, rather than a single office responsible for the board as a whole; and

WHEREAS, the existing framework already provides Council Members with the opportunity to put forward nominees, and CB3 is aware of only one instance in over 20 years where a recommendation has not been appointed, which calls into question the necessity of this change; and

WHEREAS, CB3 is concerned that Council Member offices may lack the dedicated capacity to manage the full scope of responsibilities that come with a formal appointment process; and

WHEREAS, CB3 is concerned that shared appointment authority could make it harder to address representative diversity, commitment to a single reappointment policy regarding attendance, consistent standards for appointments, varied methods of recruitment which may generate lack of equity in different communities, and may make it more difficult to have objective standards not influenced by personal relationships, and

WHEREAS, CB3 is concerned that this bill would leave board members with an unclear sense of who they are ultimately accountable to; so

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that Manhattan Community Board 3 opposes Int. No. 322-2026 and urges the New York City Council not to pass the bill.

VOTE: TITLE: Opposition to Intro 501-2026, proposed legislation that would establish four-year term limits for District Managers, with renewal authority vested in community boards and removal authority vested in borough presidents.

WHEREAS, Int. 0501-2026, a proposed Local Law to amend the New York City Charter, would establish four-year term limits for District Managers, requiring community boards to reappoint district managers at the conclusion of each four-year term; and

WHEREAS, The proposed legislation would grant borough presidents the authority to remove district managers for 1) failure to attend at least 50 percent of full board meetings in a calendar year, 2) failure to submit or cause to be submitted an annual report 3) failure to submit or cause to be submitted an annual statement of community district needs, both of which reports are generated by community board members and not within the authority of the District Manager to create, and

WHEREAS, Community board's ability to effectively represent its district relies on continuity and stability in district manager leadership, and requiring periodic renewal of the district manager position creates unnecessary uncertainty and impacts staff retention and institutional knowledge; and

WHEREAS, The imposition of four-year renewable terms would deter qualified professionals from seeking and maintaining the district manager position, as such employment uncertainty is unattractive to civil service professionals and will result in the loss of experienced and effective district managers; and

WHEREAS, Community boards already possess the authority and procedures necessary to remove underperforming district managers, District Managers are subject to NYC Tasks & Standards provided by DCAS, and

WHEREAS, Proposed legislation represents a continuation of the erosion of community board authority and independence, by further reducing the Board's control over its own operations and staffing decisions; this diminishment of community board authority may be a diminishment of a City agency authority, therefore creating the necessity of a charter commission, and

WHEREAS, Community boards serve as essential vehicles for local democratic participation and local control, and legislation that undermines the Board's independence and authority weakens the foundation of community-based governance in New York City; so

THEREFORE, IT RESOLVED, Manhattan Community Board 3 opposes Int. 501-2026.

TESTIMONY TO NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL
JUNE 25, 2026

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & FEDERAL LEGISLATION

RE:

INT 0322-2026 - A LOCAL LAW TO AMEND THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER, IN RELATION TO GIVING COUNCIL MEMBERS THE POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS TO COMMUNITY BOARDS

INT 501-2026 - A LOCAL LAW TO AMEND THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER, IN RELATION TO THE TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR DISTRICT MANAGERS

My name is Mae Lee. I have been a member of Manhattan Community Board 3 since 2013. I have chaired CB3's Health Seniors Human Services/Youth Education Human Rights Committee since 2016. As a committee chair, I am also on the Executive Committee.

I oppose Intro 322 and Intro 501. CB3 has passed a resolution also opposing Int. 322 and Int. 501 and will be submitting it to this committee. My opinion is informed by my 10 years of experience in chairing a community board committee and being on the Executive Committee. The testimony below describes this - I am speaking for myself, not on behalf of CB3.

Intro 322

The current system of city council members recommending people for membership already allows them to have a say in appointing community board members. It is important for community board members to represent the demographics, backgrounds, perspectives and geographic areas of the entire community district. When I first applied and when I reapply, I fill out an application detailing my experience, what I've done at the community board, and I am interviewed by someone who doesn't know me. Not all may have the wherewithall to lobby a city council member to appoint them. As a committee chair, I greatly value members who are representative and knowledgeable experts about the community whether it be professional, personal, volunteer or any other learned experience.

In addition, the proposal in Intro 322 to have city council members directly appoint board members may silence the voices of community board members. For example, we are sometimes asked to support an initiative or bill that a city council member is championing. This means board needs to discuss and vote on a resolution. These discussions may involve a diversity of opinions. Board members may agree or disagree with all or some of a proposal. If a board member disagrees with a proposal being put forth by the city council member who appointed them, can their opinion put them at risk for not being re-appointed? Would they feel free to voice their opinion, or would they feel obligated to support because the city council member has sole power over their appointment? Community boards and city council members should work collaboratively to serve and advocate for and our community.

Intro 501

As a committee chair I greatly value the expertise and support the district manager brings which comes from many years of experience. While I and many of board members work directly in one of the

communities within CD3, the district manager, in her duties daily interacting with constituents, liaising with other government agencies via different avenues including a district service cabinet, provides a crucial overall expertise and stability that members just don't have and can't provide. My duties as a committee chair is outlined in a 9 page handbook that is posted on the CB3 website. I could not do my job without the district manager. A district manager could not adequately support the board if their job was subject to renewal every 4 years. The district manager would be someone on the lookout for their next job.

Intro 501A includes proposals on how a district manager could be terminated - less than 50% attendance at full board meeting for the year, and failure to submit or failure to cause submission of reports and district needs statements. CB3 has is a list of tasks and standards for District Manager that is based upon the city charter. These standards and tasks are much more substantive than attendance and submitting reports. (Our district manager goes to every full board meeting and in fact plans annual vacation time around the full board meetings. I believe that most other district managers are just as committed to their job) If a district manager is not going to full board meetings, and reports/district needs statements are not being submitted, this is likely a symptom of underlying issues that need to be looked and fixed by the board and its leadership, and should have been done long ago. Simply putting this in the city charter that the district manager be terminated is not the solution.

Thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony

Mae Lee



MANHATTAN COMMUNITY BOARD FIVE

Bradley Sherburne, Chair

450 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2109
New York, NY 10123-2199
212.465.0907 f-212.465.1628

Marisa Maack, District Manager

June 15, 2026

Hon. Julie Menin
Speaker
New York City Council

Hon. Gale Brewer
Chair, Government Operations Committee, State & Federal Legislation
New York City Council

Re: Resolution Opposing Int. No. 322-2026, a Proposed Local Law Giving Council Members the Power to Make Appointments to Community Boards

At the regularly scheduled monthly Community Board Five meeting on Thursday, June 11, 2026, the following resolution passed with a vote of 34 in favor; 2 opposed; and 1 abstaining;

WHEREAS, Int. No. 322-2026 would amend the New York City Charter giving Council Members the direct power to make appointments to community boards with one-half of each community board's appointed members being appointed by the Borough President and one-half being appointed by the Council Members; and

WHEREAS, the bill would replace the current structure, in which Borough Presidents appoint all appointed community board members, with at least one-half appointed from nominees of Council Members; and

WHEREAS, Manhattan Community Board Five (CB5) is concerned that Int. No. 322-2026 would fragment a currently centralized appointment process by dividing appointment responsibility among the Borough President and multiple Council Member offices, creating unnecessary administrative complexity; and

WHEREAS, CB5 is concerned that the bill does not clearly preserve a centrally administered application, interview, review, and appointment process, and therefore risks creating inconsistent processes across Council districts within the same community board; and

WHEREAS, CB5 is concerned that boards whose districts overlap multiple Council districts could be required to coordinate membership issues with several different appointing offices, rather than with one accountable appointing authority; and

WHEREAS, CB5 believes the current process adequately allows Council Members to recommend nominees and, at least on CB5, Borough Presidents have thus far appointed all Council Member nominees, raising questions about what problem the bill solves; and


WHEREAS, CB5 is concerned that Council Member offices are often smaller and may not have staff dedicated almost exclusively to community board appointments and member administration, unlike the Borough President's office; and

WHEREAS, CB5 is concerned that shifting direct appointment authority to Council Members could make it harder to resolve issues involving members, board composition, vacancies, and attendance as responsibility would be divided among multiple appointing authorities; and

WHEREAS, CB5 is concerned that the bill would create confusion about whether board members answer to the public, to the Borough President, or to individual Council Members, without producing a meaningfully different appointment outcome; therefore be it

RESOLVED, that Manhattan CB5 opposes Int. No. 322-2026 and urges the New York City Council not to pass the bill.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bradley Sherburne".

Bradley Sherburne
Chair, CB5



MANHATTAN COMMUNITY BOARD FIVE

Bradley Sherburne, Chair

450 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2109
New York, NY 10123-2199
212.465.0907 f-212.465.1628

Marisa Maack, District Manager

June 15, 2026

Hon. Julie Menin
Speaker
New York City Council

Hon. Gale Brewer
Chair, Government Operations Committee, State & Federal Legislation
New York City Council

Re: Opposition to proposed legislation that would establish four-year term limits for District Managers, with renewal authority vested in community boards and removal authority vested in borough presidents.

At the regularly scheduled monthly Community Board Five meeting on Thursday, June 11, 2026, the following resolution passed with a vote of 34 in favor; 0 opposed; and 2 abstaining;

WHEREAS, Int. 0501-2026, a proposed Local Law to amend the New York City Charter, would establish four-year term limits for District Managers, requiring community boards to reappoint district managers at the conclusion of each four-year term; and

WHEREAS, The proposed legislation would grant borough presidents the authority to remove district managers for cause before the expiration of their term, a power they do not currently possess, thereby increasing executive control over community board staff; and

WHEREAS, Community board's ability to effectively represent its district relies on continuity and stability in district manager leadership, and requiring periodic renewal of the district manager position creates unnecessary uncertainty and impacts staff retention and institutional knowledge; and

WHEREAS, The imposition of four-year renewable terms would deter qualified professionals from seeking and maintaining the district manager position, as such employment uncertainty is unattractive to civil service professionals and may result in the loss of experienced and effective district managers; and

WHEREAS, Community boards already possess the authority and procedures necessary to remove underperforming district managers, making the proposed term limit requirement redundant and an unnecessary burden on the board's time and resources; and

WHEREAS, Proposed legislation represents a continuation of the erosion of community board authority and independence, by further reducing the Board's control over its own operations and staffing decisions; and

WHEREAS, Community boards serve as essential vehicles for local democratic participation and local control, and legislation that undermines the Board's independence and authority weakens the foundation of community-based governance in New York City; therefore be it

RESOLVED, Manhattan Community Board Five opposes Int. 0501-2026.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bradley Sherburne".

Bradley Sherburne
Chair, CB5

Written Testimony of Adem Brija
Chair, Manhattan Community Board 11

Before the Committee on Governmental Operations, State & Federal Legislation

Re: Intro. 0501-2026

Good afternoon, Chair Gale Brewer and members of the Committee.

My name is Adem Brija and I serve as Chair of Manhattan Community Board 11.

I am submitting this testimony on behalf of Manhattan Community Board 11, which voted to oppose Intro. 0501-2026. The following letter was adopted by the Board and sets forth our position on the proposed legislation.

Thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony for the record.

Respectfully submitted,

Adem Brija
Chair
Manhattan Community Board 11

DRAFT

Re: opposition to New York City Council Intro 0501-2026 a bill would limit the term of community board district managers to four years

Dear Members of the New York City Council:

Community Board 11 Manhattan opposes Intro. 0501-2026, which would limit the term of Community Board District Managers to four years, subject to reappointment, and grant Borough Presidents the authority to remove District Managers at will.

District Managers serve as the chief administrative officers of Community Boards and provide critical institutional knowledge, operational continuity, and day-to-day management of board operations. Community Boards benefit from experienced District Managers who develop long-term relationships with residents, elected officials, city agencies, and local stakeholders.

The proposed term limits and at-will removal provisions risk undermining the independence and stability of Community Boards by creating uncertainty in a position that is intended to provide consistent and professional management. This concern is even more significant when considered together with term limits for Community Board members, as the combined effect would further reduce institutional knowledge, continuity, and the Board's ability to effectively

serve the community.

Community Boards function most effectively when District Managers are evaluated based on their performance and qualifications rather than arbitrary term limits.

For these reasons, Community Board 11 Manhattan urges the New York City Council to reject Intro. 0501-2026.

Written Testimony of Marie Charles Member, Manhattan Community Board 11

Before the Committee on Governmental Operations, State & Federal Legislation

Re: Intro. 0501-2026

Good afternoon Chair Brewer and members of the Committee.

My name is Marie Charles, and I serve as a Member of Manhattan Community Board 11.

I am writing in opposition to Intro. 0501-2026, which would limit the term of Community Board District Managers to four years and grant Borough Presidents the authority to remove District Managers at will.

Community Boards rely heavily on experienced District Managers to provide continuity, institutional knowledge, and professional administration. District Managers serve as the bridge between residents, board members, elected officials, city agencies, and community stakeholders. Their effectiveness often depends on the relationships they build and the knowledge they acquire over many years of service.

I am concerned that imposing arbitrary term limits on District Managers would weaken Community Boards by unnecessarily disrupting leadership and reducing institutional knowledge. I am also concerned that granting Borough Presidents the authority to remove District Managers at will could undermine the independence and stability of Community Boards.

These concerns are particularly significant when considered alongside existing term limits for Community Board members. Together, these policies would result in the loss of valuable experience and continuity at both the board member and administrative levels.

District Managers should be evaluated based on their performance, professionalism, and qualifications—not on arbitrary time limits.

For these reasons, I respectfully urge the New York City Council to reject Intro. 0501-2026.

Thank you for your consideration.

Respectfully submitted,

Marie Charles Member Manhattan Community Board 11

Written Testimony of Nilsa Orama, Member, Manhattan Community Board 11

Before the Committee on Governmental Operations, State & Federal Legislation

Re: Intro. 0501-2026

June 22, 2026

Good afternoon, Chair Brewer and members of the Committee,

My name is Nilsa Orama, and I serve as a Member of Manhattan Community Board 11. I have been on the Board since 2014 and have served as the Chair of the Board for two two-year terms for the period of January 2018-December 2021.

Please note that while I am noting that I am a Manhattan Community Board 11 member, the views expressed in this testimony are mine as an individual and not binding to Manhattan Community Board 11. I am writing in opposition to Intro. 0501-2026, which would limit the term of Community Board District Managers to four years and grant Borough Presidents the authority to remove District Managers at will.

Community Boards rely heavily on experienced District Managers to provide continuity, institutional knowledge, and professional administration. District Managers serve as the bridge between residents, board members, elected officials, city agencies, and community stakeholders. Their effectiveness often depends on the relationships they build and the knowledge they acquire over many years of service.

As a newly elected Chair in 2018, I can speak to the support needed and offered by the District Manager as the District Manager is involved in all facets of both the office and in community priorities. He made it his priority to ensure that I was as well prepared to guide the Board as he could make me.

The District Manager of Manhattan Community Board 11, Angel Mescaín, served as the Assistant District Manager before the Board took a vote for him to become the District Manager. This continuity of service allowed him to understand what was needed in all office support positions and offer support as needed not only to the office staff but to the Board in general.

The District Manager not only supports the Chair, but in our instance, serves as liaison to committees and has a wealth of knowledge that he imparts when

supporting the committees. During Covid, this was evident as the District Manager took the lead in helping the Board meet virtually and does this still.

With changes in board member structure every two years, it is important to have someone on staff who can help inform and educate both older and newer members and can speak with institutional knowledge as needed.

The District Manager is a hire who stays not for the money but for the love of the community and the work that he does. No one should feel that they are a temporary hire at the whim of someone else; especially when they are doing a good job. Imagine yourselves in the position that no matter how good a job you are doing, it is only for a finite time and subject to removal by the Borough President.

It has been my experience that we have had very involved, supportive Borough Presidents and others that have not been so supportive. I was very fortunate in that I had a very supportive and involved Borough President during my tenure as Chair; however, there are times when Borough Presidents only interact with the Chair during Borough Board meetings when they are informed of what is going on in the respective Community Boards.

As an example, during my tenure, we would inform the Borough President's office regarding attendance issues of our members and ask them about their removing members who were not attending as they vet the applicants and send us the final list of who will serve on the Board. We were always informed that it is not the Borough President's job but the Board's job to remove board members not in good standing. If the Borough President's office cannot remove members not in good standing, why should they have the ability to remove District Managers in good standing with their community and with the Board?

Boards vote when looking to fill open office positions in the Board Office so why should Boards now take a step back and have their ability to hire qualified individuals compromised as the hiring will only be for a fixed time? Why should a community be subjected to a new hire every 4 years; especially with communities like East Harlem that are undergoing tremendous housing growth in addition to the Second Avenue Subway, the planned Grocery in La Marqueta and continued placement of social services that are more than our fair share. Not to mention issues that all communities face that benefit from informed institutional knowledge and planning.

Board members are appointed and are expected to make a multitude of decisions

that impact their communities every day. Boards deal with different stakeholders who oftentimes have different priorities from the community. The District Manager is the face of the Board and the first one that most stakeholders interact with. As you are aware, Community Boards are advisory but their informed positions can have a great impact on the community. The District Manager ensures that the Board has the best information to make decisions. If Boards are trusted to take positions that will have lasting impact on their community, why is board judgement now being called into question regarding the District manager. The Board is astute enough to remove a District Manager if they are not working out.

As you can surmise, I feel that imposing arbitrary term limits on District Managers would weaken Community Boards by unnecessarily disrupting leadership and reducing institutional knowledge. I am also concerned that granting Borough Presidents the authority to remove District Managers at will, could undermine the independence and stability of Community Boards. How can one gauge whether a District Manager was removed for cause or for a personal reason unbeknownst to the Board? Automatically removing District Managers due to term limits and not for being ineffective is inefficient; the Board who voted to hire him should be the ones to start due process for removal if the Board feels it is merited. The Borough President would then be informed of any Board actions taken.

Borough Presidents are elected officials; the District Manager is a hire as any other; politicians serve at the pleasure of the electorate; I see a situation arising where a new incoming Borough President has the ability to remove a district manager not because it is merited but because of this legislation with no knowledge of the work done by this person nor in depth knowledge of the community and how this action can work against it. A person, and their livelihood would be impacted as this person would be removed by rote not due to merit.

Imagine, Chair Brewer and members of the Committee, if you were working in another capacity and were restricted to work for a period of time not by your choice; do you think that you would apply for this position knowing that you have a short window of time to be employed no matter how effective and that you can be removed by someone that does not oversee your day to day work?

The District Manager should be left to work without worrying about job security and any restrictions other than what their respective Board decides. Communities are the ones that will be impacted the most by this proposition and would lose out by having someone potentially removed from their position who has proven invested in his/her work.

These concerns are particularly significant when considered alongside existing term limits for Community Board members. Together, these policies would result in the loss of valuable experience and continuity at both the board member and administrative levels.

Manhattan Community Board 11's District Manager, Angel Mescaín has always shown the utmost integrity and professionalism in his work. The Board would be diminished with the possibility of him being removed after a certain period through no fault of his own.

District Managers should be evaluated based on their performance, professionalism, and qualifications by their respective Boards— not on arbitrary time limits nor possible removal by the Borough President who does not oversee the respective District Manager.

For these reasons, I respectfully urge the New York City Council to reject Intro. 0501-2026. Thank you for your consideration.

Respectfully submitted,



Nilsa Orama

Member Manhattan Community Board 11

Lifelong Community Resident of East Harlem



CITIZENS UNION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

Testimony before the City Council Committee on Governmental Operations, State & Federal Legislation

250 Broadway – June 22, 2026

Good morning, Council Members. My name is Ben Weinberg, and I am the Director of Public Policy at Citizens Union, a nonpartisan good government group that has worked for honest and accountable government and open and fair elections in New York for nearly 130 years.

We thank the Council for holding this important hearing. We will comment on two bills before you today, both of which tackle the democratic challenges faced by emerging technologies: Introduction 12-A-2026 from Speaker Julie Menin, which addresses AI-generated content in local elections, and Introduction 951-2026, sponsored by Council Member Shanel Thomas-Henry, which focuses on public servants' use of prediction markets.

Introduction 951-2026: Preventing Policymakers and Their Relatives from Trading on Prediction Markets Using Insider Information

Prediction markets present new risks for public ethics. An industry that allows betting on the outcomes of real-world future events creates opportunities for individuals who influence such events—or who are privy to the planning of such events—to abuse their privileged access for private gain. In several prominent recent examples, government officials used their special access to place bets on events they knew would occur, including military actions and executive decisions,¹ cashing in big sums of money.

¹ Department of Justice, "U.S. Soldier Charged With Using Classified Information to Profit From Prediction Market Bets" (Apr. 23, 2026), <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-soldier-charged-using-classified-information-profit-prediction-market-bets>; Bloomberg, "Prediction Market Bets Spark New Fears of Insider Trading on Iran War" (June 17, 2026), <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2026-polymarket-bets-iran-war-insider-trading/>; NPR, "A Polymarket Trader Made \$300,000 Betting on Biden's Pardons" (Apr. 16, 2026),

We commend Council Member Thomas-Henry for tackling this emerging field, and offer the offer the following comments on the proposed legislation.

1. Address this issue through the City’s existing conflicts of interest law

Much of the conduct targeted by Intro 951-2026 is already forbidden under the City’s conflicts of interest law, City Charter Chapter 68. If a New York City public servant had engaged in prediction markets trading of the type described in the examples above, they would have likely been investigated and penalized by the Conflicts of Interest Board (COIB).

Section 2604(b)(3) of the Charter prohibits public servants from using their position to obtain financial gain, and Section 2604(b)(4) prohibits public servants from disclosing “any confidential information concerning the property, affairs or government of the city which is obtained as a result of the official duties of such public servant and which is not otherwise available to the public” to advance their financial interests.

Importantly, those sections are broader than the proposed bill because they apply to all public servants, not only to individuals on the “policymaker” list.

To the extent that new risks posed by prediction markets are not covered by existing prohibitions, targeted additions could be incorporated into Section 2604 of Chapter 68, which lists prohibited interests and conduct.

That would make effective use of existing definitions, enforcement processes, and penalty levels, thus reducing confusion created by having a separate law and streamlining oversight. For example, Chapter 68’s definitions for “confidential information,” relatives, associates, and policymakers have already been interpreted in advisory opinions and applied in prior enforcement actions, making them useful regulatory tools in these cases.

2. Do not apply the bill and its associated penalties to relatives of public servants

The obligation to protect the integrity of public office rests on the public servant, not their spouses. Expanding COIB’s enforcement jurisdiction to public servants’ spouses, parents, or siblings would be legally fraught and difficult to implement.

<https://www.npr.org/2026/04/16/nx-s1-5786580/a-polymarket-trader-made-300-000-betting-on-bidens-pardons>.

3. Consider alternative approaches if council members find that existing prohibitions are insufficient to preserve public integrity around prediction markets betting:

- **Ban on job-related prediction market bets:** Prohibit public servants from trading on prediction market events where the subject matter relates to their official duties or their agency's decisions, regardless of whether they had direct involvement in a specific decision or information about the event's outcome. An executive order issued last month by North Carolina Governor Josh Stein has taken that approach.²
- **Full ban on prediction market bets:** The U.S. Senate has imposed the most aggressive restriction thus far, banning its members and staff from placing any bets on prediction markets.³ Lawmakers in several states have proposed similar measures,⁴ but such proposals raise legal questions and enforcement challenges.
- **Tailored definition of “nonpublic information”:** In consultation with the Conflicts of Interest Board, lawmakers can examine whether the current interpretation of “confidential information,” as defined in Chapter 68, adequately addresses all relevant prediction market risks, and if not, whether a tailored definition that applies to the use of other types of information should be added. Governor Hochul's most recent Executive Order on prediction markets is grounded on the existing State Code of Ethics' rules on using “confidential information” but adds new restrictions that apply to using “nonpublic information obtained in the course of [public servants'] official duties”.⁵
- **Require written affirmation of existing restrictions:** Administratively, public servants could be required to sign an acknowledgment that they understand and have complied with existing prohibitions on trading confidential information for private gain, including in prediction markets. Signing such a document carries

² Josh Stein, North Carolina Governor, “Executive Order No. 37: Establishing Guardrails Regarding State Employee Participation In Prediction Markets” <https://governor.nc.gov/executive-order-no-37-establishing-guardrails-regarding-state-employee-participation-prediction>

³ The New York Times, “Senate Bans Prediction Markets for Its Members and Staff” (Apr. 30, 2026) <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/30/us/politics/senate-prediction-markets-ban.html>

⁴ Spectrum News 1 / Associated Press, “‘New Ethical Concerns’: Ohio Bill Looks to Forbid Public Officials, Employees from Using Prediction Markets” (May 21, 2026), <https://spectrumnews1.com/oh/columbus/news/2026/05/21/ohio-bill-on-prediction-markets>

⁵ Governor Kathy Hochul, Executive Order No. 60, “Prohibiting State Employees from Profiting on Insider Information” (Apr. 22, 2026), <https://www.governor.ny.gov/executive-order/no-60-prohibiting-state-employees-profiting-insider-information>.

legal weight, as a person may be charged with a misdemeanor for knowingly filing a false affirmation.

Introduction 12-A-2026: Requiring Disclosure of Digitally Manipulated Content in Local Elections

Another emerging technology that carries democratic risks is artificial intelligence, and specifically the use of AI-generated content in elections. We thank Speaker Menin for confronting this topic.

Intro 12-A-2026 would require campaigns and independent expenditure committees to submit provenance data on AI-generated content to the Campaign Finance Board (CFB).

A key part of combating deepfakes in campaigns is ensuring voters know that the ad they are seeing or hearing was generated by AI. The most direct way to accomplish that is by requiring a disclosure on the ad itself - similar to the "paid for by" attribution already required under campaign finance law.

Such disclosure is already mandated by state law. New York Election Law Section 14-106 currently requires any campaign or committee that distributes political communications containing "materially deceptive media" to disclose that use to voters. This AI disclosure requirement, signed into law in 2024, presumably applies to local candidates and independent expenditure committees active in New York City elections. Enforcement of election law violations is under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Election and the Division of Election Law Enforcement, where investigative actions are often delayed or paused. However, the law allows candidates whose likeness was generated by AI to petition the court to force enforcement.

Intro 12-A-2026 would complement the existing state framework by creating a public paper trail of any use of AI in campaign material. The CFB will be the holder of such information. We note that under current city law, campaigns are not required to submit advertisements to the CFB - only independent expenditure committees are subject to that requirement.

We also flag one key technical point: The bill references state law provisions that had not yet been enacted. The specific statutory references may need to be updated as the relevant state law develops.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I am happy to answer any questions.



**Testimony to the New York City Council Committee on Governmental
Operations, State & Federal Legislation**

***Comments on Intro 12-A (AI Political Ad Disclosure) and
Intro 951 (Banning Use of Insider Info in Prediction Markets)***

June 22, 2026

Good afternoon Chair Brewer and members of the Council Committee on Governmental Operations, State & Federal Legislation. My name is Alex Camarda, and I am a Senior Policy Advisor for Reinvent Albany. Reinvent Albany is a watchdog organization that advocates for open and accountable government in New York.

Reinvent Albany supports the intent and spirit of both these bills, but believes the Council needs to better account for how these proposals intersect with existing law.

Int. No. 12-A (Menin)

Reinvent Albany supports disclosure of when political communications are created by artificial intelligence or altered by it.

The advent of social media and, more recently, artificial intelligence, have made it very challenging for New Yorkers to discern between truth and fiction in digital media related to candidates running for office and political and public policy discourse. Social media platforms are awash in communications where the sources are not clearly identifiable and facts and untruths mingle together. The growing use of artificial intelligence compounds this already significant problem, with videos, sound, and pictures reflecting reality altered to create a false impression with the viewer often unaware of the manipulation.

Int. No. 12-A takes a first step in addressing the growing challenges to voters making informed choices about candidates by requiring provenance data – underlying metadata indicating when political communications were altered and by what tool – to be disclosed to the New York City Campaign Finance Board (CFB) and made available to the public online. While not explicitly indicated in the bill language, this disclosure appears to be implemented in concert with the CFB's disclosure regime in its rules, and

subject to its existing enforcement procedures and penalties, the latter of which is referenced in the bill summary.

While Reinvent Albany commends the Speaker for tackling this issue, it is also imperative that the bill, at minimum, clarify that disclosure is required in the communication itself that simply states, “This (image, video, or audio) has been manipulated,” consistent with New York State Election Law. Reinvent Albany will only support legislation that contains this disclosure in the communication itself, because it ensures voters are informed in real time and can adequately process the message to make an informed consideration of the candidate running for office.

Beyond the recommended disclosure in the communication, there are several other issues the Council should clarify or consider before passing this legislation, [embodied in Governor Hochul’s Fiscal Year \(FY\) 2027 budget proposal](#) (specifically Part X in the TED-AI-Generated Content; Part S in the PPGG- Protecting Elections from Misleading and Deceptive AI Content; Part R in the PPGG- Preventing Voter Suppression in Elections) and contemplated in [briefs on the issue by national experts like the Brennan Center for Justice](#). Specifically, the Council should:

- Clarify in the bill summary or legislative intent how this legislation builds on and/or intersects with NYS Election Law 14-106, which already requires disclosure of “materially deceptive media” with few exceptions;
- Adequately define “synthetic content creation system” and “provenance data,” as the bill references section 1550 of the NYS General Business Law, which does not exist. In determining these definitions, the Council should consider whether to include personal identifying information (PII) as part of the provenance data, such as an internet protocol address;
- Charge synthetic content creation system providers like OpenAI and Meta with providing a tool to the public to read provenance data in political and policy-related communications, as mandated in The NYS FY27 executive budget proposals;
- Prohibit the creation or publication of a deepfake within 90 days of an election if the publisher knows or should know it was fake, it was intended to impact the election, and was made without a candidate’s or individual’s permission if they are featured in the deepfake, as was done in the NYS FY27 executive budget proposals. This will require considering constitutional permissibility.
- Clarify if copies of communications will be provided to the Campaign Finance Board and made public with the provenance data for communications sent by candidate committees. It is our understanding that, unlike independent expenditure committees, candidate committees are not required to submit originals or copies of their campaign communications until the post-election audit process, and are not posted publicly in the searchable database. If

provenance data is not provided until well after voters have cast their ballots, or is provided without a copy of the communication a voter can reference when reviewing the data, the utility of this disclosure requirement will be greatly diminished.

- Amend section 1 of the bill to not only reference new additions to the campaign finance database this bill requires, but also other disclosures beyond contributions and expenditures of a campaign's authorized committee. For example, reference to independent expenditure committees and other disclosures should be made.

Intro 951 (Thomas-Henry)

We support the intent of this bill to clarify that public officials may not use confidential insider knowledge gained from public employment to profit in prediction markets.

Governor Hochul recently enacted [Executive Order 60](#) that prohibits state employees from profiting from insider information that they learn while working as public servants. Reinvent Albany [supported this ban](#) because it clarifies the state Code of Ethics, Public Officers Law Section 74, and provides clear guidance to public servants serving under the Governor.

Intro 951 in its current form would create a diverging regime outside of Chapter 68 of the City Charter – the city's Ethics Code – which already prohibits using confidential government information for personal gain under Section 2604.

We urge the City Council to rework this legislation to ensure that it does not create a different enforcement regime from other prohibited conduct. Chapter 68 already prohibits profiting from confidential government information in Section 2604(b)(4). If the City Council wishes to explicitly include prediction markets in this prohibition, it should amend this section rather than include a new section of law in the Administrative Code with different definitions and covered individuals.

Specifically, Section 2604(b)(4) provides that public servants cannot disclose confidential information that is "obtained as a result of the official duties of such public servant and which is not otherwise available to the public," and they cannot "use any such information to advance any direct or indirect financial or other private interest of the public servant or of any other person or firm associated with the public servant."

Intro 951 would create a new Chapter 12 in Title 3 of the Administrative Code that diverges from some of the standards in Chapter 68 of the City Charter and Section 12-110 of the Administrative Code, the Annual Disclosure Law. Specifically:

- It creates new definitions of policymaker and relative. Chapter 68 applies to all public servants, and defines those “associated” with public servants, including children, spouses, domestic partners, and persons with whom the public servant has business or financial relationships. Intro 951 only includes policymakers and their relatives. Relatives under the bill include all those listed in Chapter 68 under “associated,” but adds stepparents.
- It would impose fines upon the relatives of policymakers who profit from insider information in prediction markets. Chapter 68 only provides penalties for public servants.
- It adds new reporting requirements for financial disclosure statements, requiring a listing of all transactions of \$50 or more for prediction market transactions – “event contracts.” Currently, the thresholds for reporting income start at \$1,000.

We also note that the bill excludes “event contracts” issued on platforms regulated by the New York State Gaming Commission. While this is likely an attempt to differentiate between sports betting authorized by New York State and betting related to city government or political actions that are regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, we caution that New York could decide at some time to regulate these markets.



NYC Council Committee on Governmental Operations, State and Federal Legislation Hearing Testimony

June 22, 2026, at 10 AM

To Members of the NYC Council Committee on Governmental Operations, State and Federal Legislation:

My name is Anna Humphrey, and I am the Transportation and Voting Community Organizer with the Center for Independence of the Disabled, New York (CIDNY). As you know, our organization serviced over 75,000 disabled New Yorkers last year, 75,000 of the City's most vulnerable population, people who are always looking for answers.

Thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony for today's hearing on addressing the destructive role of AI in elections.

CIDNY supports **Int. 0012 (Menin)**, a measure to amend the New York City Charter, addressed to the dissemination of materially deceptive audio or visual media in local elections.

We are living in a time where the democratic process is facing an unprecedented technological challenge. The rise of artificial intelligence has made it incredibly easy, cheap, and fast to create highly realistic, deceptive political materials and advertisements. While technology can be a tool for innovation, in the context of political campaigns, unregulated AI can be dangerous. It allows campaigns to fabricate statements, manipulate images of candidates, and invent entirely false narratives. Left unchecked, this content has the power to alter voter decision-making. The impact can be particularly destructive to people with disabilities, especially cognitive disabilities.

What makes this issue so urgent is that our voters are already overwhelmed. Navigating an election is already a challenge for voters with disabilities. Voters face significant barriers to information, from the confusing language found in ballot measures, to systemic access-to-information issues, to the voting process itself. When a voter is trying their best to discern who aligns with their values, the addition of unlabeled, AI-generated content makes an already challenging task nearly impossible.

This bill offers a common-sense shield against this confusion. By requiring candidates and independent expenditure entities to disclose the use of AI to the Campaign Finance Board, we are restoring a baseline of truth to our elections.



Further, the enforcement method of up to a \$10,000 civil penalty for each violation sends a clear message that our local democracy is not a place for deceptive technology. Transparency is the price of admission for participating in our elections.

The City Council should do more, however. A campaign message, be it a postcard or a radio or TV or internet ad, should contain a notice that Artificial Intelligence was used to produce the ad. If fake or manipulated voices are used, the ad should state, not in staccato fashion, that “the voices you heard are not actual recordings, but were computer generated.” There are already requirements in Federal elections, included in the **"Stand By Your Ad"** provision, of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, which requires candidates to state that they approved of an ad. If an independent group or political action committee (PAC) pays for an ad, they must legally identify whether it was authorized by a candidate. If the candidate *did not* authorize or pay for the ad, the ad must explicitly state that it was not authorized by any candidate's committee. These requirements should be enshrined in rules addressed to NYC elections, and the City Council should push the State Legislature to do the same.

For the sake of preserving voter trust and supporting voters who are already struggling to find clear, accessible information, I urge this committee to pass Into 0012, and then expand voter protection

This testimony is supported by Dr. Sharon McLennon Wier, Executive Director for CIDNY.

Thank you for your time and your leadership on this critical issue.

Anna Humphrey

Transportation and Voting Community Organizer

Center for Independence of the Disabled, New York (CIDNY)

ahumphrey@cidny.org

TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF Deaf and Hard of Hearing Access in New York State and City

Submitted to the New York City Council / New York State Legislature

Date: June 9, 2026 | Organization: New York City Black Deaf Advocates, Inc.

“Accessibility and communication access are not special accommodations — they are civil rights and essential public infrastructure.”

Introduction

My name is Charles Diggins, and I am submitting this testimony on behalf of the Deaf and hard of hearing community in New York. I am here to call on this body to take meaningful, enforceable action to ensure that Deaf New Yorkers have full, equal access to communication in every aspect of public life.

The Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law already guarantee effective communication access. Yet Deaf people are forced to fight case by case for interpreters, captions, relay services, and accessible public information. The problem is not a lack of rights. The problem is a lack of enforcement, funding, and accountability.

What Needs to Change

1. Strong Enforcement of Existing Communication Access Laws

New York must stop treating civil rights as optional. Deaf people should not have to file individual complaints to access a hospital, a courtroom, or a school. We urge this body to:

- Create stronger penalties for agencies, hospitals, schools, and businesses that repeatedly fail to provide communication access.
- Require faster complaint resolution timelines so Deaf people are not harmed by delays.
- Publish annual compliance reports by agency and institution to create public accountability.

2. Guaranteed ASL and TASL Access Across State Systems

Access should be automatic — not a special request. Deaf and DeafBlind New Yorkers must be able to communicate effectively in every public system, including:

- Hospitals and all healthcare settings
- Mental health services
- Courts, legal aid, and public defense
- Emergency services: 911, disaster response, public safety
- Public schools and higher education
- State workforce, unemployment, and social services

For **Deaf** individuals, this means qualified ASL interpreters, Certified Deaf Interpreters (CDIs) when appropriate, CART captioning, and fully accessible digital communication — on demand, without barriers.

For **DeafBlind** New Yorkers, communication access must go further. It must include:

- Tactile ASL (TASL) and protactile communication
- Qualified Communication Facilitators
- Support Service Providers (SSPs) and CoNavigators

These services must be available on demand, without barriers. CDIs are not a substitute for this specialized DeafBlind communication access — both pipelines must be funded and supported. New York must commit to training and certifying interpreters in both ASL and TASL.

3. Education Reform

Many Deaf students still experience language deprivation, delayed instruction, and inadequate support. Language access is a right, not a privilege. We call for:

- Early ASL exposure for Deaf children and their families
- State funding for bilingual ASL-English education programs
- Active recruitment of Deaf teachers, counselors, and school administrators
- Meaningful oversight of IEP implementation for Deaf students

4. Employment and Economic Opportunity

Deaf professionals continue to face barriers at every stage — hiring, promotion, and workplace communication. New York should:

- Expand hiring incentives for employers who hire Deaf workers
- Require accessibility standards in contracts with state vendors and contractors
- Fund Deaf-led workforce development programs
- Support Deaf-owned businesses through government procurement opportunities

5. Deaf and DeafBlind Representation in Decision-Making

The principle of “Nothing About Us Without Us” is not a slogan — it is a standard of good governance. Deaf and DeafBlind New Yorkers must have a formal, meaningful role in shaping policies that affect their lives:

- Appoint more Deaf and DeafBlind members to state and city advisory boards
- Establish paid consultation requirements with Deaf-led and DeafBlind-led organizations
- Ensure all public hearings are fully accessible and scheduled with Deaf and DeafBlind community participation in mind, including TASL interpretation, SSP/CoNavigator support, and protactile accommodations

Our Practical Agenda

We are calling for three concrete legislative and budget priorities:

Priority	Details
Deaf Access Act	Standardized interpreter timelines, emergency communication mandates, digital accessibility standards, and fines for non-compliance.

Priority	Details
Budget Priorities	Increase funding for disability and Deaf services; fund ASL, TASL, and DeafBlind programs statewide, including training pipelines for both ASL and TASL interpreters; fund SSP/CoNavigator services; and support Deaf-led and DeafBlind-led organizations.
Data & Transparency	Track interpreter and SSP/CoNavigator complaints, measure response times, and publish public accessibility compliance data.

Conclusion

New York does not need entirely new rights for every issue — many of those rights already exist. What Deaf and DeafBlind New Yorkers need is consistent enforcement, adequate funding, accountability, and Deaf leadership in policymaking. Without those, even strong laws fail in practice.

This includes a firm commitment to both ASL and TASL access. These are distinct communication systems serving distinct communities. Deaf New Yorkers and DeafBlind New Yorkers both deserve fully funded, professionally trained interpreters, facilitators, and support service providers — not one at the expense of the other.

Disability offices are too often underfunded and understaffed to enforce the laws already on the books. That must change. This body has the power to change it.

We ask you to act. Not as an accommodation. As a civil right.

Submitted by:

Name: Charles Diggins

Organization: New York City Black Deaf Advocates, Inc.

Contact: President.NYCBDA@GMAIL.COM

Clifford Hagen

June 22, 2026

[REDACTED]

Staten Island, New York 10312

[REDACTED]

Greetings,

On November 6, 2023 I received an email from the Staten Island Borough President's office asking if I might still be interested in serving Community Board 3 on the South Shore of Staten Island. I was excited to respond with a quick affirmative. The office returned my email with notification that I was to attend the next community board meeting on November 28, 2023. That evening I was sworn in as a proud member of Community Board 3.

I served my community well, attending each full board meeting and many committee meetings. I was proud to vote on a number of pressing issues, the City of Yes and other land-use concerns, cannabis shops, battery energy storage systems and more.

When then councilman Borelli announced his early departure from City Council in January 2025, more than a few people suggested I campaign for the special election to fill councilman Borelli's seat. My peer on the Community Board 3, Parks and Environmental Committee, Frank Moran, out-performed my efforts in that special election, but not the third candidate campaigning those months for that open council seat. Councilman Moran and I faced a third opponent in the special election, the youngest son of the Staten Island Borough President, Griffin Fossella. The campaign concluded with Councilman Moran the victor and I bested the Borough President's son by nearly 1000 votes. Yes, I am the only democrat to ever defeat a republican on the South Shore of Staten Island.

One month after the special election, having dutifully served the community board throughout the campaign, I returned for our full board meeting in May, 2025, just 17 months since being sworn in on November 28, 2023. Then, just a few days before our June meeting, I received an email from Borough Hall staff notifying me that I was being removed from my position on Community Board 3, 6 months before my initial two year term was through. The letter I received stated that the Borough President wanted to "make community boards more transparent and open to the public." In the media the Borough President went on to say he wanted "new voices" and was removing veteran members.

It was obvious to me and everyone else on Staten Island, even the editors of the Staten Island Advance, that I had been unduly removed from community board because I bested the borough president's son in an election. On October 23, 2025, the editors wrote, "Also concerning was Fossella's purge earlier this year of Community Board 3 members, including the removal of longtime environmentalist Cliff Hagen." "Hagen, it just so happened, ran against Fossella's son, Griffin Fossella, for the South Shore Council seat earlier this year."

The intention of Community Boards is the representation of the diverse, disparate voices of our communities. On Staten Island the Community Boards speak with one voice, the voice representing the Borough President for anyone who speaks out of turn, steps out of line, shares a difference of opinion, that brave person is removed from service. I know. I am speaking with you here today because one man, Borough President Vito Fossella, is deciding on which version of our story is told.

I strongly support the initiative allowing for each City Councilmember the opportunity to appoint half of the people to the Community Boards in their district, voices representing their local community at a community level. I thank Councilman Moran for proposing such legislation and I urge City Council to move this legislation forward so the people of New York City, not just the Borough Presidents, could have a say in governing their communities.

Respectfully submitted,

Clifford Hagen

Clifford Hagen

Draft Testimony Opposing NYC Intro 501 (2026)

Chair, Members of the Committee:

My name is **Margaret**, and I submit this testimony as a **Termed-Out Community Board Member** who has served my district with commitment, integrity, and deep respect for the democratic process. I ask that this statement be entered into the record when Intro 501 is heard.

Statement of Principle

As someone who has lived the work of community governance, I find Intro 501 to be an *insult to the democratic values* that community boards were created to uphold. These incremental changes — presented as administrative “improvements” — instead *diminish democracy* while still relying on *the people’s money* to function.

Our tax-paying society once collectively agreed that representatives should be elected from the body, accountable to the people, and responsible for carrying forward the issues of the community. The purpose was clear: to ensure care, attention, and opportunity so that residents could grow, thrive, and contribute.

Yet increasingly, it appears that elected officials would rather assume the roles meant for the community and silence the very people who called them to task.

Context of Democratic Decline

We are witnessing, across all levels of government, a troubling trend:

- **Institutions weakened**
- **Checks and balances eroded**
- **Neutral bodies sidelined**

The U.S. Constitution is being strained by current political handlers, and the dysfunction is visible to all. Our democracy is not a social gig or a stepping-stone for personal ambition. It is a shared responsibility.

Community Boards are essential because they sit at the intersection of:

- **Education**
- **Economy**
- **Transportation**
- **Human Services**

- **Health**
- **Land Use**

When harmful decisions are made, or when personalities overshadow purpose, who corrects the course in real time? It is the neutral community bodies — not political offices — that must be satisfied and protected.

Concerns With Intro 501

1. Politicization of the District Manager role

This bill risks transforming District Managers into political appointees beholden to elected officials and party structures — not the communities they serve. That is not what the role was designed to be.

2. Loss of Institutional Memory

District Managers are long-tenured civil servants whose knowledge of agencies, local history, and community needs is built over decades. A four-year term cycle weakens continuity, disrupts long-term planning, and harms neighborhoods.

3. Weakened Community Board Autonomy

Boards could be forced to retain a District Manager who does not meet the needs or expectations of the board. This contradicts the purpose of community boards as independent, community-driven bodies.

4. No evidence of a functional problem

There has been no demonstrated issue with the current at-will structure for District Managers. The real problem is the chronic underfunding of community board offices — not the tenure of their staff.

From: [sabrina.massey](#)
To: [Testimony](#)
Subject: [EXTERNAL] New York City Council
Date: Thursday, June 18, 2026 9:09:32 AM

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Report suspected phishing emails with the Phish Alert Button or forward them to [REDACTED] as an attachment.

New York City Council

June 22, 2026

Hi my name is Sabrina Massey and I'm on the Community Board 16. I want to testify against two of the Local Laws, the Local Law to amend the New York City Charter in relation to giving council members the power to make appointments to community boards. I don't think this is right, if the decisions is given to the council members, then the board would consist of the council members decision makers. That would not be a fair board. Leave the decision making as it is and let the council members concentrate on being council members.

My next testimony is for the local law to amend the New York City Charter, in relation to the terms of employment for district manager. Being a district manager is not an easy job, you have to learn a lot, do a lot, gain a lot of knowledge and experience. This takes time in order to become a successful district leader. If you change the terms of the district leader, then that's not giving the leaders enough time to become successful. This will affect the members and then the people. It would not be a successful board, this is harming the community and we work for the community.

Preconsidered Int.(Thomas-Henry) A local law to amend the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to preventing policymakers and their relatives their relatives from trading on prediction markets using insider information. I don't think this law should be amended, it's a law for a reason. Wouldn't this be considered as inside trading? Which is illegal, it would not be fair, if it is amended, then everyone should have the opportunity to have access to the information not just relatives.

Thank you, and I hope I have the opportunity to testify, this would be my first time and I'm excited to see the process and the outcome.

Sabrina Massey

Sabrina Massey

RE: Support for Intro 0322-2026

(As testified Live via Webinar)

6/22/2026

Good morning Chair Brewer and members of the Committee,

My name is Wayne Rosenfeld. I am a former ten-year member of Community Board 3 on Staten Island. Professionally I am the Executive Director of the East Midwood Jewish Center in Brooklyn. When I first joined community board, appointments were made through cooperation between elected officials. Recommendations came from different voices, different perspectives, and different parts of the community. The result was a board that better reflected the people it served. Today, community board members are ultimately appointed by a single Borough President. While Borough Presidents play an important role, no one elected official should have exclusive control over the composition of every community board in an entire borough.

Community boards work best when they reflect the full range of voices within a community. No single elected official, regardless of party or philosophy, should be able to shape the membership of an entire community board on their own. Community boards are intended to represent neighborhoods, not the agenda of any one officeholder. A shared appointment process promotes independence, diversity of thought, and better outcomes for the communities these boards serve. Council Members are elected directly by the communities they represent and often have the closest connection to neighborhood concerns and local stakeholders. Giving Council Members the authority to appoint half of the members creates balance, accountability, and broader representation.

New York City has 59 community districts. Manhattan has 12, Brooklyn has 18, Queens has 14, the Bronx has 12, and Staten Island has 3. Each community has its own character, priorities, and challenges. It is unreasonable to expect five Borough Presidents alone to determine the membership of all 59 boards. This bill does not eliminate the Borough President's role. It simply creates a shared appointment process, ensuring that more voices are involved and that community boards better reflect the communities they serve. For those reasons, I urge the Council to support Intro 322.

Thank you,

Wayne Rosenfeld

Former Board Member Community Board 3, Staten Island

THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: _____

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Alex Canada

Address: _____

I represent: Reinvent Albany

Address: _____

THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. 501 Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☒ in opposition

Date: June 22, 2026

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Jonathan Weinberg

Address: 1 Centre St.

I represent: Manhattan Borough President (Tad Hylton)

Address: 1 Centre St

THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. 501 A Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☒ in opposition

Date: June 22, 2026

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Shawn Campbell

Address: _____

I represent: CB 4 Brooklyn

Address: 810 9th St Bklyn

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. 051-202 Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: June 22, 2020

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Sandra McKee

Address: _____

I represent: Manhattan CBG

Address: 210 E 44th St. NY, NY

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☒ in opposition

Date: _____

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Camacho Robert

Address: Brooklyn

I represent: _____

Address: _____

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: 6/22/26

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Celestina Leon

Address: 1970 Bushwick Ave Rm 370 Brooklyn, NY

I represent: Brooklyn Community Board 9

Address: _____

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: 6/22/26

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Irsa Weatherspoon

Address: _____

I represent: B'Klyn Community Board 8

Address: 1291 St. Marks Ave B'Klyn NY

11213

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: _____

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: BEN Weinberg

Address: _____

I represent: Citizens Union

Address: _____

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. 501A Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☒ in opposition

Date: 6/22/26

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Karl-Henry Cesar

Address: [REDACTED] BROOKLYN, NY, 11226

I represent: MYSELF

Address: _____

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. 951 Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☒ in opposition

Date: 06-22-26

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: CAROLYN MILLER

Address: 2 LAFAYETTE ST SUITE 1010

I represent: NYC CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BOARD

Address: 2 LAFAYETTE ST SUITE 1010

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. 9501 Res. No. 2026

☐ in favor ☒ in opposition

Date: 6/22/26

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Dante Arnwine

Address: [REDACTED] Westrand Ave

I represent: Myself

Address: _____

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. 951 Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☒ in opposition

Date: 6/22/2026

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Ethan Carrier

Address: 2 Lafayette St. Suite 1010

I represent: NYC Conflicts of Interest Board

Address: 2 Lafayette St. Suite 1010

NY, NY 10007

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: 6/22/26

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Susan Stetzen

Address: [REDACTED] E3 St

I represent: CB3 + self

Address: _____

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. 12A-2026 Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: 6/22/26

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Amanda Melillo

Address: 100 Church St 12th floor, New York, NY 10007

I represent: Campaign Finance Board

Address: _____

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. 12-A 2026 Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: 6/22/2026

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Paul S. Ryan, CFB Executive Director

Address: 100 Church St, 12th Floor, New York, NY 10007

I represent: New York City Campaign Finance Board

Address: _____

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. 501 Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☒ in opposition

Date: 6/22/26

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: MARK DILLER

Address: 3 Washington Sq Village #1A

I represent: Community Board 2 M

Address: same

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: 6/22/26

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Rafael Mourc-Punnett

Address: 1932 Arthur Ave 403A Bronx NY

I represent: Bronx Community Board 5

Address: 11

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: _____

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Laura Singer

Address: [REDACTED]

I represent: Beckton Community Board 15

Address: 201 41st Ave, 1124 No NY 11231

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: _____

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Sarah Saeed

Address: 22 Reade St

I represent: Civic Engagement Commission

Address: 22 Reade St.

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: _____

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: BENJAMIN SLOTTAIRE

Address: 22 READE ST CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

I represent: ADMIN

Address: _____

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: 6/22/26

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: EMIL MICHA

Address: [REDACTED] 57ND

I represent: 10303

Address: _____