

COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY JOINTLY WITH  
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1  
CITY COUNCIL  
CITY OF NEW YORK

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TRANSCRIPT OF THE MINUTES

Of the

COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY JOINTLY WITH  
COMMISSIONER ON CIVIL AND HUMAN  
RIGHTS

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May 3, 2023  
Start: 1:16 p.m.  
Recess: 5:52 p.m.

HELD AT: COMMITTEE ROOM - CITY HALL

B E F O R E: Jennifer Gutiérrez, Technology  
Chairperson

Nantasha M. Williams, Civil and  
Human Rights Chairperson

COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL MEMBERS:

Shaun Abreu  
Ari Kagan  
Robert F. Holden  
Julie Won  
Kalman Yeger

COMMITTEE CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL MEMBERS:

Rita C. Joseph  
Christopher Marte  
Kristin Richardson Jordan  
Rafael Salamanca

COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY JOINTLY WITH  
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2

A P P E A R A N C E S

Michael Fitzpatrick, New York City Chief Privacy Officer

Ryan Birchmeier, Deputy Commissioner of Office of Public Safety from the Office of Technology and Innovation

Hillary Scrivani, Senior Policy Counsel at the New York City Commission on Human Rights

Daniel Schwartz, New York Civil Liberties Union

Albert Fox Cahn, Executive Director of the Surveillance Technology Oversight Project

Alli Finn, Surveillance Resistance Lab

Lisa Meehan, Mobilization for Justice

Robert Tappan, Managing Director of the International Biometrics and Identity Association

Jake Parker, Security Industry Association

Jay Peltz, General Counsel and Senior Vice President of Government Relations for the Food Industry Alliance of New York

Francisco Marte, President of Bodegas and Small Business Association

Stuart Reid, Co-Chairman of The Smart Community Initiative

COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY JOINTLY WITH  
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3

A P P E A R A N C E S (CONTINUED)

Adrian Gropper. I'm the Chief Technology Officer  
of the Patient Privacy Rights Foundation

Jake Wiener, lawyer at the Electronic Privacy  
Information Center

Elizabeth Daniel Vasquez, Director of the Science  
and Surveillance Project at Brooklyn Defender  
Services

Adam Roberts, Policy Director for the  
Commissioner Housing Improvement Program

Avi Kaner, owner of the Morton Williams  
Supermarket chain

3 SERGEANT-AT-ARMS: This is a microphone  
4 check for the Committee on Technology joint with the  
5 Committee on Civil and Human Rights located in the  
6 Committee Room, recorded by Nazly Paytuvi on May 3,  
7 2023.

8 SERGEANT-AT-ARMS: Good afternoon and  
9 welcome to today's New York City Council hearing for  
10 the Committee of Technology joint with the Committee  
11 of Civil and Human Rights.

12 At this time, please silence all  
13 electronic devices.

14 If you would like to submit testimony,  
15 you may at [testimony@council.nyc.gov](mailto:testimony@council.nyc.gov).

16 Just a reminder, no one may approach the  
17 dais during any point at this hearing.

18 Chairs, we are ready to begin.

19 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Good afternoon.  
20 I'm Council Member Jennifer Gutiérrez, and I am the  
21 Chair of the Committee on Technology. I want to  
22 welcome you all to our hearing.

23 We are pleased to be joined today by the  
24 Committee on Civil and Human Rights Chaired by my  
25 friend and Colleague, Council Member Nantasha  
Williams.

1  
2 Today, we will focus on the use of  
3 biometric identification systems in New York City.  
4 The hearing will also focus on the following two  
5 bills, Intro. 1014 sponsored by Council Member  
6 Shahana Hanif prohibiting places or providers of  
7 public accommodation from using biometric recognition  
8 technology and protecting any biometric identifier  
9 information collect. Next, Intro. 1024 sponsored by  
10 Council Member Carlina Rivera limiting the use of  
11 facial recognition technology in residential  
12 buildings, and we will also hear Resolution 296  
13 sponsored by Council Member Althea Stevens  
14 establishing a task force on missing women and girls  
15 who are black, indigenous, and people of color.

16 We are here today to address an invisible  
17 but urgent issue that affects all New Yorkers, the  
18 use of biometric surveillance technology in New York  
19 City. As we continue to evolve technologically, it is  
20 critically important to ensure that our laws and  
21 policies keep pace with these advances and  
22 particularly to protect the civil and human rights of  
23 all individuals. Biometric surveillance presents a  
24 unique challenge in this regard, and it is our  
25

responsibility as elected officials to thoroughly  
examine its potential benefits and risks.

In recent years, we have seen a  
proliferation of biometric surveillance technologies  
in our city including facial recognition software,  
fingerprint scanners, and iris scanners. These  
technologies have the ability to collect vast amounts  
of personal data on individuals including their  
physical characteristics, behavioral patterns, and  
even their biometric identifiers. In many cases,  
individuals are not opting in for this data to be  
collected about them. With cameras installed in  
nearly every corner of the city, including retail  
stores, concert halls, and street corners by hundreds  
of different owners including New York City, the  
potential for misuse of this data is profound, and it  
is critical that we establish robust safeguards to  
protect against abuse.

Facial recognition technology and other  
biometric information systems are constantly evolving  
and improving, but their accuracy and potential  
biases are still a cause for concern. As such, it's  
important that we implement reasonable and effective  
safeguards to minimize these concerns including

1 privacy issues, security breaches, and  
2 discrimination.

3  
4           As we continue to grapple with the  
5 complex issues surrounding biometric surveillance, we  
6 must ask some fundamental questions. How do we  
7 balance the need for public safety with the need for  
8 individual privacy? How can we ensure that these  
9 technologies are used in a manner that is transparent  
10 and accountable, and how can we protect against the  
11 misuse of the vast amounts of personal data that they  
12 collect? How can we best implement the advice of  
13 experts who are warning about the proliferation of AI  
14 technology that is intertwined with this kind of  
15 surveillance?

16           These are challenging and complex  
17 questions, but they are essential ones that we must  
18 answer to move forward safely and equitably. I am  
19 committed to working with my Colleagues on both the  
20 Technology Committee and the Committee on Civil and  
21 Human Rights to explore these issues in depth and to  
22 develop policy solutions that reflect the values and  
23 concerns of New Yorkers.

24           Oversight hearings like this one are  
25 increasingly important to protect citizens from an

1  
2 omnipresent, unregulated technology that hides in the  
3 shadows and benefits from a general lack of awareness  
4 and understanding about the ways in which it can  
5 flourish, profit off of, or hurt people.

6           Our goal today is to gain a better  
7 understanding of how this technology and the data it  
8 collects is used in our city and start to discuss  
9 what the best path forward looks like. We look  
10 forward to working with the Administration to  
11 mitigate any negative impacts that this technology  
12 may have on our communities. We're also excited to  
13 hear from industry experts and community advocates  
14 whose testimonies will be crucial in understanding  
15 the current issues and building better solutions. Let  
16 us work together to ensure that facial recognition  
17 technology and biometric data is used ethically and  
18 responsibly in New York City.

19           I'd like to recognize Members of the  
20 Technology Committee who are present today, Council  
21 Member Holden, Council Member Abreu, and Council  
22 Member Paladino.

23           Now, I'll turn it over to Council Member  
24 Williams.



CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thank you. Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Nantasha Williams, and I serve as Chair to the Committee on Civil and Human Rights.

This afternoon's hearing is one that I've been greatly anticipating. The role that biometric technology plays in our lives has changed in a multitude of ways over the years. From the early days of automatic photo tagging in social media to being able to unlock our personal electronic devices with one look, it's safe to say the rapid advancement of this technology has played a part in its wide usage. This use is not limited to our own personal devices but also includes usage by businesses, public and private spaces, and residential homes and areas. It begs important questions such as who is holding onto the information collected by these systems and what can they use it for, was it developed with equity and accuracy in mind. Biometric identification often comes under intense scrutiny, especially facial recognition technology, which can have major civil and human rights implications. Of the main biometric identifiers, facial recognition is said to be the least accurate. Accuracy rates are the lowest when it

1 comes to identifying women of color but the highest  
2 when identifying white men. Despite these issues,  
3 facial recognition technology is used widely by  
4 different individuals, groups, and organizations, and  
5 it is estimated that one and two American adults is  
6 in a facial recognition database used by law  
7 enforcement. This inaccuracy and collateral  
8 consequences of using these technologies are issues I  
9 hope we'll get to discuss during today's hearing.

11 I'm excited to be joined by my Colleague,  
12 Council Member Jennifer Gutiérrez, Chair of the  
13 Committee on Technology, and, as she just mentioned,  
14 today we'll be hearing two bills aimed at protecting  
15 the privacy of New Yorkers in the face of an ever-  
16 advancing technological landscape. While I have  
17 questions and concerns surrounding the regulation and  
18 usage of biometric technology in our city, especially  
19 in the context of discrimination and privacy, I am  
20 also aware of its potential to be a useful tool in  
21 protecting businesses and homes. This type of  
22 technology can even be used to help track and locate  
23 missing people, something that is on my mind today as  
24 we also prepare to hear Resolution 296 sponsored by  
25 Council Member Althea Stevens. This Resolution calls

1 on New York State Legislature to pass and the  
2 Governor to sign legislation which would establish a  
3 task force on missing women and girls who are black,  
4 indigenous, and people of color. As we consider the  
5 advantages and disadvantages of this technology, it  
6 will serve us all to keep in mind its potential for  
7 good as well as potential for misuse and evil.

8  
9 I will now turn it over to my Colleague,  
10 Council Member Shahana Hanif, for her opening  
11 statement on her bill.

12 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Thank you to Chairs  
13 Gutiérrez and Williams for holding today's important  
14 hearing and for including my bill, Intro. 1014, on  
15 today's agenda.

16 I was proud to introduce this bill last  
17 week alongside Chair Gutiérrez, Council Member  
18 Rivera, Chair Williams, and Council Member Sanchez.  
19 I'm grateful to Council Members Louis, Marte,  
20 Farias, Richardson Jordan who sponsored the bill as  
21 well.

22 Currently, the only protection against  
23 the private sector's use of biometric surveillance  
24 technology is the disclosure requirement established  
25 by Local Law 3 of 2021. While an important step, this  
is insufficient in protecting the privacy and civil

1 liberties of New Yorkers. Under current law, as long  
2 as a business puts out a sign saying biometric  
3 identifier information collected at this location,  
4 they can collect the facial recognition data of every  
5 person who walks through their doors then use that  
6 data to discriminatorily prohibit entry and sell the  
7 data to third-party companies for a profit. We've  
8 seen the inevitable civil liberty violations that  
9 occur as a result of our lenient laws recently at  
10 Madison Square Garden which has been using facial  
11 recognition scans to bar entry to employees of law  
12 firms who are suing them and assign additional  
13 security to Knicks fans who criticize owner, James  
14 Dolan. While very disturbing, this high-profile story  
15 only scratches the surface of the potential dangerous  
16 uses of this technology in the private sector.  
17

18           For example, a retail store could refuse  
19 entry to a shopper because their facial recognition  
20 system incorrectly determines that the shopper is a  
21 person accused of shoplifting. Studies have  
22 repeatedly shown that this false match situation is  
23 more likely to happen to people of color, women,  
24 trans people, and young people. Or a company could  
25 sell the biometric data it collects from unknowing

1 people at New York City stores to a government which  
2 could, in turn, use this data to help ICE carry out  
3 its cruel deportation machine. As a Muslim New Yorker  
4 who grew up in the post-9/11 era, I am all too  
5 familiar with the impacts of excessive surveillance.  
6 This is a basic civil liberties issue that our Body  
7 has a responsibility to take on.

9 Intro. 1014 would prohibit businesses  
10 from using biometric technology to identify or verify  
11 a customer. This would fully ban biometric technology  
12 being used in the ways I've just described,  
13 preventing discrimination and affirming our ownership  
14 of our own private data. While this bill is  
15 monumental, I want to emphasize this is not  
16 unprecedented. Portland, Oregon has passed and  
17 successfully a similar ban. Intro. 1014 exempts  
18 businesses that truly need to use biometric  
19 technology to carry out core functions such as  
20 ophthalmologists from this ban. This exemption  
21 explicitly does not apply to stores who want to use  
22 biometric technology for the purposes of loss  
23 prevention. While our city does need to address the  
24 issue of retail theft in order to help our businesses  
25 thrive, this harmful technology is not the way to do

1 it. As evidenced by the relatively limited use of  
2 this technology in the city, it is not an essential  
3 security tool. I want to be clear that typical tools  
4 like video monitoring are not impacted by this bill.  
5

6           The bill does allow for the collection of  
7 biometric data under very limited circumstances such  
8 as a customer proactively opting into the Pay by  
9 Palmprint Payment mechanism at a grocery store. Under  
10 the bill, a company would have to receive written  
11 consent from the customer before collecting the data,  
12 and service could not be denied to a customer who  
13 rejects data collection.

14           For cases in which a customer consents to  
15 data collection, the bill establishes the following  
16 important consumer protections:

17           One, the customer would be allowed to ask  
18 for data to be deleted at any time.

19           The data would have to be deleted after  
20 its initial purpose is served or after two years,  
21 whichever comes first.

22           Third, the company would be required to  
23 publicly share its data retention schedule.  
24  
25

1  
2           Fourth, the company would be required to  
3 implement safeguards to prevent data from being  
4 stolen.

5           I want to thank the incredible Ban the  
6 Scan Coalition who we just rallied outside with and  
7 who are here to testify in support of Intro. 1014.  
8 The Coalition includes racial justice leaders like  
9 the National Action Network, civil and human rights  
10 institutions like NYCLU and Amnesty International,  
11 decarceration advocates like Freedom to Thrive, and  
12 technology experts like STOP and Fight for the  
13 Future. The broad diversity of supporters speaks to  
14 the harm that biometric surveillance creates and how  
15 urgent this bill is. Their insight has been essential  
16 in putting together our legislation, and I welcome  
17 any recommendations they have on how it can be  
18 further strengthened.

19           I also want to state my support for  
20 Council Member Rivera's Intro. 1024, which I am proud  
21 to co-prime sponsor, and amplify the Coalition's call  
22 for legislation that would ban government use of  
23 biometric surveillance as well.

24           I'll know pass it back to Chair  
25 Gutiérrez.

1  
2 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you,  
3 Council Member Hanif, and I understand that Council  
4 Member Rivera has a statement.

5 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Sorry. Right  
6 before Council Member Rivera goes to do her opening  
7 statement on her bill, I just want to acknowledge the  
8 Members of the Civil and Human Rights Committee that  
9 are here today, Council Members Marte and Richardson  
10 Jordan. On to you, Council Member.

11 COUNCIL MEMBER RIVERA: Thank you so much.  
12 Thank you to the Chairs for holding this important  
13 oversight hearing and for the opportunity to deliver  
14 these opening remarks.

15 There is a persistent housing crisis in  
16 New York City, and, as a former housing organizer and  
17 current Council Member, I know that we must use every  
18 tool at our disposal to protect tenants and their  
19 access to safe and affordable housing. Currently, we  
20 are seeing more landlords implementing technological  
21 solutions to enhance quality of life and security for  
22 residents. But when it comes to facial recognition  
23 and biometric identifier systems, there is a gap in  
24 the regulatory framework that can lead to negative  
25 impacts.



1  
2           Many New Yorkers share serious concerns  
3 when it comes to the use of facial recognition  
4 technology and biometrics in different settings, and  
5 these concerns are valid and backed by data from  
6 common user misidentification to the potential to  
7 increase the presence and accuracy of surveillance,  
8 and it falls on governments to establish safeguards  
9 that protect rights and increase transparency.

10           Alongside Colleagues and advocates, I  
11 have introduced legislation to limit the use of  
12 facial recognition technology in residential  
13 buildings to ensure New Yorkers do not have their  
14 rights violated and are not excluded or discriminated  
15 against.

16           The concerns New Yorkers have about the  
17 use of facial recognition technology and biometric  
18 identifier systems are real as some have pointed out  
19 that this type of technology could further fuel  
20 gentrification and even displacement of legacy  
21 communities. The Anti-Eviction Mapping Project  
22 published a report in 2021 focused on the New York  
23 City housing market with narratives from tenants on  
24 how facial recognition technology and biometric  
25 identifier systems negatively impact their quality of

1 life and even create a carceral-like environment in  
2 the home. Landlords can leverage these technologies  
3 to harass tenants by shaking them down for rent and  
4 leveling petty lease violations that can lead to  
5 eviction. It's a vicious housing market right now  
6 with unfettered price raises and displacement. Our  
7 city's black population has declined by 200,000  
8 people over the past two decades, and I think about  
9 the various factors that lead to the inability of  
10 historically marginalized and low-income households  
11 to stay here. The rapid expansion of technology is  
12 absolutely a pressure that leads to displacement, and  
13 it could erode what should be a very diverse  
14 collective identity of our city. While technological  
15 upgrades can certainly provide a benefit, no doubt,  
16 it is our responsibility to ensure that all New  
17 Yorkers are protected and that we use technology  
18 humanely and appropriately and take into account when  
19 it can have negative effects on our civil rights.  
20 Housing is a human right, and this legislation seeks  
21 to strengthen this.

22  
23 Thank you very much and, with that, I'll  
24 turn it back over to Chair Williams.

CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thank you. I'd also just like to recognize Council Member Kagan who has joined us from the Technology Committee and Council Member Won from the Technology Committee. Welcome.

COMMITTEE COUNSEL BYHOVSKY: Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you, Council Members for your excellent (INAUDIBLE).

I'm Irene Byhovsky. I'm the Council to the Committee on Technology, and I will be moderating this hearing today.

Now, we move to the testimony from the Administration. Today, we are privileged to have New York City Chief Privacy Officer Michael Fitzpatrick with us to provide his testimony. Additionally, we have Ryan Birchmeier, Deputy Commissioner of Office of Public Safety from the Office of Technology and Innovation and Hillary Scrivani, the Senior Policy Counsel at the New York City Commission on Human Rights to address any questions that might arise during the hearing.

Before we begin, I kindly ask you to raise your right hand. Thank you.

1 Do you affirm or swear to tell the truth,  
2 the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before the  
3 Committee today and to respond honestly to Council  
4 Member questions?  
5

6 ADMINISTRATION: (INAUDIBLE)

7 COMMITTEE COUNSEL BYHOVSKY: Thank you.  
8 You may begin your testimony.

9 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Good  
10 afternoon, Chairs Gutiérrez and Williams and  
11 Members of the City Council Committees on  
12 Technology and Civil and Human Rights. My name is  
13 Michael Fitzpatrick. I am the Chief Privacy  
14 Officer for the City of New York. I am joined  
15 today by Ryan Birchmeier, Deputy Commissioner for  
16 Public Information at the Office of Technology and  
17 Innovation. We thank you for the opportunity to  
18 highlight my office's critical work strengthening  
19 privacy policy and protecting New Yorkers'  
20 identifying information.

21 For those who are unfamiliar with my  
22 role, it was established by Local Laws 245 and 247  
23 of 2017, otherwise known as the Identifying  
24 Information Law. Implementation of this law began  
25 in 2018. Subsequent legislation formally

1 established the Office of Information Privacy,  
2 which I am responsible for leading, and Executive  
3 Order 3 of 2022 placed the Office of Information  
4 Privacy under the Office of Technology and  
5 Innovation as part of the wider consolidation of  
6 technology offices. Embedding the Chief Privacy  
7 Officer role within the Office of Technology and  
8 Innovation has enhanced the consideration of  
9 privacy in government operations and initiatives,  
10 particularly in matters of technology, by  
11 integrating core values such as transparency, data  
12 minimization, data integrity, and equity into our  
13 agency's work and citywide in close collaboration  
14 with our agency partners.  
15

16           As Chief Privacy Officer, I am  
17 responsible for advancing privacy protection in  
18 government operations and establishing citywide  
19 policies and protocols related to agencies'  
20 collection, disclosure, and retention of  
21 identifying information. A core objective is the  
22 promotion and maintenance of public trust,  
23 particularly through clear governance for the  
24 handling of identifying information across  
25 agencies to provide confidence to New Yorkers that

1 it is safe to seek and access assistance and  
2 services.  
3

4 My office is not alone in citywide  
5 privacy protection. Critical partners in this work  
6 are the Agency Privacy Officers embedded within  
7 each city agency pursuant to the Identifying  
8 Information Law. Our Agency Privacy Officers are  
9 appointed by their respective agency heads to be  
10 stewards of their agency's privacy practices and  
11 make decisions about how their agency collects,  
12 retains, and discloses identifying information.

13 Additionally, as the Council is aware,  
14 the work of setting citywide privacy policy is  
15 supported by the Citywide Privacy Protection  
16 Committee. Pursuant to the Identifying Information  
17 Law, each agency must biennially report their  
18 policies and practices regarding the collection,  
19 retention, and disclosure of identifying  
20 information to the Mayor, the Speaker of the City  
21 Council, and the Chief Privacy Officer. The  
22 Citywide Privacy Protection Committee bears the  
23 statutory responsibility of reviewing submitted  
24 agency reports and developing recommendations for  
25 the Chief Privacy Officer relating to policies and

1 procedures regarding the collection, retention,  
2 and disclosure of identifying information.

3  
4 Through this charge, the Committee is a  
5 partner in improving the privacy posture of New  
6 York City government operations while factoring in  
7 the unique missions, subject matter, and legal  
8 obligations of its agencies. The Identifying  
9 Information Law defines the committee's  
10 membership, with certain agencies as mandatory  
11 members, and lends the Mayor the authority to add  
12 other agencies with expertise relevant to  
13 protecting identifying information.

14 Just last month, the Citywide Privacy  
15 Protection Committee was relaunched with its role  
16 expanded beyond the review of agency privacy  
17 reports to include an advisory capacity to the  
18 Chief Privacy Officer on matters relating to  
19 emerging technology and current events. The  
20 reimagined committee provides space for  
21 communication across agency expertise to further  
22 enhance citywide privacy policies, affords the  
23 opportunity for its membership to remain active  
24 outside of the biennial review of agency privacy  
25 reporting, and facilitates an even stronger

community of privacy practice across city  
government.

I expect the expertise and perspective  
of the Committee will prove invaluable in  
discussion of privacy policy relating to potential  
agency use of biometric identification systems. As  
the Council is aware, biometrics is a category of  
information explicitly defined as identifying  
information in the Identifying Information Law.  
Any agency collection or disclosure of this kind  
of identifying information, including through  
technology specifically used for the purpose of  
biometric identification as well as activities  
where biometric data elements are collected or  
disclosed without using biometric identification  
systems, are equally subject to the same privacy  
safeguards afforded by the Identifying Information  
Law and associated citywide privacy policies.

While biometric identification systems  
remain an emerging area of technology and privacy  
practice globally, the framework provided by the  
Identifying Information Law, along with the steps  
taken by this administration, have positioned  
privacy to be duly considered in potential



1 government utilization of the technology in New  
2 York City. We appreciate the opportunity to  
3 participate in today's hearing, and, with that,  
4 Deputy Commissioner Birchmeier and I will now take  
5 Council Members' questions.  
6

7 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you so  
8 much and welcome. You're here for the first time.  
9 Thank you so much for your testimony.

10 Can you please describe a little bit more  
11 about your role?

12 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK:  
13 Absolutely. As the Chief Privacy Officer, and as I  
14 mentioned in my testimony, I have the responsibility  
15 of setting citywide privacy policies and working  
16 collaboratively with our network of Agency Privacy  
17 Officers that exist across the city. Our office, the  
18 Office of Information Privacy, really provides  
19 support and advisory services to the agencies, really  
20 working collaboratively to create and support an  
21 ecosystem of privacy professionals citywide.

22 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Would you also  
23 say part of your role is to oversee how agencies use  
24 personal information under that purview?

3 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I  
4 would say that part of my role is to facilitate the  
5 setting of citywide policy that agencies are  
6 obligated to follow pursuant to the Identifying  
7 Information Law and supporting the Agency Privacy  
8 Officers in implementing those policies. The  
9 Identifying Information Law really creates in support  
10 of that ecosystem of self-governance an empowerment  
11 at the agency level of making and evaluating the  
12 determinations about their privacy practices and  
13 policies through the lens of both lawfulness and the  
14 lens of the agency's unique mission and purpose.

15 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: With respect to  
16 every agency's individual protocol, your team is also  
17 overseeing how that is executed?

18 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: We are  
19 provided information pursuant to the Identifying  
20 Information Law on agency privacy practices and  
21 policies that occurs in a number of different ways.  
22 There's the biennial reporting that occurs that's  
23 provided to my office. Additionally, we receive  
24 regular reporting from agencies in the event that  
25 identifying information has been disclosed or  
collected in a manner that violates Local Law and

3 contemporaneously provide periodic reporting to the  
4 Speaker of the Council on those circumstances.

5 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you. The  
6 Identifying Information Law, Local Laws 245, 247 of  
7 2017, sets forth requirements for city agencies to  
8 follow in the event that agency collection and/or  
9 disclosure of personally identifiable information  
10 constitutes a breach of security. There is a form for  
11 New Yorkers to file a complaint in that event that  
12 personally identifiable information has been  
13 collected or disclosed in a manner inconsistent with  
14 the requirements of the Identifying Information Law.  
15 Can you share how many complaints you have received  
16 and/or how many this year?

17 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I've  
18 been in the role as Chief Privacy Officer for a  
19 little over a year now. Over that time period, we  
20 have received one complaint, and, historically, my  
21 office I think we have, the unofficial number or the  
22 best number that we have available is less than 10.

23 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Less than 10?

24 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Yes.  
25

CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay, and how do you make New Yorkers that this complaint form exists?

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Sure. As part of our consolidation within the Office of Technology and Innovation, which is really the hub of technology services now citywide, we can be engaged through the Contact the Leadership Team of the Office of Technology and Innovation page on our website.

CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Got it. Is OTI considering any regulations under the Identifying Information Law that would address potential disclosure of biometric information?

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: That's a great question, Council Member, and it's really the area of emerging technology that really was a motivation of changing the Citywide Privacy Protection Committee's cadence to allow us to be more engaged and in collaboration as a privacy community to discuss these areas of emerging technology.

CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: So it's something that you're kind of exploring at this...

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK:  
Absolutely.

CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay. Do you have any examples or instances where biometric data was disclosed?

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Can you be more specific on that?

CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Just in following up to the previous question about amendments or changes to the Identifying Information Law. The question was about disclosure of biometric information, and you're saying it's evolving and you're kind of like adjusting. Do you have any examples of that happening to date?

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Sure, absolutely. Thank you, Council Member, for the clarification.

As part of that quarterly reporting that I mentioned earlier that's provided to the Council on instances where citywide we've had identifying information disclosed in a manner that violates Local Law, that would be inclusive of any instances where biometric data elements were disclosed. I think it's also important to note in that context there's a distinction between biometric data elements and

1 utilization of those elements in connection with an  
2 identification system for example.

3  
4 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you.

5 Pursuant to Administrative Code Title 23 Section  
6 1205, each agency must submit identifying information  
7 reports. The reports include information on the type  
8 of data collected by each agency. Can you tell us  
9 what agencies collect biometrics?

10 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: It  
11 depends on the data elements. We have enumerated data  
12 elements that would fall into the biometric category.  
13 An example was provided directly in the Identifying  
14 Information Law's photographs so, unsurprisingly,  
15 there's a large number of agencies that identify the  
16 collection of photographs. An example use case in  
17 that circumstance would be for issuing, for example,  
18 employee identification cards. That would have to be  
19 identified as a collection at the agency level but  
20 does not necessarily indicate a use of those  
21 photographs in furtherance of a biometric  
22 identification system. We actively, and it's an area  
23 where I'm happy to share with the Committee the  
24 investments that this Administration is making in  
25 further developing the capabilities and resources of

1 our office. Current state, we are a team of six  
2 folks, and the Administration, and we're grateful for  
3 their support, we are actively working to more than  
4 double our office in the near-term. We're moving from  
5 a staff of exclusively attorney membership to include  
6 non-attorney roles, specifically inclusive of  
7 onboarding privacy analysts who will support our work  
8 in further refining our reporting mechanisms and  
9 policies, supporting the developments of key metrics  
10 and allowing for us to get better visibility about  
11 what we are seeing citywide in the space of  
12 identifying information inclusive of biometric data  
13 elements.  
14

15 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Any agencies  
16 that use fingerprints to collect biometrics that you  
17 can share as agencies that are providing reports or  
18 collecting data to you all?

19 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK:  
20 Absolutely. I don't have that information in front of  
21 me, but I'm happy to provide that information to the  
22 Committees.

23 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Can you at  
24 least me know, I'm just going to ask specific  
25 agencies, if you can confirm with me whether or not

1 they collect biometric data? The first one is DHS, do  
2 they fingerprint in our shelters?  
3

4 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I  
5 would need to confirm the agency report.

6 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay. Same  
7 agency, you don't know if they use facial recognition  
8 or other biometric data?

9 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Not  
10 that I'm aware of.

11 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay. Are you  
12 aware if ACS uses biometric data?

13 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Not  
14 that I'm aware of.

15 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: No? Okay. What  
16 about NYCHA?

17 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Sorry.  
18 For ACS, I want to clarify biometric identification  
19 systems I'm not aware of. I can specify the data  
20 elements that they're collecting and follow up to the  
21 Committee.

22 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: You want to  
23 follow up with that? You don't have it right now?

24 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Yes.  
25



1  
2 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay. Because a  
3 followup question would be what decisions are being  
4 made using this data.

5 What about Public Housing?

6 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Public  
7 Housing, Public Housing if we're referring to NYCHA,  
8 NYCHA is an entity that is not subject to the  
9 Identifying Information Law by virtue of its  
10 regulatory structure so I don't have the same degree  
11 of visibility that I would at other agencies, but I  
12 can say that I'm now aware of any sort of biometric  
13 identification system.

14 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: What about with  
15 the Department of Education?

16 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK:  
17 Actually same answer there. Also not subject to the  
18 Identifying Information Law by virtue of their  
19 regulatory structure, but I'm also not aware of any  
20 use of biometric identification systems.

21 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you.  
22 Lastly in this section, are you aware if LinkNYC uses  
23 facial recognition or other biometric technology?  
24  
25

1  
2 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: My  
3 understanding is that LinkNYC does not use facial  
4 recognition technology.

5 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay. Lastly,  
6 is the City collecting any data from private partners  
7 or private entities?

8 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Can  
9 you be more specific, Council Member, on any..

10 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Yeah. I don't  
11 mean to like lean into the MSGPs but any private  
12 institution that is collecting data, are you holding  
13 them accountable or connecting with them on the data  
14 that they are collecting.

15 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Sure,  
16 absolutely. Thank you for the clarification, Council  
17 Member. For that mechanic to take place, and that's  
18 really a reflection of the ecosystem of self-  
19 governance that I've been referencing, those are  
20 determinations that are made at the agency level in  
21 accordance with the Identifying Information Law and  
22 associated policies so, for example, if an agency  
23 were endeavoring to collect information from a  
24 private entity, for example, that collection would  
25 need to be reviewed by the agency privacy officer who

1 would evaluate it through that lens of lawfulness and  
2 mission and purpose of the agency as well as citywide  
3 privacy policy before the collection could occur.  
4

5 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: I see. Can you  
6 share of any of those instances where agencies are  
7 doing that from private entities?

8 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Not at  
9 this time.

10 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay. My next  
11 question is regarding just data security. For city  
12 agency biometric systems that OTI has approved or  
13 oversight over, for example, NYPD's facial  
14 recognition services, are these systems using Cloud  
15 infrastructure to collect and store biometric data or  
16 is the data collected and stored in a local  
17 processing unit?

18 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Thank  
19 you for the question, Council Member. That's a  
20 circumstances that's really going to be dependent on  
21 an agency use case by use case..

22 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: But PD  
23 specifically.

24 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: For  
25 example, if we were talking about the utilization of

1 Cloud resources, for example, that would be a  
2 touchpoint that exists that's required to go through  
3 a Cloud security review conducted by the Office of  
4 Cybercommand to ensure the security of the ecosystem  
5 before it's utilized, and that's any Cloud service  
6 that's utilized.  
7

8 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Sure. I can  
9 understand that, but can you confirm whether or not  
10 PD is using a Cloud storage system for data storage?

11 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I  
12 cannot. I'd have to refer you to the NYPD on the  
13 specific deployment of its technology.

14 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Well, we tried  
15 to get them here today.

16 In other instances, but can you confirm  
17 if other agencies, maybe you can't name them all, but  
18 can you confirm if other agencies are utilizing Cloud  
19 infrastructure to store data?

20 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I can  
21 confirm that other agencies are using Cloud resources  
22 for data storage generally.

23 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Perfect, thank  
24 you. Do you have a sense, can you share who controls  
25 access to the data?

1  
2 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: That's  
3 a great question, Council Member. From a privacy  
4 perspective, it's an area that really hinges on not  
5 just our privacy policies but the associated  
6 contracting guidance that we provide agencies so when  
7 we look at these particular vendor engagements, we're  
8 not only looking at them through the lens that I  
9 mentioned earlier about APO involvement and approval  
10 and assessment and approval or denial, but we're  
11 looking at it through the lens of contracting to make  
12 sure that we've got appropriate terms attached to  
13 ensure that the City not only has visibility into  
14 what's happening on the vendors' side in making sure  
15 that they've got appropriate safeguards from a  
16 security perspective but means of holding the vendors  
17 accountable in the event that there has been a  
18 compromise in some way.

19 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Is your team  
20 helping to set the terms with that vendor with  
21 respect to each agency?

22 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: We  
23 provide standard terms that we've developed  
24 collaboratively with the Law Department, and the  
25 default is that these are the terms and they shall

1 not be changed unless and until there's a  
2 consultation with the Chief Privacy Officer.  
3

4 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: That is you?

5 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: That  
6 is me.

7 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay. I'm sorry  
8 if you answered this already but, per those terms,  
9 who owns the data?

10 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: It's  
11 going to be dependent on the circumstance, but we  
12 would say that it's City data.

13 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay. Could say  
14 that your agency owns the data?

15 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: It  
16 would be dependent on the circumstance. If, for  
17 example, if we are in a facilitation role of building  
18 a conduit between two different agencies, those  
19 agencies would be the data custodian and we would  
20 just be enabling them from a technology perspective.

21 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay. Would you  
22 say that that also applies to biometric  
23 identification captured by PD?  
24  
25

1  
2 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I  
3 would have to look into that further on the specific  
4 role of OTI and any utilization of that technology.

5 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay. That  
6 would be helpful if they're being held to the same  
7 standard as all the other agencies are.

8 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I can  
9 say certainly that the PD, like all other agencies  
10 that are subject to the Identifying Information Law,  
11 are subject to the associated policies and the  
12 utilization of the contracting terms that I've  
13 mentioned.

14 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Fantastic.  
15 Thank you. My next question is regarding IDNYC. When  
16 you first go to apply for IDNYC obviously they are  
17 voluntarily sharing biometric data as well as a  
18 photograph. Can you just confirm who has access to  
19 the applicant's personal information and if that's  
20 shared with any other agencies?

21 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I  
22 would say that the operating agency would be best  
23 positioned to speak to those particular mechanics,  
24 Council Member, but, generally speaking, those  
25 collections as I understand them are occurring for

1 the purpose of enrolling particular applicants in  
2 programs that they may be eligible for so those  
3 collections are being evaluated by the agency privacy  
4 officer in accordance with the Identifying  
5 Information Law, and any disclosures that would be  
6 necessary would also have to be equally evaluated  
7 through that lens inclusive of other government  
8 entities, even at the federal level.

10 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: I understand. I  
11 also just want to acknowledge Council Member Rita  
12 Joseph and Council Member Gale Brewer who have joined  
13 us.

14 My next series of questions are regarding  
15 DigiDog and K5 ASR. I know some of my Colleagues may  
16 have some of these questions as well. I just want to  
17 confirm a couple of things. DigiDog and K5 ASR, they  
18 have camEras, correct?

19 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: My  
20 understanding is that they do.

21 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: They do? Okay.  
22 Can you share what data they collect?

23 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: My  
24 understanding, and, again, I would refer you to PD  
25 for the specific capabilities, but my understanding



1 for K5, for example, is that there is video data  
2 collected and the capability of recording audio data  
3 if a particular button is pushed on the device by an  
4 individual looking to make a report, for example.  
5

6 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: All right. What  
7 about DigiDog?

8 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I  
9 believe there's a video capability with DigiDog. Less  
10 certain about the audio component, but the deployment  
11 postures for each of those technologies as I  
12 understand them, there's a pilot for the K5 that's  
13 contemplated within the Times Square subway station.  
14 That was publicly announced by the Mayor and NYPD  
15 leadership and DigiDog, the utilization of that  
16 technology is reserved for specific emergency  
17 response scenarios where, for example, it would be  
18 dangerous for a human member of the service to enter  
19 a premises.

20 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay. Do you  
21 know if DigiDog or K5, if they're able to recognize  
22 faces live?

23 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: My  
24 understanding is that they cannot.  
25

1  
2 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay. Do you  
3 know if any of the data, audio, video that both  
4 DigiDog and K5 capture, do you know if any of that  
5 footage can be used to later identify individuals?

6 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I  
7 would make the distinction there that while the  
8 conduit of the technology is a robotic device, the  
9 associated technology attached to it is really the  
10 function of any other video camera so there certainly  
11 could be the capability that in response to and as  
12 part of a criminal investigation, a still image  
13 captured from one of those devices could be utilized  
14 for facial recognition technology purposes by the  
15 Police Department.

16 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay. I  
17 understand that. I think would love to dig in deeper  
18 at a later time because I know what, certainly the  
19 makers of DigiDog are saying is that it doesn't  
20 recognize faces and I get that, but I think the  
21 association of using any footage to later identify is  
22 also problematic and so I think what's being told to  
23 New Yorkers is not fully sincere around what these  
24 DigiDogs are capable of in the long-run in  
25 potentially identifying and targeting New Yorkers.

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK:

Absolutely, Council Member, and I completely understand the concern there, and I think it's an important illustration of the conversation that we're having today that we can provide that clarification as well as the steps that the Mayor and NYPD leadership took to publicly announce the capabilities of those technologies at I think at least a handful of settings at this point.

CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Do you support the use of facial recognition and other biometric technologies in the city?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: I would just say yes, OTI absolutely does not and it's not specific to facial recognition technology but certainly any emerging technology that an agency feels will be beneficial to their operation but is deployed in a lawful and responsible way.

CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Do you support the use of FRT by private companies?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Private companies, because OTI has so little dealing with the private sector, we are an internal-facing organization, we support government agencies doing

1 that. We don't feel like we are the right body to be  
2 commenting on how a private business is operating.  
3

4 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Is there a body  
5 that you believe is more equipped to do that for the  
6 private industry?

7 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: I don't  
8 know. I'd have to refer you to the Mayor's Office I  
9 guess for...

10 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: I think it  
11 does. I think it is something that OTI should...

12 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Yeah, I  
13 think that specific issue has so many stakeholders  
14 involved that we are not regularly speaking with and  
15 so for that reason I don't feel like we're the best  
16 folks to comment on the private business' operations.

17 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: But there is  
18 concern here at this Council for the way that private  
19 industries are using facial recognition technology or  
20 biometric data to serve their very rich and robust  
21 business model at the expense of marginalized New  
22 Yorkers, and that is my recommendation is that maybe  
23 working together, but I don't think that that's  
24 something that we can just say bluntly, well, there's  
25

1 too many stakeholders, we can't really take this on.  
2  
3 I don't think that's fair.

4 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Yeah.  
5 Absolutely noted and completely understand the  
6 concern.

7 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Can you share  
8 if the City has ever requested or obtained biometric  
9 data from private companies or landlords that are  
10 doing collection in New York City including NYCHA?

11 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Not that  
12 we're aware of.

13 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Do you know if  
14 any agencies purchase or sell data to and from data  
15 brokers?

16 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Not that  
17 we're aware of.

18 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: No,  
19 not that we're aware of, and just to supplement that  
20 point, Council Member, that's really another  
21 illustration of how the Identifying Information Law  
22 is operationalized. We look at it through the lens of  
23 lawfulness, we look at it through the lens of mission  
24 and purpose, but we also look at it through the lens  
25 of our privacy principles inclusive of which are

1 considerations of use specification, data  
2 minimization, and, frankly, equity. Equity was a  
3 principle that we actually just recently added in our  
4 updated policies earlier this year, recognizing that  
5 as we're enabling and building our privacy culture  
6 within city government operations and as we're  
7 thinking through these issues, we necessarily should  
8 be sensitive to the fact that as a government entity  
9 we are custodians of some information for some  
10 universes of folks more than others and calibrate  
11 those decisions accordingly.

12  
13 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you. I  
14 just have a couple more questions before I pass it  
15 off to Council Member Williams. Thank you for your  
16 patient, Nan.

17 Can you share what facial recognition  
18 technology the NYPD uses?

19 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: NYPD's  
20 use of facial recognition technology is detailed in  
21 the City's annual reporting of algorithmic tools, and  
22 so I believe the company that they list in the annual  
23 report is DataWorks.

24 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: DataWorks. I'm  
25 really glad that you brought up incorporating equity

1 into your principles. As you know, a lot of concern  
2 in our communities are related to using the marriage  
3 of facial recognition technology and other  
4 collections of biometric data to target and harm  
5 people of color, men and women of color. Do you have  
6 a sense of how can we ensure the technology that NYPD  
7 uses, for example, accounts for racial bias?  
8

9 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: I think  
10 it's an absolutely valid concern that every city  
11 around the country and world is dealing with and  
12 every body of government is dealing with this. We  
13 think of this in a number of ways, and I think from  
14 the Administration standpoint we've developed an  
15 ecosystem of governance to help ensure that every  
16 stakeholder is accounted for along the way when  
17 technology is developed. I think the citywide privacy  
18 policy is absolutely one of those elements to see how  
19 data is being used. I think citywide cybersecurity  
20 policy to see how data is being stored, Local Law 35  
21 which requires transparent use of any algorithmic  
22 tool is certainly one, the Human Rights Law to make  
23 sure that any violation of human rights is held  
24 accountable. We also use the National Institute of  
25 Standards and Technology's framework to assess tools

1 and their risk for discrimination, but further the  
2 Administration and OTI is leading this effort is  
3 developing an AI action plan that will develop a  
4 governance for how agencies are evaluating testing  
5 and piloting if they deem it appropriate any  
6 algorithmic based tool which would include facial  
7 recognition technology and risk for discrimination is  
8 going to be a critical part of that.  
9

10 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Who provides  
11 oversight over PD to ensure that they're doing all  
12 these things that you're saying, that they are  
13 complying with their own facial recognition policy  
14 and that it's only being used for "legitimate" le  
15 purposes? I think that's the piece that with the  
16 release of DigiDog and K5, obviously there's a lot of  
17 information that is being released and we're all kind  
18 of learning at the same time, but I think that  
19 there's a big and valid concern in our communities  
20 about who is doing the oversight for PD. I mean  
21 historically they've been able to launch programs and  
22 initiatives for months before they even announce it  
23 to New Yorkers and so oftentimes we are vulnerable,  
24 oftentimes New Yorkers have no sense of whether their  
25 information is getting collected. Oftentimes, New



1  
2 Yorkers don't even know their information is sitting  
3 in a database, i.e., the gang database, so who is  
4 doing that oversight of PD to ensure that they're  
5 following a protocol that you are saying exists, and  
6 I believe it and that every agency is being held to,  
7 but who is doing that for PD?

8 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: I would  
9 say that everything that I just listed, the New York  
10 City Human Rights Law, we oversee, and NYPD like  
11 every other agency across the City government has  
12 been in compliance with all of the governance that I  
13 allowed.

14 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: I just don't  
15 believe that, but I will read any and all reports  
16 that you send me.

17 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: To  
18 supplement Deputy Commissioner Birchmeier's  
19 information, I think it's important too when we're  
20 looking at the issue of potential for discrimination,  
21 we have to acknowledge that the risk exists. Within  
22 the last week or so, we saw a joint statement at the  
23 federal level by a number of agencies affirming the  
24 position of the federal government against  
25 discrimination, acknowledging the risk posed by AI

1 and automatic decision systems but recognizing while  
2 these technologies may be new they are nonetheless  
3 subject to the existing regulatory authorities of  
4 entities at the federal level, and certainly I don't  
5 think that would be any different locally, right. As  
6 we're having this conversation today, we're showing  
7 how biometric technology is considered through the  
8 existing regulatory scheme of the Identifying  
9 Information Law. When we're talking about potential  
10 oversight, we're talking about touchpoints, and  
11 Deputy Commissioner Birchmeier identified several of  
12 them. Additionally, I think it's important to note  
13 when we're thinking about the Police Department's use  
14 case, for example, we've also not only be operating  
15 in a universe where I think there's been a tremendous  
16 amount of transparency particularly under this  
17 Administration about what the Police Department is  
18 doing and why, but additionally that the utilization  
19 of facial recognition technology, for example, is  
20 also occurring in an environment where, since 2020,  
21 there has been an expanded universe of criminal  
22 discovery in prosecutions so to the extent that the  
23 technology is utilized, that information is available  
24 to the Defense Bar, for example, which would in turn  
25

1 have the capability of challenging the use of the  
2 technology in the context of prosecution but  
3 certainly informing the basis of subsequent civil  
4 litigation that may follow as appropriate.  
5

6 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you. How  
7 can New Yorkers learn about which private home  
8 surveillance footage is used in police investigations  
9 and are they required to report this usage besides  
10 New Yorkers having to request a FOIA, for example?

11 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Sorry,  
12 could you be more specific (INAUDIBLE)

13 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Sure. I guess  
14 the angle of the question is how to inform more New  
15 Yorkers about how to be empowered to learn whether  
16 they're on some kind of a list or if their  
17 information is being captured by PD and so how can  
18 New Yorkers learn about which of that footage, for  
19 example, is being used in police investigations for  
20 their own private home surveillance?

21 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Sure.  
22 From a privacy profession perspective, we're talking  
23 about the conversation, the term of art typically  
24 used is data subject rights for privacy frameworks  
25 globally, largely in the private sector. When we're

1 talking about government operations, the term of art  
2 is typically in the Freedom of Information context,  
3 either at the federal level or the local level, and  
4 that would be the best mechanism, I think, for New  
5 Yorkers to request information about themselves that  
6 may be held by any agency.  
7

8 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: What is the  
9 best way? I apologize.

10 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK:  
11 Freedom of Information.

12 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Oh, so the only  
13 option right now is a FOIA request? Okay.

14 My last question before passing it off to  
15 Council Member Williams is regarding MyCity portal  
16 you all launched now two months ago, congrats. Does  
17 the Administration have any plans to incorporate  
18 biometric data or other identification technologies  
19 into the MyCity portal.

20 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Not at  
21 this time.

22 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you.  
23 Council Member and Chair Williams.

24 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thank you. Can  
25 you just share, again, like your oversight functions

1 of other city agencies to ensure that they're  
2 maintaining privacy? What is your actual function?

3 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Sure.

4 Thank you for the question, Council Member. I would  
5 not necessarily characterize our role as oversight.

6 We are really a partner among that citywide ecosystem  
7 of privacy protection in advancing privacy practices  
8 at the agency level. We effect that regular

9 engagement with our Agency Privacy Officers, support  
10 them when they reach out to us with questions, engage

11 them when we become aware of matters of concern at  
12 their agency, and additionally facilitate reporting

13 from the agencies in the event that identifying  
14 information is disclosed in a manner that violates

15 Local Law, facilitate the preparation and reporting  
16 of that information to the Council on a quarterly

17 basis. An illustration of why I'm hesitant to use the  
18 term oversight. Purposefully within the Identifying

19 Information Law, that reporting de-identifies

20 specific agencies from being named in the reporting  
21 that's shared with the Council. I think that was done

22 purposefully so because we want to make sure that  
23 agencies feel comfortable engaging our office and not

24 that they would necessarily be negatively shamed for  
25

1 instances where identifying information has been  
2 disclosed in a manner that violates Local Law.

3  
4 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: I am so happy  
5 you mentioned the Identifying Information Report  
6 because I have a question on that because we do  
7 observe that your office provides no details, it  
8 doesn't have the agency, it doesn't list out exactly  
9 what the disclosed information was, and it provides  
10 only a short sentence of what the remedy is so do you  
11 think your office has been effective since it seems  
12 like a pretty collegial relationship and not one that  
13 can truly hold an agency accountable if they're in  
14 violation?

15 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Thank  
16 you for the comment, Council Member. I would say that  
17 the work of our office has really been one of  
18 leadership in the privacy field since it was created  
19 a little bit more than five years ago. I think the  
20 work that the team has done in developing this  
21 privacy governance framework on a citywide level,  
22 particularly when that city is New York City, has  
23 been truly remarkable, again factoring in that we're  
24 historically a team of about five or six folks, but I  
25 think that what's reflected in those reports is not

1 necessarily a reflection of the depth and detail and  
2 conversations that are happening among my staff and  
3 the agencies about what is specifically occurring at  
4 the agency level and supporting the agency  
5 remediation of concerns, but I'm appreciative  
6 certainly of the feedback that you're providing,  
7 Council Member, and will certainly bring that back to  
8 the team, and we'll consider it moving forward for  
9 future reporting.  
10

11 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Yes. It's hard  
12 to assess whether or not agencies are properly  
13 remediating issues if, for instance, we can't tell  
14 like the last quarter had 30 violations. For all we  
15 know, it could've been the same agency that had those  
16 30 violations, but there's no way for us to even hold  
17 a particular agency accountable for a particular  
18 violation because your office provides no details.

19 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I  
20 appreciate that, Council Member, as well. I will  
21 point out that the lack of identification of agencies  
22 in that particular report is done purposely pursuant  
23 to the Identifying Information Law though I will  
24 certainly say that is an area that I'm actively  
25 looking into. That is an area that is one of many

1 reasons why we are bringing on an analyst capability  
2 within our office to support a better understanding  
3 of what we are seeing at a citywide level in  
4 furtherance of also developing key performance  
5 metrics, etc. from a privacy perspective.

7 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Do you have any  
8 recommendations on how that law can be strengthened  
9 since its creation?

10 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: From  
11 my perspective, I think the Law has been  
12 operationalized I think quite effectively and I think  
13 in a very thoughtful way positions the Chief Privacy  
14 Officer to be the steward of setting that citywide  
15 privacy regulation at intervals that the cop  
16 determines are necessary and certainly in response to  
17 areas where technology policy needs to be evolved or  
18 revised in some way in response to developments.

19 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Okay. Two more  
20 questions for you. During a previous hearing, your  
21 colleague, the Chief Tech Officer, testified about a  
22 project to label all public eye technology equipment  
23 including surveillance equipment to inform the public  
24 about their functions. Does the current  
25



1 Administration support such an initiative and, if so,  
2 when can we expect the project to roll out?

3  
4 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Do you  
5 have any more context on that project?

6 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: I can get you  
7 more context, but apparently it was a project...

8 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: I didn't  
9 hear the beginning of the question...

10 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Oh. It was a  
11 project to label all public eye technology equipment  
12 including surveillance equipment to inform the public  
13 about its function so the Administration was supposed  
14 to create a list and then the list was supposed to be  
15 released to give the public an idea of all the  
16 different types of technologies that are being used.

17 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Yeah, I'm  
18 happy to check with the Chief Technology Officer on  
19 the status of that project and circle back with your  
20 office.

21 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Okay, yeah, it's  
22 something that he said at a previous hearing so we're  
23 just trying to figure out...

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Yeah, of course, I'm happy to look into it more and circle back to you.

CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Okay. There are some Members that have to leave in a second so I will stop to be so kind to my Colleagues starting with Council Member Joseph.

COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: I get to go first?

CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Yes, you're first.

COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: Thank you. My questions were around what privacy concerns have been raised by the use of biometric identification systems and how has the City addressed them?

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Sure. Thank you for the question, Council Member. The chief concern that we certainly see from being really students of the privacy profession globally is the risk of discriminatory impacts, and, in response to those risks, I think we certainly look to the revisions to our privacy policies earlier this year which added equity as a privacy principle for agencies to consider when evaluating privacy concerns, the steps that the Administration has taken

1 to reimagine the citywide Privacy Protection  
2 Committee to be engaged in a more regular manner on  
3 these types of emerging technology issues, and, as  
4 Deputy Commissioner Birchmeier mentioned earlier,  
5 stewarding the development of not only an artificial  
6 intelligence action plan to help guide lawful and  
7 responsible use of these technologies citywide but  
8 also actively hiring for a Director of Artificial  
9 Intelligence and Machine Learning to be responsible  
10 directly for this portfolio.  
11

12 COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: Thank you for  
13 that. What kind of data security measures are in  
14 place to protect biometric data collected by these  
15 systems and how is access to this data restricted?

16 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK:  
17 Absolutely. Thank you for the question, Council  
18 Member. From a privacy perspective, we look at it  
19 through the lens of ensuring that there's data  
20 minimization as a principle, that the folks who have  
21 access to that information have a justifiable need  
22 for that access, and then from a technical  
23 perspective rely on and work in partnership with the  
24 Office of Cyber Command in making sure that there are  
25 sufficient technical controls and security controls

1 in place that are in accordance with citywide cyber  
2 security policy.  
3

4 COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: In terms of  
5 application, what type of application? You mentioned  
6 AI. Are you using AI into how you gather data?

7 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: I would  
8 just say one of the reasons we feel like there needs  
9 to be an actual centralized AI framework is in it's  
10 in so many things including our personal gmail that  
11 reminds you to respond to an email to a friend so  
12 it's baked into so many things that it can no longer  
13 be treated as that's an AI tool. It's kind of  
14 foundational in a lot of things, and so that's why we  
15 want to have a centralized framework so that any tool  
16 that has that baked in, folks can go through a  
17 governance process to check everything from security  
18 to privacy to risk for discrimination and to see if  
19 it's an appropriate use for their agency.

20 COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: Thank you so much.  
21 Thank you, Chairs.

22 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Your welcome.  
23 Next, Council Member Rivera.

24 COUNCIL MEMBER RIVERA: Thank you so much  
25 for the time. I will be brief, and I want to thank

1 you all for your testimony. I want to thank everyone  
2 who's here including the advocates who helped write  
3 this bill.  
4

5           You mentioned a few of the agencies that  
6 you said that you're not aware of if they use the  
7 data or how they use it, but also in your testimony  
8 you included the law that you feel has created a  
9 framework that I think you describe as appropriate.  
10 However, I want to ask do city agencies track the  
11 usage of biometric identification systems in  
12 residential settings? Does OTI or other city agencies  
13 have any data to share that indicates trends in  
14 building owner usage of residential biometric  
15 identification systems and what is your approach? Do  
16 you support the legislation that we're hearing today?

17           DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Thank  
18 you, Council Member, for your question and for your  
19 testimony earlier. I'm not aware if any city agencies  
20 are tracking biometric technology use across  
21 residential buildings. I'm happy to check with my  
22 Colleagues who work at HPD or NYCHA and circle back  
23 with you and provide you with that. On the specific  
24 legislation, because OTI is not squarely in the  
25 housing space and we're not having regular

1 conversations with tenants, tenants' advocates, or  
2 landlords, we don't feel like we are the best people  
3 to speak to the bill, though obviously the nature of  
4 the bill is a conversation we're happy to be having  
5 with you today.  
6

7 COUNCIL MEMBER RIVERA: Understood, but  
8 you do describe in your testimony that you are here  
9 to integrate core values of transparency and data  
10 integrity and you work in close collaboration with  
11 citywide agency partners so that's why we're asking  
12 you these questions. How does the City support  
13 building owners who are interested in pursuing  
14 biometric identification systems for their  
15 properties? How does your Department ensure that New  
16 York City tenants are aware of Local Law requirements  
17 and their privacy rights?

18 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Thank  
19 you for the question, Council Member. Our office  
20 currently has a role pursuant to the Operative  
21 Private Sector Biometrics Law and working  
22 collaboratively with other city agencies and  
23 conducting outreach to entities about what the Law  
24 requires. We've effected that outreach through the  
25 development of a FAQ that's posted publicly available

1 on our website as well as DCWP's website. We're an  
2 office that, as I think we've been discussing today,  
3 our mission and primary area of concern is really  
4 internal to government operations. We have had a  
5 limited number of engagements and inquiries from the  
6 private sector about what the Law requires. In that  
7 setting, obviously, we're not counsel to those  
8 entities. We effectively direct them to the FAQ and  
9 really advise them that they need to consult with  
10 their own attorneys before the implementation of  
11 those technologies.  
12

13 COUNCIL MEMBER RIVERA: So there's an FAQ?  
14 I look forward to your check-in with HPD to see how  
15 we can further discuss implementing this legislation  
16 and gaining the Administration's support.

17 For the FAQ, that's a good start, but  
18 this is certainly something that's here to stay, and  
19 so there has to be continued collaboration across the  
20 board.

21 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER:  
22 Absolutely.

23 COUNCIL MEMBER RIVERA: Thank you. Thank  
24 you to the Chairs for the time.

25

1  
2 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Thank you. My  
3 question is a little bit of followup. On the  
4 (INAUDIBLE) keys which NYCHA residents have, mostly I  
5 think in buildings that are being privately managed,  
6 the residents hate them. Is that something that you  
7 keep tabs on? Is there any data that is collected  
8 from that? I don't know.

9 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: I'd have  
10 to refer to NYCHA on that question.

11 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Okay, but you're  
12 in charge of technology for the City though.

13 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Yes.

14 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: So you wouldn't  
15 have any idea?

16 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: No, and I  
17 think in our role more broadly, like I said earlier,  
18 we are setting governance structures, we're helping  
19 agencies make technology decisions but,  
20 operationally, these agencies are empowered to make  
21 decisions on a day-to-day basis that effect their  
22 day-to-day business and so that specific instance, I  
23 think I'd have to refer to NYCHA, and our office is  
24 happy to get that answer for you and get...



1  
2 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Okay. The second  
3 question is relevant to just storage. I know quite a  
4 bit about technology. How, where, cost, etc. Just  
5 generally the data that you do have that is under  
6 your control, where do you store it, what's the cost  
7 factor, how long does it last, etc., and, if there is  
8 a mixing of public and private which could happen,  
9 how does that work, storage in general.

10 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Storage  
11 is obviously a...

12 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: It's a big topic  
13 (INAUDIBLE) I understand that.

14 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: I don't  
15 have any specific numbers in terms of budgetary  
16 factors, but I can say that any private company that  
17 is storing data, we certainly store a lot of it in-  
18 house. Certainly, if we have any private partners  
19 that are storing data, they have to go through very  
20 strict privacy security protocols and other vendor  
21 protocols to even make it onto the list and make sure  
22 that they are adhering to our standards. Happy to get  
23 you a better snapshot of what that looks like though  
24 after the hearing.

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: I'd love to know where, how much, and the relationship between public and private, yes. Thank you very much.

CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Council Member Sanchez, did you want to provide some remarks?

COUNCIL MEMBER SANCHEZ: Thank you so much, Chairs. Yes, I would. Thank you. I was just coming out of the Housing and Building hearing.

I just want to join in my Colleagues remarks and reiterating that we firmly believe in the right to privacy and protection against discrimination, and that is what these bills are intending to address. We've seen time and again that the use of biometric technology and particularly facial recognition technology is subject to algorithmic bias, and this can result in the excess and unfair targeting of nonwhite men, people of color, women, trans women, immigrants, transgender individuals. We want to make sure that there is absolutely every single safeguard is being put in place that's within our power to regulate as a City, right.

Particularly as Chair of the Committee on Housing and Buildings, I'm proud to co-prime Intro.

1  
2 1024 with Council Member Rivera, which would make it  
3 unlawful, you know what the bill does, to install  
4 activator use biometric recognition technology. Being  
5 mindful of the time, I would be interested to know  
6 firstly how your Office collaborates with the privacy  
7 officer at HPD and what their role is in protecting  
8 tenants in particular and your position on the bill,  
9 does the Administration have any hesitation on  
10 restricting landlords' ability to use biometric  
11 technology in residential buildings? Thank you,  
12 Chairs.

13 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Of  
14 course, I'll answer the second part of your question  
15 and I'll kick it over to the Chief Privacy Officer.  
16 Just on the position of the bill, like I said to  
17 Council Member Rivera, OTI, just because we are not  
18 specifically in discussions with tenants, tenants'  
19 advocates, landlords, we are not in a position to  
20 take a stance on the bill. The Mayor's Office would  
21 be happy to get you the Administration's stance on  
22 that bill, but, that said, I think the CPO can talk  
23 about their relationship with HPD.

24 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK:  
25 Absolutely, thank you. Thank you for the question,

1 Council Member. I think what's really important in  
2 HPD and really all of our Privacy Officers, and it's  
3 truly, I would characterize it as a remarkable result  
4 of the Identifying Information Law, what we actually  
5 have here in New York City is a network of privacy  
6 professionals that not only are sensitive to the work  
7 inherent within that profession but they carry the  
8 expertise through the lens of their agency's unique  
9 mission purpose and regulatory scheme, and we have  
10 the capability of engaging with any one of them as do  
11 they directly with our office, HPD included. We've  
12 also, since I've been in the CPO role, have done some  
13 additional steps. We are accessible, we do have open  
14 door policies, but there's also standing time  
15 reserved on my calendar every week that any agency  
16 privacy officer can claim and set a meeting with me  
17 whenever they feel the need to.

19 COUNCIL MEMBER SANCHEZ: Thank you.  
20 Chairs, if you would allow me. It's a little odd to  
21 hear you say that you are not taking a position but  
22 the Admin will. When you come to one of our hearings,  
23 you are representing the Administration so look  
24 forward to seeing the Administration's position on  
25

3 these bills and having that be the case moving  
4 forward. Thank you.

5 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thank you. I  
6 don't have any more questions for you. I have  
7 questions for CCHR so I'm going to turn to my  
8 Colleagues who have questions for you so Council  
9 Member Holden.

10 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Thank you. Thank  
11 you, Chairs. I'm a little surprised that we don't  
12 have the Administration's stance also on these bills.  
13 That's why we're here. Otherwise, we're spinning our  
14 wheels a little bit.

15 I have some questions because I just see  
16 these two bills as a little overreach on businesses.  
17 When government gets involved in prohibiting certain  
18 investments that a business made to protect  
19 themselves and they bought the service or that a  
20 landlord decides I have to protect my renters or my  
21 owners because they're getting maybe certain  
22 burglaries or certain other things happening to their  
23 building so they're doing what legally they can do,  
24 and now all of a sudden the rug is pulled out. For  
25 instance, Madison Square Garden has used the  
technology to keep people who have committed violence

1 out of their arena so I'm concerned, and maybe you  
2 can weigh on this, are you concerned that by banning  
3 this technology, facial recognition or other  
4 biometrics, that we're making people less safe in a  
5 large arena of 20,000 and considering that New York  
6 City was the prime target on 9/11 that we can't  
7 prohibit individuals who have committed violence in  
8 the arena before, have been barred from the arena,  
9 now we're taking away technology that could make  
10 people around them less safe. Are you concerned at  
11 all about that?  
12

13 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Council  
14 Member, appreciate the question. Without talking  
15 about a specific private company, which like I said I  
16 don't feel like OTI is well-positioned to do, I think  
17 our position generally, and I think what we'd like to  
18 see kind of citywide if more of the ecosystem of  
19 governance that we have created from within  
20 government to allow for responsible use of technology  
21 and have safeguards for implementation, whether it's  
22 in the form of privacy regulations, cyber security  
23 regulations, human rights regulations, to make sure  
24 that every stakeholder is at the table if a  
25 technology is being deployed.

1  
2 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: To  
3 supplement that, and thank you for the question,  
4 Council Member, I think it's important from the  
5 perspective of the privacy profession, and we've  
6 talked about it, at least from the government use  
7 case, we look at lawful use, we look at mission and  
8 purpose, but we also look at principles, and it's  
9 those principles that are very important because very  
10 often as privacy professionals we find ourselves in  
11 gray areas where we have to make the best judgments  
12 that we can make, and those principles can really be  
13 guiding values, and I think what's really important,  
14 government entities learn from the private sector  
15 just as much as the private sector learns from  
16 government entities and inherent within that work I  
17 think is a direct discussion with the impacted  
18 stakeholders in the private sector which is why I  
19 think it's one of the many reasons why it's important  
20 that we're having this hearing today and having this  
21 conversation, and we're certainly interested..

22 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Right. My time is  
23 up, but can I just ask one more question, Chairs?

24 Okay. I did want to just ask about the  
25 technology. Facial recognition has changed a lot. Has

1  
2 it gotten more accurate over the years under your  
3 expertise on it, you had researched this, do you have  
4 any opinion on that?

5 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Thank  
6 you for the question, Council Member. I think  
7 certainly like most technologies you see a trend  
8 towards improvement over time, but that's not to say  
9 that risk doesn't exist, right, and I think that's  
10 where the importance of governance privacy,  
11 touchpoints...

12 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Right, but there's  
13 commonsense involved here because if a technology has  
14 advanced so far that we can catch the bad actors  
15 before they do something, before they commit an act  
16 of violence or terrorism or anything else, that we  
17 should employ that and we are doing it at NYPD and  
18 that's how they catch a lot of people that have  
19 committed crimes by using facial technology so we're  
20 going to deny that to businesses? I don't even know  
21 where the airport service, CLEAR, would come in here.  
22 If I signed up that I can get through an airport  
23 security quicker and I paid a fee, am I going to be  
24 prohibited, as a company doing business in New York  
25 City with CLEAR, that's another question I have. I



1 don't know if that bill does that, but there are  
2 certain concerns here that we're just making one fell  
3 swoop decision here and making more people less safe  
4 here so that's what my concerns are. Thank you,  
5 Chairs.

7 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: I was just  
8 asking clarity on your question. I believe that the  
9 bill has a component that would exist businesses that  
10 you have to sign up for to use that service so if I'm  
11 a CLEAR member, I signed up for it, so they would be  
12 permitted to still use the technology because I  
13 signed up to have my data used for the purposes, but,  
14 anyway, just wanted to give you clarity on that.

15 Next up, Council Member Hanif.

16 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Thank you, Chair  
17 Williams, and thank you so much for testifying. I,  
18 too, will just echo the sentiments of my Colleagues  
19 for just not having adequate representation from the  
20 Administration to really thoughtfully address some of  
21 our concerns for both of the bills that are being  
22 heard today, but I will just express my gratitude for  
23 you all for acknowledging the potential of the  
24 serious discrimination that could be involved, that  
25 is involved with facial recognition and biometrics

1 tools, and that's really what is foundational for the  
2 bills, that we are wanting to address the  
3 discrimination, the threats to democracy that exists  
4 because of these tools. Could you expand on what  
5 types of discrimination are possible in your expert  
6 role as Chief Privacy Officer?  
7

8 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Thank  
9 you for the question, Council Member, and I certainly  
10 understand the feeling on representation though I  
11 would certainly point out that the folks that have  
12 been sent by the Administration are reflective I  
13 think of the importance with which it views this  
14 conversation. This is the first time that the Chief  
15 Privacy Officer has appeared before the Council since  
16 the role has been in existence, and I think this  
17 couldn't be a better setting for that first  
18 appearance to occur. When we look at discriminatory  
19 impact, I think what's really important and I would  
20 certainly appreciate the perspective of my Colleague  
21 from CCHR, but I think we're looking at outcomes,  
22 right, so if you're talking about the public safety  
23 space you're talking about an automated decision  
24 that's made, that's relied upon in and of itself  
25 that's resulting in liberties being taken away and

1 certainly I think that risk has been acknowledged I  
2 think historically with how the utilization of, for  
3 example, facial recognition has occurred within New  
4 York City in the public safety space. Any potential  
5 match is expressly identified as not equivalent to  
6 probable cause. It's merely a lead that requires  
7 further independent investigation by an investigator  
8 in a given circumstance, but I'll turn it over to my  
9 Colleague as well.  
10

11 SENIOR COUNSEL SCRIVANI: Yes, thank you.  
12 I would say, yes, under the Human Rights Law it's  
13 unlawful to use this technology in a discriminatory  
14 manner. It focuses on the outcome of the use of the  
15 technological tools, but the Human Rights Law is  
16 designed to protect New Yorkers from discrimination.  
17 That applies in public accommodations, employment,  
18 and housing and to the extent that as a result of use  
19 of tool, discrimination takes place against a  
20 protected category, that could violate the New York  
21 City Human Rights Law, and protected categories,  
22 there's 27 under the Law. They include race, gender,  
23 national origin, color, religion, disability.

24 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I  
25 would also just supplement that. I've talked a little

1 bit about the reimagined citywide Privacy Protection  
2 Committee, and I just also wanted to highlight while  
3 the Commission on Human Rights is not a mandatory  
4 member of that Committee pursuant to the Identifying  
5 Information Law, they have been given a seat by  
6 Mayoral designation as a reflection of the importance  
7 of having their perspective in these conversations.  
8

9 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Thank you for that.

10 I think it's very critical that our City's experts  
11 and our agencies recognize the discriminatory impacts  
12 that these tools have on everyday New Yorkers because  
13 we've heard from experts, we've read the reports and  
14 especially as someone who grew up in a post-9/11 New  
15 Yorkers with the Muslim surveillance program that  
16 tore apart Muslim communities citywide, we must  
17 recognize what the impacts are of these tools,  
18 especially when we have an Administration, we have a  
19 Mayor who while on one hand has called out the abuse  
20 of MSG in their incident and has also been in favor  
21 of using facial recognition tools in businesses and  
22 so I'd like to understand a little bit about if I  
23 could just add one or more followups. In the Admin's  
24 view, in your view, when is it appropriate for a  
25

1 business to turn away a customer on the basis of a  
2 facial recognition or other biometric scan?

3  
4 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: I would  
5 say, unfortunately, OTI doesn't have a perspective on  
6 the private business's decision. There might be  
7 private sector-facing agencies that might and the  
8 Mayor's Office might be able to give you a little bit  
9 more on that.

10 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: At this moment,  
11 there isn't any sort of standard parameters that you  
12 all have outlined somewhere...

13 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: OTI does  
14 not.

15 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Not OTI? Just to  
16 get clarity on private businesses, they have the full  
17 authority in determining who to turn away based on  
18 these tools?

19 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: I'm not  
20 familiar enough with regulation around private  
21 businesses in general.

22 SENIOR COUNSEL SCRIVANI: I would just  
23 like to reiterate that if there was an intent to  
24 discriminate or also a disparate impact then that  
25 would come under the gambit of the New York City

1 Human Rights Law if it's based on a protected  
2 category so it's not to say I can speak to any  
3 reasons that they can but I can speak to reasons that  
4 they can't and, if they violate the Human Rights Law,  
5 then that could be businesses covered by the Human  
6 Rights Law.  
7

8 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Could you bring the  
9 mic a little closer to you and repeat the last bit?

10 SENIOR COUNSEL SCRIVANI: Yes. The Human  
11 Rights Law covers places of public accommodation  
12 which can include businesses.

13 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Does the Admin have  
14 a position on Intro. 1014 at this time? This is  
15 banning biometrics in places of public accommodation.

16 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: OTI does  
17 not, but the Mayor's Office is happy to provide you  
18 with the Admin stance.

19 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: How soon would  
20 that...

21 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Today.

22 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Today?

23 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Yeah.

24 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Okay. I look  
25 forward to that. I'll end there.

1  
2 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thank you.  
3 Council Member Paladino.

4 COUNCIL MEMBER PALADINO: Good afternoon  
5 and thank you very much for having this meeting. You  
6 know, normally I would be totally against any forms  
7 of what I call invasions of privacy. I hated the fact  
8 that cameras had to be put up everywhere to watch  
9 everybody's move and every action that they've taken.  
10 However, this City has come a very, very long way and  
11 not in a good way, and I'd be sitting here talking  
12 about biofacial recognition astounds me because it's  
13 something I never thought I'd ever, ever have to do,  
14 but in the police work that needs to be done today I  
15 think biofacial recognition has become a useful tool.  
16 Private businesses, that's exactly what they are.  
17 They're private. They're privately owned. Government  
18 has no business in it. So if they choose to put up  
19 these cameras or do whatever they need to do to  
20 provide the safety for their businesses because of  
21 the way they've been vandalized and theft has been  
22 rampant. Again, it's up to the individual, and it is  
23 privately owned business.

24 I want to know when we talk about the  
25 police work that this does do, and we discuss a lot

1 here about discrimination, and I don't think this is  
2 discriminatory at all as far as unique groups. I  
3 think discrimination is rampant in all nationalities  
4 so this is not something I believe any single group  
5 should ever feel singled out in because it's the  
6 reality. It's happening everywhere.

8 As far as the Mayor goes and the NYPD  
9 goes, they are in favor of this, and I really want to  
10 know how does this help the police do their job  
11 because they need all the help they could get.

12 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Council  
13 Member, it's great to see you and appreciate your  
14 comments. I'd have to refer that specific comment to  
15 the NYPD to speak about their operations and how the  
16 technology can aid their operations.

17 COUNCIL MEMBER PALADINO: As far as  
18 landlords go, that interests me too because when a  
19 person owns a building that has, let's just say a  
20 simple building in Astoria, walk-up, three floor,  
21 four floors, whatever it is, three apartments on each  
22 floor. Again, that's private, and I think if a  
23 landlord wants to institute this, if they feel it's  
24 that necessary to do it, I think they should have the  
25 right to do it. Again, coming from me, again someone



1 who is against government overreach and the  
2 overextension of power, sadly I think we're in a  
3 situation where this has become a necessity and it  
4 pains me to say so. That's all I have to say I guess.  
5 Thank you.

6  
7 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you,  
8 Council Member.

9 I just had a couple of follow-up  
10 questions for OTI based on some of my Colleagues  
11 questions. I want not emphasis Local Law 63 from 2021  
12 which in sum is mandating all property owners of  
13 multiple dwellings, which to our understanding did  
14 include NYCHA as well, that utilize these fobs or any  
15 smart technology requiring them to provide tenants  
16 with a data retention and privacy policy. Is that a  
17 Lat that you're aware of and can you say whether or  
18 not the enforcement of the distribution of said  
19 privacy policy falls within OTI?

20 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: I would  
21 say the enforcement of that specific policy does not,  
22 unless...

23 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: That's  
24 a policy that hasn't crossed my desk during my  
25

1 tenure, but I'm happy to make some inquiries in  
2 regard.  
3

4 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Do you agree  
5 with it that tenants in any multiple dwelling  
6 household are at least deserving of a policy if there  
7 are cameras, if there is some kind of biometric data  
8 collection happening where they live, in lobbies,  
9 when they're entering their building for example?

10 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I  
11 would want to look more directly into the Law and the  
12 associated policies before providing a comment.

13 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: So many  
14 unanswered questions today. Okay. I have one more  
15 question.

16 The last one is on data collected by  
17 private companies, and I think I asked this, I just  
18 need to kind of expand a little bit more on it, when  
19 private companies are collecting data, is that  
20 something that the City can purchase, can obtain, and  
21 has the City done that in these instances?

22 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: We're  
23 certainly aware of private entities that make data  
24 available for sale. On specific instances, I'm not  
25 aware of any, but certainly what I would say is the

1 evaluation of those engagements they would be  
2 considered collections of identifying information  
3 pursuant to Local Law and would need to be evaluated  
4 through the lenses that we've been discussing in the  
5 course of this hearing, lawfulness, mission and  
6 purpose, and our privacy principles.  
7

8 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Are there  
9 instances where city agencies are purchasing this  
10 data or are there examples of data that an agency can  
11 benefit from in wanting to obtain data from a private  
12 entity?

13 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I  
14 can't speak to specific instances on purchasing side  
15 but on the converse, if we're thinking about the sale  
16 of data held by city agencies, that's not something  
17 that I'm aware of as occurring and, in fact, our  
18 standard contracting language prohibits the sale of  
19 information to the extent that we are using a City  
20 vendor, for example, from that vendor reselling that  
21 information.

22 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Prohibits them  
23 from reselling it?

24 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Right.  
25

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: Council Member, I would just add that I'm not aware of any city agency that is purchasing data. I'm happy to circle back with the folks at OTI and, if that is not the case, I'd be happy to correct that with you.

CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Yeah. I think that would be helpful. Again, there's just a lot we don't know about not just the way data is being collected but what it's being utilized for, that's almost everyone's second question is what is it being used for, and I would just like to understand how your role is helping to kind of rectify that, especially within city agencies.

My last question is on when we had asked about NYCHA and DOE, for example, these are agencies that don't necessarily fall under your purview, but these are two examples of agencies, especially NYCHA, that have demonstrated a way of abusing biometric technology that is used. There was that attempt to bring DigiDogs into NYCHA, for example, in 2019, 2020, and tenants really like rallied around it so knowing that NYCHA tenants are very much empowered and very much informed about the way that data collection can continue to harm them and their

1 families. Despite you saying it doesn't really fall  
2 under OTI's purview, what recourse do tenants of  
3 NYCHA have because they are under our purview, they  
4 are tenants and residents just like everybody else  
5 and we represent them so what kind of advice can I  
6 give to a NYCHA tenant that is seeing this biometric  
7 data collection happening in their building and who  
8 do I send them to if it's not OTI? What happens  
9 there? I think your agency does have an overview or  
10 does have a reach there, but I just want to  
11 understand a little bit more because I get the  
12 Authority piece and their separate piece but then  
13 there's people piece, there's the tenant piece, and  
14 there has to be something that we at the City can do  
15 to elevate their very real and very warranted  
16 concerns around their biometric data. NYCHA is  
17 majority people of color, women and men of color, and  
18 so we're saying all these things at today's hearing,  
19 but what I'm not hearing is how to protect NYCHA  
20 tenants and I'm concerned so what are some of the  
21 things that we can tell our constituents that live in  
22 NYCHA when these fears come up? What is the City's  
23 purview to make sure that their human rights aren't  
24 being violated and that they have concern?  
25

1  
2 SENIOR COUNSEL SCRIVANI: Under the City  
3 Human Rights Law to the extent an entity is a place  
4 of public accommodation, a housing provider, or an  
5 employer, the City Human Rights Law applies when  
6 there are specific instances of discrimination so if  
7 anyone believes that they've experienced  
8 discrimination we encourage them to notify the  
9 Commission and proceed to file a complaint.

10 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Just  
11 to supplement that as well, we've talked about the  
12 nuanced distinction of city entities that fall within  
13 and outside of the purview of the local Identifying  
14 Information Law, but I want to emphasize to the  
15 Council that just because an entity like NYCHA or  
16 DOE, for example, falls outside the purview of the  
17 law doesn't mean that they don't have the same  
18 accessibility to my office for advice on privacy  
19 matters.

20 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: That's what I  
21 want to know more about. That's exactly what I'm  
22 talking about. Thank you.

23 Council Member Williams.

24 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thank you. I  
25 know we've been fielding a lot of questions and some

1  
2 are within our purview, some are inferred, especially  
3 with the City's Human Rights Law so just wanted to  
4 get your expert opinion around how the City should  
5 assess and address the potential for racial bias or  
6 other types of discrimination in the use of facial  
7 recognition technology.

8 SENIOR COUNSEL SCRIVANI: Thank you for  
9 your question, Chair Williams. I just want to say how  
10 pleased we are to be here to speak about these  
11 important issues.

12 The City Human Rights Law gets at the  
13 discriminatory impact or instances that can happen as  
14 a result of the use of the technology so we are  
15 certainly aware that this is a multifaceted issue,  
16 that there are issues with discrimination and  
17 privacy, and transparency and bias so when the  
18 Commission's role comes in is when there has been  
19 discrimination which can result from the use of  
20 technologies and then in those instances we encourage  
21 people to come forward to the Commission and file a  
22 complaint.

23 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: What are the  
24 potential consequences of false positive matches and  
25 how are these consequences being addressed or

1 mitigated? Some of the cases we were briefed on, some  
2 were in New York City, some were outside of New York  
3 City where people were falsely accused of doing a  
4 particular thing, they were arrested, and so just  
5 again wanted your opinion on potential consequences  
6 of false positive matches and if there's anything  
7 that is being done to address or mitigate those false  
8 positive matches.  
9

10 SENIOR COUNSEL SCRIVANI: I can say that  
11 the use of the technology itself is somewhat outside  
12 the ambit of the Human Rights Law which is most of  
13 the time technology is being used, unless there is an  
14 instance of discrimination that results from it, it  
15 wouldn't be actionable under the Human Rights Law,  
16 but if anyone believes that they've experienced  
17 discrimination or if there is a wide-ranging  
18 disparate impact that results from use of the  
19 technologies then it would fall under the New York  
20 City Commission on Human Rights.

21 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Okay. What  
22 happens when the technology isn't seeking to be  
23 purposefully discriminatory, maybe it's the algorithm  
24 that was created or just the lack of accuracy around  
25 a particular technology, are there any recourses



1 there, or is it just solely based off of the intent  
2 and usage of the particular technology?  
3

4 SENIOR COUNSEL SCRIVANI: Under the New  
5 York City Human Rights Law, when there is a disparate  
6 impact on a protected category, even if a policy or  
7 practice is neutral on its face, then that can be a  
8 violation of the New York City Human Rights Law.

9 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: If I  
10 may to supplement there, I think it's worth  
11 highlighting again, as we've been talking about, we  
12 have to acknowledge that that risk is apparent,  
13 right, and we take steps from a policy perspective to  
14 mitigate it so that's accomplished through  
15 transparency and reporting, that's accomplished by  
16 independent evaluation of algorithms that might be  
17 utilized to assess the extent to which biases operate  
18 within that particular environment, but certainly, if  
19 we're talking about from a public safety perspective,  
20 as I mentioned earlier, we've got I think standing  
21 NYPD policy, for example, relative to its use of  
22 facial recognition technology does not equate that a  
23 match equals probable cause, that there needs to be  
24 further investigation, recognizing that that risk is  
25 there and that further investigative work is

1 certainly needed and then, again, in the event that  
2 such circumstances would occur, for example in the  
3 public safety context, that information is disclosed  
4 appropriately so in the context of a criminal  
5 prosecution and handled as necessary in the civil  
6 context with complaints to the appropriate agency or  
7 the initiation of civil litigation.  
8

9 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: The independent  
10 evaluation and the transparency that you mentioned,  
11 for the independent evaluation, who is conducting the  
12 independent evaluations? Are you consulting,  
13 contracting it out, or is it something that your  
14 office is doing?

15 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: That's  
16 not something that our office is doing, but that's  
17 something that certainly will be part of the AI  
18 Action Plan that we are developing. I think the  
19 industry practice has certainly been really looking  
20 to the work that the National Institute of Standards  
21 and Technology is doing in evaluating these  
22 algorithms for bias to inform potential agency use  
23 cases in the current state.  
24  
25

CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Okay. I just want to acknowledge that we have been joined by Council Member Salamanca.

Just to make sure I heard you correctly, there's a plan to potentially carry out the things that you just mentioned to mitigate any potential discriminatory practices with the technology through the AI Action Plan?

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: That would be a component part of the AI Action Plan.

CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Okay. Thank you. The other question I have is what types of data collection or use limitation should be in place, if any, to ensure that facial recognition technology is not used to infringe on First Amendment rights such as freedom of speech or assembly. There were tons of reports that during the BLM protests there was various forms of surveillance that was used, and so if you could share what those limitations might be in reference to infringing upon the First Amendment rights?

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Sure, absolutely. I think if we're talking about the public safety context, NYPD is certainly best positioned to

1 speak to that, but obviously the First Amendment  
2 context is an extraordinarily sensitive one, and New  
3 York City NYPD operations in the space of political  
4 activity have been governed by a longstanding federal  
5 consent decree known as the Handschu Consent Decree,  
6 which provides for a framework for how investigations  
7 involving political activity may occur by the  
8 Department, and the current state of that consent  
9 decree also includes the integration of an  
10 independent civilian representative who has a seat at  
11 the table to facilitate compliance with the Consent  
12 Decree and any engagements that may be necessary to  
13 flag violations of it to the overseeing federal court  
14 judge.  
15

16 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: What you're  
17 talking about, is that the Handschu Committee or is  
18 this something different?

19 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: That's  
20 correct. That's the Handschu.

21 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Okay, so one of  
22 the things with that which was here in the briefing  
23 documents is that the Handschu Committee was not a  
24 part of the recent surveillance practices of the  
25 Black Lives Matters protests so I know this is not

1 really your purview, but it seems as though that  
2 Committee is not being used in all aspects of  
3 surveillance and it's only used in particular aspects  
4 of surveillance.  
5

6 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: For  
7 the specific use cases, there again I'd have to refer  
8 you to the NYPD for specifics.

9 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: No problem. The  
10 next questions I have are around limitations and  
11 restrictions on facial recognition technology in  
12 sensitive locations such as schools, places of  
13 worship, abortion clinics, or public protests. We've  
14 been talking about public protests. If you could just  
15 give us your broad opinion, and this could be CCHR or  
16 OTI on what you recommend the Council consider such  
17 limitations to protect privacy and safety of  
18 individuals so this could be an agency by way of the  
19 NYPD and/or private actors that might want to use  
20 this technology and have there been any reported  
21 instances of using facial recognition technology at  
22 such sensitive locations to CCHR or any other city  
23 entity?

24 SENIOR COUNSEL SCRIVANI: As far as the  
25 privacy aspect, that's somewhat outside the purview

1 of the City Human Rights Law, and I know there's a  
2 lot of issues that are coming up, equity,  
3 discrimination, transparency, privacy, but I want to  
4 be clear that unless it's involving discrimination it  
5 really isn't in the purview of the Commission. Again,  
6 just reiterating that the Commission's role comes in  
7 when, generally most uses of technology wouldn't be a  
8 violation of the City Human Rights Law, but if  
9 they're used in a discriminatory manner, that's when  
10 it would come to the Commission.  
11

12 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Have you seen  
13 any cases?

14 SENIOR COUNSEL SCRIVANI: We have not had  
15 any cases where allegations of discrimination based  
16 on facial recognition have come to us. The closest  
17 thing, we have had a case where artificial  
18 intelligence was a factor in alleged discrimination,  
19 and that involved a website using an algorithm that  
20 had a discriminatory impact on a protected category.

21 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: What happened in  
22 that case?

23 SENIOR COUNSEL SCRIVANI: The case was  
24 resolved via settlement, and, as part of the  
25 settlement, the website had to incorporate some human

1 interaction so it wasn't just the algorithms at play  
2 which resulted in the discrimination.  
3

4 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thank you. Do  
5 any of my Colleagues have any... Council Member Hanif.

6 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Thank you. Could  
7 you share how many businesses are currently  
8 disclosing their use of biometric technology pursuant  
9 to Local Law 3 of 2021?

10 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: That's  
11 not information that my office maintains or has  
12 visibility into.

13 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Who would have this  
14 information?

15 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BIRCHMEIER: I'm not  
16 sure if it's collected.

17 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Got it. I'm just  
18 trying to understand sort of how the City does  
19 interact with this Law.

20 Second, how is the Administration holding  
21 companies who use biometric technology without  
22 disclosing as required by Law accountable?

23 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I'm  
24 not aware of specific enforcement actions by the  
25 Administration, though certainly my understanding is

1 that the Law at issue affords impacted entities from  
2 bringing private rights of action independently  
3 against offending parties.  
4

5 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Against?

6 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK:  
7 Offending parties.

8 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Offending parties.  
9 Was that the one complaint that came up earlier in  
10 the conversation today?

11 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: No.

12 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Okay. Could you  
13 describe a little bit, more clarify what that was  
14 referring to?

15 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Sure.  
16 The specific instance at issue, I received engagement  
17 from a member of the public that a particular city  
18 agency had disclosed identifying information in the  
19 course of a legal proceeding and raising concerns  
20 about the nature of that disclosure. In response, I  
21 and my office engaged the privacy officer at the  
22 particular agency to get an understanding of the  
23 specific circumstances in which that occurred and  
24 certainly to enable an agency-level investigation  
25 into it.



1  
2 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Okay. How does the  
3 public know to report violations of privacy?

4 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: The  
5 Identifying Information Law affords for a mechanism  
6 for the public to engage with us, and that's enabled  
7 through the OTI webpage.

8 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: OTI webpage, but  
9 there isn't a sort of campaign like if you feel that  
10 your privacy is under attack or..

11 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I  
12 wouldn't say specifically through that lens, though  
13 one of the areas that, and I'm very appreciative of  
14 the support of this Administration, is the efforts  
15 that it's made in putting the work of the Privacy  
16 Office and the existence of the Privacy Office into  
17 more public-facing settings such as this one to make  
18 sure that folks are aware that New York City actually  
19 does have a CPO and what those responsibilities are.

20 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Great. What about  
21 for CCHR? On this question but to CCHR, if a New  
22 Yorker wants to report, is there material for New  
23 Yorkers to know that they can do this, that they  
24 should not feel any threat around repercussions when  
25

1 they feel that there's been a violation of their  
2 privacy?  
3

4 SENIOR COUNSEL SCRIVANI: The issue of  
5 violation of privacy rights is outside of the Human  
6 Rights Law which is really addressing discrimination  
7 against protected categories in employment, places of  
8 public accommodation, and housing, but as far as  
9 materials as part of our Agency's mission and  
10 mandate, we are constantly educating the public, both  
11 the covered entities who are subject to obligations  
12 and New Yorkers who gain protection from the City  
13 Human Rights Law about their rights and also about  
14 their right to be free from retaliation and how to  
15 file complaints.

16 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Thank you. That's  
17 it.

18 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you,  
19 Council Members. No other Member has questions?

20 I will just conclude by saying I  
21 appreciate you all being here, nice to meet you. So  
22 many of our questions are unanswered, and I'm  
23 disappointed because we tried to frame them centering  
24 concerns from our constituencies and our Districts,  
25 and I've said this before but I hope that when you

1  
2 come again that you'll be able to share some of those  
3 answers, even in the meantime to send them over. I  
4 think we've got a record amount of advocates signed  
5 up to speak. You likely won't stay to hear their  
6 questions, but I think it's really important that  
7 when we come to these hearings that we're entering to  
8 the best of our ability. You're OTI. People want to  
9 hear the data. We want to hear all of that, and  
10 that's really important, and I don't ever want to  
11 waste anybody's time here so thank you for the  
12 answers that you were able to provide and looking  
13 forward to hearing back from some of the ones that  
14 you were not able to do so today.

15 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK:  
16 Absolutely, and you can count on that, and thank you,  
17 Council Member, for having us and thank you to all  
18 Members of the Council for the conversation today.

19 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you very  
20 much.

21 COMMITTEE COUNSEL BYHOVSKY: Thank you,  
22 everyone, for your testimonies and insight, and now  
23 we move to the testimony from the public.  
24  
25

1  
2 We'll start with witnesses who are here  
3 today in person and then call witnesses who are here  
4 virtually.

5 Before we begin, I also would like to  
6 acknowledge that we have received written testimonies  
7 from the public including the Real Estate Board of  
8 New York, Food Industry Alliance of New York State,  
9 Tech NYC on behalf of its clients, Mobilization for  
10 Justice, Partnership for New York City, and  
11 (INAUDIBLE) and others.

12 If any member of the public wishes to  
13 submit written testimony, you can do that by emailing  
14 to [testimony@council.nyc.gov](mailto:testimony@council.nyc.gov).

15 Now, I want to welcome our first panel,  
16 and our first panel is Daniel Schwartz, Albert Fox  
17 Cahn, and Alli Finn.

18 To accommodate all witnesses, we kindly  
19 ask to limit your testimony to three minutes. Thank  
20 you.

21 DANIEL SCHWARTZ: Thank you. My name is  
22 Daniel Schwartz, and I'm testifying on behalf of the  
23 New York Civil Liberties Union. We thank the  
24 Committee and Council Members for holding this  
25

1 hearing and for the opportunity to provide testimony  
2 today.  
3

4           Facial recognition and other biometric  
5 surveillance tools enable and amplify the invasive  
6 tracking of who we are, where we go, and who we meet.  
7 They are also highly flawed and racially biased. The  
8 widespread use of these technologies presents a clear  
9 danger to all New Yorkers' civil liberties and  
10 threatens to erode our fundamental rights to privacy,  
11 protests, and equal treatment under the law.

12           The Council must ensure New Yorkers are  
13 not surveilled, targeted, discriminated against, and  
14 criminalized on the basis of invasive, flawed, and  
15 biased technology. To this end, we call for  
16 prohibitions on biometric surveillance in areas of  
17 severe power imbalance including its use by law  
18 enforcement or other government agencies, in housing,  
19 and in other areas where our fundamental rights are  
20 at stake or where informed consent cannot be given.

21           Intro. 1014 would prohibit places of  
22 public accommodations from using biometric  
23 recognition, and it would require written consent for  
24 any collection of biometric data. It would create  
25 transparency, security, and deletion requirements and

1 ensure that customers are not treated or charged  
2 differently because they do not consent to the  
3 collection of their biometric data. The facial  
4 recognition deployment by MSG Entertainment to target  
5 staff from law firms in litigation with MSG points to  
6 Orwellian use cases where it will be impossible to  
7 move and associate freely, and the technology's  
8 racial as well as gender bias risks  
9 disproportionately impacting women and people of  
10 color such as a misidentification of a black teenager  
11 that barred her from entering an ice-skating rink.  
12 For these reasons, we support banning biometric  
13 surveillance in places of public accommodations.  
14 Furthermore, visiting retail stores, restaurants,  
15 museums, entertainment venues, or healthcare sites  
16 should not automatically open one up for the  
17 collection of sensitive biometric information without  
18 prior informed consent and clear rules for access,  
19 use, security, retention, and deletion.

21 To ensure that the legislation fully  
22 meets its goals, we make detailed recommendations in  
23 our written testimony. In brief, we recommend the  
24 coverage to apply to all individuals, not just  
25 customers. The policies should be required to be

1 publicly available outright rather than conditioning  
2 the availability on a request. Finally, the private  
3 right of action must be further strengthened as an  
4 accountability and enforcement tool.  
5

6           On Intro. 1024, it would prevent  
7 landlords from using biometric recognition  
8 technology. The deployment of biometric surveillance  
9 risks conditioning entry into one's home, the place  
10 where our Constitutional rights are at the most  
11 robust, on the provision of one's most sensitive  
12 biological data. Residents should not have to live in  
13 fear that landlords are tracking their comings and  
14 goings and amassing sensitive data on them and their  
15 guests. Not only does biometric surveillance in  
16 residential buildings cause harm to tenants' privacy  
17 rights but also their civil rights to access housing  
18 on equal and nondiscriminatory terms. Notably missing  
19 from this bill, I'm almost done, is a private right  
20 of action that would provide tenants and their guests  
21 with a tool to hold landlords accountable. Without  
22 it, there would be no recourse for affected people  
23 and likely no enforcement against violating  
24 landlords. Given the City's housing crisis, we  
25 strongly recommend the addition of a private right of

1 action and as a crucial enforcement and  
2 accountability mechanism.

3  
4 Nobody wants to live in a world where  
5 pervasive surveillance identifies them, tracks their  
6 movements and associations, and impacts which places  
7 they can visit, which services they can access, with  
8 whom they meet, or how to exercise their free speech  
9 rights. The NYCLU supports Intro. 1014 and 1024, and  
10 we urge their swift passage. Thank you.

11 ALBERT FOX CAHN: Good afternoon. My name  
12 is Albert Fox Cahn, and I'm the Executive Director of  
13 STOP, the Surveillance Technology Oversight Project.  
14 We are a New York-based privacy and civil rights  
15 group. I have a statement for the record that I've  
16 submitted that details why we believe that Intros  
17 1014 and 1024 are indispensable safeguards for New  
18 Yorkers, but I also need to respond to some of the  
19 misinformation we have heard from the Administration  
20 officials in this very hearing. We have heard that  
21 New York City doesn't provide information about New  
22 Yorkers to private companies. This despite the fact  
23 that historically the NYPD provided facial  
24 recognition training data to IBM so it could better  
25 develop facial recognition software to track black



1 and Latinx individuals. We heard that they didn't  
2 know if we had the City obtaining information from  
3 private companies even though the NYPD has access to  
4 more than 30,000 cameras through the Domain Awareness  
5 System. We heard how equity was a value that was  
6 driving the City's policy, but when my organization  
7 asked the NYPD for its data on the bias and accuracy  
8 of its own facial recognition system under Freedom of  
9 Information as described in this hearing we were told  
10 not only that they wouldn't provide any records but  
11 that the records didn't exist, that they truly had no  
12 information about whether or not their own facial  
13 recognition system was biased. This was submitted  
14 under oath by NYPD officials, and we are continuing  
15 to litigate that matter. We heard about how there are  
16 all these commitments to transparency despite the  
17 fact that the Office of the Inspector General  
18 recently came out with a report saying that the NYPD  
19 has failed to correct 93 percent of the deficiencies  
20 found in the NYPD's implementation of the POST Act.  
21 The NYPD is systematically breaking transparency and  
22 oversight laws and, while it's great that we have  
23 identifying information protections under City law as  
24 was described with Public Law 247, there is no  
25

1 mention of the fact that there is a carveout that you  
2 can drive a truck through, that it exempts  
3 information disclosed for law enforcement purposes,  
4 so again we are told this narrative that New Yorkers'  
5 privacy is being protected when in practice it is a  
6 free-for-all. There are no meaningful safeguards, and  
7 that's why these sorts of protections, why we need  
8 these sorts of laws to defend against the consistent  
9 growth of facial recognition.  
10

11 I want to highlight that given this track  
12 record, we cannot trust the Administration to enforce  
13 these laws. Arguably, Human Rights Law already  
14 outlaws facial recognition because it is  
15 discriminatory and barring access to a place of  
16 public accommodation, but that has never been  
17 enforced, and that's why we need a private right of  
18 action in both these bills. Thank you.

19 ALLI FINN: Hi. My name is Alli Finn. I'm  
20 testifying today on behalf of the Surveillance  
21 Resistance Lab, an NYC-based organization that  
22 focuses on corporate and state surveillance systems  
23 as one of the greatest threats to democracy, migrant  
24 rights, economic justice, racial equity, and economic  
25 justice. I'm also going to go off script because I'm

1 so concerned by a lot of what OTI shared today. OTI  
2 said that they are not aware of city agencies  
3 purchasing our private data from private entities. We  
4 have a lot of questions about how this works, but we  
5 know it is happening. For example, Data Miner, which  
6 is a social media surveillance company and data  
7 broker which there have been numerous news reports  
8 about how Data Miner extracts social media data to  
9 surveil and help police target Black Lives Matter  
10 protesters in the wake of George Floyd's murder. Data  
11 Miner contracts with NYPD as well as the Office of  
12 Emergency Management. LexisNexis, one of the most  
13 notorious data brokers, which helps ICE profile,  
14 track, identify immigrants for detention and  
15 deportation, also contracts not only with the NYPD  
16 but numerous city agencies, and we have a lot of  
17 unanswered questions about how much of our city data  
18 is going into LexisNexis' profiling systems as well  
19 as partnerships that are not necessarily written down  
20 in contracts but arrangements such as sharing data  
21 from Ring cameras, the NYPD, all 77 precincts, have  
22 an MOU with Ring that is not a paid agreement for  
23 access to some of that footage.  
24  
25

1  
2           Putting that aside, I just want to say  
3 that biometric surveillance tech including facial  
4 recognition is a monumental threat to democracy and  
5 peoples' rights and security, not only privacy, so we  
6 urgently call on the City Council to pass these two  
7 essential bills as well as a full ban on government  
8 use. There is no other option. Facial recognition is  
9 so dangerous that its use cannot be justified even  
10 when it helps some people in this room feel safe.  
11 Biometric surveillance has been increasingly  
12 weaponized in our city and worldwide to take away  
13 peoples' rights, liberties, and access to basic  
14 resources. This includes criminalizing poverty,  
15 facilitating mass arrests and incarceration of BIPOC  
16 communities, surveilling protesters, and targeting  
17 immigrants for deportation, and increased accuracy  
18 rates will never, ever fix these harms because tech  
19 and algorithms are not neutral and they reflect the  
20 biases of the people behind them and the systems that  
21 use them. I'm going through this real fast.

22           Lastly, I just want to say that biometric  
23 surveillance does not only rely on the collection of  
24 faceprints and our other data, our iris scans, etc.,  
25 but unregulated mass data-sharing systems that

1 drastically exacerbate these risks, and that's why I  
2 wanted to highlight what OTI failed to mention today.  
3 We would love to work with the City Council to  
4 investigate these harms, to investigate mass data-  
5 sharing and how these surveillance systems interact  
6 with those webs as well which actively materially  
7 harm New Yorkers. Thank you.  
8

9 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you. Yes,  
10 I would love to have that conversation and build out.  
11 Obviously, I was very disappointed, I think a few of  
12 the Members also shared how disappointed with the  
13 level of preparation that OTI came here with today,  
14 although I'm not surprised. Their interest is in  
15 protecting what they do, but our responsibility here  
16 is to continue to demand and push that they be more  
17 transparent and accountable. I have two questions for  
18 you all as you are advocates but the experts. Are  
19 there any positive examples of the use of facial  
20 recognition technology besides like our iPhones being  
21 able to open it, but do they exist, and then my  
22 second question is, obviously I'm in support of both  
23 bills, but can you share what are some of the risks  
24 of storage of biometric information by private  
25 entities like landlords for example?

1  
2           ALBERT FOX CAHN: Just to quickly touch on  
3 those points. If your credit card number is hacked,  
4 you can change your credit card. If your Social  
5 Security Number is compromised, you can even change  
6 that. You can't change your biometric data. If it is  
7 compromised, it is compromised for life, and it will  
8 be a persistent threat to your privacy, to your cyber  
9 security. As far as good uses of facial recognition,  
10 I think that there is a world of difference between  
11 voluntarily using facial recognition on your own  
12 phone as a matter of convenience versus having it  
13 used against you as a surveillance tool by those who  
14 have power over you, and the power differential is  
15 key here. That's why we're talking about places of  
16 public accommodation, that's why we're talking about  
17 landlords, because these are core environments where  
18 you potentially see technology augmenting systemic  
19 discrimination and just a lengthy inability that  
20 tenants and customers have had to exercise their  
21 rights.

22           DANIEL SCHWARTZ: In addition to what  
23 Albert just mentioned, I think the BIPA, Biometric  
24 Information Privacy Act, in Illinois is a great  
25 example of how biometric privacy protections can work

1 and why it's so crucial to have informed consent with  
2 transparency on the privacy policies as Intro. 1014  
3 would required, clear guidelines on retention,  
4 deletion schedules, and really making clear that in  
5 those use cases that are covered by Intro. 1014 and  
6 1024 informed consent cannot be given because as  
7 Local Law 3 has exemplified since it came into effect  
8 it's not meaningful, people are oftentimes not  
9 informed, and there's no other way than outlawing it  
10 and prohibiting it in those circumstances and  
11 ensuring that the collection of biometric and storage  
12 of biometric data only happens on a narrowly defined  
13 and with a provision of clear rights to affected  
14 people.  
15

16 ALLI FINN: Thank you so much, Chair, for  
17 your questions. I agree about Illinois' law. It's one  
18 of the strongest ones we have in the country, and  
19 there's numerous jurisdictions that are legislating  
20 responsibly about this, and many of those are full  
21 bans. I do want to say no opt-out regimen is ever  
22 going to keep people safe. Opt-in, there's a lot of  
23 debate about that. I don't have a lot of positive use  
24 cases for you, but gold standard would include opt-

1 in, never any opt-out to put the burden on the  
2 resident.  
3

4           You also asked about risks of storage by  
5 private entities. These are numerous, largely because  
6 it's not only at the local level that we don't have  
7 adequate protections. We don't have adequate  
8 protections or any protections really at the State or  
9 the Federal level so when we're talking about private  
10 entities that extract, store, share, and sell our  
11 biometrics and other personal data there's virtually  
12 no restrictions about how they would treat that data,  
13 who they share it with, where it goes, the extent of  
14 where it is sold, and we don't know the full extent  
15 of it. In addition, ransomware attacks and cyber  
16 security attacks are increasing on municipalities.  
17 Some of what Baltimore dealt with is a really  
18 terrifying example of that and, just like Albert  
19 said, this is not information that can easily be  
20 changed. You're stuck with your iris scan and your  
21 faceprint pretty much forever, and we cannot take  
22 these risks because the NYPD wants to feed the Domain  
23 Awareness system and because landlords want to drive  
24 out rent-subsidized and low-income tenants.



1  
2 ALBERT FOX CAHN: If I could just add, on  
3 a personal note, I recently rented an apartment, and  
4 I tried very hard to find one that wouldn't collect  
5 my biometric data. I couldn't and so every day I have  
6 to go into a building where my data is being taken  
7 without my consent and without even the bare notice  
8 that's required under existing laws so notice is not  
9 enough because it's simply not being honored.

10 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you.  
11 Council Member Hanif had questions?

12 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Yes. Thank you so  
13 much for just teaching us so much about biometrics  
14 and facial recognition tools and just how they  
15 directly breach our privacy and threaten democracy.  
16 Could you share if, right now like the expectation  
17 for me, for us is that some store has collected my  
18 biometrics. Can I just assume that I've gone to a  
19 grocery store, I've gone to a shop that already has  
20 my details, my data? What does this mean for me? What  
21 does this mean for a New Yorker day to day?

22 DANIEL SCHWARTZ: Unfortunately, as the  
23 Administration already earlier mentioned, they don't  
24 keep track of who's deploying biometric surveillance  
25 systems, and we don't have a database of that either.

1 We know of some instances of large corporations,  
2 obviously the famous reporting and deployment of MSG  
3 has been a case in point, other corporations have  
4 posted since also at Kashmir Hill at the New York  
5 Times had some great reporting in the followup to the  
6 Council hearing in February regarding biometric  
7 disclosure law in New York City, but what it means, I  
8 think it really depends. We see the rise of  
9 centralized data collections by some of those  
10 surveillance vendors that would be able to really  
11 analyze customer and people's behavior of which  
12 stores they visit, how they spend their time, what  
13 they're interested in, and target them very  
14 specifically. We see with MSG where it scraped all  
15 the law firm's staff pages and LinkedIn pages for  
16 profile photos of people that work at law firms that  
17 are in litigation with them and denied them entrance  
18 to the venues that are under their control, and I  
19 think that is just the tip of the iceberg. In my  
20 testimony, the case of a black teenager that was  
21 denied entrance because of a misidentification of her  
22 that flagged her as having been involved in a fight  
23 but she had never been before to that ice-skating  
24 rink, and she was denied entrance and had to wait for  
25

1 her parents to pick her up afterwards, and I think in  
2 the vast majority of cases people will never know  
3 that their information is being collected, there are  
4 profiles created about them, and I think that's also  
5 why we only know about so few cases nationally, and  
6 the cases that we do know about, the six publicly  
7 known cases of false arrests or where people were  
8 arrested because of facial recognition  
9 misidentifications, all six of them were black men,  
10 and where we know the software is utilized, it was  
11 DataWorks Plus, what was mentioned earlier in the  
12 testimony by OTI that is used by the NYPD, and  
13 Clearview AI which also has been used by the NYPD.

14 ALLI FINN: Thank you for the question. I  
15 think similar to other forms of surveillance,  
16 biometrics collection and facial recognition is about  
17 power, and who holds those technologies are those  
18 whose power is being increased. You, yourself,  
19 mentioned the history of post-9/11 surveillance in  
20 the city on Muslim, Arabs, South Asian, and other  
21 communities. The Department of Homeland Security's  
22 establishment after 9/11 drastically increased  
23 funding and rhetoric and support for surveillance  
24 across the country including in New York City, and a  
25

1 lot of that surveillance is based on targeting people  
2 who those in power at the time decide is a threat,  
3 and that threat can change, and what that means is  
4 that surveillance doesn't target everyone equally.  
5 These are a threat to all of our rights, but, of  
6 course, it is targeting certain groups of people  
7 more, and the City Council has a responsibility to  
8 protect people of color, to protect Muslim, Arab,  
9 South Asian communities, to protect trans and queer  
10 communities, low-income communities, the list goes  
11 on. What it means for you as a New Yorker depends a  
12 little bit on who you are and where you live, and I  
13 think that's important to not skate over. MSG showed  
14 how a company can decide that a lawyer is a threat  
15 because of where they work and deny them the  
16 opportunity to see a performance with their child,  
17 but it also shows that surveillance can be easily  
18 weaponized in so many other iterations. Business  
19 owners can racially profile shoppers and call the  
20 police on someone simply for what they look like for  
21 walking into a store and landlords can criminalize  
22 and limit who comes and goes and, like Council  
23 Members have mentioned, deny people housing and  
24 increase eviction rates and gentrification so I can  
25

1 monologue about this for a while, but I'll pass it  
2 on.  
3

4 ALBERT FOX CAHN: I think the sad truth is  
5 no one can tell you the complete answer because the  
6 technology is going to continue to evolve, it's going  
7 to continue to proliferate, and your biometrics won't  
8 change, and so a biometric violation today can impact  
9 your safety, your security, your autonomy 10 years,  
10 20 years, 30 years from now, and I have no idea what  
11 the technology will be capable of then, I have no  
12 idea how it will be used, and so it's really that  
13 timeframe of harm here that I think sets biometric  
14 surveillance apart. There's a lot of data that's  
15 collected about us constantly, but this is the one  
16 piece of data that will stick with us for the rest of  
17 our lives.

18 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Are there positive  
19 uses for biometrics and facial recognition tools,  
20 and, if so, what are they?

21 ALBERT FOX CAHN: Again, I think there's a  
22 difference between when you consent to use biometrics  
23 on your own device as a point of convenience versus  
24 when there's a power dynamic between the person  
25 installing the biometric surveillance and the person

1 being watched. Landlords aren't tracking themselves  
2 with the same technology. Oftentimes, they are  
3 installing it track tenants and not the other way  
4 around. Business owners are not being tracked with  
5 this technology; the customers are. So I think really  
6 you can never at a technology divorced from the power  
7 dynamics of how it's used.  
8

9 ALLI FINN: We get this question a lot  
10 including from folks at the NYPD when we raise  
11 concerns, and I just want to say just because a  
12 technology exists doesn't mean we have to use it. It  
13 doesn't mean that it's the solution. Just because a  
14 company is selling a product doesn't mean that we  
15 have to buy it and apply it to New Yorkers' lives so  
16 when I get asked that question I like to talk about  
17 other things that I would like to see our City invest  
18 its resources in like housing, like schools, like a  
19 lot of what the Mayor has cut budget from rather than  
20 technologies that serve corporate and carceral  
21 interests.

22 DANIEL SCHWARTZ: I would just add that  
23 the few use cases that are often marketed with and  
24 are used to justify the deployment of biometric  
25 surveillance don't weigh against all the harms that

1 we're seeing, and, as I mentioned earlier, we only  
2 know of the tip of the iceberg because most of the  
3 people are never made aware whether facial  
4 recognition was used for example in their arrest, in  
5 their identification, and facial recognition and  
6 biometric surveillance at large, it's dangerous when  
7 it works as we see in the MSG deployment, and it is  
8 harmful when it doesn't work because of all the  
9 racial and gender bias that we have mentioned.

11 COUNCIL MEMBER HANIF: Finally, the  
12 companies that are like scraping this data and like  
13 investing in biometrics and facial recognition tools,  
14 is this a growing base of companies, are we seeing  
15 more of these companies, and do you have the research  
16 like who are the most egregious companies or most  
17 popular companies in New York City given the Admin  
18 really had no answer to that but since you all do  
19 this research day-in and day-out would love for the  
20 Council to receive some of the names of these  
21 companies to learn a little bit more?

22 DAVID SCHWARTZ: It's a vast field, and  
23 it's only growing because of the lack of regulations.  
24 I mentioned BIPA earlier. Under BIPA, fortunately,  
25 there was a settlement against Clearview AI, one of

1 the most infamous surveillance vendors that has  
2 amassed more than, by their own account, 20 billion  
3 social media images so basically anyone that has ever  
4 used a social media platform, whether it's Facebook,  
5 Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, and hadn't locked down  
6 the privacy settings and had some photos publicly  
7 available, that person is likely to be included in  
8 the database and could be in the crosshairs of paying  
9 customers of Clearview AI. Many of the large tech  
10 companies have their own biometric surveillance  
11 systems. There's a number of algorithms that are out  
12 there, and even small startups have scaled up, and I  
13 think it's impossible to track at this point all the  
14 names of vendors because there's literally hundreds.  
15 NIST was mentioned earlier by OTI about how they're  
16 evaluating and doing audits on the accuracy, and that  
17 test has grown in size, but they have also found the  
18 bias, specifically the racial bias, that we note in  
19 literally all the vendors across the board.

21 ALLI FINN: I just want to highlight this  
22 even further, that we don't know the full list of  
23 vendors that the City is contracting with. Going back  
24 to Fiscal Year 2010, there are almost 5 million  
25 anonymized spending records in the City's procurement



1 database. That means that the vendor is not named.

2 This is across all agencies. We do not know the scope  
3 of these contracts.  
4

5 To answer the other part of your  
6 question, this is an extremely lucrative industry  
7 that is only growing because of this lack of  
8 regulation and because of the money there is to be  
9 made because of the increasing list of customers for  
10 these vendors, and a lot of times when cities and  
11 agencies are contracting with vendors focused on  
12 surveillance- and data-driven technologies, they are  
13 not only using data that comes from those vendors but  
14 they're providing that information so law enforcement  
15 data is shared, private information is shared. I'm  
16 happy to go into more detail.

17 ALBERT FOX CAHN: While there is a  
18 relatively small number of companies that offer  
19 physical entry devices for buildings that integrate  
20 facial recognition. It's a growing universe, but it's  
21 comparatively small, but there's a huge number of  
22 apps and websites and software providers, many of  
23 which are based outside the U.S. and operate without  
24 any compliance with our minimal privacy laws here in  
25 the U.S. and will offer facial recognition services.

1 A key thing to remember is that every camera is just  
2 one software upgrade away from being used for facial  
3 recognition. You can take a photo from just a  
4 traditional CCTV camera, from an employee's cell  
5 phone, from anywhere and run it through websites that  
6 for 20 bucks I can go and take that photo and figure  
7 out someone's identity. It's that unregulated today,  
8 and really I think when you look at the full range of  
9 businesses in New York there probably are thousands  
10 of different facial recognition products and other  
11 biometric products being used.

12  
13 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thank you. I  
14 just want to make sure I heard you correctly. Did you  
15 say that city agencies are contracting with these  
16 companies?

17 ALLI FINN: Could you clarify the  
18 question?

19 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Yeah. You said  
20 something about companies and something about the  
21 agencies are contracting with...

22 ALLI FINN: Yeah. I'm not sure if this is  
23 what you're referring to. We've been looking at City  
24 procurement data since Fiscal Year 2010 simply  
25 because that's when the bulk of it has been made

1 available online, and what we're finding is there's  
2 close to 5 million spending records where the vendor  
3 has been anonymized across city agencies so maybe the  
4 Comptroller has access to that, maybe other city  
5 agencies have access to that, but we, as the public,  
6 do not know who those vendors are. Some of those  
7 could be surveillance and policing technologies. Was  
8 that the question you were referring to?  
9

10 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Yeah. You said 5  
11 million vendors or...

12 ALLI FINN: Close to 5 million records,  
13 spending records, so some of those can be under the  
14 same contracts, but we have been asking questions  
15 about this, and we'd love to ask more.

16 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Where did you  
17 say that was (INAUDIBLE)

18 ALLI FINN: It's in the Checkbook, the  
19 online public database of NYC procurement. They're  
20 under NA Privacy Security. That is the name of the  
21 vendor in all of those cases.

22 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: You said it was  
23 NY Security?  
24  
25

1  
2 ALLI FINN: NA like not applicable privacy  
3 security. This is also not in the procurement rules  
4 so we would love to investigate this further.

5 ALBERT FOX CAHN: I should mention last  
6 year the Legal Aid Society and my organization  
7 released about 3 billion dollars in formerly secret  
8 NYPD contracts that had been hidden from the public  
9 under what was called the Special Expenses Program.  
10 This was a program in collaboration with the  
11 Comptroller's Office that allowed them to redact  
12 contracts that were being entered into on privacy  
13 grounds and so we see a number of these programs to  
14 shield contractors, and we also see that the NYPD  
15 Foundation is being used as a workaround to avoid  
16 having contracts publicly recorded, and there's  
17 extensive use of trial accounts so Clearview AI, the  
18 NYPD was explicit in the past that they never had a  
19 contract with Clearview AI but later was leaked that  
20 they were the top user of the platform at the time  
21 because they had so many trial accounts that they had  
22 officers running thousands of searches and when  
23 officers got access to Clearview AI trial, they got  
24 an email saying essentially don't just run one or two  
25

1 searches, try running a dozen and see how good it is.  
2  
3 It was really an invitation to abuse the software.

4 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thank you. I was  
5 just wondering because I know that the Administration  
6 testified when asked a question about the usage of  
7 consultants that are providing this, and they kind of  
8 made it seem like they don't know or the City was  
9 potentially using those resources. Okay.

10 Are you done with your questions, Council  
11 Member Hanif? I believe you were. If so, Richardson  
12 Jordan was next.

13 COUNCIL MEMBER RICHARDSON JORDAN: Thank  
14 you for coming. Thank you for waiting. Thank you for  
15 your testimony. I appreciated the information because  
16 I honestly picked up a lot, and I just wanted to ask  
17 you because you're advocates and you're informed in  
18 this space, how would you combat the narrative around  
19 policing and crime? How would you argue about the  
20 values that we're speaking about to end the  
21 surveillance in the context of people saying that we  
22 need to do the biometrics to stop crime?

23 ALBERT FOX CAHN: I think it's important  
24 for people to understand just how error-prone facial  
25 recognition is. In addition to the algorithm being

1 biased in many cases, you also see a lot of  
2 pseudoscience so the standard procedure for the NYPD  
3 has historically been that they'll get an image and  
4 if the eyes are closed they'll photoshop them open,  
5 if the mouth is open they'll photoshop it closed, and  
6 in some cases they've even gone onto Google and typed  
7 in the phrase black male model, found the face of a  
8 random individual, copied the jawline of that  
9 individual onto the image from the crime scene, and  
10 then put that collage through the facial recognition  
11 algorithm, and that led to an arrest, and so you see  
12 a lot of these practices. I'm sure you'll hear from  
13 technology industry professionals later about how  
14 algorithm might be improving or might be changing,  
15 but the algorithm is just one source of what's  
16 driving the error here, and so it's not a question  
17 about choosing between our Constitution and our  
18 safety, it's a question of whether we're going to  
19 allow the City and for these businesses to continue  
20 to waste huge amounts of money on technology that is  
21 putting New Yorkers in harm's way. I just think that  
22 as we've seen all too often with the Administration's  
23 rhetoric on surveillance, whether it's ShotSpotter or  
24 handing out Air Tags as a way to prevent car theft  
25

1 even though they've been routinely abused to stalk  
2 members of the public, that they're looking for the  
3 rhetoric of a quick tech fix but all too often the  
4 tech isn't up to the job.  
5

6 ALLI FINN: I think that as more and more  
7 people look for alternative approaches to policing  
8 that can be inherently violent, there is a push  
9 towards technology and towards surveillance and that  
10 can be tempting, but what I always talk about with  
11 people is it's really important to remember that  
12 surveillance is a form of policing. It has always  
13 been in service of policing. Oftentimes what people  
14 experience on their bodies is a direct result of  
15 tech-supported surveillance that led to that moment  
16 whether it is an ICE arrest or someone being racially  
17 profiled and physically harmed by the police, it  
18 plays a role, so I think there's a difference between  
19 surveillance cameras making some people feel safe and  
20 what safety actually is. Do they prevent theft from  
21 happening or harm from happening? No, but they have  
22 the illusion and push us further away from the  
23 interventions that our communities desperately need  
24 that are actual public safety.  
25

2 DANIEL SCHWARTZ: Maybe just to add on  
3 both Alli's and Albert's points, a lot of the use  
4 cases are also not for what it's (INAUDIBLE) like  
5 they will prevent terrorist attacks or other really  
6 serious forms of crime and incidents here in New  
7 York, but we see this technology used against like  
8 minor theft of like, for example, a man was  
9 identified through facial recognition and he was  
10 stealing bottles of beer at a corner store. How did  
11 they actually use the facial recognition in that  
12 incident? They used again these completely  
13 unscientific methods and used a celebrity lookalike  
14 because they thought this person looked like Woody  
15 Harrelson and so the CCTV footage was so grainy and  
16 then at an angle, bad resolution, so instead of using  
17 the original CCTV capture, they googled the actor and  
18 utilized the high-resolution portrait of the actor  
19 instead.

20 COUNCIL MEMBER RICHARDSON JORDAN: Thank  
21 you.

22 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Council Member  
23 Holden.

24 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Thank you. Just to  
25 clarify, you're against, and this is yes or no, you



1 don't have to go into a long explanation, but are you  
2 against the ARGUS, the police ARGUS cameras that we  
3 paid 35,000 as Council Members to post in the  
4 neighborhoods?  
5

6 ALBERT FOX CAHN: Yes, I'm against the  
7 use...

8 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: You're against.

9 ALBERT FOX CAHN: Of those cameras because  
10 they haven't been shown to actually...

11 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: No, I would  
12 imagine. Go ahead.

13 DANIEL SCHWARTZ: Which cameras?

14 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: ARGUS, the police  
15 cameras that we see.

16 DANIEL SCHWARTZ: I think it depends on  
17 the specific details...

18 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: These are  
19 surveillance cameras that on the streets of New York  
20 City, all over. There are thousands of them.

21 DANIEL SCHWARTZ: Yeah, against.

22 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: You're against it?

23 ALLI FINN: Yes, we don't need them.

24 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: You don't need  
25 them either? Are you against the red light cameras?

1 DANIEL SCHWARTZ: As long as the privacy  
2 protections are there, so it really depends on the  
3 limitations both from...

4 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Red light cameras,  
5 speeding cameras, you'd be okay with?

6 DANIEL SCHWARTZ: It depends. There's both  
7 protections from the technological side and the  
8 policy side. For example, if those are met...

9 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: I just want a yes  
10 or a no.

11 DANIEL SCHWARTZ: There's no simple yes or  
12 no because there's such a wide range of...

13 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: You know what a  
14 red light camera does?

15 DANIEL SCHWARTZ: Yes, but there's  
16 different products, and so as long as the protection...

17 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: It gets your  
18 license plate and it sends you a fine. What about  
19 you? Are you against?

20 ALLI FINN: I agree with Daniel that these  
21 are complex issues.

22 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: They're complex  
23 issues when we talk about running a red light but not  
24

1 for catching a mass murderer with the ARGUS cameras,  
2 right?  
3

4 ALLI FINN: I think it goes down to,  
5 again, who has access to that data and what is being  
6 done with.

7 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Okay, so let's say  
8 the person who just killed three kids, we use facial  
9 recognition to get him, to arrest that person, that's  
10 not good? Is that what you're saying?

11 ALBERT FOX CAHN: Council Member, that's a  
12 horrific hypothetical, but the truth is this is being  
13 used to arrest people for shoplifting beer, like we  
14 can always talk about the..

15 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: I know, but there  
16 is a thing called where we have the technology and we  
17 could actually put somebody away that could protect  
18 us on the streets of New York City from this person  
19 repeating the crime and the fact that all three of  
20 you seem to be against an ARGUS camera is ludicrous,  
21 that's my opinion, but the second thing. You also  
22 mentioned about the Ring cameras. Do you know the  
23 NYPD had an agreement with Ring, people posted their  
24 Ring information online, they put it online for other  
25 people to see to warn people against people that were

1 stealing packages or coming in their yard and  
2 trespassing so I posted, let's say, because I'm on  
3 the Ring network to warn my neighbors, and you're  
4 using that as an example of how the NYPD is  
5 infringing on people. This is ludicrous. This gets to  
6 a point where you're not mentioning everything,  
7 you're just picking and choosing, like you're for the  
8 speed cameras, sort of, some are not, but you're  
9 against cameras that can put murderers away or at  
10 least catch them, get them off the streets. Okay,  
11 thank you, Chair. I mean it's just mindboggling.

12  
13 ALBERT FOX CAHN: Can I briefly respond,  
14 Chair?

15 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Sure. Briefly.

16 ALBERT FOX CAHN: I just want to point out  
17 in recent weeks there was an individual who refused  
18 to give police Ring camera footage about their  
19 neighbor and received a warrant for all the Ring  
20 camera footage, not just of their neighbor's house  
21 but from within their own house. There is so much  
22 potential for abuse with any of these systems, even  
23 something as simple as a Ring camera.

24 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: That's slightly  
25 different. That's a different situation. I'm talking

1 about what you had mentioned, I think you had  
2 mentioned or it's in your testimony, that the Ring  
3 issue was some kind of nefarious conspiracy by the  
4 NYPD. These are things that are posted on social  
5 media that everyone can see. That's what I'm  
6 mentioning. I didn't mention anything about other  
7 agreements that the NYPD did, but, see, we have to  
8 get the whole picture here, and by withholding  
9 certain things it's not really a wise thing. We do  
10 have cameras for a reason. I've never had a  
11 constituent, by the way, ask me to take a camera out.  
12 They want more cameras on the streets, and your  
13 extreme views on this is troubling because you can't  
14 pick and choose I like the speed camera or the red  
15 light camera, some of you have done that, or I don't  
16 like where we can catch a murderer. Come on. Are we  
17 living in a bizarro world here sometimes? I  
18 understand technology has to be controlled. I  
19 understand that, but we get to a point where if it  
20 really makes us safe and not feel safer, when it  
21 really makes us safe, that I don't want somebody  
22 placing a bomb in Madison Square Garden. If facial  
23 recognition stops that, then I'd be for it. I have  
24 nothing to hide. You put a sign up, there's facial  
25

1 recognition, you don't want to come in, don't come  
2 in. You don't want to go into the store, don't go  
3 into the store. Going the other way, you're going to  
4 infringe on the rights of the rest of us. Thank you,  
5 Chair.  
6

7 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thank you,  
8 Council Member Holden.

9 Okay, I have some questions as well, but  
10 I just wanted to let my Colleagues to go. If you  
11 could share with us the harms of potentially linking  
12 data? I think it's one thing to have facial  
13 recognition data but then it's another thing when  
14 data gets linked so are you able to share with us the  
15 harms of linking data, especially biometric data?

16 ALBERT FOX CAHN: Yeah. When you combine  
17 and link data, you're multiplying the impact it has  
18 if that data is breached, if it's disclosed, if it's  
19 accessed by a third party. When you see vendors like  
20 LexisNexis or Thompson Reuters compiling dossiers,  
21 each of these data points may seem innocuous on its  
22 own but the danger posed by the amalgamation of all  
23 this data is greater than the sum of its parts. I  
24 would say that you're creating an even greater impact  
25 when you link data.

1  
2 ALLI FINN: Just to add to that, the other  
3 danger is that in many cases what we see is it's not  
4 only people's datapoints that are getting linked,  
5 their biometrics, their biographics, right, their  
6 home address, where they live, what they do, etc.,  
7 but also assumptions about them, very harmful  
8 assumptions, and categories and labels, like people  
9 put into the NYPD's Gang Database without their  
10 knowledge. Those people in the NYPD's Gang Database  
11 are labeled as a gang member or an alleged gang  
12 member, and that label can follow them, right, in  
13 these data-sharing systems regardless of what they  
14 have or have not, and, as we know, many people in the  
15 NYPD's database were put there because of the color  
16 of shirt that they were wearing, the neighborhood,  
17 what they post on social media, so we also see that  
18 these labeling of people as criminal, as  
19 undocumented, as threats follows them and can further  
20 exacerbate those harms, and, again, we have very  
21 little regulation, transparency, oversight into these  
22 systems.

23 DANIEL SCHWARTZ: I think to just add on  
24 and something we haven't mentioned yet is also the  
25 linking of those technologies of databases of

1 correlating different technologies together is  
2 oftentimes greater than the sum of its parts, and I  
3 think a good example here is the Knightscope robot  
4 that was released or announced by the NYPD a couple  
5 weeks ago. That specific robot, or the deployment and  
6 pilot project did not follow the POST Act  
7 requirements to first post the use and impact policy,  
8 get public comment, and then finalize that policy  
9 before any procurement and deployment of such a  
10 technology, and this robot specifically, it combines  
11 video analytics, as mentioned earlier, it has video  
12 cameras, it has microphones, but also the vendor  
13 includes in its product facial recognition.  
14 Supposedly it's not being used, but it also includes  
15 other forms of video analytics such as license plate  
16 reader detection, it includes behavior detection, it  
17 includes signal detection such as when your phone  
18 pings looking for public wi-fi networks or known wi-  
19 fi networks, and combining all these technologies  
20 together is greater than the sum of like those  
21 technologies grouped individually because they allow  
22 for far greater insight and analytics capabilities,  
23 and that is also why we've been calling out the NYPD  
24 on separating out and/or (INAUDIBLE) also grouping  
25



1 arbitrary technologies together in these ambiguous  
2 categories that they have created for POST Act  
3 disclosures.  
4

5 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thank you. Are  
6 you able to share with us the different usages from  
7 private companies? Are they repackaging data? I know  
8 you mentioned the person who collected all of this  
9 data from Instagram images. How are they repackaging  
10 that data? Obviously, I'm sure they're selling the  
11 data, perhaps, but if you could just share a little  
12 bit more in detail how they're using the data and how  
13 they also might be repackaging the data when it's  
14 going to other parties?

15 ALLI FINN: It can work in various ways. I  
16 can speak to one example of data brokers and maybe  
17 someone else can speak more to Clearview, the company  
18 that you mentioned on facial recognition. Data  
19 brokers make their money by mass extraction,  
20 scraping, purchasing of our most intimate data,  
21 repackaging that data often with analytics products  
22 based on algorithms that can be biased to make  
23 predictions about risk, for example, and selling  
24 those to both private and government entities. For  
25 example, LexisNexis, which I am very much not a

1 lawyer, but legal students, journalists use  
2 LexisNexis research products, that's how many people  
3 know them, Lexis is a mass data broker and has been  
4 for decades, and they create dossiers on people. They  
5 advertise they have 10,000 or more public and private  
6 sources of data, 10,000 or more public and private  
7 sources of data, so they have these dossiers on  
8 people which include their biographic information,  
9 where they go, what they do, who they know, their  
10 health records perhaps, any court records, local tax  
11 and property records, utility data, marriage and  
12 divorce records, traffic violations, all of these  
13 comes into a usable profile that then only law  
14 enforcement can purchase including ICE and local  
15 police. That's just one example. I don't know if I  
16 answered your question.

18 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: No, that did.  
19 Thank you. How do you delete data out of these  
20 various systems? I know there's a lot of cyber  
21 security concerns if these systems are breached. Is  
22 there a way to extract your data outside of some of  
23 these systems?

24 ALBERT FOX CAHN: The terrifying reality  
25 is the vast majority of New Yorkers have no idea what

1 data is being collected by these systems to begin  
2 with. We have no way to confirm that it's being held,  
3 and we have no way, absent a court order, something  
4 that I've never really actually seen in these sorts  
5 of cases, that you could compel it to be deleted,  
6 whether you're looking at databases like the NYPD's  
7 Domain Awareness System or the government Fusion  
8 databases that share NYPD data with federal agencies  
9 like ICE, whether it's the private sector data  
10 brokers like Thompson Reuters and certainly  
11 LexisNexis. You can opt out of some systems. There  
12 are some cases in the private sector where you can,  
13 but in the public sector you can't, and, even worse,  
14 a lot of the time there are so many redundant copies  
15 of your data out there, by the time you opt out of  
16 one, they can just populate it from another database.

18 DANIEL SCHWARTZ: Just with regards to  
19 Clearview AI, for example, New Yorkers have no way of  
20 getting their biometric data deleted from that  
21 vendor. Residents of Illinois because of the BIPA law  
22 there have the possibility to get their biometric  
23 data deleted and also residents from Europe because  
24 of the GDPR protections.

2 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Okay, thank you.  
3 Are there any ways that people can avoid being  
4 surveilled?

5 ALLI FINN: On an individual level, it is  
6 almost impossible, and that is why we need systemic  
7 action from the City Council. There's a lot of work  
8 there of how to protect yourself in a protest, for  
9 example, but it will never go all of the way. You'd  
10 have to opt out of 99 percent of society. That's an  
11 exaggeration, maybe, maybe not, so we strongly need  
12 action by the City Council to protect us on a  
13 societal level because individually this is so  
14 insidious and so unregulated that it's virtually  
15 impossible.

16 ALBERT FOX CAHN: I want to highlight that  
17 this isn't a fringe opinion. The United States  
18 Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Roberts even  
19 acknowledged this opinion in a case just a few years  
20 back where he said that these technologies are  
21 indispensable to modern life, you can't navigate the  
22 world without them, and so there is no effective way  
23 to opt out.

24 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Yes, Nader in my  
25 office just gave me a quote earlier that if you want

1 security and freedom, you can't get both? What was  
2 the term? Tell me because it was a good term. Go on,  
3 say it.

4  
5 NADER AHMED: (INAUDIBLE)

6 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Yeah, so pretty  
7 much if you trade your freedom for security, you  
8 pretty much end up with neither, and so that's kind  
9 of what you're saying here, that, of course, people  
10 are trading in freedoms for the sense of security,  
11 but in trading in your freedom you essentially don't  
12 get either, like we're not more secure and at the  
13 same time and the same breath you're also trading off  
14 the freedoms that you have and rights to privacy.

15 ALBERT FOX CAHN: That's not a new  
16 position. Benjamin Franklin made that point more than  
17 two centuries ago.

18 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: It was Ben  
19 Franklin's point that he quoted to me.

20 Okay, do you have any suggestions outside  
21 of the bills today that the Council could consider to  
22 prevent companies from discriminating against people  
23 due to the usage of the technology?

24 ALBERT FOX CAHN: I think that in addition  
25 to the bills today it's really indispensable to have

1 a private right of action in both bills to ensure  
2 that individuals can have their day in court when  
3 their rights are violated. I think it's also crucial  
4 that we update the POST Act which was meant to  
5 require the NYPD to disclose these sorts of  
6 surveillance practices but which they have  
7 systematically violated for years, and now it's an  
8 opportunity to have greater accountability through  
9 legislation. I think we need to really revisit some  
10 of the decisions made on algorithmic discrimination a  
11 couple of years ago at the Council in the case of  
12 employment because New York law, we have a number of  
13 laws that have attempted to address the threat of  
14 algorithmic discrimination, but without actually  
15 having the sort of robust protections we need, and so  
16 really looking at outright bans on the most risky  
17 cases of algorithmic operations I think would go a  
18 long way.

20 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: I actually have  
21 a question on that because I know with the passing of  
22 that law that happened before my time companies are  
23 having a lot of conversations about copyright  
24 infringements, right, so if they have to be subject  
25 to an audit they are concerned that their proprietary

1 information, the algorithm that the company might've  
2 created to synthesize job applicants might now be  
3 subject to competitors because it'll suddenly be out  
4 in the open for the public so what is your opinion  
5 about that because that is an active conversation and  
6 it is my understanding that New York City is one of  
7 the first really government entities, I know in the  
8 UK, I know they've been looking at this, but in terms  
9 of like a government entity really seeking to  
10 regulate algorithms New York City is kind of the  
11 first out the gate and so what kind of  
12 recommendations or thoughts do you have around  
13 companies fearing that their proprietary information  
14 will now be out in the open for competitors to  
15 utilize?  
16

17 ALBERT FOX CAHN: You can't have a robust  
18 financial audit without disclosing a lot of  
19 proprietary information. You have to open yourself up  
20 to scrutiny when you're going through a meaningful  
21 audit, and what I'm terrified of and what I warned  
22 the Council about several years ago as a reason not  
23 to pass the law is that we don't have any agreement  
24 about what an effective audit means and so it's like  
25 mandating a financial audit when you don't have

1 accounting rules, don't have a tax code, don't have  
2 any framework for how to do it, and so I think that  
3 for these audits to be worth the paper they're  
4 written on you have to have broad disclosure around  
5 training data, around methodology. It can't simply be  
6 a surface-level examination because that's going to  
7 rubberstamp a lot of systems that are augmenting  
8 discrimination.

9  
10 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thank you. I  
11 have just a few more questions that I guess I'll ask  
12 on behalf of Council Member Gutiérrez.

13 The Administration mentioned at a  
14 blockchain hearing that they plan to provide digital  
15 wallets to residents. What are your comments,  
16 opinions about this announcement? What are the risks  
17 of having a digital wallet issued by the City and  
18 what are the risks of having digital wallets linked  
19 to biometrics?

20 DANIEL SCHWARTZ: I think we're really  
21 lacking details. There has been no announcement of  
22 this project. There has been little to no information  
23 of the scope, of the contracts, of the vendors, what  
24 the system would entail. I only know parts of the  
25 oral testimony that occurred, and I think it raises



1 privacy concerns, it raises security concerns, it  
2 raises concerns around really trying to influence  
3 shopping behavior made in that testimony, but I think  
4 we need more transparency and disclosure of what that  
5 project entails and what the guardrails.

6  
7           With regards to the second part of your  
8 question, I don't think it's a place to deploy  
9 biometric identification there. We've seen in the  
10 instance of the IRS that had experimented with ID.me  
11 for biometric verification and the Department of  
12 Labor for unemployment benefits, the failure of using  
13 biometric verification because it was requiring  
14 people to enter their sensitive biometric information  
15 to get their rightful benefits, it was locking people  
16 out, accessibility issues, especially people with  
17 less tech literacy or access to devices or stable  
18 internet connection were struggling with getting  
19 their benefits or submitting their taxes and so I  
20 think there's a number of issues that could touch on  
21 that.

22           ALLI FINN: Yeah, I share these concerns  
23 and that we need to know a lot more. Some of my  
24 colleagues are working on this more than I am so also  
25 happy to follow up, but our understanding is that

1 some of these contracts were initiated through a  
2 demonstration project, I think I'm correct on that,  
3 not a more traditional procurement process that has  
4 points of additional oversight by different city  
5 agencies. That's how ShotSpotter came into use in New  
6 York City, also through a demonstration project to  
7 bypass some of those processes. It raises some  
8 concerns and red flags including some of the vendors  
9 involved. I agree about biometrics, and there is a  
10 long history of digital IDs and digital wallets which  
11 often sound convenient and sound like that increase  
12 sufficiency. The actual use cases often show that  
13 people end up getting denied access to rights and  
14 resources and they can become trackable tools that  
15 can increase discrimination. I'm speaking very  
16 broadly, but we would love to see the City Council  
17 investigate this further along with communities and  
18 organizers.  
19

20 ALBERT FOX CAHN: Blockchain would be a  
21 boondoggle. It's an absurd proposition with no  
22 technical justification. We saw with the Excluded  
23 Worker Fund how bad some of these payment delivery  
24 systems could be using existing infrastructure, but  
25 to put every person's transaction on the blockchain

1 would make meaningful privacy protections impossible,  
2 and it also would just be a security nightmare. To  
3 me, it honestly felt like just buzzword bingo and not  
4 serious policy.  
5

6 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thank you. I  
7 don't think anyone else has any questions so I'll  
8 turn it back to you.

9 COMMITTEE COUNSEL BYHOVSKY: Thank you. I  
10 want to thank the panelists for your testimony, and  
11 we're going to move to our next panel.

12 I would like to welcome Lisa Meehan,  
13 Robert Tappan, sorry I mispronounced it, and Hally  
14 Thornton to testify.

15 Any order is fine.

16 LISA MEEHAN: Can you hear me? Okay, it's  
17 working. Hello. My name is Lisa Meehan. I'm here to  
18 testify on behalf of Mobilization for Justice.

19 Mobilization for Justice offers free  
20 legal assistance to low-income New Yorkers in many  
21 areas including housing law. We work alongside  
22 tenants and community-based organizations to prevent  
23 evictions, obtain repairs, and protect tenants'  
24 rights, and we appreciate the opportunity to share  
25

1 with the Committee our thoughts on limiting the use  
2 of biometric recognition technology.  
3

4           It is well-documented that facial  
5 recognition technology is less accurate at  
6 identifying the faces of people of color, women,  
7 elderly people, children, and transgender and  
8 nonbinary individuals than it is at identifying the  
9 faces of cisgender white men. As a result, tenants  
10 are often misidentified by the technology in their  
11 buildings. Tenants at one building have to resort to  
12 humiliating dances in front of their cameras just to  
13 be seen by the cameras, and guards end up buzzing in  
14 everybody who is waiting. The cameras at that same  
15 building mistakenly let a tenant's cousin in even  
16 though the tenant's cousin did not actually live in  
17 the buildings so, overall, both false positive and  
18 false negative matches result in less security for  
19 tenants rather than more security. Even if the  
20 technology were able to identify all faces with  
21 perfect accuracy, its use is still a violation of  
22 tenants' privacy. It infringes upon our most basic  
23 fundamental rights to privacy and freedom of  
24 association under the First Amendment of the  
25 Constitution by putting up barriers for tenants who

1 want to invite guests, family members, or service  
2 workers like home health aides to their homes.  
3 Landlords also use technology to surveil and harass  
4 tenants, particularly tenants who are already  
5 marginalized and at increased risk of being  
6 displaced. Lastly, the technology is dehumanizing. As  
7 one tenant said, we do not want to be tagged like  
8 animals. We are not animals. We should be able to  
9 freely come in and out of our development without our  
10 every movement being tracked.  
11

12 In conclusion, Mobilization for Justice  
13 urges the City Council to pass the initiatives and  
14 protect New York City residents. Thank you.

15 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thank you.

16 ROBERT TAPPAN: Thank you. Good afternoon,  
17 Council Members, Chairman Gutiérrez, Chair Williams.  
18 Thank you for giving me the opportunity to address  
19 you today.

20 My name is Rob Tappan. I am the Managing  
21 Director of the International Biometrics and Identity  
22 Association based in Washington, D.C. We are a non-  
23 profit industry associated chartered to advance the  
24 adoption and responsible use of technologies for  
25 managing human identity and to enhance security,

1 privacy, productivity, and convenience for  
2 individuals, organizations, and governments. We do  
3 this through advocacy, engagement, and education.

4  
5 Our reason for appearing before you here  
6 today is to communicate our concerns to the Council  
7 about the potential for overreach and the unintended  
8 consequences in the proposed draft legislation in  
9 bills 1014 and 1024.

10 With regard to the proposed language  
11 contained in bill 1014, I would tell you that  
12 residential building security is only as good as the  
13 weakest component, which is usually humans. The  
14 principles of various assurance levels of physical  
15 and logical security using multifactor authentication  
16 are well-captured in documents and standards  
17 published by the National Institute of Standards and  
18 Technology or NIST. The highest levels of assurance  
19 include biometrics as authentication factors. For  
20 building trying to offer highly secure environments  
21 for their tenants and residents, all residents and  
22 guests should be required to enroll biometrically or  
23 that high level of security can't be guaranteed. We  
24 do this in our businesses and our enterprises as well  
25 as in hospitals and healthcare facilities, and

1 building owners should be allowed to offer this level  
2 of security to their tenants. This level of security  
3 isn't a threat to be restricted. Rather, it is a  
4 privacy- and security-enhancing feature for residents  
5 and their guests. In the broader commercial space,  
6 biometric technologies are useful in fighting crime  
7 and reducing theft. The ability for stores, shops,  
8 and merchants to prevent shoplifting and robberies,  
9 or at least hold perpetrators accountable, is key to  
10 controlling this worrisome trend. According to a  
11 recent article in the New York Times, over the past  
12 five years shoplifting complaints nearly doubled,  
13 peaking at nearly 64,000 last year police data shows.  
14 Only about 34 percent resulted in arrests last year  
15 compared with 60 percent in 2017. Biometric  
16 technologies help in reducing crime, identifying  
17 repeat perpetrators as well as facilitating loss  
18 prevention and, when stores can't control their  
19 losses over time, they must make a difficult decision  
20 about to whether they remain in business in that  
21 location or their neighborhood. I have just two more  
22 sentences. When stores and commerce flee that area,  
23 that can create phenomena like food deserts limiting  
24 the options of area residents which in turn  
25

3 exacerbates the cycle of crime and economic despair.

4 Asking criminals for permission to enroll them

5 biometrically isn't realistic and doesn't support the

6 objective of reducing crime in New York City. I'll

7 leave the rest of my remarks for the record please.

8 Thank you.

9 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thank you.

10 Council Member Holden.

11 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Thank you both for

12 your testimony. I'll ask you both. What you said is

13 that if the residents opt in for facial recognition,

14 is there anything wrong with that, that the residents

15 said I wish to participate in this because my

16 building would be safer, would you be against that?

17 Let me ask, because you spoke against it, would you

18 be against that?

19 LISA MEEHAN: Our concern with opting into

20 the technology is that oftentimes tenants wouldn't

21 actually get the option to opt in. That option

22 wouldn't actually be communicated to them by their

23 landlords, and then, even if they are given the

24 choice to opt in, oftentimes tenants wouldn't feel

25 like they actually had a choice because of the power



1  
2 imbalance between landlords and tenants so we would  
3 have an issue with that.

4 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Let's say there  
5 was a bill, or included in this bill, that residents  
6 could opt out of the bill because they would like to  
7 have their building, whether it's their perception or  
8 not whether it's safer, but that they feel that they  
9 want to keep people who are constantly getting in the  
10 building, let's say the doorman or security person  
11 misses the person going in and gets in the building  
12 or somebody brings somebody in that had domestic  
13 violence, let's say, issues, and we want to keep them  
14 out, technology often is better than somebody saying  
15 I think that person looked like that guy, I'm not  
16 sure, whereas the biometric, I've read issues and  
17 maybe you could attest to this, but that what you had  
18 mentioned in your testimony that mostly people of  
19 color are singled out in this, that the technology  
20 was bad, that was the case, but the articles I read,  
21 that was the case years ago but not anymore, and what  
22 I'm reading is there's a 95 percent success rate. Do  
23 you have any other information on that, on facial  
24 recognition?

1  
2           ROBERT TAPPAN: Yes, Council Member. Yes,  
3 the cycle of innovation that has taken place even  
4 since 2019 where this sort of misnomer first  
5 occurred, the development of technology and  
6 innovation has quintupled, grown at an exponential  
7 pace in order to improve and be better and more  
8 effective and more accurate.

9           COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Have you heard the  
10 95? Because I've read articles where it said 99  
11 percent success rate, 95, that's not good enough?  
12 People opting in and say my building, I live in this  
13 building because I'm afraid and I'm afraid of who  
14 gets in the building, I don't believe that security  
15 at the desk is good enough, or whatever the reason,  
16 if somebody wants to opt in, shouldn't they be able  
17 to? You say yes, but you say it could be slipper  
18 slope I guess, right?

19           ROBERT TAPPAN: Council Member, I just  
20 want to make one point, and it's a personal story. I  
21 have two parents in assisted living right now.  
22 They're in a folks home not too far from my house.  
23 Every time I go and visit them, I go to a kiosk, type  
24 in the person I want to see, my mom and dad, and I go  
25 through a facial recognition thing because I

1 preregistered, I gave them my driver's license,  
2 they've compared it to my face, and it lets me in,  
3 and I want to be let in to see my parents, but I  
4 don't want some stranger off the street and neither  
5 do any of the other sons and daughters of members at  
6 an assisted care facility want that so it is truly a  
7 very good security measure and keeps places safe and  
8 secure.  
9

10 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Thank you. Thank  
11 you, Chairs.

12 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Can I ask you a  
13 question? Can you share examples of incidents where  
14 landlords adequately informed their tenants about no  
15 hot water, about a broken elevator, no heat? I think  
16 it is wildly irresponsible to position landlords to  
17 put up notification in their buildings about opting  
18 out, it is really dangerous, because they don't even  
19 do the minimum to meet dignified housing in many  
20 cases and in Districts like mine. I don't know about  
21 every other District that maybe has privilege to have  
22 doormen, but that doesn't happen in a lot of  
23 communities of color so do you have examples of when  
24 that does happen?  
25

1  
2 LISA MEEHAN: Not on top of mind. I can't  
3 think of any specific examples of landlords providing  
4 notice for things like that, no.

5 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: So would it be  
6 safe to say that you also don't feel confident that  
7 they would even follow the existing law which is  
8 notifying tenants of when their biometric information  
9 is being captured now?

10 LISA MEEHAN: Like we said, our concern  
11 with opting out or even opting in is that tenants  
12 often don't feel like they have a choice when they're  
13 in negotiations with their landlords because of the  
14 power difference between landlords and tenants in  
15 these types of negotiations, and there's the  
16 troubling trend of technology, any kind of technology  
17 used by landlords to surveil and harass tenants. In  
18 our written testimony, we talked about a lot of  
19 examples that are well-publicized of landlords using,  
20 for example, typical security cameras without facial  
21 recognition technology to harass tenant organizers,  
22 to screenshot minor lease violations and try and  
23 evict tenants.

24 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you.  
25

2                   ROBERT TAPPAN: Madam Chair, may I respond  
3 to that as well very briefly? One of the things that  
4 I've seen at this hearing today very ably run by you  
5 and your Colleagues here by many of the respondents  
6 is that there's a conflation of terms here. Sometimes  
7 we're talking about surveillance in the strict sense  
8 of the word when we're actually talking about  
9 verification or authentication. When we're talking  
10 about the use of biometric information versus what a  
11 dumb closed circuit television camera that's actually  
12 recording video, there's a little bit of conflation  
13 between these two types of things. Biometric  
14 technology has so much more computer power and  
15 analysis behind it than closed circuit television in  
16 the same way that having a smart card to buzz you  
17 into your apartment, it might record some information  
18 but it doesn't record your biometric information so  
19 there's, I think, a conflation of some of these  
20 technologies where we might hate the fact that when  
21 we use our keycard that our landlord or the apartment  
22 building owner knows that we come in at 11 o'clock at  
23 night and we don't leave until 11:30 the next day, we  
24 don't want people knowing that information but that  
25 has absolutely nothing to do with biometrics. That

1 has everything to do with technology making sure that  
2 the people who are where they need to be and are  
3 allowed to be there are allowed to get in, and it's  
4 the same way with biometrics in that if you want  
5 access to your account and you can use voice  
6 recognition in order to be verified, that's something  
7 that her voice is not the same as my voice, and if  
8 I'm trying to access her bank account, my voice ain't  
9 going to make it but hers will, and the integrity of  
10 that, the integrity of that biometric technology  
11 behind it is really what the security is all about.

13 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: I appreciate  
14 your response. I understand that distinction. I'm  
15 speaking specifically about how biometric data is  
16 used and can be abused by landlords, specifically in  
17 buildings with predominantly people of color and the  
18 ease of which, the Administration here, I think,  
19 identified how they're not really working or have no  
20 sense of whether existing laws are even being  
21 enforced, right? We walked into this hearing, hearing  
22 from them that there is no indication that they can  
23 share, yes, this Local Law is being enforced. We  
24 heard from advocates the opposite. What I'm saying is  
25 that it is far easier for landlords in these

1 situations to potentially abuse that and not solely  
2 use it for the purpose of security or safety for  
3 their buildings. They can utilize it, and there are  
4 examples of them utilizing that to evict tenants, to  
5 give that information to PD, and in those instances  
6 every time that data is shared, that person's  
7 biometric information is being compromised because  
8 they're being added to lists that they're not even  
9 aware of, and that's what I'm trying to drive home,  
10 the abuse of that. I get what you're saying. Council  
11 Member Williams.  
12

13 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: If you can  
14 share, you mentioned integrity, if you can talk a  
15 little bit more about I guess companies that are  
16 members of your non-profit association, the industry  
17 association, if you could share how they maintain  
18 integrity because I hear what you're saying, and it  
19 makes sense. If you need to scan a fingerprint to get  
20 into a building, that's completely different from  
21 having other information that could be calculated  
22 from the single use of your fingerprint to get into  
23 the building, but how can companies sort of safeguard  
24 against that because I always say it's not  
25 necessarily the technology, it's who is using the

1 technology, and what the technology is being used for  
2 and because oftentimes in government we can't  
3 regulate it, it just becomes dangerous across the  
4 board so how do your members sort of protect and  
5 safeguard against integrity?  
6

7           ROBERT TAPPAN: All very, very good  
8 points, and I agree with you on many of them. If you  
9 put a good technology into bad hands, something bad  
10 can be done with it, and you can put a person behind  
11 a car and they get a place to drive to work every  
12 day, but you can also put a bad person behind a wheel  
13 and they kill somebody so the technology is  
14 Switzerland, it is dependent upon the user and the  
15 usage. Our members have agreed to a code of ethics, a  
16 code of standards of ethical conduct and responsible  
17 use of biometric technologies. It's all on our  
18 website at [ibia.org](http://ibia.org) so those sort of principles can  
19 be looked up and our members adhere to them. A large  
20 part of our membership does business with the federal  
21 government and state and local governments around the  
22 country so our members are part of programs that are  
23 administered by the Department of Homeland Security,  
24 the Transportation Security Agency, the Customs and  
25 Border Protection, as well as any one of a number of



1 law enforcement entities out there, and the usage for  
2 this is security, identification and verification,  
3 and, in the milieu of travel, it's to assure that the  
4 people who have a boarding pass or use their face as  
5 a biometric in order to get on the plane are the  
6 people who they say they are and that are the people that  
7 are supposed to be on that plane or getting on and  
8 off a ship at a port of entry and exit and coming  
9 into the country. We have biometric passports, and we  
10 have biometric cameras at our entries, CLEAR program,  
11 any one of a number of a different programs that use  
12 biometrics. There was a question that's been asked a  
13 number of times, what are the good things about  
14 biometrics, what good aspects of biometrics are  
15 there, and there's many, and I can go off the shores  
16 of the United States and go to India where the AADHAR  
17 national ID program is being implemented right now.  
18 Right now, there are 1.6 billion people who are now  
19 able to have an ID that they can show and get  
20 benefits from the government when they couldn't do it  
21 before because they had no identity before that.  
22 There are just any one of a number of Indian faces,  
23 right, so you've got this identity card now. That  
24 gives you something. That's currency. That is  
25

1 existence. That is identity. It's those sorts of  
2 things that really are the positive parts of  
3 biometrics.  
4

5 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Just another  
6 question in the same vein. Outside of integrity, I  
7 know that there's been a lot of conversations around  
8 the makers of various algorithms and how information  
9 is scrubbed so if you have someone creating an  
10 algorithm, a human creating an algorithm or plugging  
11 into a computer, you know humans, we all have bias,  
12 every human has a bias...

13 ROBERT TAPPAN: Absolutely.

14 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Have your member  
15 organizations, do they look at that type of...

16 ROBERT TAPPAN: Indeed, they do. I'll make  
17 two points about this. One, to answer your last  
18 question first. They look at that time all the time.  
19 NIST, the National Institute of Standards and  
20 Technology, does a competition every year with the  
21 largest makers, actually any company that develops  
22 algorithms and these types of technologies can enter,  
23 and it goes to the old adage garbage in, garbage out.  
24 The 2019 NIST study made some generalities about some  
25 really bad algorithms that were out there and that

1 was maybe first, second generation, and really don't  
2 reflect the algorithms that are here right now, and  
3 that's the pace of innovation and the pace over five  
4 years. The other thing about algorithms, and I like  
5 to use analogies and I'm not trying to dumb this down  
6 at all, but an algorithm is like a recipe. You have a  
7 recipe for brownies, and you know that you have to  
8 bake them at 350 and you add an egg and you add some  
9 oil or butter and 25 minutes later you have brownies,  
10 right? Some people like chewy brownies and some  
11 people like cakey brownies, right? Add more eggs, you  
12 get cakey brownies. You add more fat, you get chewy  
13 fudgy brownies, right? These algorithms can be  
14 manipulated and they have been, right, but it's not  
15 in the best interest of any good upstanding company  
16 who is in the biometrics industry, that has any ounce  
17 of integrity, to build in white bias or majority  
18 bias, it doesn't make any sense. You're striving for  
19 perfection. You're striving for, okay, the word  
20 discrimination has two meanings, right.  
21 Discrimination is the bad one, the first one is  
22 discriminating against people and sidelining them.  
23 The one about discriminating is actually coming to a  
24 finer point and getting to the accuracy of something.  
25

1 You're discerning. You've got a discriminating  
2 palate. That's what our member companies are trying  
3 to do with the algorithms that they are building.  
4 They're trying to get more and more accurate, and the  
5 Council Member who did say that there was 95 percent  
6 accuracy on some, indeed there was in the last set of  
7 NIST tests. Is there ever going to be perfection? No,  
8 but we can strive for perfection, and that's what our  
9 member companies try to do. Thank you.

11 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Yeah. How are  
12 they controlling for that? The explanation that you  
13 provided, do you know how they're controlling for  
14 that, how are they trying to get to better accuracy,  
15 how are they running test models, maybe even bringing  
16 different people into the company, what are the  
17 tangible things that they're doing to control for  
18 said potential bias that might show up in these  
19 various systems?

20 ROBERT TAPPAN: Yes. Thank you for the  
21 question. First of all, I'm not a true technologist.  
22 Otherwise, I'd be working for a biometrics company  
23 myself. I will say that a lot of this has to do with  
24 the datasets. In the early days of coming up  
25 algorithms, there was a control set that probably was

1 predominantly white, Caucasian, light-skinned, right?

2 Over time, we've been able to absorb more and more  
3 datasets of people of various shades of skin color,  
4 etc. That makes the algorithms with each iteration  
5 become more and more accurate so it's a matter of  
6 ongoing testing, ongoing innovation, and expanding  
7 the universe of people that are in that dataset.  
8

9 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Outside of the  
10 datasets, are there any like focus groups that some  
11 of your membership organizations have or like special  
12 committees just to get sort of that, because one of  
13 the things that the Chief Privacy Officer talked  
14 about is independent reviews and he also talked about  
15 transparency so one, providing information to the  
16 public in terms of what the algorithm is, what the  
17 data is showing, but then he also said, I wrote it  
18 down somewhere on one of these papers, I wrote on a  
19 thousand papers today, I don't know why, that was  
20 very, very silly of me, it might be under here...

21 ROBERT TAPPAN: Ma'am, to your point there  
22 are professional associations like myself, IBIA, and  
23 then there's also the Security Industry Association,  
24 there's any one of a number of industry associations  
25 that gather scholars and technologists of all

1 different backgrounds in order to be able to make  
2 things like algorithms more accurate and that sort of  
3 thing. NIST is also involved. I look at this as a big  
4 partnership. We've been asked and actually cooperated  
5 just a few weeks ago with the National Academies of  
6 Science, Engineering, and Medicine and provided our  
7 testimony into how our membership is making  
8 algorithms more accurate, less biased, and more  
9 focused on getting towards that 100 percent accuracy,  
10 and so there is a very large network of government,  
11 private sector, trade association, and then  
12 enterprises who are actually in the business who are  
13 all cooperating together. Is it perfect? Is it at the  
14 urgent pace that perhaps this Council is looking for?  
15 I don't know. That remains to be seen, but I will  
16 tell you that it is being worked and that we are  
17 dedicated towards making it better so that we don't  
18 have to appear before you all in this sort of adverse  
19 situation.  
20

21 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Yeah. I think he  
22 said independent evaluations so just was wondering  
23 if...

24 ROBERT TAPPAN: I would consider the  
25 National Institute of Standards and Technology to be

1 an independent body. Though funded by the federal  
2 government, it certainly has a stake in the way that  
3 the FDA has a state in making sure that drugs are  
4 safe and efficacious.

5  
6 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thank you. I  
7 think that's all. Thank you.

8 COMMITTEE COUNSEL BYHOVSKY: I would like  
9 to thank all panelists for their testimony, and we're  
10 moving to our next panel.

11 I would like to welcome our last panel  
12 in-person, and then we will call witnesses who are  
13 here virtually.

14 Our next panelists are Jake Parker, Jay  
15 Peltz, Stuart Reid, and Francisco Marte.

16 JAKE PARKER: My name is Jake Parker. I'm  
17 with the Security Industry Association, a non-profit  
18 organization representing more than 70 companies  
19 headquartered in New York. I appreciate the  
20 opportunity to participate and be before you today.

21 Our members provide a broad range of  
22 security and life safety products and services in the  
23 U.S. and throughout the City including biometrics.  
24 Today, biometric technologies contribute to the  
25 safety and security of our communities and bring

1 value to our daily lives. In nearly all cases,  
2 businesses are utilizing this technology as a better  
3 way to accomplish pre-existing underlying processes  
4 of verification and identification that is already  
5 occurring through other less effective means. The  
6 purposes generally fall into two categories,  
7 enhancing business operations and also optimizing the  
8 functionality or security of products and services  
9 used by customers. The vast majority of these  
10 applications are opt-in and based on prior consumer  
11 consent.  
12

13 We do have some concerns about the two  
14 proposals before us today. I think a measured  
15 approach could address some very specific concerns  
16 about the technology, and we understand that there  
17 are concerns, but the measures would simply outlaw  
18 most uses of biometric technologies by businesses,  
19 consumers, and property owners regardless of the type  
20 of biometric, regardless of the purpose, and  
21 regardless of whether it's a service that's been  
22 requested or agreed to by an individual. This would  
23 rob consumers of the choice to use more secure and  
24 convenient methods to verify their identity, and it  
25 would dictate unnecessary limitations on methods New



1  
2 Yorkers can use to protect themselves and their  
3 property. No other jurisdiction in the U.S. has ever  
4 considered something of this scope.

5           Here are just a few examples of the  
6 biometric technologies that would be eliminated under  
7 this type of prohibition. Customer choice of  
8 biometrics is a more convenient form of payment and  
9 access at sporting events and entertainment venues,  
10 biometrically secure driver authentication for  
11 rideshare services, fingerprint access for gym  
12 members, use of increasingly popular virtual doorman  
13 systems by homeowners' associations and residential  
14 buildings which offer a more secure and convenient  
15 access for residents, we've talked a bit about this  
16 today, use of fingerprint timeclocks and cash  
17 register locks by business and employees,  
18 biometrically secure building and door access systems  
19 for workers, biometrically enabled security systems  
20 protecting persons or properties including systems  
21 that augment efforts to fight organized retail crime  
22 and address the theft issue that we certainly have  
23 (INAUDIBLE) systems have been able to greatly reduce  
24 incidents of theft. Also use of biometrics for  
25 streamlined embarkation by airlines and cruise lines

1 providing curb-to-gate travel services. Earlier on,  
2 it did come up the question about airlines and travel  
3 services, I don't see any kind of exemption in this  
4 draft that would make these restrictions not apply in  
5 those instances to the services we were talking about  
6 unless I'm missing something.  
7

8 I'll just say one last thing, there is an  
9 existing biometric data law in place in the City  
10 which is unique and one of its kind which has just  
11 recently gone into effect 18 months ago, also the  
12 Tenant Data Protection Law has just gone into effect  
13 in January and requires consent for biometric use in  
14 those types of systems, and it covers electronic  
15 access information so I think we should see how the  
16 regulations goes before layering on further  
17 prohibitions.

18 JAY PELTZ: Good evening. My name is Jay  
19 Peltz, and I am the General Counsel and Senior VP of  
20 Government Relations for the Food Industry Alliance  
21 of New York. FIA advocates on behalf of grocery,  
22 drug, and convenience stores throughout the state. We  
23 represent a broad spectrum of the NYC retail food  
24 sector from independent neighborhood groceries to  
25 large chains including many unionized stores.

2           We oppose this legislation because it not  
3 only bans the use of biometric recognition technology  
4 to identify a customer without a public safety  
5 exception, but it also creates numerous new  
6 conditions on the collection of biometric identifier  
7 information that are so far-reaching that they  
8 effectively prohibit the accumulation of such  
9 information by the City's grocers. The inability to  
10 collect such information and use biometric  
11 recognition technology would seriously undermine the  
12 ability of the City's grocers to deter shoplifting  
13 and assist law enforcement investigations of repeat  
14 offenders. The failure to reverse rising thefts at  
15 marginal grocery stores will likely result in the  
16 closure of those locations, thus exacerbating the  
17 City's food desert problem. Historical NYC crime data  
18 demonstrates a recent surge in petit larceny  
19 complaints including a 46 percent increase in such  
20 complaints between 2020 and 2022. A rise in retail  
21 theft is accompanied by an increase in threats of  
22 violence and actual violence during the commission of  
23 such crimes. This creates the need for merchants,  
24 many of whom are people of color, to use legal  
25 ethical methods that are nonconfrontational to deter

1 theft and assist law enforcement investigations of  
2 repeat offenders. Biometric systems are focused on  
3 identifying recidivists who commit a disproportionate  
4 share of thefts in the city. It is our understanding  
5 that the commercial use of facial recognition is  
6 legal in all 50 states. In addition, there's a  
7 current trend away from blanket bans of facial  
8 recognition technology. The trend towards expanded  
9 facial recognition includes appropriate privacy  
10 protections and exemptions for safety and security  
11 applications. This is why we oppose this legislation  
12 and strongly support a collaborative effort to  
13 replace this bill with a new measure that will allow  
14 the collection of biometric identifier information  
15 and its use through biometric recognition technology  
16 that enables the identification of individuals for  
17 the well-being and safety of customers and workers.

18  
19 We look forward to participating in such  
20 a cooperative process with Council Members and other  
21 government stakeholders. I'd be happy to answer any  
22 questions you might have.

23 FRANCISCO MARTE: My name is Francisco  
24 Marte. I didn't bring nothing in writing because it  
25 was short notice and, besides that, because I'm going

1 to tell the (INAUDIBLE) and the facts. I am really  
2 opposed to this draft.  
3

4           Since 2020, we've been facing a lot of  
5 problems (INAUDIBLE) bodegas and supermarkets. I'm  
6 talking on behalf of the bodegas (INAUDIBLE) small  
7 businesses, restaurants and (INAUDIBLE) as well as  
8 supermarkets. We've been having a lot of problems.  
9 Now the technology is helping us. This type of  
10 technology is to prevent a crime to happen and how we  
11 can prevent, in a small (INAUDIBLE) to be turned into  
12 (INAUDIBLE) use these technologies, we will prevent a  
13 lot of problems, a lot of incidents that happen. We  
14 will keep using this. Even we put a sign outside  
15 saying that we are using the recognition technologies  
16 in the store that we are using. As the President of  
17 Bodegas and Small Business Association, I've been  
18 promoting to my members that you have to use it  
19 because we need to product our customers, our  
20 employees, and our business. We've (INAUDIBLE) a lot  
21 of problems (INAUDIBLE) a lot of problems that happen  
22 because of the violence so this wave of violence was  
23 created since 2020 when (INAUDIBLE) start to  
24 disrespect the police, when the Police Department  
25 lost their respect so it's a (INAUDIBLE) that right

1 now the sponsor of these bills, in their Districts  
2 there are high crimes, and we, the business  
3 community, we've been suffering a lot as the working-  
4 class (INAUDIBLE) I hope that if this bill passes,  
5 the Mayor vetoes them because we will keep fighting  
6 even we have to move to another (INAUDIBLE) because  
7 we will keep using this to protect our business, our  
8 customer, our community. That was that, but I just  
9 want to make this very clear. These don't (INAUDIBLE)  
10 no one because when we use (INAUDIBLE) if someone  
11 comes, a repeat shoplifter or a criminal comes, he is  
12 just going to get a notice. We don't deny anyone to  
13 come, even if you are already an offender. What we do  
14 is we keep eyes on you to prevent that you commit a  
15 crime. That's what we do. These technologies are  
16 really helping the store owners and the communities  
17 (INAUDIBLE) Thank you.

19                   STUART REID: Good afternoon, Members of  
20 the New York City Council on Technology, Chairs  
21 Gutiérrez and Williams, guests gathered here today.  
22 Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak  
23 about technology, security, and safety in New York  
24 City. My name is Stuart Reid. I'm the Co-Chairman of  
25 The Smart Community Initiative, TSCI, a 501(c)(3)

1 not-for-profit partnership of public housing and  
2 residents and veteran New York City community  
3 technologists who have come together to help improve  
4 the quality of life for our residents utilizing  
5 innovative technology applications and services.  
6

7           While TSCI certainly applauds the  
8 Council's efforts to reign in and regulate the use of  
9 technology to monitor and surveil in the name of  
10 public safety, particularly with the accelerated  
11 implementation of AI, TSCI encourages the Council to  
12 also invest its attention and resources to support  
13 successful community-based public safety initiatives  
14 utilizing innovating technology to keep our public  
15 housing developments safe. TSCI believes that our  
16 communities themselves should be in control of our  
17 own public safety and security rather than some  
18 third-party technologist, agency, or government  
19 entity. TSCI and its Directors have been working in  
20 partnership with public housing residents for decades  
21 on this very issue. TSCI trains residents in  
22 emergency and public safety communications,  
23 procedures, and protocols utilizing mobile radios,  
24 smart phones, and other communication devices to stay  
25 in touch with each other and to keep our communities

1 informed. Working in collaboration with resident  
2 association leadership, TSCI installs emergency  
3 digital bulletin boards in building lobbies that  
4 display and announce emergency preparedness and  
5 mitigation information as well as development news  
6 and information. TSCI also works with residents in  
7 creating the Virtual Tenant Patrol Service which  
8 enables residents to view live images of their  
9 building's lobbies, entrances, and other public  
10 spaces on mobile phones and connected devices. Where  
11 residents, many of them seniors, previously sat in  
12 building lobbies to monitor and report on suspicious  
13 traffic in their buildings, they are now able to do  
14 so remotely without sitting directly in what could be  
15 harm's way. The emergency digital board and Virtual  
16 Tenant Patrol services put public safety and quality  
17 of life directly into the hands of residents. The  
18 service is completely controlled by resident  
19 leadership, including programming of emergency and  
20 building announcements and also serving as an  
21 information kiosk. When everyone can see what's going  
22 on in the development, when everyone is informed and  
23 aware of their building conditions, threats, and  
24 safety protocols and responses, the community,  
25



1 itself, becomes its own watchdog and first responder  
2 as we all work together to keep each other safe.

3  
4 In summary, as (INAUDIBLE) the abuses and  
5 possible threats of biometric surveillance and AI,  
6 TSCI encourages the Council to explore community-  
7 based technological solutions to public safety that  
8 are already being successfully deployed to empower  
9 our communities to take control of and realize true  
10 public safety and security. Thank you.

11 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you. I  
12 have some questions for both Francisco and Jay.  
13 Curious in both of your experiences, your members,  
14 what specifically is being captured by the biometric  
15 collection?

16 JAY PELTZ: Right. With our members, it's  
17 just facial recognition. No other metadata. No other  
18 personal identifier information. If there's a match,  
19 it's a better system than the old school dumb systems  
20 because if there's...

21 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Which is just a  
22 security camera, do you mean?

23 JAY PELTZ: Well, it's not smart.

24 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay.

1                   JAY PELTZ: There's no app. It's not  
2  
3 software based. It's better because it's faster and  
4 more efficient and a lot more accurate. Much less  
5 chance of error. If somebody is observed committing a  
6 crime in the store, then an image is taken and stored  
7 and, if there's a hit on that image again when that  
8 person comes in, then internally to the loss  
9 prevention people there will be a message sent if  
10 there's a match.

11                   CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: I see.

12                   JAY PELTZ: And then the store is in a  
13 position to assist law enforcement if law enforcement  
14 is interested, which they aren't always interested,  
15 but that's all that's done with it. It's just a tool  
16 that can assist law enforcement in their effort to  
17 enforce the law. The problem historically with  
18 shoplifting cases is that the police simply didn't  
19 have enough evidence to go on so shoplifting  
20 historically has been under-enforced. I've been  
21 around the business since I was born. My dad was in  
22 the business, operated independent grocery stores in  
23 the stores. I operated independent grocery stores.  
24 It's been very difficult to prosecute those types of  
25 cases because of a lack of evidence. These systems

1 create the possibility of having accurate eviction  
2 which is a match on somebody's face.

3  
4 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Before you  
5 answer, just one followup question for you. In those  
6 instances, I appreciate the timeline because that was  
7 going to be my followup question. In those instances  
8 where there is a capture of some theft happening and  
9 then the next time the person comes in, do you have a  
10 sense of how often does that happen? Our concern is,  
11 yes, the biases of algorithms but also the fact that  
12 like technology is not perfect and kind of the risk  
13 that that could put people in so do you have a risk  
14 of like how often that happens where it's capturing  
15 the right person or kind of what that discrepancy  
16 looks like?

17 JAY PELTZ: My understanding, what's being  
18 reported to me is that the system is very reliable,  
19 the error rate is very low, but the number of  
20 incidents overall citywide are up. In 2022, there  
21 were over 115,000 complaints according to the NYPD of  
22 petit larceny. That's the highest number by far  
23 throughout the 2000-2022 period, but theft rates vary  
24 by individual store, individual neighborhood.

2

CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay.

3

Francisco, for your members (INAUDIBLE) supermarkets?

4

FRANCISCO MARTE: Yes.

5

6

CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: What is the  
data that they're collecting and walk me through

7

similarly if you can the way Jay did like how does

8

that prevent theft for the business owner?

9

10

FRANCISCO MARTE: Yes. Similarly like he  
said, we just collect the image, and it's just to

11

prevent, when the people, we don't deny the service

12

(INAUDIBLE) knows that we know that they're there so

13

if you come to commit a crime, don't do it. Just

14

leave. If you're not going to shop, you're not going

15

to buy, just go. Don't try to shoplift because we

16

have the eyes on you, and that's better because

17

that's a prevention so basically this camera has

18

already doing for us (INAUDIBLE) to prevent for a

19

crime to happen or a violence because of shoplifting.

20

CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: In the

21

occurrence where the person who maybe previously

22

committed theft comes back, doesn't do anything, what

23

happens there after that match is made?

24

FRANCISCO MARTE: If they don't come?

25

1  
2 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: No, if they do  
3 come but they don't do anything. They maybe patron  
4 the store.

5 FRANCISCO MARTE: All right. Yes, if they  
6 don't commit a crime, we won't do anything to them.

7 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Will it still  
8 go (INAUDIBLE)

9 FRANCISCO MARTE: (INAUDIBLE) is going on.

10 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: There's still  
11 notification and so that happens and so now you're  
12 just watching this person more carefully?

13 JAY PELTZ: A person can be barred from a  
14 store. It's a private establishment. If a person is  
15 witnessed shoplifting a number of times, that person  
16 might be barred, a letter sent to the local precinct.  
17 If that person has been barred, then, at the  
18 discretion of the store, they can contact the local  
19 precinct and then it's up to law enforcement to take  
20 it from there, but there are a couple of points I  
21 wanted to make related to your overall line of  
22 questioning. This is all about somebody, one of the  
23 panels before talked about stealing a bottle of beer.  
24 We're not here because people are stealing individual  
25 bottles of beer. We're here because of repeat

1 offenders. In my full testimony, there's a reference  
2 to a New York Times article that about 1/3 of  
3 shoplifters, about 327, have been arrested and re-  
4 arrested 6,000 times, and the issue now for the first  
5 time in my life going back to 1963, that organized  
6 retail theft is hitting grocery stores so they're  
7 causing thousands upon thousands of dollars' worth of  
8 damage, and what our members are trying to do is to  
9 address that problem. That's where the focus is.  
10

11 In terms of bias, first of all, we  
12 represent chains and independents. Most of our  
13 independents probably are people of color, Hispanic  
14 people, Arab people. They're not biased against  
15 people of color, and they're not going to allow it to  
16 happen if...

17 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Oh, they are,  
18 speaking from my community, but go on. Everyone is  
19 biased.

20 JAY PELTZ: In our experience, bias is  
21 profoundly offensive. It's a complete waste of the  
22 owners' resources. They're not investing in the  
23 system in order to give people a hard time who aren't  
24 committing any crimes in their stores. If they're  
25 deemed to be engaged in bias, it's likely to result

1 in loss of business so bias is not something that our  
2 owners are interested in nor is it something that  
3 they would allow to continue so if the return isn't  
4 there, the return is measured solely by how many  
5 repeat offenders do you catch, they're going to shut  
6 the system down.  
7

8 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: For both of  
9 your membership organizations, was the use of  
10 biometric technology installed during the pandemic,  
11 2020? Just because I understand what you're saying,  
12 your concerns, I believe there's like a bigger issue  
13 around why people are stealing food or grocery stores  
14 for example, but I'm just trying to...

15 JAY PELTZ: Well, people steal food for  
16 different reasons for sure, but the big problem is  
17 the organized retail theft rings who have their own  
18 warehouses, it's like product in, product out,  
19 they're making a fortune. That's got nothing to do  
20 with people starving and everything to do with people  
21 who want to make money through illicit means. My  
22 understanding is that our members have increased  
23 their purchase of these systems since 2020 when state  
24 level reforms were enacted and crime rates went up,  
25 theft rates went up as a response to that.

1  
2 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: You're  
3 referring to bail reform?

4 JAY PELTZ: I'm sorry?

5 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: You're  
6 referring to bail reform?

7 JAY PELTZ: And other measures that were  
8 enacted by the State.

9 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay.  
10 Francisco.

11 FRANCISCO MARTE: We've been having this  
12 problem, the problem started to get worse since 2020,  
13 but we already had been having that kind of problem  
14 but we didn't have the technologies and while we are  
15 using the technology just to prevent, that's what we  
16 are doing, it is a prevention (INAUDIBLE) we've been  
17 resolving with the facial recognition. Like I told  
18 you, we don't collect data, we don't share that  
19 information, it's just for us, to protect us, from  
20 the shoplifting. Remember, over 97 percent of the  
21 people who do shoplifting, they do it to resell or to  
22 use drugs or do something. They don't do it for need.  
23 In New York, we are not in that situation, the  
24 hungry, because there's so many pantries, there is  
25 food everywhere. If they came to any of our stores



1 and they ask for food because they're hungry, we are  
2 going to give them food. It doesn't matter, you know,  
3 we don't ask if you are, how can I say, for a  
4 (INAUDIBLE) or nothing like that because, like he  
5 said, we are independent owners, we work hard and we  
6 have to defend our stores because that's the only  
7 (INAUDIBLE) we have.

9 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you.

10 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: I just had a  
11 comment and then I guess a question.

12 The comment, I just wanted to mention  
13 that I know you, Mr. Jake, you mentioned some of the  
14 beneficial applications that would be eliminated and  
15 some of them would not apply to this law, but some of  
16 them, you are right, would apply to the law. I just  
17 wanted to mention that to you, that some of them  
18 would be exempt from having to comply with this law  
19 because they're specific to public accommodations and  
20 the other one is specific to housing.

21 The other thing I wanted to ask in that  
22 same vein is would you be, or any of you all since  
23 you all oppose the bills, would you be open to  
24 amendments to the public accommodations bill that  
25 allows for people to consent to have their biometric

1 information used to verify and/or identify them?

2  
3 Would you be okay if that was included, because I  
4 know that's technically not included in the bill.

5 It's just a consent to collect information, but the  
6 bill will still ban all forms of biometric

7 identification to verify and/or identify a person so

8 would you be okay with the bill if that amendment was  
9 made?

10 JAKE PARKER: A couple of problems there.

11 One is that for the security and safety type of  
12 applications that we're talking about, consent really

13 isn't appropriate and that would not work for the

14 functionality of those systems. Certainly, notice is

15 important. I think that can be provided in a lot of

16 instances. Also, then it becomes a concern about the

17 method of enforcement through the private right of

18 action where we've seen in other jurisdictions, in

19 primarily Illinois, where technical allegations about

20 whether consent has been provided or not can be the

21 basis of frivolous lawsuits and can really damage

22 particularly small businesses in that state that have

23 been sued in the instances where no harm to a person

24 has occurred but there's an allegation of a technical

25 violation so I think that concept should work but

1 there needs to be reasonable exceptions for safety  
2 and security.  
3

4 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: I know in Texas  
5 they ban, and I'm trying to pull it up, but they  
6 don't allow for the private right of action that you  
7 mentioned. It's only the Attorney General that can  
8 enforce the violations of the law so what is your  
9 opinion about the Texas version?

10 JAKE PARKER: That's a state level law.  
11 It's really a different situation. What the Council  
12 has already passed, the Biometric Data Ordinance in  
13 2020 I believe it was and the Tenant Privacy Act from  
14 2021 that has just gone into effect, both include a  
15 private right of action as the enforcement mechanism  
16 and so I definitely think there could be abuse of  
17 that mechanism. We haven't seen, I believe, but maybe  
18 just one lawsuit so far under the Biometric Data Law,  
19 but certainly a concern.

20 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: I know it's a  
21 state law. I was just wondering how you felt about  
22 removing the private right of action and creating  
23 more of a government entity that can enforce because  
24 there have been bills that particularly have come  
25 before my Committee and, of course, the concern is it

1 opens up companies to a whole bunch of lawsuits and  
2 so if there was a way to, I don't know, perhaps  
3 minimize that, would you be in support of the  
4 legislation?  
5

6 JAKE PARKER: I think as a general  
7 statement that's a better way of enforcing laws like  
8 this, but I think in this case I think the question  
9 why haven't there been more lawsuits if the level of  
10 abuse is what it's assumed to be.

11 STUART REID: I would just like to  
12 mention, Council Member Williams, I do not oppose the  
13 bill, TSCI does not oppose the bill, so though I'm  
14 here with these other gentlemen that do, you  
15 mentioned "you all," I'm not among that group, and I  
16 also just wanted to say that one of the earlier  
17 panelists talked about the power equation of who is  
18 in control of the technology, who's in control of the  
19 cameras, who's in control of the data, and I think  
20 that is so important, and what our experience has  
21 been, TSCI's experience has been, is when the people  
22 on the ground, when the residents are in control of  
23 the technology and the data, it changes everything.  
24 It becomes no longer a punitive technology. It  
25 becomes more of a preventative technology, and I

1 think that's something that I encourage the Council  
2 to explore further.

3  
4 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thank you for  
5 the clarification.

6 JAY PELTZ: If I may. Regarding private  
7 right of action, one of the problems with private  
8 right of action clauses in the city is that I've  
9 never seen one with a provision that allows an  
10 establishment to allege that the claim is frivolous.  
11 Our members face way too many lawsuits as is, many of  
12 them are frivolous, and that's the worry is that  
13 there will be more frivolous lawsuits.

14 In terms of consent, that wouldn't work  
15 for the grocery sector because there are thousands of  
16 transactions, thousands of customers that go through  
17 grocery stores, each store, in any given year so you  
18 can't possibly get consent from a significant number  
19 of them. There's the likelihood of litigating over  
20 whether or not the consent was properly given or the  
21 underlying validity of the consent. The big problem  
22 is that wrongdoers, particularly members of organized  
23 retail theft rings, are not going to consent to their  
24 information being collected or to a system being used  
25 to apply that information to identify them.

1  
2 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Okay, I know  
3 consent is one thing, but what about a public notice?  
4 That would work for a supermarket.

5 JAY PELTZ: Public notice in the current  
6 law? Yeah.

7 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: No. I'm just  
8 asking your opinions about different potential tweaks  
9 because you're opposing the bill so I'm just saying  
10 would you like if it had this, would you like it if  
11 it had that. You said consent wouldn't work because I  
12 get it, you have to like sign and say I consent to  
13 this, but you can't do that when you're walking into  
14 a supermarket so what I'm saying is what about a  
15 public notice?

16 JAY PELTZ: We would be open to a  
17 reasonable public notice requirement, sure.

18 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Okay. Thank you.  
19 Council Member Holden.

20 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Thank you again. I  
21 have a, I guess most of us do in New York City, we  
22 have the retail drug chains that have locked  
23 everything up behind plastic covers and cabinets and  
24 you need a key because we've never seen anything like  
25 this where people walk in with plastic bags and the

1 same people are walking into these establishments,  
2  
3 Chairs, the same people are walking into these  
4 establishments with a bag and they fill it up. That's  
5 why the drug chains have done this. They've made it  
6 an inconvenience to go and shop because you can't get  
7 toothpaste or something else that you want, you have  
8 to go ask the management to open up the case. We also  
9 have high-end companies that looked at this bill and  
10 said we may not open up here or expand in New York  
11 City because if this bill goes through we're going to  
12 be sitting ducks and they're going to be going in and  
13 stealing because, I speak to the COs of all my  
14 precincts, and they all say the same thing. Nobody's  
15 going to jail for property theft. The same person is  
16 stealing the cars, the same person, he's arrested,  
17 two days out, and he's back on stealing car or  
18 stealing catalytic converters or doing other things.  
19 I'm also hearing from gas station owners. One  
20 gentleman has four gas stations in my District. He  
21 says I consider it a good day when I'm not losing  
22 2,000 or 3,000 dollars to theft. Then we have the  
23 City Council proposing this, which the worst timing  
24 you could imagine, to a city that's still under  
25 siege, that's still trying to figure out what are we

1 doing about property crime, what are we doing to  
2 protect businesses that are under siege with  
3 shoplifting like your clients, by the way, Jay, they  
4 have a small profit margin, don't they?  
5

6 JAY PELTZ: Tiny. If you're doing 1  
7 percent net nowadays, you're doing well.

8 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: That's why we see  
9 supermarkets closing. I used to have a lot more in my  
10 District, probably triple the amount I have now.  
11 People want supermarkets, but if we're not going to  
12 allow them the technology to protect themselves,  
13 they're going to close so this is what we want  
14 because, some of the things I heard today are not  
15 even true because the technology, like I said, I've  
16 read articles, 95 percent of the time facial  
17 recognition is accurate. Is that more accurate than  
18 somebody saying I think that looks like the guy, I  
19 think this guy is the guy? If they have no technology  
20 to verify that, they're going to stop way more people  
21 that are innocent. The Police Department uses facial  
22 technology almost to a degree where it's actually  
23 facial recognition is all, if I had a perp, and I did  
24 witness a crime, I had to identify a person, they  
25 gave me five pictures, I think it was five, of the



1 person, it looked like the same person because they  
2 have to make it more difficult that you have to be  
3 sure that's the person, so it's more difficult. I  
4 think you had something to add. I'm sorry.

5  
6 JAKE PARKER: I was just going to respond  
7 and say the problem is this would take away an  
8 ability to reduce theft without sending anyone to  
9 jail. As the gentleman at the end of the table was  
10 mentioning, this was feedback we had from our members  
11 that provide services to the retail clients, when  
12 you're using systems to simply flag individuals who  
13 are involved in this activity, what they are offered  
14 is increased customer service in knowing that someone  
15 is watching them as they come in the store and there  
16 have been instances where stores have seen they've  
17 come back less often after a certain number of  
18 recognitions. After seven or eight times, they don't  
19 show up anymore, and they've been able to reduce  
20 theft by 80 or 90 percent.

21 JAY PELTZ: In our experience, we think  
22 that a bill can be done that allows biometric systems  
23 to be used for public safety purposes with  
24 appropriate safeguards to guard against the

25 (INAUDIBLE)

1  
2 COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Yeah. Again, these  
3 are amendments that could be done. I'm not saying I'm  
4 against this whole thing if we could make it  
5 transparent, but we don't take the ability to  
6 actually safeguard merchandise because we're going to  
7 lose more businesses, and I think it's  
8 unconstitutional first of all. That's the bottom  
9 line. I'm looking at this, and you can't prohibit a  
10 business who invested already, who invested maybe  
11 millions into this technology, and we're going to say  
12 now you can't use it, which is, to me, I just don't  
13 think it's going to, it's going to get challenged.

14 I just want to say at this point with the  
15 current conditions of the City and the current  
16 conditions that we're not putting people away and  
17 we're talking to everyone, we're talking to  
18 businesses that have given up. By the way, the  
19 businesses in my District, Chairs, they're telling me  
20 they stopped reporting to the local precinct or  
21 calling 9-1-1 because they don't come, there's not  
22 enough cops to patrol the neighborhoods, and, again,  
23 I do listen to the scanner and I do hear that, and if  
24 everybody is going to put these legislations together  
25 that are going to hurt more businesses than help

1 them, we have to rethink who we are as a Council so  
2 thank you, Chairs.

3  
4 FRANCISCO MARTE: Robert, we really would  
5 love this bill and support if this bill would come  
6 with another one that said there's going to start to  
7 be consequences for the criminal, for the theft, for  
8 the shoplifting. If we have the consequences for the  
9 shoplifting, we don't need the camera, but we need to  
10 have consequences. When you see people arrested over  
11 30, 40, 50 times, and they come back, you know what  
12 it has done to a store owner? They've been arrested,  
13 they've caught a shoplifter, they call the police.  
14 When they used to come and they're arrested, they  
15 come later on, maybe two hours later or the next day,  
16 (INAUDIBLE) to the store owners, there's nothing you  
17 can do, look, I am now here, you can do nothing to  
18 me, so that's what's been happening and that's the  
19 sense that is out there. We can do whatever we want  
20 because there is no consequence. The police,  
21 sometimes they say we don't come because they have to  
22 walk out or we just have to give (INAUDIBLE) so, like  
23 that, what we need is law and order and consequence  
24 so for everyone, when they commit a small crime, they  
25 should have at least some type of consequence so they

1 know that they did something wrong, at least  
2 community service day. What happened to (INAUDIBLE)  
3 that was with something less than two dollars, three  
4 dollars, but it turned to a tragedy. Why? Because  
5 there was no consequence. There's no respect. That's  
6 what we need. If we have the respect and consequence  
7 with the criminal, when they commit a crime, we would  
8 not even need cameras, but that's what we need, and  
9 that's the support that we need, the Mayor needs to  
10 support or the Council Members, we, your  
11 constituents, we need your support to bring back the  
12 public safety which we already lost. Thank you.

14 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: I have one more  
15 question and then we can wrap, okay, then Nantasha.  
16 What are your thoughts, I understand, you've  
17 certainly made the case about how having the option  
18 to utilize this technology for your membership and  
19 their businesses could aid in preventative theft, and  
20 what I would like to know is what is your position on  
21 utilizing this biometric information, this data, for  
22 other things other than things like theft prevention,  
23 like if someone were to petition your members wanting  
24 to buy the data for whatever reason? I think our  
25 concern is an abuse of this, right, and so right now

1  
2 there's very little safeguarding, to be honest, with  
3 private entities and the way that they're utilizing  
4 data and like what they do. Obviously, the MSG and  
5 the Dolan example is I think something that is a lot  
6 larger, certainly none of your members are doing that  
7 because this is MSG and Radio City Music Hall, but I  
8 want to ask what is your position on that, like being  
9 approached by a data company wanting to purchase the  
10 data that your businesses are capturing?

11                   JAY PELTZ: I thought that that was  
12 already barred under City Law. That's illegal. You  
13 can't sell biometric data, but we're not...

14                   CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: But what we  
15 learned today is that there's no real sense if that  
16 is actually being enforced is what I'm saying, and we  
17 have advocates today that said no, we know it is  
18 being sold. I get what you're saying, but for your  
19 businesses...

20                   JAY PELTZ: We're only interested in the  
21 ability to utilize the identifier information through  
22 a system solely for public safety purposes.

23                   CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: For theft  
24 prevention?

25

1  
2           JAY PELTZ: Correct, and not just theft,  
3 but there was an example somebody gave me of how  
4 somebody had stolen, there was a relationship that  
5 fell apart and the noncustodial parent grabbed the  
6 kids and went to a different state, to Jersey, and I  
7 forget the facts, but they were able to contact the  
8 police in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, and that  
9 person was apprehended, the kids were taken away, and  
10 then wound up with a relative and then back with the  
11 custodial parent, with the mom.

12           CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Yeah. Thank  
13 you.

14           JAKE PARKER: I was just going to say, our  
15 members, we don't buy or sell biometric data, and I  
16 think there's a little bit of confusion about that  
17 out there. I know there's concerns about data brokers  
18 and what they do. It's a little bit different. Part  
19 of that is because of the nature and what biometric  
20 data is produced by biometric technologies is. The  
21 purpose of biometric technology is to match  
22 individuals to confirm so each software platform  
23 creates an individual way of measuring your  
24 biometric, like your fingerprint, it's not actually a  
25 picture of your fingerprint, it's that software's

1 numerical value it assigns, and so that can only be  
2 used inside that software, and so if that were to be  
3 stolen or transferred to someone else, they could do  
4 absolutely nothing with it and so I think there's  
5 just a little bit of misconception there, but, just  
6 to confirm, our members do buy and sell data.

8 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you.

9 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: I lost my notes  
10 again. It's too much paper. You mentioned that you  
11 would be okay with the bill if there were some  
12 changes, you said something to that effect, could you  
13 detail what you feel would need to be changed or  
14 taken out to be more comfortable with the bill? I'm  
15 just interested in your thinking.

16 JAY PELTZ: We're looking for a public  
17 safety exception, and we're happy to engage in  
18 discussions to work that out, exactly what the  
19 standards would be, with adequate protections to  
20 address the legitimate issues that you raised today.

21 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Thanks. I had a  
22 question for the other guy, but I think, Jake, you  
23 can possibly answer it. It's about cyber security. We  
24 didn't talk about that so I was interested if his  
25 members were looking at cyber security, and I guess

1 through your company, how are you adjusting and/or  
2 prepping yourself, protecting yourself from cyber  
3 security breaches.  
4

5 JAKE PARKER: Biometric data, as I was  
6 just describing, it is a form of sensitive personal  
7 data that needs to be protected just like you would  
8 with other types of data Social Security Numbers,  
9 other kinds of identifying data, but the way that  
10 biometric data is created and used is actually a  
11 natural form of cryptography because without the  
12 software or any kind of reference data to compare  
13 that against, you can't like, for example, recreate a  
14 facial image from your facial template created by the  
15 software, you can't recreate an image of your  
16 fingerprint from a fingerprint template so that's a  
17 natural form of cryptography, but also those  
18 templates themselves need to be subject to the best  
19 practices for data security and storage such as  
20 encrypting, make sure that data is encrypted at rest  
21 and in transition, that's very common throughout the  
22 industry.

23 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Is that you are  
24 storing data through like secure encryption systems?

25 JAKE PARKER: Absolutely.



CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Okay. What about you?

JAY PELTZ: Also to add to that, one of our worst nightmares would be if there was a security breach and people's biometric data was stolen and got out there. The concerns that you've raised are reasonable. We don't like them and we don't want them. This is not what our members want. They're just looking for a targeted exception for public safety purposes.

CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Yeah. I think, I'll speak for myself, I appreciate that, and I appreciate what everyone is saying here, and I think Chair Gutiérrez just also said this is like the abuses of it and how do we protect around the abuses of the technology and then how do we cure once abuses have been made, how are people made whole if there is an abuse or if there is some inaccuracy in a particular technology that might facially recognize somebody that is not actually the person that has stolen from your store 30 times but there's just inaccuracies in a flawed system so how can we, again, cure and make that person whole and then also how do we protect against inherit biases and other things

1 that might take place for the person who's actually  
2 using the technology because I do think that because  
3 there is not as much regulation, it doesn't create a  
4 lot of space to even try to attempt to provide some  
5 type of guardrails around said abuses, and I think  
6 that's the intent of a lot of these bills is just to  
7 provide some level of guardrails and, for me, even  
8 though I might sign onto a bill, when I'm at a  
9 hearing, I'm genuinely listening to what everyone is  
10 saying even if I come into the hearing with a certain  
11 opinion, like I'm genuinely trying to understand what  
12 your issues are, how it will impact your business,  
13 because I understand we're in a capitalistic society  
14 so how is it going to impact your business, how is it  
15 going to impact public safety, and ultimately how is  
16 it going to impact all New Yorkers and their  
17 conveniences. I'm a CLEAR member. I was talking  
18 behind him, MSG uses CLEAR so if this bill goes into  
19 effect, I technically can't use CLEAR to go into MSG  
20 so I'm trying, and I'm just giving you that mindset  
21 so you can understand quite frankly my line of  
22 questioning because I'm really just genuinely trying  
23 to understand what the concerns are, how can we  
24 provide some type of guardrails without unintended  
25

1 consequences that I think a lot of bills tend to have  
2 naturally because laws are also not perfect, just  
3 like technology isn't perfect, and so for me I'm  
4 always trying to figure out how do we mitigate as  
5 much as possible some unintended consequences from  
6 well-intentioned laws.  
7

8 JAY PELTZ: Right. I mean that's a fair  
9 point. If the goal is to make abusive practices, if  
10 abuse is the standard, then you can incorporate that  
11 into the bill without being overly broad and banning  
12 or over-regulating conduct that's legitimate and that  
13 shouldn't be over-regulated.

14 In terms of people suffering harm, it's  
15 the same point. There's a way to draft that clause so  
16 that only people who are harmed because of a pattern  
17 of bad behavior or willful malfeasance. It's a matter  
18 of crafting the right standards so that the bill  
19 isn't overly broad.

20 JAKE PARKER: If I could add to that, I  
21 would say that the use of biometric information for  
22 commercial purposes definitely should be consent  
23 based and, I'm coming back to what we were talking  
24 about earlier I think, but there is a model of ways  
25 to do that. If you look at the most recent statewide

1 data privacy measures that have passed in  
2 Connecticut, Virginia, some other places and likely  
3 to pass in four or five more states this year.  
4 They've made sure that personal data is only used  
5 based on consent, but they've created a specific  
6 exception narrowly defined for security purposes so  
7 that's been done already at the state level.

9 CO-CHAIRPERSON WILLIAMS: Can you say the  
10 states again? You said it really fast, and I only got  
11 Connecticut.

12 JAKE PARKER: I'm sorry. Virginia and  
13 Connecticut were the most recent states, but a number  
14 of others have enacted something similar already this  
15 session, Iowa, Indiana will, and several others.  
16 Happy to provide more information.

17 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Can I ask one  
18 question? How much does it cost a bodega, por  
19 ejemplo, to use this technology?

20 FRANCISCO MARTE: How?

21 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: How much does  
22 it cost a bodega or a supermarket to have this  
23 technology?

24 FRANCISCO MARTE: It's pretty expensive,  
25 4,000 to 5,000 dollars.

CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: And it's a one-time fee, no?

FRANCISCO MARTE: Huh?

CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: It's not a one-time fee?

FRANCISCO MARTE: Yeah, I mean for one or two cameras, but we only use it in ones that to face the...

CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: The door.

FRANCISCO MARTE: Door, but it's pretty expensive. That's right (INAUDIBLE) we don't have it yet because it costs a lot of money, but little by little we'll be enforcing that because we need (INAUDIBLE)

CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Okay. Thank you all so much for sticking out.

COMMITTEE COUNSEL BYHOVSKY: Thank you so much for your testimony. Now we hear testimony from witnesses who are here virtually, and our next panelists are Adrian Gropper, Jake Wiener, Elizabeth Daniel Vasquez.

SERGEANT-AT-ARMS: Your time will begin.

COMMITTEE COUNSEL BYHOVSKY: You can start your testimony.

2 ADRIAN GROPPER: Me?

3 COMMITTEE COUNSEL BYHOVSKY: Yes.

4 ADRIAN GROPPER: Okay. I'm Adrian Gropper.  
5 I'm the Chief Technology Officer of the Patient  
6 Privacy Rights Foundation. As a physician and  
7 technology entrepreneur, I'm an expert in the safety  
8 and effectiveness of technology in licensed practice.  
9 I'm also an invited expert to global standards  
10 organizations working on digital identity laws.

11 I'm testifying to the need to number one,  
12 prohibit hidden or unconsented data brokerage of  
13 biometrics, and, two, prohibit secret or proprietary  
14 technology for biometrics and artificial  
15 intelligence.

16 Biometrics are essentially public, and  
17 their risks are vastly increased with AI. Deep fakes  
18 are the combination of AI and biometrics. The harm  
19 from deep fakes ranges from attacks on the individual  
20 to attacks on democracy. Data brokers come in two  
21 flavors, open like Facebook or TikTok, and hidden  
22 like the thousands that sell commercial surveillance  
23 for profit. Either way, there is currently no limit  
24 on the ability for data brokerage to leverage AI in  
25 developing other more valuable ways to manipulate us.

1 Regulation of biometrics is tricky because they're  
2 essentially public, even DNA can be picked up without  
3 our knowledge. Regulation of AI is even harder  
4 because the technology is still in its infancy. There  
5 are, nonetheless, two obvious ways regulation can  
6 mitigate the risks of biometrics and AI, data  
7 brokers, and secret privatized technology. Commercial  
8 surveillance of biometrics should be illegal. Any  
9 service provider that employs biometrics for security  
10 or convenience, for example a bank or a notary  
11 public, should be absolutely prohibited from  
12 interacting with a data broker without consent. The  
13 data brokers we call credit bureaus are already  
14 regulated, and they should be further constrained  
15 from secondary uses outside of strictly consent to  
16 credit services. The other point of regulation of  
17 biometrics and AI should be a prohibition on secret  
18 or proprietary technology. It's hard enough to  
19 envision regulating technology for surveillance  
20 (INAUDIBLE) but that task is made much, much harder  
21 with the technology that's treated as confidential  
22 private assets by the operators. Biometric technology  
23 and machine learning must be kept open source and in  
24  
25

1 the public view and treated as public goods, the same  
2 way we regulate and label our food. Thank you.  
3

4 COMMITTEE COUNSEL BYHOVSKY: Thank you for  
5 your testimony. Let's move to our next panelist, Jake  
6 Wiener.

7 SERGEANT-AT-ARMS: Your time will begin.

8 JAKE WIENER: Council Members, my name is  
9 Jake Wiener. I am a lawyer at the Electronic Privacy  
10 Information Center, also known as EPIC, in  
11 Washington, D.C. I study advanced surveillance  
12 technologies, including facial recognition, the flaws  
13 in these systems, and their impacts on society. As an  
14 advocate for privacy and civil liberties, I'm  
15 impressed with the City Council's proposed approach,  
16 and I urge the Council to pass both bills into law,  
17 ensuring that there is a strong private right of  
18 action in each bill.

19 Facial recognition is a dystopian  
20 technology, frequently subject to error and bias, and  
21 even more dangerous when it works effectively. I'm  
22 going to go off script here just to address several  
23 points that were raised by industry groups.

24 First, these bills are targeted. They are  
25 addressing places of public accommodation and



1 housing, and they're very well thought out to address  
2 places where consent is not viable.

3  
4           Second, I just want to say that there is  
5 no peer reviewed eviction I'm aware that biometric  
6 surveillance systems actually reduce crime, no peer  
7 reviewed eviction. At the very best, what these types  
8 of surveillance systems can do is push crime around  
9 and concentrate it in the poorest communities,  
10 providing maybe a little more safety for the rich and  
11 increasing harm on the poor and the marginalized.  
12 They don't reduce the overall incidents of crime, and  
13 I find it deeply ironic that the groups pushing for  
14 more biometric surveillance are also the groups  
15 citing crime statistics. There is more surveillance  
16 in New York City than at any time in our history, and  
17 it cannot be that a spike in crime coinciding with  
18 the rise in surveillance will be resolved with even  
19 more surveillance.

20           Third, there is no way, and I want to  
21 just expand here, there is no way to meaningfully  
22 obtain consent for these systems. I want to give you  
23 a couple of examples. First, let's talk about an  
24 apartment building. Even if you do things like really  
25 well, you get consent from every single one of your

1 residents and they actually want that, you're still  
2 not going to be able to obtain meaningful consent  
3 from their guests, from service workers, delivery  
4 drivers, your plumber, and many of these people who  
5 you're giving an illusory choice to. For me, I think  
6 about like if I'm invited to a dinner party, I can  
7 either go to that dinner party, submit to the scan,  
8 not knowing what's happening with my data, not  
9 knowing if I'm going to be wrongfully excluded, or I  
10 decide to miss out on a social event. For a grocery  
11 store, the case is even sharper. You either submit to  
12 the scan or you go without food. That is illusory  
13 consent; it's not real consent.

14  
15 I just want to flag I'm happy to answer  
16 questions that the Council has on bias in facial  
17 recognition systems, why these systems will never  
18 stop making mistakes, how NIST testing, although  
19 good, falls short, and why biased use is always going  
20 to be a risk, but I'm going to focus the rest of my  
21 testimony on how these systems harm our society.

22 I've thought a lot about this, but I want  
23 to raise one issue that's not been discussed much  
24 which is the potential for facial recognition systems

3 and other biometric monitoring to create  
4 comprehensive...

5 SERGEANT-AT-ARMS: Your time is expired.

6 JAKE WIENER: If I can just have like 30  
7 more seconds. Every time you submit to one of these  
8 systems, you're creating a record of where you were  
9 and when you were there, and as these records  
10 compound it becomes essentially impossible for you to  
11 preserve privacy in your public movements. This is  
12 unique in a certain way to biometric systems because  
13 I can leave my phone at home, but I can't leave my  
14 face at home. I have no control over my location  
15 being logged, potentially being sold to data brokers,  
16 given to the police without my consent and without a  
17 warrant, and that makes these systems incredibly  
18 dangerous, and I welcome any questions. Thank you.

19 COMMITTEE COUNSEL BYHOVSKY: Thank you,  
20 Mr. Wiener, for your testimony. Our next witness is  
21 Elizabeth Daniel Vasquez.

22 SERGEANT-AT-ARMS: Your time will begin.

23 ELIZABETH DANIEL VASQUEZ: Good evening.  
24 My name is Elizabeth Daniel Vasquez, and I'm the  
25 Director of the Science and Surveillance Project at  
Brooklyn Defender Services. I want to thank City

1 Council and Chairs Gutiérrez and Williams for holding  
2 this joint oversight hearing. As we can tell by the  
3 conversation that's been had today, this hearing is  
4 particularly timely.  
5

6 As public defenders for the Borough of  
7 Brooklyn, we see these systems in daily use,  
8 impacting our clients in the criminal legal systems,  
9 the family separation systems, and the immigration  
10 systems. We've even seen them deployed against our  
11 clients seeking unemployment benefits, facing  
12 evictions, or calling their loved ones from  
13 detention. Underlying the mad spread of biometric  
14 identification systems is the national and global  
15 expansion of artificial intelligence generally.  
16 Computerized pattern matching entities are dominating  
17 the news, and their dangers are being debated  
18 globally. We've talked about them here today, but to  
19 get to the core of the era-defining issue, we need to  
20 understand how machine learning or artificial  
21 intelligence works. Fundamentally, to build an AI  
22 system, we heard this from a witness earlier, a  
23 developer needs a large amount of data. Features of  
24 surveillance data (INAUDIBLE) faces in surveillance  
25 footage form datasets that then get used by big tech.

1  
2 It's those large datasets that teach AI systems, and,  
3 without them, biometric identification systems would  
4 be impossible. AI then brings with it a voracious  
5 appetite for data, our data. Thus the conversation  
6 our community truly needs to have is not one centered  
7 around banning individual technologies but instead  
8 about defining our rights to our data and  
9 particularly grappling with the inequities of the  
10 data surveillance economy we are already constructing  
11 around ourselves. The single largest user of  
12 biometric identification systems in our city is  
13 government. Agencies including NYPD, DOC, ACS, the  
14 Department of Labor, DHS, ICE, and CBP, and the  
15 neighborhoods carrying a disproportionate amount of  
16 our city's surveillance load are black and brown. Our  
17 city has invested billions in a 20-year surveillance  
18 infrastructure building program that relies  
19 critically on biometric identification technologies.  
20 Despite these investments in deployments, the  
21 promised of enhanced public safety has not been  
22 realized. Earlier today, the Chief Privacy Officer  
23 for the City made the assertion that the NYPD is in  
24 compliance with biometric data privacy laws and  
25 policies. He suggested that the NYPD has been

1 transparent about the deployment of these  
2 technologies, that the new discovery laws have  
3 ensured disclosure if such technology has been used  
4 in cases, and that the courts are able to provide  
5 oversight to protect our communities' constitutional  
6 rights, dignity, and liberty. Each of these  
7 assertions is false. As a public defender in this  
8 city, we have faced a long history of secrecy on the  
9 part of the NYPD, particularly regarding its use of  
10 surveillance technology. The OIG's recent report on  
11 NYPD's compliance with the POST Act underlies this  
12 point neatly. Perhaps, more critically, I can attest  
13 as a public defender that the new discovery laws are  
14 not being enforced in a way that ensures NYPD  
15 disclosure of its use of surveillance technology that  
16 relies on biometric information. For example, when  
17 the NYPD...

19 SERGEANT-AT-ARMS: Your time is expired.

20 ELIZABETH DANIEL VASQUEZ: When the NYPD  
21 uses facial recognition cases, they do not disclose,  
22 and the DA offices fight disclosing the underlying  
23 case files documenting that facial recognition  
24 analysis. In many cases, the most we get is a so-  
25 called potential match notification report and no

1 information about how facial recognition tool  
2 analysis was actually conducted.

3  
4 Another example is the Domain Awareness  
5 System. The NYPD use DAS in every investigation. In  
6 every case, the NYPD does not disclose, and the DA  
7 offices fight disclosure of the complete DAS reports  
8 that were generated in those investigations. I could  
9 continue.

10 As it relates to the court's ability to  
11 oversee the NYPD's use of biometric data, a close  
12 examination of the NYPD's POST Act disclosures brings  
13 home the devastating reality that I experience every  
14 day as a public defender. Despite the comic belief  
15 that the courts provide oversight of police tactics,  
16 the collection, storage, and use of the vast majority  
17 of the NYPD's surveillance data including biometric  
18 data will never be reviewed by any court or anyone  
19 outside law enforcement. According to its own  
20 disclosures, the NYPD does not believe it needs to  
21 seek a warrant or court approval to use 3/4 of the  
22 surveillance collection methods it has disclosed  
23 deploying. In the face of our City's permeating  
24 surveillance ecosystem, there is significant urgency  
25 for the Council to truly and thoroughly reckon with

1 the use of biometric identification systems. I would  
2 love to talk with each of you more about the threat  
3 of the problem we are seeing in Brooklyn and the  
4 comprehensive solutions (INAUDIBLE) identify from our  
5 unique vantage point in the city. The bills before  
6 the Committees today are a step, and they will  
7 positively impact the communities of Brooklyn that  
8 BDS serves, but they are not enough.

10 COMMITTEE COUNSEL BYHOVSKY: Thank you so  
11 much for your testimony. Our next panelist is Adam  
12 Roberts.

13 SERGEANT-AT-ARMS: Your time will start  
14 now.

15 ADAM ROBERTS: Thank you for holding this  
16 hearing today. I am Adam Roberts, Policy Director for  
17 the Commissioner Housing Improvement Program, which  
18 is also known as CHIP. We represent New York's  
19 apartment building workers and owners, and we are  
20 here to express concerns about Intro. 1024 of 2023.

21 Biometric recognition technology is still  
22 very new, particularly in its application to  
23 residential buildings, and while it may not be widely  
24 used now it is likely to become more common across  
25 New York's residential buildings in the next few



1 years. Banning it outright would stop New Yorkers who  
2 want to use biometrics in the future from utilizing  
3 its benefits. Biometrics may prove particularly  
4 useful in maintaining a building's security. Most of  
5 our city apartment buildings cannot afford to have a  
6 full-time doorman or security guard. Biometrics limit  
7 access to tenants, guests, and building workers at a  
8 fraction of the cost of full-time doorman. This would  
9 also provide significantly greater security for  
10 tenants and building workers. Furthermore, biometrics  
11 can make building security more convenient for  
12 tenants. Though not widespread yet, biometric  
13 technology does already exist to allow tenants to  
14 enter their apartments without a key. Fingerprints or  
15 irises can serve as an additional option for entering  
16 (INAUDIBLE) building in the future. In buildings  
17 without doormen, this would reduce the burden of  
18 forgetting or losing a key. This convenience  
19 biometrics provide is already evident, and it is this  
20 convenience factor which has made biometrics widely  
21 used for entering sporting events, concerts,  
22 airports. Considering this, there should be no reason  
23 to ban tenants from using biometrics when entering  
24 their own homes or workers from entering their  
25

1 workplace. Biometrics have the ability to be a great  
2 equalizer for New York's tenants by providing  
3 additional security at a fraction of the cost of  
4 traditional methods. They can have very consequential  
5 impacts like ensuring access only for tenants,  
6 guests, and building workers. Banning biometrics  
7 would fall hardest on those tenants who could not  
8 afford to live in a doorman building or those workers  
9 who are not employed by luxury building owners. We  
10 recognize concerns that our privacy and profiling  
11 biometrics and, therefore, we hope the Council will  
12 redraft this bill or consider new legislation  
13 (INAUDIBLE) thoughtfully address those concerns  
14 without outright banning biometrics. Thank you.

15  
16 COMMITTEE COUNSEL BYHOVSKY: Thank you,  
17 Mr. Roberts. Our next panelist is Avi Kaner.

18 AVI KANER: (INAUDIBLE) Hold on. Hello.

19 COMMITTEE COUNSEL BYHOVSKY: Hello. We can  
20 hear you.

21 AVI KANER: Oh, good, good. Thank you.

22 Hold on, I'll take it off speaker. Hello. Thank you  
23 for inviting me today. My name is Avi Kaner. I'm the  
24 owner of the Morton Williams Supermarket chain. Our  
25 stores are primarily in Manhattan. We have over 1,000

1 full-time union employees, almost all of them are  
2 immigrants. Our stores were open 24/7 during COVID  
3 while people were hunkered down in their apartments  
4 or fled the city, but now our stores are under  
5 assault by theft driven directly and specifically by  
6 New York City's refusal to prosecute thieves.  
7 Stealing up to 1,000 dollars at a time is now an  
8 entitlement in New York City. Just like many  
9 drugstores have closed their doors, now many  
10 supermarkets are starting to close their doors  
11 because they can't handle the crime. You guys are  
12 probably too young to remember this, but years ago we  
13 used to have Polaroid cameras. We used to take  
14 pictures of thieves, scotch tape them by the time  
15 clocks, and, if that person were to show up again,  
16 we'd confront the person and tell him or her that  
17 they can't shop in the supermarket. There's really no  
18 difference between that and the facial recognition  
19 software. The only difference is the facial  
20 recognition software is more accurate, and you're not  
21 holding the Polaroid picture and just randomly  
22 tagging people because they look like that person.  
23 Over the past year alone, our gross margins are down  
24 2 percent due to theft and the City's refusal to  
25

1 prosecute thieves. Also, last year we spent an  
2 additional 1 million dollars in off-duty NYPD  
3 officers, we were paying them 45 dollars an hour, now  
4 they've raised the price to 55 dollars an hour so we  
5 stopped using them, we can't afford to use them. Half  
6 of our stores are at risk of shutting down, and  
7 that's the last the City, New York City does not want  
8 to turn into another San Francisco, believe me, so  
9 the City has done enough with its assault on  
10 businesses like ours. Many of our employees have been  
11 violently attacked when they try to stop thieves, and  
12 the police refuse to even arrest the thieves since  
13 the prosecutor will not prosecute them. We must have  
14 the ability to protect our businesses. We are not  
15 collecting biometric data. We're simply using photos  
16 of known thieves to prevent their entry into our  
17 stores. I implore you to please reject this misguided  
18 law, although it's well-intentioned. I agree with you  
19 that it's well-intentioned and I would support  
20 letting people know that by entering this business  
21 they acknowledge that we're using facial recognition  
22 to reduce theft and to protect them, but to ban it  
23 outright is really a continued assault on business.  
24 Thank you.  
25

3 COMMITTEE COUNSEL BYHOVSKY: Thank you  
4 very much for your testimony, and we're moving to our  
5 last witness. The last panelist is Hugh Ross.

6 HUGH ROSS: Thank you. Good afternoon.  
7 Hello.

8 COMMITTEE COUNSEL BYHOVSKY: Good  
9 afternoon. You can begin your testimony.

10 HUGH ROSS: Yes, good afternoon. I'm here  
11 as the Chief of Security for the 34th Street  
12 Partnership and the Bryant Park Corporation. Bryant  
13 Park Corporation and 34th Street partnership are  
14 business districts that operate in Midtown Manhattan  
15 and are committed to improving these areas by  
16 providing security, sanitation services, free public  
17 programs as well as events. I have worked for these  
18 organizations for 31 years, rising from a uniformed  
19 security officer to now the Chief of Security. My  
20 responsibility is to provide a safe Midtown  
21 environment for the enjoyment of the residents of New  
22 York, visitors, and the tourists, and our working  
23 commuters. To further this goal, Bryant Park  
24 Corporation and 34th Street Partnership has installed  
25 and used surveillance camera systems. These systems  
have enhanced public safety and are an indispensable

1 public safety tool. Currently, we are working with  
2 businesses in the area to obtain (INAUDIBLE) to  
3 follow increased safety. Although our BID does not  
4 currently utilize facial recognition technology, I  
5 believe the technology will also become indispensable  
6 to public safety and should not be prohibited. With  
7 the increase in mass shootings in public spaces, it  
8 will be counterproductive to prohibit the use of this  
9 technology. Add to these incidents, the identity of  
10 dangerous individuals sometimes before the incident  
11 occur. Facial recognition technology could lead to  
12 the apprehension of the individuals before a shooting  
13 and should save lives. We must also never forget the  
14 tragic stories that have struck the City on numerous  
15 occasions in the past and I'm sad to say will likely  
16 occur again. (INAUDIBLE) facial recognition  
17 technology could prevent another 9/11. Facial  
18 recognition technology could be used in multiple  
19 additional ways to serve and protect New Yorkers. For  
20 example, facial recognition can be used to protect  
21 victims of domestic violence. Many times, domestic  
22 violence perpetrators stalk their victims in the  
23 vicinity of their homes or places of work. These  
24 systems could provide an early warning signal that  
25

1 could prevent acts of violence. Moreover, facial  
2 recognition technology could be used to locate  
3 missing children, adults with special needs such as  
4 autism, Down syndrome, and dementia, and victims of  
5 kidnapping and abduction. Facial recognition  
6 technology is in its infancy and can be a valuable  
7 tool for society. I commend the Council for bringing  
8 this topic for public discussion but believe the  
9 prohibition of facial recognition technology is not..  
10

11 SERGEANT-AT-ARMS: Your time is expired.

12 HUGH ROSS: The appropriate course of  
13 action and will harm the public and fail to enhance  
14 public safety.

15 I take the opportunity to thank you for  
16 the opportunity to address you on this important  
17 topic.

18 COMMITTEE COUNSEL BYHOVSKY: Thank you,  
19 Mr. Ross, for your testimony.

20 I want to thank all panelists today  
21 who testified and then turn it to Chair Gutiérrez  
22 to officially adjourn the hearing.

23 CO-CHAIRPERSON GUTIERREZ: Thank you,  
24 everybody. [GAVEL]

25

3 COMMITTEE COUNSEL BYHOVSKY: The hearing  
4 is adjourned.  
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C E R T I F I C A T E

World Wide Dictation certifies that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. We further certify that there is no relation to any of the parties to this action by blood or marriage, and that there is interest in the outcome of this matter.



Date May 15, 2023