CITY COUNCIL
CITY OF NEW YORK

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TRANSCRIPT OF THE MINUTES

Of the

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & FEDERAL LEGISLATION

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Wednesday, May 29, 2024

Start: 10:15 A.M. Recess: 12:32 P.M.

HELD AT: Council Chambers - City

Hall

B E F O R E:

Hon. Lincoln Restler, Chair

COUNCIL MEMBERS:

Public Advocate Jumaane Williams

Speaker Adrienne E. Adams

Gale A. Brewer
David M. Carr
James F. Gennaro
Jennifer Gutiérrez
Shahana K. Hanif
Vickie Paladino
Lynn C. Schulman
Inna Vernikov

Other Council Members Attending:
Powers and Hudson

#### A P P E A R A N C E S

James Caras, General Counsel

Susan Lerner, Executive Director of Common Cause New York

Betsy Gotbaum, Director of Citizens Union, representing self

Adam Clayton Powell IV, Former Assembly Member, representing self

Louis Cholden-Brown,
Former Deputy Counsel to the Former Council
Speaker, representing self

Sharon Brown, Representing self

Tiffany Raspberry Director of Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

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#### 1 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & FEDERAL LEGISLATION 2 SERGEANT MORENO: This is a microphone check for 3 the Committee on Governmental Operations, State, and Federal Legislation; located in the Chambers; 4 5 recorded on 05/29/2024 by James Marino. 6 SERGEANT AT ARMS: Good morning, and welcome to the New York City Council Hearing of the Committee on 8 Governmental Operations, State, and Federal 9 Legislation. 10 At this time, please place all electronic devices 11 to vibrate or silent mode. 12 Please do not approach the dais at any time. If 13 you have questions, please raise your hand and a 14 Sergeant at Arms will kindly assist you. Thank you 15 very much for your kind cooperation. 16 Chair, we are ready to begin. 17 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: (Gaveling in) 18 Good morning, My name is Council Member Lincoln 19 Restler, and I have the privilege of chairing our 20 Committee on Governmental Operations, State and 21 Federal Legislation. I'd like to welcome my 2.2 colleagues who have joined us this morning, our 23 Speaker, Adrienne Adams; Council Member Lynn 24 Schulman; and Council Member David Carr, thank you

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each for being with us.

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2 At today's hearing, the Committee will be hearing 3 Intro 908, sponsored by our Speaker, Adrienne Adams.

I would now like to turn it over to Madam Speaker for opening remarks.

SPEAKER ADAMS: Thank you very much, Chair Restler, and good morning, everyone.

We want to thank our Governmental Operations
State, and Federal Legislation Committee Chair
Lincoln Restler for holding today's hearing on
Introduction 908, my proposed legislation would
require the advice and consent of the Council as part
of the appointment process for 21 city agency
commissioners that are not currently required to
undergo this process, and thank you all who've joined
us today.

Advice and consent is not a new concept or practice. Since the founding of our democracy, advice and consent has been used to protect against the abuse of power within our government. This power was vested in the legislative branch of the federal government by the founders of the nation's democracy. It was intended as a safeguard and tool of good government on behalf of the people, rather than any individual interests. New York State has enshrined

2 this power in the upper body of the New York State

3 Legislature as well. Advice and consent is a powerful

4 to tool to ensure our government maintains a level of

democratic accountability in support of the public

6 interest.

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I believe that good government calls for us to make this authority more consistent for our local legislature in the Council by expanding existing advice and consent powers to include more of the City's agency commissioners.

Advice and consent ensures that city agency commissioners who control critical services that affect and determine the well-being of New Yorkers are held to the highest standards. The City Charter makes it clear that commissioners are responsible to all elected officials, and the advice and consent process ensures that the mandate is met.

For decades the Council has held advice and consent power related to several mayoral appointees. It includes the Commissioner of the Department of Investigation, Taxi and Limousine Commission Chair and members, and dozens of other positions on boards and commissions that influence New Yorkers lives.

Most recently, in 2019 the voters overwhelmingly approved extending our advice and consent power to the Corporation Council. The way the Council has exercised this authority has shown that we take this responsibility seriously. Our Council has approved over 35 mayoral nominees since the start of Mayor Adams' mayoralty, and helped to ensure that qualified candidates are selected. Let me repeat that, our Council has approved over 35 mayoral nominees since

Advice and consent establishes a transparent process for nominees to introduce themselves to all stakeholders, and provides the public with an opportunity to engage and comment on the nominations. It maintains a focus on a nominee's ability to perform their charter mandated responsibilities on behalf of all New Yorkers.

the start of Mayor Adams' mayoralty.

A transparent process advances our collective goal of good government, and benefits nominees by offering them an early and valuable opportunity to earn trust, and further effective governance through collaboration and communicating their expertise and qualifications.

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Expanding the application of advice and consent also carries the benefit of moving the appointment process out of the shadows. That is why I have introduced legislation that expands the Council's advice and consent powers to an additional 21 agency commissioners.

The legislation we're considering today is incremental; it does not apply to all of the over 80 commission commissioner-level positions that are appointed by the mayor. However, this legislation does acknowledge that government leadership positions are an honor for accomplished public servants who are qualified to meet the challenges of their roles.

This reform measure we're considering today would strengthen our city's government and representative democracy -- indeed it would bring us into greater alignment with the processes used by many large cities across the country as well as the state and federal governments. It would help ensure the top positions in city government remain beacons of public service.

I want to be clear that this bill is certainly not about curbing the power of any particular mayor, but is instead focused on improving government.

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As a city, we stand to benefit from this change and will continue to work on increasing transparency and good governance regardless of who is in office at any given time. That is the way we can continue to safeguard our future and the foundation of our democracy.

I look forward from hearing more from my colleagues today on the importance of expanding the powers of advice and consent. And, finally, I want to thank the committee staff for putting this hearing together. Now. I turn it back over to the Chair. Chair Restler?

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Thank you so much, Speaker Adams for those wise opening remarks and for this really terrific piece of legislation.

The concept of checks and balances has been at the heart of American government ever since our nation was founded. In grade school we're taught that checks and balances are embedded in the very foundation of how American government should function. Checks and balances are necessary to prevent any singular person or branch of government from holding too much power. Every branch of government is given some form of oversight by the

#### COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & 1 10 FEDERAL LEGISLATION 2 other. The goal is for neither the Executive, or 3 Legislative, or Judicial Branch to dominate our 4 government. This simple but essential idea is fundamental to our democracy, yet this fundamental democratic ideal has been undermined by Mayor Adams. 6 7 The City Charter gives agency heads the full quote, 8 "... cognizance and control of the government Administration, and discipline of their agencies". just want to quote the Charter again, because it's so 10 11 important. The charter gives agency heads the quote, 12 "... full cognizance and control of the government 13 Administration and discipline of their agencies". 14 But under this mayor, we've seen what can happen when 15 dedicated professionals are prevented from doing 16 their jobs. Commissioners have indeed been hand 17 cuffed by City Hall, unable to freely answer 18 questions about their budgets at City Council 19 hearings, unable to execute critical projects planned 20 by experts at their own agencies, and even unable to 21 meet with elected officials without the blessing of

the mayor. This is not checks and balances, this is

not the checks and balances that our founders

envisioned and that we teach our children. It's

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definitely not how the government of New York City is supposed to work.

The 1989 Charter Revision Commission was the last major overhaul of our city governance, and its intent was to create a strong city council and ensure government bureaucracy that is responsive to New Yorkers.

Introduction 908, the legislation proposed by Speaker Adams, is a realization of that purpose. It asserts the exact role the Council should play; subjecting 21 agency commissioner appointments to advice and consent of the Council, providing a necessary check to ensure our government is led by competent, experienced, and ethical leaders. The advice and consent process improves accountability and strengthens New Yorkers confidence in our public officials. This legislation will strengthen our City Charter by making sure our city is run by the most qualified professionals who understand their responsibility to serve the residents of New York City, and work effectively with duly elected officials - like the City Council, the state legislature, and members of congress.

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The proposed legislation will add to the existing 12 agencies with positions that require City Council consent advice and consent as part of their appointment process. Many of those 12 agencies have been subject to advice and consent of the Council for nearly 50 years. It will also clarify that the procedures for vacancies, will expedite the filing of open positions, and formalize processes for

determining interim agency leadership.

Advice and consent works; it works for the 12 City agencies that already require it; it works for the state of New York where the state senate approves all of the Governor's nominations for department heads; it works at the federal level where the US Senate is charged with the approving 1,200 political appointments, including every cabinet secretary and the leaders of all federal agencies. It works in Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, and other big cities where a majority of mayoral appointments are subject to the approval of their city councils. In fact, the National Civic League, founded by Theodore Roosevelt over a hundred years ago, promotes advice and consent as a best practice for structuring municipal governments.

Subjecting more agency heads to Council review

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3 will help ensure appointees of the mayor are 4 thoroughly vetted and meet appropriate qualifications and ethical standards. A public hearing held by the Council will require the mayor's appointees to 6 7 demonstrate that they are deeply knowledgeable about their agency and equipped to serve in critically 8 important leadership positions. An advice and consent process will allow the mayor's appointees to show 10 11 that they are committed to working with all relevant

stakeholders, will be responsive to our diverse

Any mayoral administration confident in the qualifications and character of their appointments, would welcome this model.

communities, and will fulfill their charter mandated

role to quote, "advise and assist elected officials".

Beginning in 1853 the Mayor of New York City's appointments were subject to advice and consent of the City Council. We should reestablish this practice in city government today. Advice and consent has demonstrably clear foundation in the goal of preserving representative democracy. It has worked well for the City in a limited scope, and it's time to expand its application to align with the broader

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2 use at the state and federal levels of government and 3 by many other municipalities.

New Yorkers can be made confident that the mayor's appointed commissioners are qualified and positioned to capably serve as leaders of our city agencies.

This administration declined to show up today.

Though I do see the senior adviser to the mayor for

Intergovernmental Affairs here, so perhaps Tiffany

Raspberry would like to share a few words.

That being said, despite the mayor publicly expressing concern about this legislation, his administration decided to not engage in good faith in the legislative process. The mayor's dismissiveness and disrespect of this city council, and his administration's refusal to engage directly on the record on the Speaker's legislation is disappointing. Instead the mayor has appointed a highly questionable Charter Revision Commission whose only real objective seems to be delaying this worthy legislation from potentially reaching the voters.

In closing, I would like to thank Speaker Adams for her courageous leadership in proposing this legislation to better calibrate city government

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toward democratic accountability. This is a historic

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3 and significant bold step by this city council to

4 demonstrate the importance of strong legislative

5 oversight for effective and good governance. I deeply

6 appreciate her leadership of this body and of our

7 city, especially in light of a mayor who undermines

8 good government.

With that, I'd like to thank our committee staff
Jayasri Ganapathy and Erica Cohen for their hard work
and preparing for this hearing, David Seitzer for
impressively drafting this bill, Julia Agos, who does
a great job from the Speaker's Communications team,
who helped us, and just my team, my awesome
Communications Director, Nieve Mooney, and Molly
Haley, my Chief and Special Counsel, who is
brilliant.

I'd like to acknowledge a couple of my colleagues who are here with us today, Council Member Brewer and Council Member Powers, thank you for joining us. And we got Lynn already -- and Council Member Schulman, if I missed you earlier, thank you so much.

Now we will turn it over to our first panel. I'd like to call Susan Lerner, Executive Director of

2 Common Cause, and Jim Caras to come before us and 3 testify... Committee Counsel.

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You each have five minutes to testify. I think

Jim has some time constraint, so maybe we can let him

go first, uh, if that's okay, and we'll go from

there. Thank you, both, for being here.

MR. CARAS: Thank you. Good morning, Speaker

Adams, Chair Restler, and members of the Committee on

Governmental Operations, State, and Federal

Legislation. My name is Jim Caras, it's good to be

back here. Thank you for inviting me today to testify

on Introduction Number 908, which would provide for

City Council advice and consent over a number of city

agency heads.

As you well know, there are some peculiar topics in government that are near and dear to my heart, budgetary units of appropriation being one, but another is advice and consent. As General Counsel And Special Counsel at the City Council, as General Counsel to the Borough President, and most significantly as the Manhattan Borough President's appointee to the 2019 Charter Revision Commission, I became very familiar with the subject of legislative advice and consent for mayoral appointees.

In 2019, I was a strong proponent of subjecting

the appointment of the City's Corporation Counsel to

City Council Advice and Consent - a Charter change
that I think has greatly improved the process of
selecting the city's top lawyer.

I wanted to share with you three reasons why I
think the process of appointing city commissioners

and consent, and why arguments to the contrary really

can be improved by subjecting them to Council advice

carry very little weight. And I'm going to echo a lot

of what the Speaker said, because I think she was

completely on point.

First, advice and consent is a salutary check on the appointment power and has been a pillar of government in this country since its founding.

Second, New York City is an outlier among the largest cities in this country in its failure to provide any role to the local legislative body in the appointment of agency heads, and; therefore, on its failure to provide any check on the Executive.

Third, the City Council has demonstrated that it has handled the limited advice and consent it currently has in a responsible manner that has

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improved the appointment process for those office holders.

In relation to my first point on how advice and consent is a pillar of good government, a New York lawyer, who is much smarter than I am, observed that quote, "...it is not easy to conceive a plan better calculated than this to promote a judicious choice of men for filling the offices of the Union... " that is what Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist Paper 76 concerning presidential appointments. He pointed out that advice and consent retains all the advantages of allowing the chief executive his or her choice in appointments, while putting in place a critical guard rail against potential abuse of unchecked executive power that could result in an unfit or compromised appointee. What stops the Legislative Branch from using advice and consent in an inappropriate manner is the fact that at no point can the legislature substitute its judgment for the Executive's.

Second, in regard to the use by the largest cities throughout the country of legislative advice and consent of their mayor's appointees, New York City has for too long been an outlier. Of the four most populous cities in the US -- New York, Los

Angeles, Chicago, and Houston -- it appears that all but New York subject most if not all department heads

4 to City Council advice and consent.

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The fifth largest city, Phoenix, has a completely different form of government in which all appointees are made by a City Manager; however, in Phoenix it is the city council, which includes the mayor, which hires and fires the city manager. So, New York City appears to be an outlier amongst the very largest city governments by virtue of the fact that it gives no role to its Legislative Branch, direct or indirect, in the appointment process of most city department heads. Our charter is missing an important check on the Executive.

Finally, as the Speaker said, the New York City

Council has demonstrated how responsibly it has

exercised the advice and consent powers that it does

have. Since, 2020 when the Council was overwhelmingly

granted the power of advice and consent over the

appointment of the Corporation Counsel, the Council

has approved two out of two submitted candidates for

the City's top lawyer job -- a respected career

veteran of the Law Department, selected by Mayor de

Blasio, and a long serving esteemed jurist selected

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2 by Mayor Adams. And as a city government lawyer of

3 three decades, now retired, who reads the New York

4 newspapers, it appears from my vantage point that the

5 | that the public discussion over a potential

6 replacement for Judge Hinds-Radix is an important

7 discussion to have. Indeed, as the Speaker said, in

8 | the vast majority of instances where the Council

9 currently has the power of advice and consent, the

10 Council approves a mayoral nominee. I know that the

11 | Council's Rules Committee process is an extremely

12 | thorough one. Nominees are carefully vetted both in

13 | terms of (TIMER CHIMES) qualifications and potential

14 problems and conflicts. This is exactly as it should

15 be, and an instances where issues might be found,

16 | this gives both sides of City Hall the chance to

17 | address them, and, where appropriate and serious

18 | enough, provides the public with an opportunity to

19 | weigh in on them. I do not see how it could be viewed

20 as anything but a positive for a potential

21 commissioner to get a taste of what the

22 | representatives of the 51 council districts think

23  $\parallel$  their priority in their prospective agencies should

24 be.

I am certain that Introduction Number 908 would improve the selection process for city agency heads by making it more robust. I urge the Council to consider applying this to all agency heads. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Because of Mr. Caras's time constraints, I just would like to ask if committee members have any questions for him, and then we'll hear from Ms. Lerner after that if that's okay.

Madam Speaker, would you like to go first?

SPEAKER ADAMS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

And, Jim, it is wonderful to see you.

MR. CARAS: It's great to see you, too.

SPEAKER ADAMS: We miss you. But, we see that you're living your best life, so... (LAUGHTER).

I just have a couple of questions for you, I know that you have to leave.

What do you think the benefits are of executive appointments being subject to advice and consent processes? And how does the use of advice and consent impact governance? You gave us a taste of it in your statement, but just dig a little deeper for me.

MR. CARAS: Again, I think it does not... it's still going to be the mayor's choice. It is a

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FEDERAL LEGISLATION 2.2 2 safeguard to ensure that that person does not have 3 some hidden conflict of interest, that that person 4 has the qualifications to do the job. I think it has a really healthy effect on the appointment process, because it should make a mayor think before 6 7 appointing someone either seriously unqualified or with some hidden agenda or some hidden connection, 8 uh, you know, appointing, for example, a lobbyist to something where nobody thinks a lobbyist should be 10 11 , you know, serving in that capacity. So, I think... I 12 think it helps on the front end in tempering the 13 mayor's choices, then, as I said, I've seen up close 14 and personal -- and obviously ,you know, I won't 15 divulge any information that I've seen in my role as 16 a Council lawyer for so long -- but the vetting 17 process of the Rules Committee and The Rules 18 Committee staff is so thorough. I've seen issues come up where either the Mayor's Office -- I'm not talking 19 20 about any particular mayor -- either has missed the 21 issue or has not thought it was a big deal, and the Council's vetting process uncovers the issue --2.2 2.3 either goes back to the candidate or goes back to the Mayor's Office, and in one form or another, that 24

issue is generally addressed. But, that's a healthy

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thing, and sometimes the... and that then the third sort of prong of that is the public hearing part. And sometimes whether ,you know, usually the nominee ends up going through, but oftentimes those issues are publicly discussed. The public is made aware of them; sometimes a guard rail is put in place -- and ethics opinion or something like that, and if the nominee proceeds, then we're all better off for it. So, I really don't understand the argument in which it's a

SPEAKER ADAMS: Thank you, Jim. You know... and ,you know, as a member of the Rules Committee now for about seven years, since I've been on the Council I've been on the Rules Committee, and I've lived exactly what you just said. And seeing sometimes that things have been missed, the Council has caught those things, we've talked through them in oversight, and we've moved on.

MR. CARAS: And it happens ,you know, not... maybe not all the time, but not infrequently either. And that's what a good process should do.

SPEAKER ADAMS: Right, that's right, I agree. I agree.

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bad thing.

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Along those lines, I mean, you said you don't know, but why would you think that New York has lagged behind other states and... compared to other municipalities -- and New York State -- with regard

6 to advice and consent?

MR. CARAS: I think perhaps because when the 1989 Charter was written there was a sense that the City was out of control and that , you know, you needed I think perhaps some checks that might otherwise have been imposed on the mayor were left out. And I think as we've come along, I mean, I know in the 80's, early 90's, it was the Council that froze property tax rates. You know, it was... so I think the Council has grown into its powers. I think the Council has demonstrated with advice and consent that it is completely responsible in the way it exercises those powers. And I think what your legislation does in moving towards where other big cities are in this country, I think , you know, we took one step in the 2019 Charter Commission; we made the Corporation Counsel subject to advice and consent. I think this is a very good next step.

SPEAKER ADAMS: Thank you very much, Jim. Mr.

25 | Chair?

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Thank you, Madam Speaker.

I will just ask a question or two, and I think

Council Member Brewer has a question or two for you,

and then we'll get you on your flight.

Just for the record, Jim, you're one of the foremost experts on the City Charter. I really enjoyed an article you wrote back in 2013 on the separation of powers in New York City.

Could you just -- would you mind elaborating on the record your resume and expertise on this topic?

And, then, just secondly -- and then I'll kick it over to Council Member Brewer -- the other question I just like to ask is, the TLC (Taxi and Limousine Commission) is an agency of, I don't know, 500 employees, with a \$60 million budget; the Department of Buildings is an agency of 1,500 plus employees, \$190 million budget, it's three times as big. Uh, TLC Chair is subject to advice and consent; DOB (Department of Buildings) is not. Can you explain this? Is there kind of any rationale for why this makes sense, uh, beyond the historic composition of certain agencies, why some positions require advice and why others don't?

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2 MR. CARAS: Thank you. I haven't ,you know, in 3 the time I have, I haven't really gone back and reviewed the 89 Charter Commission; although, over 4 the course of my career I've spent a lot of time looking at those transcripts. I think the idea was 6 7 that boards and commissions would be subject to advice and consent, but commission heads, agency 8 heads, would be solely mayoral appointees. And, as I said, I think the idea back then was that you needed 10 11 sort of one tough person on top of everything that 12 goes on in the City. You know, when I argued for 13 City Council appointment advice and consent powers over the Corporation Counsel, I pointed out that that 14 15 had often been -- especially during the Giuliani 16 years I'll say -- had been subject to what I thought 17 was an appointee, a corporation counsel being too 18 beholden to the mayor, and making decisions that were 19 sometimes legally questionable, or at least, I think, 20 one of the examples I gave in the Charter Revision 21 Commission was when the Speaker, the Public Advocate, the Brooklyn Borough President, all of the Chairs of 2.2 2.3 all of the cultural institution groups all felt that it was legally infirm and an appalling decision to 24

pull funding from the Brooklyn Museum, uh, every

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2	court	ended	up	agreeing	with	them.	And,	yet,

3 Corporation Counsel defended the mayor and basically

4 against every other involved City elected official.

5 And I think this gives -- advice and consent gives

6 the sense to those appointees, it doesn't substitute

7 | the Council's judgment for the mayor; there's no

8 | mileage for the Council in turning down appointees

9 | just because they have some slight disagreement with

10 them -- because the next appointee could be worse --

11 but, it gives a sense that they are accountable to

12 more than just the mayor, they're accountable to the

13 | City as a whole, and all the people in the city. And

14 | to back up and, uh, my view of this comes from ,you

15 know, 30 years as a City Council lawyer working with

16 agencies and agency heads, uh, as the Deputy General

17 | Counsel at the Council, the Finance Council at the

18 | Council, and then the Land Use Director and General

19 | Counsel at the Borough President's Office, where I

20 | was then Borough President Brewer's appointee to the

 $21 \parallel 2019$  Charter Commission. On that Commission, I pushed

22 | hard for advice and consent over the Corporation

Counsel, and then back at the Council as General

24 | Counsel and Special Counsel.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Thank you so much.

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2 Council Member Brewer?

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COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Thank you very much. First of all, Alexander Hamilton, you're smarter, I know all of the descendants of Alexander Hamilton.

(LAUGHTER IN CHAMBERS) I love them, I respect them, but you're smarter.

In terms of when you were the wonderful appointee, did other suggestions come up other than Corporation Counsel to be part of this process, or how did Corporation Counsel participate? I should remember, but I wanted... thought it would be good for the public to remember, too

MR. CARAS: I think in my head there were other potential ,you know, to take it a little bit further, but it never got to that point. It was clear that Corporation Counsel at that time was sort of the most significant change we could make -- and both to its credit, the 2019 Commission, but also making it difficult. Being a, I want to say a real Charter Commission, with a wide array of viewpoints, I think that that Charter Commission had to settle on a few key changes that we could get consensus. We had appointees from every borough president. We had a

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2 Public Advocate appointee, we had mayoral appointees 3 and we had council appointees. So... (CROSS-TALK)

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: It was my bill, I remember...

Mr. CARAS: Yes, exactly. And it was , you know, so that made it difficult to take on sort of huge changes. And I don't think we thought that huge changes were necessary. And the truth is now at this point, from this vantage point of view, I don't think this is a huge change. This is a quardrail, this isn't a change to who appoints commissioners. This isn't a change to how the commissioners will function, other than that... and I think Hamilton, somewhere in that Federal paper says, "it's a quiet but important change" it's not a radical alteration. It doesn't change the appointment power, it just has a healthy effect both... as the mayor makes... thinks about his selections, his or her selections, the Council and the public get to speak to those candidates.

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Right. The other question I have, which I think you would agree, is when the public sees , you know, x person, this is the only opportunity they would see x person. In other words, 2 understandably you make an appointment nobody ever

3 knows who that person is. Now you have a transcript,

4 a record, a public if anybody wants to participate in

5 any way. Does that... do you also agree that that

6 gives perhaps more opportunity for that agency to

7 even be what it could be? In other words, they have

now a record of what they're... how they're going to

9 run that agency.

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MR. CARAS: Absolutely.

11 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: And the public sees what

12 | their taxpayer dollars are going toward and can

13 | testify to that effect.

MR. CARAS: It's good... it's so much better to me

15 | for the public, and for advocacy groups, and interest

16 groups, and groups whose lives that agency is going

17 | to affect, to be able to attend a hearing, or have

18  $\parallel$  groups that they're members in attend those hearings,

19  $\parallel$  raise issues -- even if the Commissioner ends up in a

20 position that's adverse to some of those groups, at

21 | least those groups have presented their views to the

22 | Commissioner, it's an exchange and a more active

23 | involvement in the introduction of that commissioner

24  $\parallel$  to the government than having a mayor stand at a

#### COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & 1 FEDERAL LEGISLATION 31 2 press conference and just introduce a face, which may 3 or may not get covered by the press. 4 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Thank you. And the other cities you mentioned, they do in fact do such processes for all of the commissioners. 6 That's your understanding... (CROSS-TALK) MR. CARAS: My understanding, and I looked at the 8 Charters over the weekend, is that most, if not all, agency heads in those cities, other than Phoenix, in 10 11 which the council just appoints the city manager, 12 go through the advice and consent process. 13 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Thank you very much, 14 and... MR. CARAS: And you'll see, there's an exhibit 15 attached to my testimony that has links to the 16 17 various city charters. 18 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Thank you, Jim Caras. He 19 walks rockstar status, thank you. 20 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: We really appreciate you 21 testifying, we hope you make your flight. 2.2 MR. CARAS: Okay. 2.3 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Congratulations to your nephew. 24

MR. CARAS: Thank you, thank you very much.

2 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Ms. Lerner? Thank you so

3 much.

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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR LERNER: Thank you very much,

I'm Susan Lerner, I'm the Executive Director of

Common Cause New York, which is a national

organization that works for efficient and inclusive

representative government across the country.

I'd hoped to testify first, because it's really a hard act to follow Jim Caras. (LAUGHTER) I cannot pretend to have the depth and breadth of experience or knowledge of New York City government, so I'm going to talk in much more general terms.

We filed written testimony electronically, but I want to step back and really talk about what some of the academic and general discussions about a strong versus a weak mayor system teaches us here in New York. I do want to preface my remarks by saying I am not really focused on any one mayor or any one administration, because I think the strengths and weaknesses of a strong mayor system, as we have, as Jim points out, pretty much on steroids here in New York City, be obvious to any New York City resident, and you can pick examples from any of our past mayors in the last 20 or 30 years.

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So, the advantage to a strong mayor system is we are a large city with a lot of complex issues, and a strong mayor gives us guidance. I think in 1989, with the unconstitutionality -- sudden unconstitutionality of the Board of Estimate, there was a desire to have clarity and to institute a strong mayor system. But, I think we've gone too far in that direction. And what this measure seeks to do is to rebalance. We are not suggesting a weak... a so-called weak mayor system. This measure doesn't supplant the mayor's appointment process, this doesn't replace the mayor with a city manager like you have in approximately 40 percent of New York cities, uh, not New York, but national cities, but it addresses the weaknesses of a strong mayor system. And one of the I think most salient weaknesses of a strong mayor system is that it gives too much influence to special interests -whether those are special interests who have a lot of money; whether it is special interests who have political power; whether they are special interests who are loyal to a particular individual mayor. Uh, it basically allows a small group of highly influential people to influence the mayor, to get policies passed, which may not be reflective of the

desires of the vast majority of New Yorkers, but reflect the interests of a much smaller group.

A second problem that we see with a strong mayor system is that frequently, not well, but on occasion what we can see is that the choice of who to appoint is not based on professional qualifications, but rather it would be based on political support or other factors than political -- than professional qualification. So, rather than looking at the relevant experience or expertise, it's more of what does this particular appointment bring to me, the mayor, in my political life, uh, in insulating me from challenges or ensuring that there won't be push back on particular policies that I want to push because of that small group that I talked about earlier?

And its third problematic factor is that it tends to over speak the diverse voices of neighborhoods and different groups in our community which are represented by the diversity of our City Council. And it allows the mayor to ignore those voices, listening, again, to a small group of influencers for money or political power, and not be as responsive to

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the varying different requirements and needs of the communities.

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So having to have more of an advise and consent function brings the mayor into more dialogue with the Council. The Council is much more representative of the diversity of our city and the various needs of the communities, and all of us are benefited when the mayor and the Council collaborate to develop the strongest possible policies and to choose the people who have the best professional qualifications to handle -- as Chairman Restler pointed out -- departments that have hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars, uh, departments that have an extraordinary impact on literally the life and death of New York City residents.

So, to the extent that we can encourage all of our elected representatives to work together, to build a consensus, to represent all of the needs of the people of New York City (TIMER CHIMES), we will be stronger and better as a city. That's why we support 908.

But, I do want to say that while we support 908, and we think this is a very reasonable number of offices to be subjected to advise and consent, we

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2 | would urge you to shorten the timeframe. The advise

3 and consent process is important, but so is the

4 appointment of people who, as you point out, control

5 | hundreds of millions of dollars and the lives, of and

6 livelihoods, and well-being of New Yorkers.

So, our suggestion is to hold yourself to a tight schedule. Revise so that you have 30 days for hearing and 60 days to vote, uh, because these are important appointments and they should be addressed quickly. The public should hear what the concerns are, and if there is a problem with the nominee, they should be up for a quick vote. And if they need to be replaced, then that should happen quickly. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Thank you so much, Ms.

Lerner, for that testimony. I'd like to pass it to

Speaker Adrian Adams.

SPEAKER ADAMS: Thank you, again, Mr. Chair.

It's good to see you Ms. Lerner, welcome.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR LERNER: Thank you.

SPEAKER ADAMS: Just a couple of question for you, because you've been doing this for a long time as well, so don't short change yourself when it comes to Jim now, okay?

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Just a couple of questions. Do you anticipate that requiring advice and consent of the Council would change who any mayor nominates for any of the commissioner positions?

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR LERNER: I would hope that it would. I would hope that it would influence a mayor, any mayor, to take a longer look at the professional qualifications of the person who is appointed, and be less influenced by what they could bring him or her politically. So, yes, I think it should have a

salutary impact by ensuring more qualified nominees.

SPEAKER ADAMS: Do you see any downside to putting forth advice and consent? And would you welcome even the extension of more commissioners added?

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR LERNER: The only downside I see is if it drags... if it takes too long, that's why we suggested shortening the timeframe. But, I think that it strengthens both the Council and the mayor. I think it urges the mayor to make better appointments. I think it places the Council in more of a consensus, building communication with the mayor. And I think that it is a strong net positive for our city.

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SPEAKER ADAMS: Thank you very much for your testimony.

I like to hear, and I think that we need to continue to stress that this is not about taking power away from a mayor at all, but it's more about really about the collaborative process and making sure that we're getting the right folks into these positions.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR LERNER: Exactly, and, you know, I think all New Yorkers want to see collaboration between the mayor and the Council. We all want the best thinking and the development of the policies that are going to strengthen our city and solve our problems in the best way possible.

SPEAKER ADAMS: Thank you very much.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR LERNER: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Thank you so much, Ms.

Lerner. I'll pass it to Council Member Carr.

COUNCIL MEMBER CARR: And I want to thank you and the Speaker for having probably what is to me the most interesting hearing we've had since the 2008 term limits debate in this body. And it's a matter of great weight and importance that we're considering today. I'm thinking a lot about the history of

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39 FEDERAL LEGISLATION 2 municipal government in in New York. And, in many 3 ways, you know, we had earned the moniker the "ungovernable city" in times past. And I think it was 4 5 alluded earlier that the 89 Charter revision was in many ways a rebuttal to that charge. And we have a 6 7 strong Mayor-Council system for a reason. It's intentionally tilt towards the other side of the 8 building, and the question that I'm kind of posing to the public, and the one that I'm certainly going to 10 11 be posing to myself as I consider this piece of legislation, is... is not whether advice and consent 12 13 is a good idea in the abstract, but whether it's a 14 good idea to introduce it into a system that's 15 already been functioning for some time beyond the 16 scope that it currently has. And I think it is an 17 important question, because of that history of 18 misgovernance and a lack of faith in our governing 19 institutions from times in the not too distant past. But it also calls to mind that we're considering 20 21 this piece of legislation in a vacuum. Power dynamics are much more complicated than simply the advice and 2.2 2.3 consent issue. So, I'm concerned that as we pull one string out of the shirt of city government so to 24

speak, we don't necessarily know where it leads, and

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2 | this is profoundly consequential. The other piece

3 | that I'm very mindful of right now is my

4 | constituents, outer neighborhoods of the most outer

5 boroughs, uh, are not so much concerned with the

6 dynamic of power between one side of this building

7 and the other; they're concerned with the

8 accumulation of power in this building period. And

9 there are questions that I ask, which is why the Land

10 Use issues end with the Council and not with the

11 | borough boards? Why are our borough commissioners not

12 | appointed by our borough presidents rather than by

13 | the heads of our mayoral agencies? These are the

14 | questions that I wish we would get into, and I'm not

15 | sure that we'll be able to in this hearing, and I

16 don't think we're going to be able to in the Charter

17 | Revision Commission that's been assembled, because I

18 don't think that's the point. And, for me, what I'd

19 | really love to see as we look at the Charter more

20 | closely is a renegotiation and a diffusion of power

21  $\parallel$  away from this place and into the boroughs that we

22 represent. That's really the thing that's most

24 | Brooklyn representative, thank you, Chair.

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2 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR LERNER: Council Member, I

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would you know refer back to what I said earlier, which is one of the weaknesses of a strong mayor system is that it allows one elected official to ignore the neighborhoods and the boroughs that have a difference of opinion. So, an advise and consent system is, I would say, the most mild form of rebalancing, because, as been pointed out, the mayor still gets his or her choices for an agency heads, but it allows the consideration of your constituents to actually be addressed in the confirmation process, which may not happen at all when the mayor chooses somebody perhaps because of political affiliation, because of influence in an important industry and can overlook the concerns of your constituents. So, I would suggest that this measure addresses one of your concerns.

COUNCIL MEMBER CARR: If I could just respond briefly, Chair? I think that that has the potential to, right? But I'm not sure that's always going to be the case. Often times, agencies come to my district in response to local laws passed by the Council that mandate that they do particular things. So, I'm not sure that it's always just the mayor with this

accumulation of power who's imposing his or her

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3 vision on a particular borough or neighborhood. I

4 think often times we overlook how much the two sides

5 | the City Hall often agree on things. And, to me, the

6 only check on that is borough power. And that's

7 something we've not considered. And over the course

8 of our history as a city from consolidation in 1898,

9 we've seen more and more power taken from the

10 boroughs and brought here into the Mayor-Council

11 | together as an operating in tandem or the Board of

12 Estimate before that.

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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR LERNER: But, I would suggest that in an open confirmation process there is more opportunity for the boroughs and their concerns to be heard. And I'm sure we can agree that in any human system there's not 100 percent perfection no matter

COUNCIL MEMBER CARR: Without a doubt, certainly not in government. Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Thank you so much, Council Member Carr.

Just to elaborate on I think part of that back and forth ,you know, inherently the Council is a more representative body of New Yorkers than any one

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person can be. And this is ,you know, proudly the most diverse Council in the history of New York City. Don't you... do you therefore believe, or could you kind of elaborate on how an advice and consent process ensures that the diversity of perspectives inform that we have qualified ethical and competent candidates serving in these critical positions?

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR LERNER: Well, I'd also like to point out that I think our city council may be the largest city council - Yes, we are the largest city, but we have an unusually large and diverse representative city council. And that means that there are many more view points from , you know, Council Member Carr's constituents to Council Member Brewers constituents and everything in between. So, that an open process with Council input means to me that we address one of the weaknesses of a strong mayor system, which is not enough attention to the different concerns of a lot of different communities and diverse needs. And this open process allows 51 representatives from very different communities to reflect the concerns of their communities, uh, educate, as I think Jim Caras pointed out, the nominee to more diverse concerns than they might be

aware of if they are simply handpicked by the mayor
and rubber stamped at a press conference.

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CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: The National Civic League includes advice and consent as part of their model City Charter they note that quote. "The professional qualifications of the person selected may be higher if the Council has to approve the choice..."

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR LERNER: Exactly.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: "the Mayor is not free to simply choose a person to advance his or her electoral interests."

What do you think of this rationale? Do you believe that advice and consent reduces the possibility of political patronage and selection of political loyalists to these influential positions?

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR LERNER: Well, that's the goal.

I mean as ,you know, Speaker Adams asked if I think
that it would help in that regard, uh, and I really
do. The more discussion of a person's qualification
the more an appointing authority knows that the
qualifications are going to be not only vetted behind
closed doors by council members, but discussed in
open hearings with members of the public, advocates
for different communities and organizations able to

2 weigh in. I think that it really encourages a more

3 professionalized qualification goal than if you're

4 able to pick somebody, because they're close to me or

5 because they are the favorite of a particular power

6 center that you want to be sure is on your side in

7 your reelection.

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CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: And if I may, on a, I think related topic, I'd just like to ask you your insight and expertise on the Charter Revision Commission that's been recently appointed. In your long expertise as a good government leader in New York City, can you recall a Charter Revision Commission being convened so late in the year, uh, announced on May 22nd, its first meeting today May 29th? Do you think it's possible for there to be meaningful public engagement and input in just a matter of weeks before they need to develop language to appear on the ballot?

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR LERNER: It's interesting that you raised exactly those questions, because that is something we at Common Cause have discussed. And we put out a statement today where basically we don't want to anticipate failure of any commission, but what we hope to see is a commission that will rise to

#### COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & 1 FEDERAL LEGISLATION 2 the high standards of previous commissions. And that 3 means holding hearings in every single borough, hearing from the public, and releasing thorough and 4 thoughtfully researched staff recommendations. It's less important to us who the staff is, it's the 6 7 willingness to really dig into the issues, to look 8 across the country to find good models, and to provide the commissioners with a thorough, thoughtful, and neutral analysis of different 10

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CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Well, we greatly appreciate your testimony today. If there aren't any additional questions, thank you so much for joining us Ms.

proposals. And I think that that can be accomplished

by any commission and any staff if that's what they

set out to do. And it's our expectation that this

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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR LERNER: Thank you.

commission will rise to that standard.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: We really appreciate it.

I'd like to acknowledge my friend and colleague, Council Member Jim Gennaro, from Queens, and I would like to invite the next panel to come before us to testify.

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We are joined by our former Public Advocate and the Director of Citizens Union, Betsy Gotbaum, former assembly member, Adam Clayton Powell, and Louis Cholden-Brown. You're all three free to come up and testify.

Ms. Gotbaum, if you'd like to begin? Thank you so much.

MS. GOTBAUM: Press the button, okay... Good morning, and good morning Madam Speaker, Council Member Gennaro, long time no see, Council Member Schulman, congratulations, I haven't seen you since you've been a council member, and Council Member Restler.

Uh, good morning, I am here to testify basically from the good government aspect. I do not want to show any preference to the mayor's side or the Council side. With all respect to the Speaker, this is a very personal analysis of my experience having been Parks Commissioner and Public Advocate. I do feel one thing quite strongly from the good government aspect, and that is that, we, as an organization, Citizens Union, did not have the time to come up with a policy we have a process which we take quite a while to come up with whether we are for

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FEDERAL LEGISLATION 48

it or against it. And we did not have time to do
that, so Citizens Union has no stand at this point. I
think you probably know in the past what we have been
for and what we've been against. We certainly were
for the advice and consent on the Department of
Investigations and the Corporation Counsel. And I
actually totally believe we should also have advice
consent on the Police Commissioner just because of
the range and what but there are other offices
which I do not, uh, I do not think that this proposal
would be particularly useful. And I hate to disagree
with my colleague Susan Lerner, but I just want to
point out now going having the Parks Commissioner
hat on, uh, that ,you know, there are many, many
passionate Park people in this city, and there are
certainly many of them in Queens. And the two of you
know that once people know that they have the
possibility of entering into some kind of consent,
you will have such chaos and it'll take so long. And
I've read that you would have a Deputy Commissioner
who would be running the Agency while this process
was going on. Who would appoint that Deputy
Commissioner? Would it be the old Deputy
Commissioner from the old commissioner's

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2 organization, or would it be somebody else? So, I

3 think that's something that has to be taken into

4 consideration very seriously. Who would appoint the

5 Deputy Commissioner running that agency during this

6 process? And, I'm... again, I repeat the process in

7 Parks would be unbelievable, the people are very

8 passionate, they're very knowledgeable, but they are

9 very strong. And once they know that they have a

10 chance to be heard, they will be heard and it'll take

11 a long time.

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So, I do believe that we should not... this process should not be rushed, and that time should be given to look at what the various problems are and consequences of this kind of... on specific agencies, by the way. And I also believe that, as I've said, that the commissioners included in this bill deserves much more scrutiny. There is quite a difference between a Parks commissioner, and say the Buildings commissioner, and I think those things have

We do support, and we did support, the

Corporation Counsel being subject to advice and

consent, because that that officer represents both

the mayor and the Council. And the Commissioner of

to be taken into consideration in doing this.

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government.

Investigation is subject to advice and consent, we believed, because they must be independent to conduct oversight of city government. The commissioners proposed in this bill do not n necessarily fall into that category. We, as I've said before, Citizens Union does support making the Police Commissioner subject to the advice and consent of the Council, because of the unique role it serves in the status of the New York City Police Department in city

And I just want to say that I am afraid that this will... this particular bill will make the power... will diminish the power of the mayor, and I'm not so sure we don't need a strong mayor with good oversight by the Council. And I think that's one of the things that we have to really push -- is for good oversight of all of these issues by the City Council. On that, I conclude.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: I just am going to take a point of privilege just to clarify a couple things that have been mentioned in testimony to make sure that they are accurately reflected on the record.

The proposed legislation by the Speaker would give the Council just a 30-day time frame to review

2 and approve an appointment after it is received by

3 the Council or the appointment takes effect. So it is

4 a... that is the current timeline for advice and

5 consent appointments to the Council, and that would

6 be the timeline under consideration for these

7 additional appointments.

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Secondly, if vacancy occurs at an agency, the agency head, uh, the First Deputy Commissioner would become the Interim Agency Head. If that position does not exist at the agency, then the Commissioner's designee would become the Interim Commissioner, or the design of the mayor if the Commissioner failed to make a designation. The commission... and from there, we would seek the mayor to make an appointment in an aggressive timeframe for us to review it and approve it. That's what's proposed in this legislation, and I just want to make sure that that's clearly understood on the record. Uh, Former Assembly Member?

MR. POWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Madam

Speaker, other members of the City Council. Besides

being a former assembly member, I also served as a

council member back in the day, between 1991 and

2 1997, representing parts of Northern Manhattan and the Bronx.

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In the relationship between the City Council and the mayor's side has always been somewhat adversarial, uh, contentious if you will, even with David Dinkins, as much of a gentleman as he was, it just goes with the territory.

I also served the City Council when Giuliani was elected -- oof -- was that contentious. Some of you may not believe what I'm about to say, but there was a time when Giuliani told his commissioners that they could not speak to city council members. Yes, that is correct, city council members could not speak to the commissioners or top level staff in the mayor's side. This didn't last very long, but it went on for a couple of months, and obviously not conducive to being productive.

This is just not practical, advice and consent can take weeks, if not months sometimes. During the pandemic, the Department of Health Commissioner left and, uh, Bill de Blasio was able -- then Mayor Bill de Blasio was able to replace that position quickly. Imagine what would have happened if the Department of Health position, the Commissioner of the Department

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of Health, would have remained vacant for weeks or months during the pandemic.

I've heard some references been made to oversight in Congress and in historical oversight in other cities, but reality is that making New York City like Washington is a recipe for gridlock. And, may I also go back in history, it was tried in 1884 in New York City, tried right in 1884, a system where City legislators confirm mayoral appointments, but it failed. And that's why for 140 years the mayor of the city of New York has had sole authority to make these appointments. The reality is that, again, it's not practical, we don't need another level of bureaucracy, we need a streamlined process. And imagine if at some point, you, as a City Council member, uh, were required to have advice and consent of your local community board, for example, to appoint your Chief of Staff or your local development corporation LDC to appoint your legislative liaison. Obviously this doesn't make any sense, and it would not be practical, because, at the end of the day, it's your name that appears on that ballot; and at the end of the day, it's the mayor's name that appears on the ballot, and it's a mayor's... and the

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: And if I may, I just want to

acknowledge colleagues, Council Member Shahana Hanif

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and Council Member Paladino have joined us this

3 morning, thank you for being with us, and, of course,

4 we're joined by our great Public Advocate Jumaane

5 Williams...

MR. CHOLDEN-BROWN: Who I was about to recognize, and all the other Council Members, and from the Committee and otherwise. Thank you for the invitation to testify. For the sake of the record, I'm Louis Cholden-Brown, and I am appearing in my personal capacity. As you well know, I had the privilege to previously serve as Deputy Counsel to the previous Council Speaker; authored the 2021 Introduction pertaining to the Police Commissioner appointment, and work on the 2019 Charter Revision Commission, which proposed the question requiring advice and consent for the Corp Counsel. While I'm a professed proponent of advice and consent, my summary, my longer written remarks, focus on earlier history and the murky history of the Council's pursuit of confirmatory powers.

So, New York was actually the second state to implement advice and consent in 19... sorry in 1777, but actually abolished it in 1821, didn't bring it back until the late 1890's, and it didn't take its

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current form until 1925. So, that's why at the consolidation of the City in 1898, it was not an issue for consideration by that Charter Revision Commission, though the city of New York, that was then just Manhattan and the Bronx, had indeed exercised advice and consent via the Board of Alderman from 1857 to 1884. That did not begin piecemeal restoration until the 1970's, though the City Council actually had been fighting for advice and consent as early as 1966. But, the Corp Counsel continually took the position that the 1936 commissions and the 1961 commission had wellconsidered their decision to not grant that power and should not be disturbed. Indeed the Council actually gave itself its first confirmatory power in 1971 -both the Taxi and Limousine Commission and the Environmental Control Board were created by Council legislation that had the mayor's support, but was not subject to referendum, and neither imposed a time limit on Council's review. In 1975, was when the Council was given the power for advice and consent on fixed term mayoral appointments, to boards and commissions, but not to any major single-headed executive department, that commission shared by

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2 republican state senator found that they should be

3 | left to the mayor's discretion, uh, because it would

4 interfere with the mayor's ability to run his own

departments.

Repeated City Council Speakers and City Council Members have encouraged numerous commissions from 1989 to the present to broadly expand advice and consent -- only two have answered that call. Of course, the 1989 Commission granting it for the Commissioner of Investigation at the advice of (INAUDIBLE) Pierpont (phonetic) who was then the Chair of The Board of Ethics, now the COIB, and the and then the 2019 Commission, which despite the Council asking for fixed terms and advice and consent for the Commissioners or Directors of the NYPD, City Planning, OATH, CFB, and COIB went with the Corporation Council, which actually had been Speaker Quinn's request in 2010, because the Corp Counsel's unique role and legal obligation to both the City and the Council. And it also should be noted that the list found in Charter § 31 is actually not exhaustive. The Council now exercises advice and consent of the Local Conditional Release Commission, which it created in 2020 pursuant to the Corrections

2 Law. And I'm acknowledging that Keith Powers, the

3 Chair of that legislation is here, uh, has that

4 authority there. And Speaker Adams is actually in a

5 long line of distinguished members that have held her

6 position to seek this, starting with Vice Chair and

7 then Speaker Valone, who introduced legislation in

8 | the 1980's-90's throughout -- hearings were held,

9 they did not always make it across, they did engender

10 some opposition. But, this is not a new concept, and

11 | that's what I want to sort of make sure to leave

12 people with there.

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Recognizing the shortness of time, just going to summarize. People have talked about how unique New York City is nationally, but actually New York City is unique in the state. Albany, Yonkers, Rochester, Buffalo each do advice and consent, as do, I'm going to say, about 12 counties, I have them all listed here by name, but I can't to the math quickly. Then, for the sake of the diminishing time, I'm just going to quickly note that my written submission discusses both legal concerns about certain enumerated positions and logistical concerns about the temporal concentration of nomination, and the unique time

constraints placed upon the Council for consideration

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2 and proposes several interventions -- including

3 legislation pertaining to the Mayoral Committee on

4 | Appointments and the diffusion of Council

5 consideration upon more Committees to address these

6 matters.

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I also discuss (TIMER CHIMES)... I'm happy to address in response to questions, the proposed differing limitations of selection of acting Commissioners and the provisions of Home Rule Law that (INAUDIBLE) any Council bill passed between now and the fall to November 2024 - 2025 ballots. I'm happy to answer any questions about the past 25 or 250 years.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Thank you very much. We... I imagine we'll have a good number of questions for you.

I'd like to offer our Public Advocate the opportunity to make a statement, and then we'll turn over to the Speaker for questions.

PUBLIC ADVOCATE WILLIAMS: Thank you, Mr. Chair, thank you, Madam Speaker, thank you Mr. Cholden-Brown, Assembly Member, Public Advocate, for being here and sharing remarks.

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I just want to be present here in support of what the Council is doing, thank the Speaker and the Chair. I think it's long overdue, uh, having been a Council Member myself, as many of you have, this city has the strongest (INAUDIBLE) probably in the country. I think many people know that. I don't think it lends itself to allowing the Council to provide the counterweight that it should, and I just want to thank the Speaker again for doing the best that she can with the tools that exist. I do think providing that balance will be a lot more helpful, and getting advice and consent on the Commissioners doesn't mean that they report to the Council, they still report to the mayor and still function as such. And the Council itself can't provide names, all they can do is say yay or nay, haven't been here as well, I haven't seen too many times when advice and consent hasn't been here. And, actually, the times that there's been discussion, it has only helped make things better. It is done all over the country, as people have mentioned, in cities, the state, federal government. If it weren't a process that helped, I think that we

would not see it happening all over.

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So, I do wish that the Department of Education,

which I know the City is a (INAUDIBLE) of the state, and the NYPD were included, so hopefully that might be something we can think about going forward. But, in terms of the providing the balance that the that the constituents want the Council to do, and often don't understand, they don't have the tools to do, this is a very much important step in the right direction. I guess I can see why the mayor and the supporters may be opposed to it, but it doesn't mean that it is right for good government. And, so my hope is that we can get this passed, so we can get the people of the City to vote on it. It is very important to provide the type of balance of power that the constituents need from us. And it actually

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Thank you so much Mr. Public Advocate.

candidates who are being appointed to these positions

are the best candidates to do that. Right now, those

discussions don't happen at all. Thank you so much.

provides some very good conversations on whether

Madam Speaker?

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SPEAKER ADAMS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you for all being here this morning, we do appreciate it.

I'm going to just pose this question generally,
and anyone or all can answer.

Do you believe that the public should have the right to weigh on advice and consent when it comes to the appointment of Commissioners?

MR. POWELL: May I?

I believe the public has a right to weigh in, and I believe they do that on election day. And they exercise that power throughout the four-year period by... in various ways ,you know, organizing, marching, demonstrating, coming to testify at different hearings, writing, calling and so forth. But ,you know, the problem is, I can foresee somebody with perfect qualifications, for whatever the agency may be, and be denied -- not on their qualifications, but they could have personal beef with a council member or two. It could be something that has nothing to do with government, nothing to do with integrity, nothing to do with qualifications, but simply the fact that somebody does not like them. You know that,

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2 and I know that, and that's a problem that we would 3 encounter.

SPEAKER ADAMS: I'm just going to say that, again, as I said in my opening statement, that this Council has approved 35 candidates under this current administration, and we do take this responsibility very, very seriously. The expansion, and we do consider this a minute expansion, by the way...

MR. POWELL: I differ... I differ...

SPEAKER ADAMS: Well you can...

MR. POWELL: I think this is big...

SPEAKER ADAMS: you can differ...

MR. POWELL: Okay.

SPEAKER ADAMS: You can differ. I'm just telling you my opinion. We consider this, I consider this, a minute expansion of over 80 roles that we could have put into this existing bill. With that minute entry of these commissioners, I dare say once again, that the purpose of these oversight hearings is to hear the candidates, is to be able to question, in depth, the candidates, and also give the public the opportunity to exercise their opinions regarding all candidates as well. All of that information is taken

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2 into advisement before the Council comes up with a

3 decision, a vote, if you will.

member would impact greatly... And we're talking about a commissioner here, uh, overseeing tremendous work for our city. I do take issue with it. I'm not saying that you are incorrect, because everybody is a human being, and feelings do come into all of what we do. But, once again, when it comes to the appointments of commissioners and the approval, which has always gone in the affirmative for this current administration, I do beg to differ.

Mr. Cholden-Brown?

MR. CHOLDEN-BROWN: Sure, yeah, so, I'm going say I absolutely support the public being able to weigh in on advice and consent. My two reservations would be, thus, again, you're proposing 21 offices, there are others that members of the Council -- members of the public have identified they also want to see -- and having to repeatedly return. and another thing I would point out is that the including, for instance, so, Department of Veteran Services is a relatively new agency. I believe Council Member Ulrich passed in 2016 - 2017 -- so again, as we create more entities

having to potentially return to the public. And the

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3 issue of mayoral appointments is not only restricted

4 to these Commissioners, but the Council in the past

5 has suffered litigation losses around the independent

6 Police Investigation Audit Board and others, because

7 the Council cannot create new entities that have

representation from other than the mayor.

So, I absolutely support the public weighing in, but I think that there may also be opportunities and exploration about how to not ask the public each time the Council wants to reset in this minute way. I agree that balance, or each time the mayor reorganizes government to make sure it encompasses the properly named institutions.

SPEAKER ADAMS: Ms. Gotbaum, did you want to...

MS. GOTBAUM: I just caution everybody about the number of people and the number of institutions and organizations that would weigh in on all of this. And I'm not saying that isn't good, but I think it will create, as Assemblyman said, my colleague over here, it would just create a layer of bureaucracy that is going to be very, very difficult to cut through, and I fear for that. And, as I said earlier, I don't quite understand what the Council Member said about

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the Deputy Commissioner. A Deputy Commissioner is appointed by the Parks... I'm talking about Parks now, by the Parks Commissioner. And if in fact that Commissioner appoints a Deputy Commissioner, who will be running the agency while this, I think, very long process — and I don't know how you implement a time restriction on it, and I think that's an interesting point to discuss — I just feel that allows the last commissioner to have far more say in what goes on than you might want. And I just see that as a potential big, big gridlock — creating a gridlock, excuse me.

SPEAKER ADAMS: Thank you very much.

I just have one more question for the three of you, or anyone if you would like to answer this. Do any of you anticipate that requiring advice and consent of the Council would change who a mayor would nominate for any of the commissioner positions?

MR. CHOLDEN-BROWN: Yeah, I mean I'm going to say, yes. I mean, but I do not think that that is a bad thing. I mean, and I actually happen to believe the 21 individuals holding these offices right now are all esteemed public servants in one way or another. But, I only have to look at the end of the previous

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2 administration to see several individuals who

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3 succeeded long term commissioners, who for one reason

4 or another chose not to stay till the end of 2021,

5 that were replaced by people from inside the mayor's

6 orbit or donors and the like in a way that... I do

7 | not think any of them ever acted untowardly, none of

8 this is meant to disparage any of their records, but

9 I do not necessarily think that they had a record of

10 work in that area that would have sustained

11 questioning or they had a vision for those several

12 months that they would be there. So, again, I

13 definitely think it would change it. I do not think

14 | it would change it on the whole, but I think that

15 extra layer, whether it's through this, or as I talk

16 about a Committee of Appointment Process for certain

17 | other positions, I think is a net gain for the City.

SPEAKER ADAMS: Thank you.

19 MR. POWELL: I also agree that, yes, it would...

20 | it might change the appointment process, but I do

21 | think it's a bad thing. If you don't allow the mayor

22 to appoint his first choice for Sanitation

23 | Commissioner, how can you hold him accountable for

picking up the garbage? If you don't allow the mayor

25 | to quickly fill in a vacancy at the Department of

#### COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & 1 FEDERAL LEGISLATION 68 2 Health, how can you expect them to handle the COVID 3 emergency at the time? So, yes it would change, and I 4 think that's a bad thing. SPEAKER ADAMS: Mr. Chair? CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Mr. Powell, I imagine you've 6 7 reviewed the bill; you've said that you think it would create gridlock. How long does the Council have 8 in this proposed legislation to approve an appointment? 10 11 MR. POWELL: Thirty days. 12 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Thirty days. So, 30 days for 13 a Department of Youth and Community Development 14 Commissioner to be reviewed, vetted, screened, hold a 15 public hearing, and approved. You think it would 16 create gridlock if there was a 30-day window for 17 oversight of a Commissioner appointment? 18 MR. POWELL: Yeah, and perhaps bureaucracy is a 19 better ,you know, description, sure. It adds another 20 level of bureaucracy when you could be doing other, 21 better, and more important things. 2.2 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: To create... to ensure that 2.3 we have highly credible, vetted, experienced candidates, you think bureaucracy outweighs it? 24

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MR. POWELL: Yes

1	COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & 69
2	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Bureaucracy is more
3	important than ensuring that we have competent
4	(CROSS-TALK)
5	MR. POWELL: Bureaucracy is (INAUDIBLE) (CROSS
6	TALK)
7	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: ethical people serving our
8	Administration (CROSS-TALK)
9	MR. POWELL: Right, right, yes, absolutely.
10	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Okay, it's an interesting
11	perspective. Uh (CROSS-TALK)
12	MR. POWELL: At the end of the day, just to
13	just to finish
14	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Sure
15	MR. POWELL: At the end of the day, the mayor is
16	accountable on Election Day. And prior to that, by
17	various hearings, and demonstrations, and letters,
18	and other constituent (INAUDIBLE) (CROSS-TALK)
19	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: This legislation still
20	ensures that the mayor is appointing each and every
21	key position in his administration, correct?
22	MR. POWELL: Each and every key
23	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Key position in his
24	administration, is appointed by the mayor, correct?
25	MR. POWELL: Right (INAUDIBLE) (CROSS-TALK)

1	COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & 70
2	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: This legislation does not
3	change who is appointed to serve in these roles, is
4	that correct? (CROSS-TALK)
5	MR. POWELL: Well, it changes the (CROSS-TALK)
6	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Yes or no?
7	MR. POWELL: (INAUDIBLE) just mentioned, it may
8	change who he will appoint if he has to receive the
9	advice and consent (CROSS-TALK)
10	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Right, and it's a national
11	best practice utilized at the state and federal level
12	and other large cities around the country (CROSS-
13	TALK)
14	MR. POWELL: (INAUDIBLE)
15	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: because it leads to more
16	ethical and competent people being serving in our
17	in public service (CROSS-TALK)
18	MR. POWELL: If we want to mirror ourselves after
19	Washington, D.C.?
20	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Well, you served in Albany?
21	MR. POWELL: Yeah.
22	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: What positions are subject
23	to advice and consent in the state legislature? What
24	governor appointments are subject to advice and
25	consent in the state legislature?
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1	COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & 71
2	MR. POWELL: Many go through the senate (CROSS-
3	TALK)
4	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Yes (CROSS-TALK)
5	MR. POWELL: The state senate.
6	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Every, single department
7	head in the state of New York. Do you think that's
8	caused bureaucracy and gridlock? (CROSS-TALK)
9	MR. POWELL: It changes things. And here
10	(INAUDIBLE) (CROSS-TALK)
11	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Did it cause chaos, and
12	gridlock, and bureaucracy (CROSS-TALK)
13	MR. POWELL: It has caused great (CROSS-TALK)
14	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: as you testified today?
15	MR. POWELL: It has great bureaucracy.
16	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Did you do anything to
17	introduce legislation to modify the advice
18	MR. POWELL: No, I have not (CROSS-TALK)
19	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: and consent process? No. In
20	fact, in your last five years, I believe, in the
21	state legislature, from 2005 to 2010, you reportedly
22	didn't introduce a single bill. Is that correct?
23	MR. POWELL: That has nothing to do with the
24	legislation (INAUDIBLE) (CROSS-TALK)

1	COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & 72
2	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: I'm interested in your
3	(CROSS-TALK)
4	MR. POWELL: I'm just saying (CROSS-TALK)
5	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: your your (CROSS-TALK)
6	MR. POWELL: That has nothing to do with advice
7	and consent. The City Council over mayoral
8	(INAUDIBLE) (CROSS-TALK)
9	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Well, you're expressing
10	concern about advice and consent (CROSS-TALK)
11	MR. POWELL: Yes, (INAUDIBLE) (CROSS-TALK)
12	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: But, you didn't do anything
13	to address advice and consent in the state
14	legislature (CROSS-TALK)
15	MR. POWELL: Well, the state Senate is the one
16	that advises and consent (CROSS-TALK)
17	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: As an assembly member, you
18	have the ability to put forward legislation to
19	recalibrate the advice and consent process.
20	MR. POWELL: All right.
21	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Okay. And in the City
22	Council, you served during Giuliani's first term
23	(CROSS-TALK)
24	MR. POWELL: I served (CROSS-TALK)

#### COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & 1 7.3 FEDERAL LEGISLATION 2 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Did you introduce a single 3 bill in the City Council during Giuliani's first term? (CROSS-TALK) 4 MR. POWELL: Not on advice and consent. It wasn't needed. It... (CROSS-TALK) 6 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Or on any other topic. 7 MR. POWELL: Sure. 8 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: It looks like from 1994 to 9 10 1997, according to Council records, you introduced zero bills... (CROSS-TALK) 11 MR. POWELL: Well, that's... (CROSS-TALK) 12 13 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: and co-sponsored two. 14 MR. POWELL: Okay, that is not true, but I didn't 15 come here to discuss my political history. 16 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Well, it's relevant. You're 17 testifying before us. Uh... (CROSS-TALK) 18 MR. POWELL: Advice and consent with the City 19 Council. 20 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Well, so somebody's 21 background would be considered during an advice and 2.2 consent process, is that right? 2.3 MR. POWELL: Yes. 24 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Do you...

MR. POWELL: It just may bring a different nominee as versus the nominee the mayor may have had in mind.

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MS. GOTBAUM: Yeah.

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MR. POWELL: And, yes, it would add another level bureaucracy, even if it's only 30 days.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Do you believe that the ethics and background of a nominee are relevant to whether they should serve?

MR. POWELL: Of course.

MS. GOTBAUM: Of course.

MR. POWELL: But, as I stated before, it may not be the level of qualifications of the nominee, it could be personal with a Council Member.

MS. GOTBAUM: Yeah

MR. POWELL: It could be personal with a Chair of a Committee.

16 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: What... in your... (CROSS17 TALK)

MR. POWELL: It could be personal with a Speaker.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Okay. In your time serving in the Council, can you recall a specific example of that occurring and it being a hindrance to preventing

22 a qualified nominee... (CROSS-TALK)

23 MR. POWELL: (INAUDIBLE) years ago... (CROSS-TALK)

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: from coming forward?

2 MR. POWELL: and we did not have advice and

3 consent. But, yes, there were many personal..

personal... (CROSS-TALK)

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CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: There was advice consent for a dozen agencies between 1992 and 1997... (CROSS-TALK)

MR. POWELL: (INAUDIBLE) personal situations, yes.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Give us an example of....

(CROSS-TALK)

MR. POWELL: (INAUDIBLE)

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: when it was a hindrance. It exists for a dozen agencies in city government. You served in the state legislature for nearly a decade. Could you cite one specific example on the record today for when it was a hindrance and caused, in your words, gridlock, chaos, and bureaucracy? (CROSS-TALK)

MR. POWELL: No, no... (CROSS-TALK)

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: No? Okay, so despite serving in state... in elected office for 15 odd years, in city and state government, you cannot... and the advice and consent being widely utilized at the state level, and utilized narrowly at the city level, for dozens of appointments, you cannot cite a single

2 example of it being a hindrance, an obstacle...

(CROSS-TALK)

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MR. POWELL: No.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Okay, thank you very much.

I will come back to ask questions of other witnesses, but we'll kick it to Council Member Gennaro, followed by Council Member Powers.

COUNCIL MEMBER GENNARO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I had a certain question in mind when I signed up to ask questions of this panel; I've kind of pivoted since then, and I think what I had on my mind was addressed by the Speaker and the Chair.

But, let me just speak from my own personal experience. People can make comments on this or whatever. I've been in, yeah, I started in city government 1983 under Mayor Kotch, on the executive side, I came over to the Council in 1990. And have been... have served the Council for 27 years or 28 years combined as a member and as a member of the central staff. And all my time in city government — and I also used to teach State and Local Government at Queens College or whatever, so I supposedly know a little bit about that — aside from my experience being here — is that one of the ,you know, one of

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the phenomena that has always gotten to me, and every mayor has a little bit of it, which is hubris. And the fact that the Administration couldn't see fit to testify at this hearing today and engage with the Council on this important issue, I think is the most compelling testimony that we could ever have as to why we need to establish ourselves as the partner in government and not be dismissed by the Executive -which has been happening from Kotch through today in my experience. As much as I loved , you know, many of those mayors. So, I think that speaks for itself. Every mayor wants to dismiss the Council. Every mayor wants to say that the Council is up to no good, that the Council has motives and whatnot that are something different than good government. And I think this is an insult to the Council. And the fact that the Administration couldn't bring itself here today to say one word about this bill is the most compelling testimony for this bill that I can possibly think of. That's my statement. Anyone feel free to comment to that.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: I'd like to just express how much... how strongly I support Council Member Gennaro's statement on the record.

Council Member Powers?

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COUNCIL MEMBER POWERS: Sure, thank you for all your testimony, I'm sorry I missed some of it, I was actually taking a school class around City Hall.

I think everybody... I think I could understand reasonably why there would be concerns from the Administration about allowing the Council to have more advice and consent power and how that might lead to potentially blocking or stopping certain appointments. I would note that the history so far in the City Council, I'm the Rules Chair, has been pretty... I mean obviously there's relevant examples right now, but pretty contrary to that point, which is that the Council has approved almost... actually to date, every single appointee that's come before us in the City Council. We've been... held hearings on all of them that had required advise and consent and have approved them. And I think had the standard of people that have come through us have been very high, and those qualified people have had their hearing, and have had the opportunity to present their credentials and answer questions -- relevant questions. And we've approved every single one so far. And when there are contentious examples, they

will go through the process reasonably to have to do

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3 the same process as others. But, I think others...

4 think you're all presenting different , you know,

5 cases for and against -- and lots of history from

6 Louis -- and I think we could all understand the

debate and where it exists.

I did want to ask a question, because the one of the main points against adding advice and consent is around additional bureaucracy -- additional ,you know, red taped and approval processes that would exist. And I'm sensitive to it from the stand point of timing with a new administration coming in, how you might have to handle all these advice and consent hearings in in short order. I'm sensitive, as the Chair, of that, of course. But, the point about added bureaucracy, slowing down the process, things like that, those also seem to exist in the current... what's not happening here, but what's happening in my district at the Roosevelt House, which is that we are potentially going to end up in a process where we're going to have a Charter Commission that's going to recommend and ask the voters to vote on processes, which will significantly slow down the City Council's ability to vote on legislation, make considerations

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2 around the budget things like that. They may end up

3 being really great ideas, they may be ideas we all

4 hate. But, it certainly seems a similar thing is in

5 | play here, which is we are going to end up in a thing

6 that will significantly add more bureaucracy to the

7 duly elected officials of City Council to represent

8 their constituents and make decisions. It feels like

9 those arguments prevail, and it could prevail. For

10 the folks who have raised these bureaucracy concerns,

11 do you have similar concerns when it comes to that

12 process and how that might slow down legislative

13 processes and budgetary processes here at the City

14 Council?

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15 MR. CHOLDEN-BROWN: I mean, I'll start with a

16 comment about advice and consent. I just want to note

17 | that I just want to note that though I talk about I

18 | think there could potentially be ,you know, a

20 | that that poses actually some unique hurdles for you

21 as The Chair. (INAUDIBLE) think for the process, you

22 know, Laura Kavanaugh, who I'll identify, as I think

23 | she's a distinguished individual was not officially

24 appointed Fire Commissioner until October of 2022.

Right? Laura served as first Deputy Commissioner and

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2 Acting commissioner for 10 months. She did so ably, and there was no bureaucratic hurdle. The DYCD 3 4 Commissioner was also appointed in the month of April and the like. So, the mayor's process often moves quite slowly, and while if this legislation had been 6 7 in effect in 2022, the Council would have been called upon to approve 12 commissioners by the end of March. 8 The Council approved two, plus two members of the Conflict of Interest Board in that time quite well. 10 11 So, there is no bureaucratic standstill from those 30 12 days. Again, currently acting commissioners often 13 serve quite longer than that, and again, to name a few who I think are quite distinguished, Margaret 14 15 Forgione, of course, is now the First Deputy; 16 Commissioner Oxiris Barbot the Department of Health, 17 who was the Baltimore Health Commissioner, had 18 already led a major department; Sandra Abeles, who's now the Executive Deputy Comptroller at DCWP. So, all 19 20 of that, I think, those concerns I think, on the 21 record, are unfounded. That having been said, I do 2.2 think ,you know, one has to see what I will call the 2.3 Scissura Commission, because I like to call them all by their Chair's names, and in honor of Dick Ravitch 24 25 and Fred Schwarz, comes up with (sic), but certainly

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the proposal that was brought to the mayor by some of the individuals who are now on that commission, which seems to functionally be every single piece of Public Safety legislation has to go through all 59 community boards, is what I would call a boondoggle.

COUNCIL MEMBER POWERS: Other folks want to add any comments in that? (TIMER CHIMES)

MR. POWELL: Well, I mean the issue of the 30 days and the added level bureaucracy is one concern. I think a bigger concern is what was outlined before, whereby a mayor could maybe appoint somebody or nominate somebody else rather than his first or second choice. I think that's a bigger concern as well.

MS. GOTBAUM: I just go back to the you... the idea of the Deputy Commissioner running the agency. Appointed by whom? Again, think about Parks, when I came into Parks, there was a structure in there that was pretty good. It was very political, and frankly had I not been there to kind of change some things around, I'm not sure that it would have been the kind of thing that you all would want. And, again, I don't want to get into personalities, it's more structure of how it's going to work, one, and, two, I just see

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84 the whole issue of community involvement, which is very important -- and by the way, as Parks Commissioner, the thing that you do the most is listen to the community as much as you possibly can, because everybody has an opinion, and they're very strong about their opinions. And you've got to figure out... and that's which... one of the things you're appointed for -- but, I really feel that it's going to take an enormous amount of time to get these things straightened out. And just looking at what you

said about the 30 days or the 30 whatever, I just

think it's a nightmare.

COUNCIL MEMBER POWERS: Yeah, and just for the record, I was raising the possibility. I think Louis's answer, you know, also provided a lot of insight into exactly how you can time that process out, and the process for setting up an administration that might take time anyway to get everyone to the approval process. So, I understand some of the concerns. I think they're also resolvable.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Thank you so much, Council Member Powers.

Ms. Gotbaum, just a couple questions for you and then a couple questions for Mr. Cholden-Brown.

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approves ,you know, we referenced a section of the Charter that notes agency heads, "... shall have

requiring elected officials to fill out a form to

recent hearing on the mayor's new form policy

engage with city agencies, that he reviews and

Corporate Counsel was subjected to advice and consent following the Charter Revision Commission of 2018 - 2019. It led to the appointment of the first two women to lead Corporation Counsel, uh, distinguished qualified women of color, Georgia Pestana and Judge Sylvia Hinds-Radix.

Do you believe that subjecting Corp Counsel to advice and consent has caused any negative issues, or do you think that was a positive development?

MS. GOTBAUM: I think it's a positive development.

I think, yes, I think it's a positive development.

And I think because Corporation Counsel represents
the Council, you want to make sure that the person
that is appointed to that position is strong and will
be fair in terms of both the Council and the mayor.

To me that's a very important issue and; therefore,
yes, the answer to your question is I do think that
was a good...

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: And as we discussed at a

MS. GOTBAUM: very concerned about that...

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CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: So, if an agency head were to resign, uh, or be let go, uh, by the mayor, the First Deputy Commissioner would take over as an interim if that position exists. Don't you think that that would help ensure that City Hall and the commissioner of the agency want to have really strong first deputy commissioners in place, who are prepared to step in as necessary, if the commissioner is no longer able to serve?

MS. GOTBAUM: No, no, I see it is different when you have elected a mayor, and then that a process is taking too long to advise and consent or create advice and consent for the commissioner. And then you put... and then the current Deputy Commissioner is in charge. That's the old administration running the agency, and perhaps that wouldn't work out with the current mayor, you don't know. And I just don't see that as a good possibility. I mean, frankly, again, I don't want to get personal but that did happen when I became Parks commissioner.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: But, if we only... if the Council only has 30 days to review, hold the hearing, and approve an appointment after we've received... after the Council has received an appointment, do you

and for the council team to do the necessary vetting

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2 and review for a nomination. That to me feels like an

3 expedited process, a swift process very different

4 | than what we see in Washington, for example, where we

5 don't... where the Senate can be slow this. The

6 Council works very quickly, and would work very

7 quickly under these expanded authorities in this

8 bill.

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9 MS. GOTBAUM: Well, I don't know if that's true.

10 You're talking about an enormous number of agencies.

11 | I mean if you're just talking about these... the ones

12 | that were, uh, stated in the legislation, I just

13 don't see you'd be able to do with that quickly for

all of them. I just don't. I mean, sort of

15 practically speaking, if you have various people,

16 understanding that they can be a part of advised

17 consent, how are you going to avoid all of those

little bit different if you have the whole city,

20 right?

21 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Right. Just to be clear,

22 | if... in the Speaker's proposed legislation, if the

23 | Council failed to act within 30 days... (CROSS-TALK)

MS. GOTBAUM: Yeah.

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just right.

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CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: the appointment takes effect. So, that's the timeframe for how it would work. You know, having seen the Council's lawyers up close ,you know, and their partnership with DOI, I'm confident that this is a process with some expanded capacity that could be done on an aggressive timeframe that is laid out in this legislation. But, I think we've heard in the testimony today both critiques: that it's too fast and that it's too slow. So, maybe, uh, for Goldilocks' purposes, we got it

So, I will just ask Mr. Cholden-Brown just a question or two if that's okay, and then if there... if my colleagues have any further questions... Oh, and I failed to acknowledge my neighbor and friend, Council Member Crystal Hudson.

I'd like to ask about the 1989 Charter Revision Commission, which put a great deal of thought into subjecting CPC nominees, the City Planning Commission nominees, to advice and consent. And I believe the rationale from the documents that we've reviewed was that it shouldn't just be all appointments by the mayor, and that the input of the Council and the

appointments from other stakeholders were valued and
valuable.

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Do you think that same logic should apply to other agencies in city government and for other appointments?

MR. CHOLDEN-BROWN: Yeah, so, I mean, you know, the creation of the current City Planning Commission actually was very fraught dating back to 1987, when Dick Ravitch started his commission, through the end of the Schwarz Commission in 1989. There actually was something called the Land Use Commission for a long time, and those proposals that would have been a seven-member body with actually some direct Council appointments at various times, but obviously there was a very deliberate and robust debate between ,you know, Chair Schwarz other luminaries like Matt Leventhal, Judah Gribetz, David Trager, uh, all of whom had long government careers once or another (sic). So, you know, it ended where it did, but certainly I think that that logic follows through to this day. I would absolutely agree.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: And, from your perspective, ,you know, across the 12 or so agencies that do have appointments that are subject to advice and consent,

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have been in place for 50 years since

many of which have been in place for 50 years, since the 75 Charter Revision Commission, can you note any significant problems or hindrances that have been

5 caused by the advice and consent process?

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MR. CHOLDEN-BROWN: No, again, I mean, I think one thing that is notable is that commissioners on the boards and commissions serve until the appointment of their successor, which I think obviously obviates against vacancies, though vacancies do of course occur. But, to my knowledge, in those 50 years, no commission has ever failed to achieve a quorum because of the time period. And, again, 30 days is a very rapid period. I must admit I come down on the side that it should be a little bit longer. Albany does 45 at various points, Speaker Vallone sought 60, but at no point has the Art Commission, LPC, TLC or any of the others suffered because of advice and consent, even when under unfortunate circumstances, nominees had to withdraw, and the process has rebegun. So, no, I think it's not been a hurdle at all... (CROSS-TALK)

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: And this may be a question for you or Ms. Gotbaum, if you could, when the mayor appoint... plans to or considers appointing a person

appointment, and there is a little bit of additional

#### COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & 1 94 FEDERAL LEGISLATION 2 transparency in that regard. But, certainly that does 3 not preclude anyone from taking the post if they're 4 willing to jump through the hoops or for go pay or whatever other contrived process, uh... (CROSS-TALK) 5 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: And if the mayor is not 6 7 concerned about the ethical issues... (CROSS-TALK) 8 MR. CHOLDEN-BROWN: Right, yeah... (CROSS-TALK) 9 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: that were raised in the background check. But, if the candidate were subject 10 11 to advice and consent, could you explain how that would work in the City Council process? 12 MR. CHOLDEN-BROWN: Well, yeah, I mean, certainly 13 I think that the Appointments Investigations Unit 14 15 has a long history of strong collaboration with DOI, as well as doing its own investigations, not only on 16 17 these appointments, but actually all appointment 18 appointments that are made by the Council or by the Speaker pursuant to law -- Museum bylaws or the 19 20 other. So the Council has a very strong record there 21 of identifying things of ,you know, nominees have to 2.2 fill out questionnaires and all... and those things 2.3 are either placed upon the record, if it's deemed appropriate, or private conversations and letters 24

securing people's agreements to either resign from

2 conflicts or otherwise address a potential concern,

3 uhm, are obtained and shared with the committee as

4 appropriate before a vote is taken. So, there's a

5 very robust process that the Council engages in in

6 those 30 days to make sure that any ethical hurdles

7 are identified and ameliorated.

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CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: I just want to ask one more question of you, well, in reference to comments that were made by Mayor Adams over the weekend where he said quote, "If my team were to come to me and say, 'Eric, you should approve the committee chairs of the City Council.' I'd say, 'No, I would not do that.' The Speaker needs her chairs to carry out the overall agenda. My chairs are my Commissioners. I would not go into the City Council to determine who's the Public Safety chair, who's the Housing chair, who's the Land Use chair, because that is just wrong for me to determine the direction that the Speaker in the City Council would like to go."

I found those comments baffling, and I was wondering from your experience working in the Council, have you experienced this mayor and other mayors weighing in on speakers' races and on specific committee chair persons... (CROSS-TALK)

(LAUGHTER)

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MR. CHOLDEN-BROWN: (BACKGROUND NOISE AND CHATTER)

There has never been an instance where I have not known that to happen. But, I also am going to note that...

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: That was a lot of double negatives. Would you mind doing that one in reverse for us?

MR. CHOLDEN-BROWN: Sorry? (CROSS-TALK)

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Would... (CROSS-TALK)

MR. CHOLDEN-BROWN: Oh, yes, I mean every mayor has weighed in on the speakers' race -- except for Giuliani, he was stuck with Peter Vallone and certainly committee chairs. And I will acknowledge that some speakers certainly in the 90's, let us say, were responsive to those pressures, including even midway through a term.

The other thing I wanted to note, though, quickly is, the mayor misconceives how committee chairs are appointed. Right? Certainly the Speaker has a very large role in that, but this is a process that the Temporary Rules Committee, or the Permanent Rules Committee, depending on the time participates in, and ultimately the chairs are ratified by the Council for

#### COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & 1 97 FEDERAL LEGISLATION 2 a committee chair to be removed requires. It requires 3 two-thirds vote of the Council. It is not a unitary 4 process, so it actually very much resembles advice and consent process where every member of the Council is actually a part of determining who chairs which 6 committee. 8 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: That's very insightful, thank you for clarifying that. I do not have any further questions for this 10 11 panel. We're good? Council Member Brewer, are you good? 12 13 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: No, I have a question. 14 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Council Member Brewer, go 15 for it. COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Thank you, so... (CROSS-16 17 TALK) CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Oh, and Paladino, excuse me. 18 19 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: I was out, so, I did hear 20 Jim Caras point out other cities, and not as large, 21 but Chicago has the same number of elected in the 2.2 city council as New York -- smaller city, just as

many members of the city council -- advice and

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consent.

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FEDERAL LEGISLATION

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So, my question is, uh, it seems to me that every single time somebody comes within the 30-day period, uh, that it is good to have sunshine on that individual to see for the public that that individual is qualified. And I know from friends in Chicago that they like the process.

So, my question to you is, do you think that this process, despite the challenge of the numbers of people that would have to be certified quickly, do you not think all of you being, uh, understanding the importance of Open Meetings Law, sunshine on government, do you not think that this would be another example of having that kind of sunshine so that the public knows where their dollars are going for x number of agencies? Chicago -- it works.

MR. CHOLDEN-BROWN: Yes.

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Adam?

MR. POWELL: Thank you, uh, no, I think another point that has not been brought up, it's... this process of advice and consent may actually discourage very qualified individuals from participating, be it because they have some personal issues that may be embarrassing; although, has nothing to do with their integrity or their qualifications professionally, but

#### COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & 1 99 FEDERAL LEGISLATION 2 again, they may be discouraged from even applying, or 3 they may have personal beef with a chair of a 4 committee or speaker or council members 5 (INAUDIBLE)... (CROSS-TALK) COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: I will tell them to get 6 7 the hell out of the job, Adam... (CROSS-TALK) MR. POWELL: I understand. I understand. It 8 politicizes the process. COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Okay. Betsy? 10 11 MS. GOTBAUM: I will agree with my colleague over 12 here. I think he's right, and I can cite personal 13 experience along those lines. Again, there was no advice and consent when I was named Parks 14 15 Commissioner, but had there been, I don't think I 16 ever would have been Parks Commissioner because... 17 (CROSS-TALK) 18 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Why? 19 MS. GOTBAUM: Because everybody said, "She's never 20 had anything to do with Parks; she's not an 21 environmentalist." Environmentalist has nothing to do 2.2 with how you run the Parks Department... (CROSS-TALK) 2.3 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: I think you would have been appointed, Betsy Gotbaum. 24

MS. GOTBAUM: (LAUGHS) I don't think I would...

regulate the entire mayorship to simply a ceremonial

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2 position, simply because we don't want... we don't

3 like his appointments. I mean, I... I'm not

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4 understanding this. I see this as a, uh, a genuine

5 | overreach. Elections mean living with the decisions

6 that the voters have made. In New York, that means

7 | our mayor gets to appoint commissioners of his

8 choosing. It's as simple as that. This is nothing

9 more to me than a power grab by the City Council.

10 And, as far as I go, it would lock in a progressive

11 | control without... over this entire city, nullify the

12 | mayoral elections, and frustrate any future attempts

13 | at reforming the City -- by this or any other future

14 | mayor. With all the problems that this city is

15 | facing, the City Council majority should be

16 reflecting deeply on how we got here and what could

17 be done to fix things -- not engaging in dangerous

18  $\parallel$  political games with the mayor like this. I think

19 | it's ridiculous. And you cite Chicago, like we're

20 going to hold Chicago up, one of the worst cities in

21 | this country? And we're going to hold up Los Angeles,

22 one of the worst cities in this country, as an

23 | example of what happens when we turn over control to

24  $\parallel$  the City Council? Absolutely not. Absolutely not. I

totally disagree with this, and I really hope that we

2 all come to our senses. And that's all I have to say

3 right now.

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CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Thank you very much. I would underscore for the record that checks and balances are enshrined in our constitution, they exist at every level of government in most large municipalities, the state level, federal level, and I think they have worked quite... it has worked quite well.

With that, we will excuse this panel. Thank you all for joining us today.

We will next hear from members of the public, followed by a representative of the Administration, who has joined us after all, so thank you.

Before the member of the public testifies, I am just going to share a brief statement.

I remind members of the public that this is a formal government proceeding and that decorum shall be observed at all times. As such, members of the public shall remain silent at all times. The witness table is reserved for people who wish to testify. No video recording or photography is allowed from the witness table. Further, members of the public may not present audio or video recordings as testimony, but

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2 may submit transcripts of such recordings to the

3 Sergeant at Arms for inclusion in the hearing record.

4 If you wish to speak at today's hearing, please fill

5 out an appearance card with the Sergeant at Arms and

6 wait to be recognized. When recognized, you will have

7 three minutes to speak on today's hearing topic: The

8 elected official agency engagement request form...

Oh, excuse me, you'll have three minutes to speak on

10 today's topic: *Introduction 908*.

If you have a written statement or additional written testimony you wish to submit for the record, please provide a copy of that testimony to the Sergeant at Arms. You may also email written testimony to <a href="mailto:testimony@council.nyc.gov">testimony@council.nyc.gov</a> within 72 hours of this hearing. Audio and video recordings will not be accepted.

Once again, for those of you who are testifying in person and registered in advance, please fill out an appearance card with the Sergeant at Arms.

For panelists on Zoom, once your name is called, the member of our staff will unmute you, and the Sergeant at Arms will give you the go-ahead to begin upon setting the timer. Please wait for the sergeant

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2 to announce you that you may begin before delivering

3 your testimony.

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I would now like to invite Ms. Sharon Brown to testify, followed... and we'll do a second panel followed by Ms. Tiffany Raspberry.

Miss Brown? Did we lose her? Okay, she's coming over now.

Miss Brown, you're invited to testify.

MS. BROWN: (NO MIC) Okay, can you give me a rundown of what this one is about? I have so many hearings, sorry.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Okay, this one is Intro 908 introduced by our speaker, Adrienne Adams. And this bill would subject additional appointments of the mayor to advice and consent of the City Council.

Twenty-one agency heads would be required to be submitted to the Council, where we'd hold a vote to ratify their nominations or reject them.

MS. BROWN: (NO MIC) Okay, you have...

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Would you mind just pressing the button in front of you so we can hear you? And to remind you, you're on the clock, so you have a limited amount of time.

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MS. BROWN: Okay, I believe that they should have a vetting process of 30 days. And when you can find the proper information of a candidate for 30 days, it should be fine. But, there should be an addendum that if you don't get to vet the person properly then additional time should be added. That should be a part of the bill.

So, if you can get it done in 10 days or whatever days, you don't have to fill that 30 days up. It can be as far as you can find out enough information about the candidate. So, if it's within the 30 days, you can move on, unless you want to just dig more to make sure you got everything.

The 30-day allotment is proper, just make sure that you add more time.

It should be in the bill that if for some reason you can't find the information that you seek, you should get an extended amount of time -- maybe another 30 days, and maybe you can extend it and have some kind of delay or something on the appointment. If you can't get the proper information, they shouldn't just go in, if you can't get the information or there is conflicting information, thank you, Sharon Brown.

the Governmental Operations Committee.

### COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE &

FEDERAL LEGISLATION 107

DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: Speaker Adams, Chair Restler,

Council Member Gennaro, Council Member Brewer, it's a

pleasure to sit here before you this morning.

While we were never formally invited to participate in the hearing, I want to take an opportunity to address some of the claims that were made today -- that were said otherwise, specifically from you, Chair Restler.

I will not be taking questions since we were not invited and I did not have time to prepare.

For the record, we are opposed to this legislation. We are focused on what New Yorkers care about most, bringing down crime, cleaning up our streets, and improving quality of life. This statement I'm about to read is from the mayor and was supposed to be submitted as written testimony.

Again, Speaker Adams, Chair Restler, and Members of the Committee on Governmental Operations, State and Federal Legislation, I am submitting this testimony as mayor of the City of New York to express my concerns regarding Intro. 908, which would require the advice and consent of the City Council for 21 city commissioners.

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As you know, the City... As you know, excuse me,

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the mayor of New York City has had sole authority to

4 appoint Commissioners and agency heads since 1884 -

5 for 140 years - and for good reason. In March 1884,

6 then Governor Grover Cleveland signed a bill into law

7 | placing the responsibility to appoint agency heads

8 solely with the mayor. Governor Cleveland issued a

9 signing statement emphasizing that the principles of

10 good government required this change because New

11 Yorkers are best served by vesting the power of

12 appointment only in the mayor who is "elected by all

13 of the people in the municipality," not by dividing

14 or sharing that power with legislators who are

15 responsible only to their constituents in their

16 respective districts." Governor Cleveland further

17 | wrote: "If the chief executive of the city is to be

18  $\parallel$  held responsible for its order and good government,

19 he should not be hampered by any interference with

20 his selection of subordinate administrative

21 officers..." and "[t]he plea should never be heard that

22 a bad nomination had been made because it was the

23 only one that could secure confirmation.

The real world impacts this legislation, if enacted, would have on every New Yorker across the

#### COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE &

FEDERAL LEGISLATION 109

five boroughs would be vast, and once you think about
the proposal you are quick to conclude that it would
be undoubtedly bad for New Yorkers.

Any uncertainty or delay in appointing agency leadership creates the real possibility for harm from delayed service delivery. From emergency management to senior services, to health care continuity, to garbage collection and construction safety -- this bill risks diminishing the City's ability to manage and respond to the service needs that we all hear from the public every day. Right now, we regularly experience significant delays in scheduling confirmation hearings for the relatively small number of nominees to even be considered by the City Council. As we have seen many times, major events have challenged the City such that administrative and political delays could have major, negative impact on the delivery of service and confidence of New Yorkers in their government. You only need to look back to the prior administration when the Health Commissioner resigned in the midst of the fight against COVID. Imagine taking several weeks or months for a new commissioner to take their place, and the impacts of

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# COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & FEDERAL LEGISLATION

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2 that vacuum of leadership would have for the staff of 3 the agency, and New Yorkers at-large.

On top of those risks, the politicization of the appointment process can have many harmful implications for New York City's professional governance. While the City is able to attract some of the best talent to lead our agencies, there are significant sacrifices those individuals make in order to serve New Yorkers, whether that is in the form of salary or work-life balance. Adding the uncertainty and potential for public spectacle of an "advice and consent" process to the list of sacrifices would seriously hamper the City's ability to attract and retain good talent. We have a clear example of how this process can be corrupted by politics when we look to our nation's capital and see a process that is weaponized and politicized to score cheap political points, and is a disservice to the American people. This legislation, we believe, would have the same impact on New Yorkers.

And the mayor wanted me to add that he believes that it would be unconscionable for him to interfere in the speaker's process to decide on committee chairs and leadership of this body.

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Prior to 1884, the City experimented with a system where the city's legislators -- known as the Board of Aldermen -- confirmed the mayor's appointments. To put it plainly, the system proved to be bad government, primarily because it induced a lack of accountability. When there is no one clearly in charge, and therefore no one who can clearly shoulder blame, New Yorkers lose faith in government. This is precisely why the Aldermen system of confirming mayoral appointments was abandoned. In short, it was tried and failed and the City moved

decisively away from it in order to bring more

accountability to city government and services.

The mayor's power to appoint agency heads has remained intact since 1884. In fact, multiple charter review commissions have reinforced that this mayoral authority is critical both to the mayor's ability to govern and to the people's ability to hold the mayor accountable at the polls. In 1975, for example, the Commission found: "It is the mayor whom the public holds accountable for City programs and services. With this responsibility must come authority to select those individuals who are to carry out executive policy. The role of the City's legislative

bodies should be to evaluate and report on the
performance of the mayor's appointees."

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There are only two exceptions in all of New York City government for which the City Council has advice and consent for non board or commission agency head appointments -- for Commissioner of the Department of Investigations and the Corporation Counsel. The charter commissions said that those exceptions were made because of the very unique nature of those positions. The DOI Commissioner is responsible for conducting investigations citywide, including "as directed by the mayor or the council." Additionally, the Council's recent charter commission distinguished the position of the Corporation Counsel, because that position represents not just the city agencies, but also the City Council and Comptroller. As such, for those two positions, exceptions were made in recognition of the uniqueness of the posts.

Lastly, the Council already has significant checks on the mayor's power, including budget, land use, and oversight. The Council regularly holds oversight hearings, approves of the budgets, and legislates reporting requirements from City agencies. If there ever are shortcomings from any agency, the

### COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & FEDERAL LEGISLATION

Council then holds those who have been appointed to

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do these jobs accountable. If for whatever reason the Council feels that information they are seeking is

5 not being produced, they also have the authority to

6 subpoena the administration to compel us to comply or

7 face legal sanctions by a court. In other words,

8 oversight from the Council already exists. Expanding

9 that oversight to having final say on the mayor's

10 choice of who they want to lead agencies to carry out

11 | the polices that city voters elected them to carry

12 out would be a disservice to New Yorkers for the

13 reasons outlined throughout this testimony.

I would ask that the Council reflect on the experience and judgment of past Governors, Mayors, Charter Revision Commissions and others who have all come to the same conclusion: this proposal is misguided. I urge you to reject this proposal, if brought to a vote. I thank you for the opportunity to share my concerns with Intro. 908. I know that both the Administration and the Council have a shared commitment to good governance that is both reflective and responsive to the needs of all New Yorkers -- one that is rooted in accountability and transparency to

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#### COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & 1 FEDERAL LEGISLATION 114 2 ensure public trust and to advance the public good. 3 Thank you. 4 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Ms. Raspberry, I would ask you to take questions since you are here before us 6 today. 7 DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: I am not prepared to take questions, but I wanted (INAUDIBLE)... (CROSS-TALK) 8 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: The Administration will not engage in good faith? 10 DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: I think... (CROSS-TALK) 11 12 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: On this legislation? DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: I think that if you had 13 14 formally invited us, as I mentioned, at the 15 beginning, we would (INAUDIBLE)... (CROSS-TALK) 16 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: When was your office 17 contacted... (CROSS-TALK) DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: more... (CROSS-TALK) 18 19 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: about this hearing? DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: We read about it online on 20 21 Thursday evening when it was noticed. And on Friday, my staff reached out to the Speaker's office, and we 2.2 2.3 had a conversation with the staff where we explicitly asked if there was an expectation for us to testify 24

at this hearing and we were told that there were not.

### COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, STATE & 1 115 FEDERAL LEGISLATION 2 So, you sent a series of casual messages, which were 3 shared to me by my Director of City Legislative 4 Affairs, but at no time did we receive, in the traditional way, in the way in which the Administration is invited to testify to hearings, a 6 formal invitation to testify (INAUDIBLE)... (CROSS-8 TALK) CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: The Administration is not required to receive a formal invitation to testify. 10 11 The hearing was noticed on Thursday, I contacted the 12 City... the City Legislative Affairs Director 13 contacted me on Thursday afternoon, (INAUDIBLE) asked who was testifying from the Administration. At that 14 15 time we were advised that a representative from the Law Department may be coming before us. On Friday, 16 17 the Director of Legislative Affairs to the Council 18 was in communication with the Office of Legislative 19 Affairs, inviting the Administration to testify. You 20 all have chosen not to... (CROSS-TALK) 21 DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: Chair Restler, I... (CROSS-2.2 TALK) 2.3 CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: come and engage in good faith... (CROSS-TALK) 24

DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: I believe... (CROSS-TALK)

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                       FEDERAL LEGISLATION
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         CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: in this... (CROSS-TALK)
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         DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: I... I... I believe...
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     (CROSS-TALK)
         CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: on this issue... (CROSS-
     TALK)
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         DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: I believe that... I am
 8
     familiar with the exchange you had with my
     director... (CROSS-TALK)
         CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: I just want to clarify it on
10
     the record.
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         DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: And he shared with me that
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     you all were exchanging those messages in jest. So,
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     now that we understand that you didn't take it that
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     way, we will be sure to make sure that anything that
     is shared in jest, in a collegial manner, that we
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17
     specify that that is the case... (CROSS-TALK)
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         CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: I want to be clear. I don't
19
     generally engage in... (CROSS-TALK)
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        DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: I'm... I really... (CROSS-
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     TALK)
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         CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: in private text messages...
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     (CROSS-TALK)
        DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: appreciate you... (CROSS-
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TALK)

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2	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: on the record, but you
3	did (CROSS-TALK)
4	DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: I really appreciate you
5	allowing me this opportunity (CROSS-TALK)
6	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: I I have (CROSS-
7	TALK)
8	DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: to read the mayor's
9	testimony (CROSS-TALK)
10	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: I have to say, I think it's
11	very disappointing (CROSS-TALK)
12	DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: And I hope that you have a
13	great rest of the day (INAUDIBLE) (CROSS-TALK)
14	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: I think it's very
15	disappointing, Miss Raspberry (CROSS-TALK)
16	DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: (INAUDIBLE) (CROSS-TALK)
17	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: that you would come here and
18	not engage in good faith and answer questions on
19	legislation (CROSS-TALK)
20	DIRECTOR RASPBERRY: Thank you.
21	CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: And especially when the
22	testimony that you shared had some significant
23	inaccuracies. I will offer Speaker Adams the
24	opportunity for a statement while Miss Raspberry is
25	still here.

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SPEAKER ADAMS: Thank you very much. This to me illustrates a contempt for this Council, which we have all witnessed with great clarity. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Thank you, Madam Speaker. And I would like to just inform on the record that Ingrid Lewis-Martin informed the Chief of Staff to the Speaker, uh, was informed of this hearing by the Chief of Staff to the Speaker. The mayor's senior advisor was informed by the Chief of Staff to the Speaker about this hearing. So, there was multiple levels of communication with this administration request that they come and testify today. And their disdain and contempt for the Council is noted on the record.

I would like to make a statement, but I will first offer the opportunity to Council Member Gennaro.

COUNCIL MEMBER GENNARO: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I wish to be associated with the Speaker's remarks. And, you're going to make a statement. I just feel compelled to put on the record that the characterizations that were made in the statement by the Administration, I am just reading from a little

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2 note that I made here, there was a characterization

3 that, it's like we, the Council, exist to score cheap

4 political points. I don't see how those kinds of

5 comments can be put into a statement that is

6 attributed to the mayor and put on the record here in

7 | this formal hearing. If that doesn't amount to

8 disrespect and hubris, I don't know what does. And

9 with regard to the accuracy of the statement, there

10 was a -- And I am not blaming Tiffany for this, she

11 was given something to read and she read it -- that

12 | the mayor, it was attributed that he would never

13 | interfere in trying to have an impact on the Council

14 | leadership. But, everybody in New York City who is

15 attuned to politics , you know, on any level,

16 understands that that is exactly what the mayor tried

17 | to do. Not the first mayor to try to do that, but

18 , you know, he had his own desire of whom he wished to

19 see as speaker. He did not win that contest of

20 | whatever you want to call it. And, so, I just want to

21 point out the factual inaccuracy and the hypocrisy of

22 | that part of the statement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON RESTLER: Thank you very, Council

24 | Member Gennaro.

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I will just offer my closing remarks.

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I am incredibly disappointed with the cowardice that has been displayed by the mayor and his administration today. Their inaccurate statements on the record, and the refusal to take questions from this Council, is gravely disappointing. And this legislation proposed by our speaker would advance good governance in New York City, building on the success that we've had in a narrow manner with advice and consent, and on the broad application that advice and consent has had at the state and federal levels, and with other large municipalities across the country. It establishes the critical accountability and oversight role of the Council. Frankly, the display by the mayor's representative today underscores why the expansion of advice and consent authority is so urgently needed. I am very disappointed that the mayor... that an on-the-record statement from the mayor would be given that was clearly inaccurate, where they indicated that the mayor would never interfere on committee chairs. He interfered in our speakers' race a number of years ago, advocating for an alternative candidate and pushed aggressively for specific people to get

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rederal Legislation 121 committee chair positions in this Council. So, that is wrong, it is just plain inaccurate.

And I'd like to just clarify that if an emergency... If we were in a state of emergency, if an emergency declaration were declared, then, of course, the mayor could potentially expedite or use those emergency powers to advance an appointment process as necessary. The mayor also has the authority to work with agency heads to ensure that there are qualified capable, competent, ethical people in First Deputy Commissioner positions to take over City agencies when a vacancy occurs. This process would ensure that we have competent, ethical, experienced people serving the city of New York. This administration has unfortunately not been the partner to this City Council that New Yorkers expect. It undermines the efficacy of our government. It undermines our ability to get things done when this mayor fails to work with his counterparts in government. And I hope that today is a turning... will represent a turning point, because I don't know how we get any lower. Thank you very much for joining us today at this hearing. I will just close it out. Thank you very much. (Gaveling Out)

World Wide Dictation certifies that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. We further certify that there is no relation to any of the parties to this action by blood or marriage, and that there is interest in the outcome of this matter.



Date June 25, 2024